WORKSHOP SUMMARY

1. On 17 and 18 June 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Japan Institute of International Affairs hosted the fourth workshop in the “International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation” (International Process), which is being co-sponsored by Turkey, Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia, and Switzerland, and supported by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, i.e., all of the discussion was off the record and not for attribution. The following summary reflects some of the highlights, themes, challenges, and recommendations identified during the meeting but is not an official or complete record of the proceedings and does not necessarily reflect the views of all the participants.

2. The aim of the fourth workshop was to allow for reflections on the earlier workshops and an opportunity to focus sustained attention on capacity building, which the UN Strategy recognizes as a “core element of the global counter-terrorism effort.” Although not intended to reach any definitive conclusions, the two-day event allowed some 40 experts representing states, multilateral bodies, and civil society to engage in a frank discussion of the role of states, regional bodies and mechanisms, and the UN in enhancing Strategy-related capacity building, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia. The workshop provided an excellent opportunity not only to reflect on the performance of these actors in assessing vulnerabilities and delivering and facilitating Strategy-related capacity building assistance in both the traditional and non-traditional counter-terrorism areas, but to consider ways in which the overall effort could be strengthened.

3. Although the workshop focused on Southeast Asia, many of the issues raised were relevant to wider Strategy-related capacity building efforts. Among the key themes highlighted were: 1) the need to enhance horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation and identify a clear division of labor among the wide range of multilateral and bilateral donors engaged in capacity building activities in Southeast Asia (and elsewhere) in both the traditional (i.e., law enforcement and other security-related issues) and non-traditional (e.g., education, good governance, and development) counter-terrorism fields, in particular the role of CTED, which is trying to strengthen its role in assessment of assistance needs and facilitation of assistance, and UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force(Task Force), which is aiming to enhance coordination among all the related bodies, including non-traditional actors in the counter-terrorism assistance; 2) the need to ensure that Task Force is provided with the resources and mandate necessary for playing the role it can usefully play adding value to the works of other related bodies; 3) the importance of deepening engagement between the UN and local and regional actors on Strategy-related capacity building issues; 4) the need for ASEAN – as an organization – to be given the mandate and resources to allow it to play a leading role in promoting Strategy implementation in the region and facilitating engagement between the UN and countries in the region; 5) the importance of having the UN reinforce (but not duplicate) regional and bilateral capacity building activities; 6) the need to ensure that local and regional
perspectives are adequately reflected in the work of UN entities engaged in Strategy-related activities.

**INTRODUCTION: SUMMARY AND REFLECTIONS OF ZURICH, BRATISLAVA, AND ANTALYA WORKSHOPS**

4. A number of ideas originally put forward at the three prior workshops in the International Process were enumerated as among those that would be considered at the final workshop in New York on 10 and 11 July. These focused on: 1) improving the coordination within the UN on a range of thematic areas addressed in the Strategy among entities involved in capacity building; 2) providing the Task Force with the necessary mandate and resources to ensure it has the capacity to carry out its coordination and information sharing role more effectively; 3) finding ways to deepen the engagement between the Task Force and regional, sub-regional, and functional bodies and civil society, including by finding a forum at the regional level where the UN could meet with relevant regional stakeholders to develop a Strategy implementation plan; 4) finding more ways for states to engage with the Task Force; 5) connecting the UN’s counter-terrorism activities more directly to national counter-terrorism coordinators and focal points; and 6) using the Strategy to further national efforts to develop holistic national counter-terrorism strategies and deepen inter-agency cooperation.

5. Participants reiterated the importance of finding ways to get those UN actors that are involved in Pillar I issues more engaged in the work of the Task Force, while remaining sensitive to the concerns of those which do not wish to be too closely associated with or have their ongoing work labeled as “counter-terrorism.” In this regard, the goal should be trying to identify complementarities and synergies between the traditional and non-traditional counter-terrorism actors and encourage better coordination, including regular information sharing, among them.

6. It was argued that the Task Force should be at the center of the international effort to combat terrorism. It was also highlighted that providing it with the necessary resources to carry out its mandate should be at the top of the agenda going into the September 2008 review of the Strategy by the General Assembly, while there was another opinion that institutionalization of the Task Force should be considered within existing resources as stipulated in the Strategy. In addition, some called for finding or creating a forum to allow for more regular interaction between member states and the Task Force. The point was also made that there needs to be a mechanism to allow for proper coordination among UN bodies, programs, and funds to allow the UN to engage with regional, sub-regional, and functional bodies and member states on Strategy implementation issues. Absent such a mechanism, it was noted, the Strategy lacks the necessary grounding to become operationalized. Rather than such a permanent mechanism, it was suggested that a more flexible oversight mechanism is needed to guide the Task Force.

7. It was further mentioned that the September 2008 review is an opportunity for member states to provide the Task Force with direction regarding its future activities, something that is currently lacking.

8. Alternatively, the view was also expressed that the Task Force should remain a Secretary-General-run body and there should not be a role for states in providing it with direction or oversight. Allowing member states to assume such a role, it was argued, risks placing the Task Force in a straight-jacket and limiting the innovative work that is capable of under its current loose structure.
9. It was widely accepted that capacity building is a key element of the Strategy and that a holistic approach is needed to ensure that vulnerabilities are identified and addressed in the region before those gaps are further exploited by terrorists.

10. A number of examples of national and regional efforts in Southeast Asia to assess needs were provided. Discussions highlighted the following challenges and efforts and suggestions to overcome them:

   o At the national level, effective coordination across government departments and agencies on a broad array of issues is required to ensure that vulnerabilities and needs are identified effectively. To this end, a number of Southeast Asian nations have established national coordination mechanisms and are beginning to address this issue. Examples were cited of instances where CTED and bilateral partners, such as Australia, are working to improve interdepartmental coordination.

   o Some countries in the region are among the least developed economies in the world. It was noted that it is only with the generous help of donors, that some of these countries are even able to attend the relevant ASEAN meetings related to counter-terrorism and other issues.

   o The point was made that threat or vulnerability assessments by states in Southeast Asia are often undertaken purely from the perspective of the government. This can create tensions between the state and the public at large suggesting the need to involve “grass roots” perspectives in developing national and regional assessments including community-based ones to bridge that gap and garner greater buy-in from the public by showing an understanding of the practical needs of all stakeholders at the local-level. There is a need for more independent local assessments that can present clear and actionable recommendations that can stimulate informed interaction with donors to meet priority needs on the ground.

   o Academic studies that have been conducted on threats and vulnerabilities are not reaching or being absorbed by policymakers, but need to be.

11. It was also pointed out that the sharing of national assessments that identify and acknowledge vulnerabilities of individual states at the regional level remains difficult. This is largely due to the continuing relevance of the cherished norm of non-interference among ASEAN countries. Yet it was also noted that individual ASEAN countries have partnered with donor countries outside the region to develop and implement counter-terrorism capacity building programs.

12. It was noted that it often takes too much time for discussion within ASEAN to translate into action when identifying needs and building capacity. It was pointed out that binding standard operating procedures are sometimes necessary to strengthen bilateral judicial cooperation and information sharing in the field of counter-terrorism but they are difficult to achieve while sensitivity to issues of sovereignty and non-interference remains an overarching concern among member states. It was also pointed out that this dynamic is slowing down the fulfilment of the creation of an ASEAN Security Community.
13. It was suggested that a UN focal point in the region was needed to work with existing regional partners such as ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum and help transport Strategy implementation into a local context and make it more in tune with priorities on the ground. It was pointed out however that before identifying such a focal point, more attention should be focused on improving the cooperation and coordination among the three Security Council counter-terrorism-related bodies and their expert groups, which still lags considerably.

14. It was also suggested that in order for the UN to be able to engage more effectively in the region that the ASEAN Secretariat will need to be provided the mandate and resources to become a reliable partner.

15. The need to develop an inventory of the myriad Strategy-related capacity building activities in ASEAN was highlighted as a priority; this would help to reduce duplication and allows countries in the region and donors to more clearly identify where the priority gaps are.

16. The importance of building trust and confidence among experts in the region was also highlighted as a priority; this will lead to the sort of informal exchanges of information that is needed to overcome the reluctance to share at the official level. Regional capacity building workshops were cited as excellent vehicles for doing this.

17. The UN needs to have a better understanding of local conflicts and other contextual issues in the region if it wants to be able to work effectively and enhance its credibility on Strategy-related issues with ASEAN countries. For their part, ASEAN countries need to share information and otherwise communicate more regularly with the CTED and other relevant members of the Task Force in New York.

18. It was noted that at the end of the day the key to implementation of the Strategy is national action. The Task Force can contribute most effectively to national implementation when it has a good understanding of what each country perceives to be its priority needs, where there is local ownership of capacity building efforts, and where there is a regional organization working to reinforce national efforts.

19. It was also noted that UN bodies such as CTED, which have limited resources and expertise on the region, need to focus more on linking up with the regional actors in Southeast Asia to avoid duplication and maximize use of these resources.

20. More broadly, there is need for the UN to more clearly identify its comparative advantages in a region that already receives so much bilateral donor attention and where CTED is starting to work on the assessment and matching. It was pointed out that the Task Force should play a complementary role and identify how it can best contribute to building Strategy-related capacity without being too idealistic. It was also suggested that given the political sensitivities surrounding counter-terrorism cooperation within ASEAN, it might be easier for UNDP and UNESCO, two bodies not clearly identified with counter-terrorism to develop Strategy-related projects with the ASEAN Secretariat.

 SESSION II: THE FACILITATION AND DELIVERY OF CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE ON UN STRATEGY-RELATED ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF THE UN: SUCCESSES AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

21. With respect to CTED, it was noted that while it has the necessary tools to conduct needs and vulnerability assessments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, it has been struggling with how to
facilitate the delivery of technical assistance. It was pointed out that the new technical assistance strategy it will soon present to the CTC for its approval will aim to address some of its shortcomings to date and structural limitations.

22. Rather than trying to be everything to everyone, CTED should seek to get involved in a few targeted areas, but do the job right. It should limit itself to countries where it has the necessary information to provide needs assessments with the necessary specificity so as to make them useful to donors. Further, the CTED needs to develop closer links with UN actors on the ground as well as gain a better understanding of the different donor interests and expand its donor engagement.

23. The importance of identifying CTED’s comparative advantage was also stressed, with a view to minimizing the overlap with other UN activities and regional and bilateral programs. Three such advantages identified were: 1) engaging on remedial capacity building activities, where there is limited existing donor engagement; 2) providing the UN stamp of approval; and 3) offering a macroscopic overview of capacity gaps.

24. It was also pointed out that some countries in Southeast Asia have been reluctant to work with CTED on an ongoing basis and to use its assessments to inform its counter-terrorism policy development. Ideally, however, these assessments could be relied on more by the states and ASEAN and other regional bodies and mechanisms.

25. Participants discussed the pros and cons of providing the CTED with a mandate to support wider UN Strategy implementation efforts and the work of the Task Force. It was suggested that there is a need to transform CTED into a mechanism that member states can more widely accept. Some cautioned against giving it a broader role, noting that as a Security Council body it is probably not well-placed to assume one. Attention instead, it was argued, should be placed on further improving the effectiveness of CTED and other existing mechanisms. CTED and UNODC resources could be harnessed to support the work of the Task Force, for example, in particular the activities of its integrated implementation working group, which is due to conduct pilot projects in two countries.

26. Nevertheless, it was asserted that existing mechanisms need to be adapted to the new situation that now exists following the adoption of the UN Strategy in a manner that appeals to all member states.

27. Participants also reflected on some of the lessons learned as a result of UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch’s criminal justice-related delivery of technical assistance, the effectiveness of which depends on the ability to generate local ownership. This requires in depth knowledge and experience in the local legal and criminal justice system, striking the right balance between applying global standards and respecting the local legal system; and adopting a comprehensive approach in terms of criminal justice reform, respecting human rights, and promoting the rule of law.

28. The participants recognized the importance of deepening engagement between the UN and local and regional actors on Strategy-related capacity building issues.

- Rather than establishing a local presence for either CTED or the Task Force, however, it was suggested that efforts be made to identify an existing UN actor in a particular country or region to serve as a focal point for discussing these issues.
Another way to deepen such engagement, as well as to promote the whole of government approach to counter-terrorism that is embodied in the Strategy, is for each country to appoint a national focal point for Strategy implementation. Such focal points would have an overview of national counter-terrorism efforts, broadly speaking. The Task Force or one of its entities such as UNODC could provide a platform where focal points could meet to share information and experiences on Strategy-related issues.

Further, it was recommended that both member states and regional bodies become more involved in the work of the Task Force, including via invitations to participate in its work.

29. There was also discussion of the Japan-ASEAN counter-terrorism dialogue, which was mentioned as an example of an effective regional framework for discussing and embarking upon concrete capacity building projects, which enhance regional counter-terrorism capabilities.

30. It was stressed that one of the keys to effective counter-terrorism capacity building is the existence of the necessary political will on the part of the recipient country. In some cases this requires raising awareness of the threat and vulnerabilities in the particular country or region.

31. Finally, participants noted that most of the Strategy-related capacity building activities in Southeast Asia have so far focused on the traditional counter-terrorism areas (i.e., law enforcement and other security-related issues), where bilateral donors and CTED have been most active. In addition to finding ways to engage with a range of UN and other actors involved in capacity building in the non-traditional areas, more attention should be given to enhancing the coordination between traditional and non-traditional counter-terrorism actors. It was noted that in non-traditional areas identification of assistance needs is more difficult. The suggestion was made for the UN to stimulate information and experience sharing among these actors at the country or regional level.

SESSION III: THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BODIES AND MECHANISMS IN PROVIDING AND FACILITATING THE DELIVERY OF CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE ON UN STRATEGY-RELATED ISSUES: SUCCESSES AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

32. Examples of successful capacity building programs in Southeast Asia were noted including: the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which, through funding from the Australian government and others, has conducted over 100 courses for more than 3,000 participants from 17 countries; and the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force, which has focused on common concerns about threats to member economies, including cyber-terrorism and potential threats to the food supply. Further, it was pointed out that APEC plays an important role by offering an opportunity for leaders from around the Pacific Rim at the highest level to engage on counter-terrorism issues.

33. It was noted that ASEAN has strengths through its diversity of its membership and its desire to look outward in order to cultivate trade partnerships for its exports and it often acknowledges that it needs help from others to build its capacity. This could be built upon to further capacity building on an array of Strategy related issues.

34. It was pointed out that in the context of promoting the Strategy, ASEAN has recognized the relevant UN counter-terrorism resolutions and is putting pressure, albeit nonbinding, on its members to make headway on ratifying the relevant UN conventions. ASEAN could be doing more to address Pillars I and IV of the Strategy. Moreover, the establishment of a “People’s ASEAN” offers an opportunity for wider stakeholder participation from civil society that could help to further Strategy implementation at the community level.
35. The important work by CTED in the region, including providing valuable input to the development of an ASEAN plan of action to implement its Counter-Terrorism Convention, was cited. It was suggested, however, that the Task Force could help ASEAN develop its own framework for addressing regional Strategy related needs across all four pillars.

36. The point was made, however, that in order for the Task Force to be able to engage more effectively with ASEAN, the ASEAN Secretariat needs to be given the mandate and resources to work with the Task Force. It was suggested that donor countries could provide these resources, just as they support the counter-terrorism activities of some regional bodies in Africa.

37. During the time it will take for the ASEAN Secretariat to build its capacity, it was suggested that a more informal step could be taken to build more support for UN Strategy implementation efforts in the region and ensuring there is effective coordination and cooperation among the wide range of relevant UN and regional stakeholders. This would be for an individual state in the region to convene a regional Strategy implementation meeting, with donor support and under the auspices of ASEAN, to which all of the key stakeholders, including the Task Force, would be invited, and where a regional Strategy implementation plan, along with a division of labor could be developed.

38. The need for more transparent and efficient information sharing was highlighted. It was noted that terrorists have often communicated and cooperated efficiently to coordinate attacks. At the same time, factors such as the preference for a national approach among ASEAN members, reluctance to communicate among peers across the region, and the confidentiality of CTED country reports, are hindering the pace of crucial counter-terrorism data exchange efforts both within and between countries in the region.

39. Finally, working with nongovernmental research centers and networks, such as the Council for Asian Terrorism Research, which regularly convene leading experts with access to data on vulnerabilities and capacity gaps, was cited as an example where policy-relevant information is available to Strategy-related stakeholders in the region. In order to enhance their ability to produce more credible needs assessments, it was suggested that the relevant Task Force entities not only be provided with this information but engage more directly with NGOs on the ground.

**SESSION IV: THE PROVISION AND COORDINATION OF CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE IN THE KEY AREAS OF THE UN STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE UN: SUCCESSES AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**

40. The importance of enhanced coordination and cooperation within the UN system to operationalize the linkages between development, peace, security, and human rights that are reflected in the Strategy was stressed. It was also noted that the UN not only has a role to play in serving as a clearinghouse for the exchange of information, but as a platform for member states to overcome challenges faced in capacity building.

41. The role of CTED as a facilitator of capacity building assistance received attention. It was noted that CTED is seeking to move from playing a more passive role in this area, where it has traditionally relied on cataloguing donors’ profiles and recipients’ needs on its website, to a more proactive one. Examples cited of the new approach include:

- The October 2007 fifth special meeting of the CTC with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations where the CTED focused on a specific thematic issue – the
strengthening of border controls. Workshop participants highlighted the importance of ensuring that CTED and the relevant organizations take the necessary action to follow-up on what is contained in the action plan adopted at the conclusion of that meeting.

- The July 2007 CTED-convened informal meeting in New York that brought together relevant states donors to discuss the needs of a particular region: West Africa. The point was made that while such a meeting is a step in the right direction, the New York discussions need to be translated into action in the field. To this end, the importance of convening relevant stakeholders in the region itself was emphasized.

- Developing a more productive relationship with the G8’s Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG). These efforts are focused on providing the CTAG with more timely and relevant analysis of county or regional needs and priorities to allow the donor group to focus on particular countries, regions, or themes. CTAG, particularly if its practice of convening local CTAG meetings is reinvigorated, offers an opportunity for enhanced donor coordination on the ground and stronger synergies with CTED. Participants welcome the efforts to reinvigorate CTAG.

  - However, in order to make the CTAG’s work more relevant, it was suggested that consideration be given to expanding its mandate beyond the narrow law enforcement and other security-related issues being addressed by the CTED and covered under Resolution 1373 to include the broader set of issues covered by the UN Strategy where enhanced coordination and cooperation among donors is needed. The view was expressed that while in theory this idea made sense, in practice it might be difficult to implement as the current CTAG representatives may not have the expertise in the broader set of issues covered by the Strategy.

  - In addition, it was suggested that the CTAG’s membership be expanded to include all of the major counter-terrorism donor countries.

42. CTED’s work in the field of countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) was discussed. It was reported that the CTED is mindful not to duplicate the work that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the leader in this field, is undertaking. In terms of Southeast Asia, it was noted that CTED is working with the Asian Development Bank to encourage it to become a more active donor on issues related to Resolution 1373 and is trying to devise an understanding with the CTC on how to share information and experiences with the Asia-Pacific Group (the relevant FATF regional-style body). Despite these efforts, the point was made that there remains a need for improved coordination among the different entities undertaking assessments of national CFT efforts. For example, it was noted that one country in Southeast Asia received separate, and in some instances incompatible, assessments from the CTED and APG which created confusion among experts in the capital.

43. Participants discussed the role of UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in delivering technical assistance related to the ratification and implementation of the now 16 universal instruments against terrorism. It was reported that the TPB has carried out 30 national training workshops already this year and plans to hold 30 more before the end of the year. The concrete results from all of TPB’s national and regional workshops and regional meetings of ministers of justice are considerable. For example, it was noted that there have been over 400 new ratifications of the relevant instruments and 48 of the 80 countries to which TPB provided bilateral assistance now have counter-terrorism legislation in place. With respect to the useful regional meetings of ministers of justice that TPB convenes to discuss the ratification and implementation of the universal
instruments, it was suggested that these fora be used to discuss the wider set of criminal justice reform issues contained in the Strategy.

44. Despite TPB’s successes so far, challenges remain. For example, it was noted that no country has yet to ratify all 16 universal instruments, although Switzerland is expected to do so soon. In addition, only 98 countries have ratified all 12 of the original instruments. Thus more legislative drafting assistance is needed. Further, additional specialized training of criminal justice officials to implement the conventions is required. To this end, TPB is interested in launching a systematic and more comprehensive training program in ten pilot countries. In addition, the point was made that the TPB and CTED should be mindful not always to equate the ratification of the universal instruments with the ability to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorists and engage in international legal cooperation in terrorism cases. In some cases, it noted, governments have the necessary legal tools in place despite not having joined a number of the universal instruments.

45. Participants discussed the planned activities of the Task Force working group on integrated implementation of the Strategy, which is intended to offer “one-stop shopping” for countries interested in receiving assistance from the UN in implementing the UN Strategy. It is intended to complement the work of individual Task Force entities and take into account the needs assessments already undertaken by them. The group has received requests from two countries and will undertake a mapping of ongoing and planned capacity building activities in each one. The working group has developed an automated information exchange system that will compile all of the information submitted by Task Force members regarding their previous and ongoing work with the country at issue.

- While this system was welcomed, a question was raised about ensuring not only the accuracy of the information provided, but that the information is obtained across all four pillars of the Strategy to ensure a truly integrated UN response to the country concerned.

46. With regard to the Task Force working groups as a whole, the importance of minimizing the overlap between these activities and the work of the CTED, and its new thematic working groups was stressed (for example, each has one on terrorist financing). The point was made that increased CTED participation in the Task Force, which has been endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1805, will help maximize the synergies between the Task Force and CTED. It was also suggested, however, that the most effective way to minimize the overlap would be to provide CTED with the mandate to service both the Task Force (and its working groups) and the CTC. Thus, there would no longer be any need for separate CTED and Task Force working groups. This could be done, for example, by making the CTED an office or department in the secretariat.

47. Participants recognized that the Task Force will be needed after the September 2008 General Assembly review, as there remains a need for some entity to coordinate the Strategy-related work of the UN system. It is up to member states to come up with ideas as to how to ensure the Task Force has the necessary resources and mandate to allow it to play this coordinating role most effectively. States should be open-minded, it was argued, about how to do this. Finding ways in which CTED resources could be used to support the Task Force would be a good start.

48. It was also suggested that the General Assembly mandate the Task Force to serve as a centralized registry – via a password protected website – for all UN counter-terrorism programs. In such a role the Task Force could challenge all of its members to register their ongoing individual and joint programs, specifying in what particular countries these programs are ongoing.
The countries could then verify the accuracy of this information and inform that Task Force of the name of their chosen national Strategy-related focal point.

49. The work of the UN Asia and Far East Institute for Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) received attention. UNAFEI, it was reported, offers training courses and seminars on crime prevention and criminal justice for experts and officials, including from Southeast Asia. As a result of its work, it has identified a number of challenges to more effective legal cooperation between states in Southeast Asia. These include the refusal of a request for international legal cooperation because of the non-existence of a treaty; the lack of dual criminality in relevant national laws; the continued use of the political offence exception; and the failure to make the criminal activity in question an extraditable offence. A number of suggestions were made for overcoming these obstacles, including: revising national laws, adopting more bilateral treaties, and ratifying the universal legal instruments, which have clauses which would address these shortcomings. In addition, the importance of building a network of legal and other law enforcement experts among countries in Southeast Asia – as a means to building trust – was cited as essential to improving the information sharing and other practical cooperation that is needed.

50. Participants discussed the activities of the Task Force working group on radicalization, emphasizing that the process of radicalization is a complex interaction of factors, which do not necessarily lead to violence and that not every radical becomes a terrorist. The working group is setting out to map the measures being taken in various countries and regions around the world to prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. The process, which has been ongoing since January 2008, will culminate in a report that will be submitted to the Secretary-General by the end of July and made available to states, upon their request, at the end of August.

51. It was pointed out that a number of states in Southeast Asia have developed effective “de-radicalization” programs and activities, which countries from outside the region could learn from. The UN, it was asserted, can not only help facilitate and encourage the development of regional capacity, but the cross-regional sharing of information and experiences as well, which it is attempting to do in this area through the Task Force’s radicalization working group.

52. It was suggested that after September – assuming member states decide that the Task Force and its working groups should continue to operate – this working group could carry out joint activities with states, regional organizations, and civil society, with a view to undertaking two case studies on radicalization and good practices on de-radicalization in two countries or regions. At a minimum, such an approach will foster greater consideration of radicalization and de-radicalization issues with a more regional perspective, as well as help to encourage the development of regional work programs that address these issues based on local knowledge of the complex politico-socio-economic issues germane to the region. The point was also made that since addressing violent radicalization requires a wide range of measures that cut across all four pillars of the Strategy, these studies could offer a clear sense of how the implementation of the Strategy can be operationalized at the national level across these pillars.

53. The participants agreed that quality education is a crucial component of any effective long-term strategy to counter-terrorism. In this regard, it was noted that UNESCO is seeking to scale up existing programs for strengthening the capacities of educational systems worldwide to integrate human rights education, internationally shared values, conflict prevention, and critical thinking into every aspect of these systems, including the development of curriculum standards, the training of teachers, and the approval of school textbooks. To this end, UNESCO is working with its member states 1) to update and revise education and cultural policies to reflect a human
rights-based approach, cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and sustainable development; 2) to ensure quality education to foster a climate of tolerance and security; 3) to facilitate teacher training and the revision of textbooks and curricula to help ensure the removal of hate messages, distortions, prejudice, and negative bias from textbooks and other educational media; and 4) to ensure basic knowledge and understanding of the world’s main cultures, civilizations, and religions.

54. Participants recognized that many ongoing UNESCO activities are furthering the implementation of the Strategy and encouraged UNESCO to become more actively involved in the work of the Task Force without necessarily giving these activities a “counter-terrorism” label. In addition, participants recognized the importance of more field-based engagement among the relevant Task Force members, with a view to developing region or country-specific projects relevant to the implementation of the UN Strategy. The point was also made that in some cases it might be more effective to provide UNESCO with the funds to implement a counter-terrorism-related capacity building project in the field of education rather than carrying it out through a national development agency. It was also suggested that UNESCO and other non-traditional actors can be further encouraged to participate in the visits of CTED so that Task Force members can enhance coordination at the local level.

**Next Steps**

55. At the end of the workshop it was announced that the Government of Switzerland will be hosting the final workshop in the International Process on 10-11 July 2008 in New York, which will provide an opportunity for the participants to consider a range of proposals for strengthening the implementation of the UN Strategy that have been put forward during the International Process. It was announced that these proposals will be included in a paper that will be circulated to the participants in the July workshop by 30 June 2008. This paper will then form the basis for discussion in July. The paper will be revised following the workshop and submitted to the co-sponsors of the International Process for their consideration, with a view to presenting it at or around the time of the September 2008 General Assembly review of the UN Strategy.