Japan-India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues*

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Japan and India marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 2012. They enjoyed a brief honeymoon period after the relations were established in 1952, it did not last, however, as efforts to foster the relationship were thwarted by the unfolding Cold War. Entering the 1990s, we witnessed a gradual improvement disrupted only by a brief period of coolness arising from India’s nuclear testing in 1998, and since 2000 the two countries have enjoyed an accelerated rapprochement.

This rapprochement is the result of growing convergence between the two countries’ world views, interests and goals. In other words, they have become partners of convenience in terms of both economic issues and their China policies, to the extent that they could be described as mutually indispensable. The bilateral relationship is now experiencing a second honeymoon period of incomparably greater depth and breadth than the first one shortly after World War II.

To provide a context for the current situation, this chapter will lead off by sketching Japan-India relations during the Cold War. Key issues in the development of the relationship since the 1990s will then be highlighted, examining the status of the Japan-India relationship in the context of Asia’s international politics.1 In order to delve into Japan-India relations, we have to keep in mind India’s deep-seated orientation of strategic autonomy, which is virtually a genetic characteristic in India’s foreign policy. In terms of the Indian foreign policy matrix outlined in the preface,2 India views the Japan-India relationship primarily in the context of the regional (Asia) level.

I. Post-Cold War Japan-India Rapprochement

1. Japan-India Relations during the Cold War

Japan’s foreign policy strategy after World War II was based on three guiding principles: diplomacy centered on the United Nations; collaboration with Free World nations; and adherence to Japan’s position as an Asian nation (first Diplomatic Bluebook in 1957). At the time, Southeast Asia was also considered to include South Asia. For example, in 1957, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi undertook a diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia as the first postwar foreign trip by a Japanese head of state, his itinerary included India, Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). India and Pakistan were also part of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s 1961 tour of Southeast Asia.

However, “the mid-1960s marked the beginning of an era in which South Asia including India was

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omitted from what Japan considered as Asia" (Sato 1993: 165). When the Asian Development Bank was set up in 1966, it was intended to cover Asia inclusive of South Asia, but the focus was in fact Southeast Asia. The following year in 1967 when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed, ASEAN’s reach was confined to Burma (now Myanmar) westward, excluding South Asia. Japan was in the midst of its high economic growth period at that time, and as the concomitant oil demand pushed the Middle East oil-producing nations further up in the list of Japan’s diplomatic priorities, South Asia positioned between Southeast Asia and the Middle East became equivalent to an “air pocket” in Japanese diplomacy, according to a senior official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1984.

As a result, Japan-India relations were generally subdued. There were cases such as Indian iron ore contributing to the steel industry, which underpinned the Japan’s postwar recovery, but relations were merely amicable rather than close. The problem was their relationships with the US. In other words, Japan’s foreign policy at the time was centered on the Japan-US alliance, while India pursued first non-alignment and then its alliance with the Soviet Union (Horimoto 2012: 39-40; Ghosh 2008), leaving Japan and India estranged each other in terms of economic policy too. India’s pursuit of an insular economic system in contrast to Japan’s open market economy stymied the development of close economic ties.

The first signs of change in this situation emerged in the 1980s. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had visited Japan in 1969, made another visit in 1982, while Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to India in 1984 was the first by a Japanese Prime Minister since Ikeda’s visit 23 years prior. Some analysts regard Nakasone’s trip as the starting point for Japan-India relations through to the present, arguing that if Indira Gandhi had not been assassinated in 1984 but had instead survived another five years, the names of both Nakasone and Gandhi would have been linked to a new phase in Japan-India relations (Sato 1993: 176).

Indira Gandhi’s eldest son Rajiv Gandhi, who came to power in 1984 after her assassination, visited Japan in 1985 and again in 1988. India in the 1980s was relaxing its foreign capital restrictions and Suzuki Motor Company (later Suzuki Motor Corporation) began manufacturing cars in India in 1983, while Japan was increasing its yen-denominated loans to India, with both countries taking the first steps toward building a new bilateral relationship.

2. Post-Cold War Signs of Improvement in Japan-India Relations
It was the end of the Cold War that provided the real impetus for a further development of Japan-India relations. Japan-India relations after World War II can be broadly divided chronologically into two phases: the first phase lasting until the end of the 1980s and the second phase beginning in the 1990s. The event symbolizing the start of the second phase was Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s tour around South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) over April-May 1990.

India was not necessarily in accord with Japan’s new steps at that time. Because the fulcrum of India’s diplomacy since the early 1960s had shifted from Asia to the Middle East where many non-resident Indians were living. As its consequence, there was a limited interest toward Japan. So it is said, very few Members of Parliament attended Prime Minister Kaifu’s address to the Indian Parliament and Parliamentary Secretariat employees apparently had to be rallied to fill up the vacant seats.

The event that led India to develop a more positive image of Japan occurred in 1991, when Japan provided an emergency foreign exchange loan to India. In April that year, partly because of the Gulf crisis, India’s foreign exchange reserves plummeted to US$1.1 billion (Kojima 1993: 199-200). To meet its financial contingency, the government of India was seriously considering selling its Embassy office
property in Tokyo (Asrani 2012). But of all the countries asked by India for emergency assistance, only Japan responded. Indian experts in Japan-India economic relations laud Japan's emergency support (Choudhury 2013: 223).

The emergency assistance was also a manifestation of Japan's proactive India policy. When the US and Europe were busy dealing with the Gulf crisis and had little attention to spare for the economic crises being experienced by the Asian countries, it was Lower House Speaker Yoshiio Sakurauchi (1990-1993) who responded to MOFA calling for assistance to India with a view to placing greater priority on Asian diplomacy. He lobbied the three top-ranking officials in the ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party) and the Finance Minister to realize the loan. Sakurauchi served for many years (1997-2002) as chairman of the Japan-India Association, and put considerable effort into improving Japan-India relations on the grounds of India's strategic importance. Then-Indian Finance Minister Mammohan Singh repeatedly expressed his gratitude for Japan's emergency assistance even after becoming Prime Minister in 2004.

On the Indian side, Narasimha Rao of Indian National Congress, who became Prime Minister in 1991, visited Japan in 1992, on the 40th anniversary of Japan-India diplomatic relations, but the divergence in the two countries' concerns was apparent. Japan saw Prime Minister Rao's visit as an excellent opportunity to advance the worldwide expansion of a nuclear non-proliferation initiative by having India accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India's aim, by contrast, was to garner more direct investment from Japan as part of the economic liberalization agenda which India had launched in 1991. Apart from this economic liberalization, India set out its "Look East" policy in 1993 (Haidar 2012: 53), and had high hopes for Japan in relation to investment, trade and technology. The policy signified one major implication to deal with China's attempt of pursuing bilateralism and multilateralism in Asia in the 1990s (Kondapalli & Mifune, 2010: xvii).

Thus, the gap between the two countries' expectations could not be resolved. The 1992 edition of Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook merely notes that "various events were held in 1992 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In June 1992, Prime Minister Rao visited Japan as an official guest, and exchanged views on the international situation including bilateral affairs, and agreed to hold bilateral talks on nuclear non-proliferation."

3. Nuclear Issue Hampers Improved Relations

After the Cold War, Japan was quickest among the US and the other liberal nations to seek to improve its relationship with India. US President Bill Clinton had scheduled a visit to India for February 1998, but this scheduled visit was postponed because of the upcoming Indian general elections and then cancelled after India's nuclear tests in May (Talbott 2004: 45).

However, Japan's early initiative was to see no further progress right throughout the 1990s, mainly due to the stumbling block of the nuclear issue. In Japan, antipathy toward India grew when India not only failed to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996 when the treaty was formulated, but proceeded to conduct another round of nuclear tests in 1998 after the first round in 1974 (all references below are to the 1998 round). A perception gap opened between the two countries. Japan as a nation that had experienced atomic bombings unable to understand how India could move against the worldwide tide of nuclear non-proliferation. On the other hand, India puzzled that Japan as a nation protected by the US nuclear umbrella would criticize India for undertaking nuclear tests with the aim of achieving an autonomous defense capacity, still at the same time remain silent on China's nuclear testing.

Japan responded to India's nuclear tests by immediately suspending any new Official Development
Assistance (ODA). Japan had been India's largest ODA donor from FY1986 onward (with the exception of FY1990), but the yen loans that formed the core of that assistance were slashed in FY1998, and in FY1999 there were no new loans at all.

While an examination of Japan's South Asian diplomacy in the 1990s revealed Japan's efforts to balance between India and Pakistan, there looks to be no existence of a coherent India policy. Certainly, Japan's political leadership was exercised toward a new diplomatic engagement with India, led by Prime Minister Nakasone and backed by Lower House Speaker Sakurauchi. However, India was low on Japan's foreign policy priority, and the international environment was not really such that Japan needed to find a new utility from India in these days.

Consequently, from the perspective of the anti-nuclear stance which formed the heart of Japan's foreign policy, India's nuclear testing was simply inconceivable, causing the country's diplomatic standing to plummet in Japanese eyes. It was a return to the Japanese view of India during the Cold War era. The author clearly recalls hearing from a MOFA official in the mid-1980s joke that the priority of the Ministry's Asia Affairs Bureau was firstly China, secondly Korea, thirdly Southeast Asia, fourthly nowhere, and fifthly South Asia, a painful reminder of the extent of Japan's diplomatic disinterest in South Asia. Japan's foreign policy would retain that old mindset on India even in the 1990s.

India was in a different but similar situation. India began to show signs of emerging as an important power in the late 1990s, drawing global attention. As a result, India's foreign policy began to evince a sense that India could get by without Japan. For example, in an interview study on perceptions of Japan undertaken in India in 2001 by a Japanese India scholar, one Indian journalist noted that "the important countries for India's Ministry of External Affairs are the US, the UK, Pakistan, China, Russia, and then France and Germany; Japan is further down again" (Kondo 2001: 23). Even in the 2000s (2000-2009), the order of priority in India's foreign policy was the US, the UK/EU and Pakistan, with Japan "at best in fourth place alongside China and the Arab Gulf states," according to a Japanese journalist specializing in South Asia (Yamada and Otani 2007: 195).

II. Progress toward Rapprochement in Japan-India Relations

1. Relations Warm in the 2000s

The rapprochement in Japan-India relations that emerged in the 1990s picked up steam as of the mid-2000s. The catalyst was Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000 and the creation of the Japan-India Global Partnership agreed during that visit. Both foreign ministries too marked this as a watershed in the bilateral relationship. The Recent Relations under the Japan-India Relations section of MOFA's website notes that "Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000 provided the momentum to strengthen the Japan-India relationship. Mr. Mori and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided the establishment of Global Partnership between Japan and India."

The number of high-level visits between Japan and India reveals a clear trend toward closer relations. Figure 1 shows an imbalance in high-level visits between the two countries in the 1980s, but the total number of visits began to rise in the 1990s, and increased markedly in the 2000s. The 23 visits over the five years between 2000 and 2004 alone almost match the 27 visits recorded over the entire decade of the 1990s. The visits over the five years between 2005 and 2009 were more than 2.5 times the amount for the previous five years.
Figure 1. High-level Visits between Japan and India 1980-August 2014 (No. of visits)


Note: The figure for 2010-2014 only covers up until August 4, 2014. Visits from Japan to India include two economic missions dispatched by the government (in 1992 and 2000).

In addition to these high-level visits, economic relations also became closer around the mid-2000s onward as the other side of the same coin as these visits. Japanese direct investment in India presented a noticeable trend (Figure 2), while bilateral trade evinced a similar upward trajectory (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Japanese Direct Investment in India (100 million yen)


Note: Major projects boosted the figures for 2008 and 2009.
Moreover, the yen loans suspended in response to India’s nuclear testing were resumed from October 2001 and progressively increased. India replaced China as the top in FY2003. In FY2005, total loans to India reached 155.5 billion yen, well above second-placed Indonesia (93 billion yen). The yen loans have been put to demonstrably good use, including construction of the Delhi Metro subway system, which has become an indispensable means of transport for Delhi residents, reaching a new daily user record of more than 2.7 million people on August 4, 2014.9

Bilateral cooperation emerged not only at the level of economic relations but also in Asian international politics. A typical example was the East Asia Summit (EAS), first held in December 2005. There was initially disagreement between Japan and China over the composition of the EAS, with China arguing for only three more countries (Japan, China and Korea) to join the ASEAN 10 whereas Japan was pushing for six (Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand). Ultimately, ASEAN weighed in on the matter for all 16 countries.

The joint statement issued when Prime Minister Koizumi visited India in April 2005 noted that “The Japanese side conveyed its decision to support India’s membership in the East Asia Summit and the Indian side expressed its appreciation for the Japanese support.” India also took steps to return the favor. Japan and China were allowed to participate as observers at the November 2005 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit meeting, apparently due to India pushing strongly for the participation of Japan along with China.

2. Factors behind Rapprochement

The favorable improvement in Japan-India relations which began as a mere rivulet in the 1990s began to grow into a stream 2000 onward, and by around 2005 had gained all the momentum of a major river. As seen in the table below, there were in fact a string of key declarations, arrangements, dialogues and consultations between Japan and India.
This situation presumably reflects the strong mutual needs of both countries. In Japan’s case, MOFA interprets India’s importance to Japan as follows:

India is the world’s largest democracy, boasting a population of 1.2 billion, and shares universal values such as freedom of speech and the rule of law. In economic terms too, India has the third largest GDP in Asia and has sustained a high level of economic growth, possessing considerable potential in terms of greater economic exchange with Japan. Further, the coast of India runs right along a sea lane to the Middle East, making India an important presence in terms of Japan’s energy security. As it grows into a major power, India has also become critical in efforts to address climate change, nuclear disarmament, the world economy and other global issues (Recent Situation in India and Japan-India Relations, March 2012).10

While India does not appear to have issued the equivalent of this MOFA statement, overall economic relations with Japan not only offered the trade, investment and technology necessary for India’s economic development but also encouraged India’s expectations that Japan would serve as a bridge between India and the Asia-Pacific. India’s Look East policy was realized with India’s elevation into a full dialogue partner in ASEAN in 1995 and then a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. With India achieving its goals in Southeast Asia in August 2009 through the conclusion of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (goods only, with services and investment excluded; entry into force January 2010), it was hardly surprising that as a logical consequence India made East Asia its next goal. Following the India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in January 2010, Japan and India moved their own CEPA into force in August 2011. For India, acceptance into the EAS spurred major progress with its Look East policy. Even an Indian expert on Asia pointed out “India has now become an inalienable part of the evolving East Asian economic and security order” (Naidu 2013).
Japan and India have few negative historical legacies, and they are economically complementary, making them low-risk options for each other. The 2011-12 Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs implies as much in noting that Japan-India relations "enjoy a high degree of mutual trust and confidence, and are characterized by an unprecedented level of exchanges."

3. Japan-India Rapprochement and the Improvement of India-US Relations

Another factor in the rapprochement between Japan and India has been the position of the US in both countries' foreign policies. In short, the improvement in US-India relations has contributed to closer Japan-India relations.

During the Cold War years, the Japan-India relationship was defined by the Soviet-India alliance against the US-Japan alliance, preventing the two countries from drawing any closer. However, after the Cold War ended, Prime Minister Rao set out to improve India's relations with the US (Horimoto 2012: 48-49) in order to access the US markets, technologies and capital that would be vital to the Rao administration's economic liberalization agenda. This emphasis on the US was maintained by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) when it assumed power in 1998.

The US responded to these strong overtures from India (Horimoto 2006). President Clinton became the first US president to visit India in 22 years in March 2000 and the Bush administration established a strategic partnership with India in 2004 and pursued a policy of extending both nuclear power materials and technologies as well as facilities to India even though the latter was not a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory (Horimoto 2007). The Obama administration has in general sustained this pro-India line.

Although better US-India relations certainly exerted a positive influence on the turnaround in Japan-India relations, the relationship between Japan and India was not entirely unproblematic. First, there was the status of the US. Japan maintained its adherence to the Japan-US alliance while India viewed its relationship with the US first and foremost as a strategic matter.

Dr. Satu Limaye, an American specialist on Asian affairs (currently Director of the East-West Center in Washington), notes in relation to the past and present position of the US on Japan-India relations that “[During the Cold War,] Japan was undoubtedly influenced by US policies and consequently reduced its own ties to India. India in turn responded by basically writing off Japan as an American surrogate in Asia. Japan's close relations with the United States, and the latter's troubled relations with India, have strongly shaped the Japan-India encounter—a theme that persists to this day” (Limaye: 226-227). Thanks to current relations with the US, it has become easier for Japan to work to improve ties with India, but [from India's perspective,] the fact that Japan is not viewed as an autonomous agent has been a constraining factor. The same view has been voiced by an Australian scholar of India (Brewster 2012: 67). The argument that Japan has failed to act autonomously is persuasive. When Prime Minister Mori was planning to visit India in August 2000, he apparently first sounded out the US and gained its approval. This was after President Clinton had already visited India in March that year.

There is a different view that Japan's India policy was not entirely shaped by the US in terms of India policies, the similarities between Japan and the US and Japan's own autonomous orientation cannot be ignored (Tamari 2013: 155).

The second issue was the historical relationship between Japan and India. Japan has a history of treating India as a pawn in its foreign policy game. During World War II, when its military operations on the Chinese mainland failed, Japan tried to expand its Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by invading India which resulted in a spectacular failure. The Japan-India Peace Treaty, negotiated by Japan after the
war in the hope that India would renounce its reparation claims and hand back Japanese assets in India, highlighted India’s goodwill on the basis of the calculation that this might have a positive effect on reparation negotiations in Southeast Asia. Hiroshi Sato, who is also well-versed in contemporary bilateral relations, notes that “Japan’s relationship with India has always had a derivative nature,…with its direction shaped by relations with China, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia…. Rather than considering India’s position, it was more a matter of approaching India in a manner that suited Japan, or, put more negatively, opportunism” (Sato 2006: 123).

III. Japan-India Relations and the China Factor

Then why have Japan and India been coming rapidly closer despite all this? To begin from the conclusion, because dealing with rising China with its remarkable economic growth and new status as a major military power has become the top priority for both countries, to the extent of overriding the problems between them.

The initial catalyst was the anti-Japan demonstrations which occurred all around China from 2004 into 2005. An Indian scholar of Japan has suggested that the China factor came to have major significance for Japan-India relations as of April 2005 (Varma 2013: 52). First there was the markedly anti-Japanese behavior displayed by Chinese spectators against Japanese players at the AFC Asian Cup football match in Chongqing, China in July 2004. And then between March and April in 2005, large-scale anti-Japanese riots targeting Japanese stores in Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai and other cities broke out.

This raised a great concern about China risk. In 2004, Japan's trade with China (including Hong Kong) reached 22 trillion yen, replacing the US of 20 trillion yen trades with Japan, and thus China became Japan's biggest trading partner. As a consequence, “spurred by the anti-Japanese demonstrations occurring in China in spring that year, companies began increasing their direct investment in Vietnam and India to take advantage of the high growth and significant market scale expected in these countries, as well as to defuse the risk of investment concentration in China” (Tsutsumi 2005).

In other words, Japan's interests in India's economic rise, as well as the adoption of a more multifaceted economic agenda as a means of defusing the risk of investing solely in China following the anti-Japanese demonstrations there, were also key factors behind the new prioritization of India. The biggest recipient of yen loans was already India rather than China in FY2003.

1. India's China Hedge Policy and Japan

The economic relations were certainly one of major factors in the Japan-India rapprochement, an even bigger factor was security policy to cope with rising China as the top priority in common. Rather than been initiated on the basis of a clear policy direction, the rapprochement policies adopted by both Japan and India were instead the result of fortuitous timing in the gradual convergence since 2000 in the two countries’ foreign policy needs on both economic and security fronts.

Viewed from the perspective of their China policies, both countries’ policy needs—engagement in economic areas and hedging in terms of security—could also be said to have drawn Japan and India closer together. This same double-sided policy of engagement and hedging underpinned the approaches to China pursued by the US (where it was framed as a “rebalance toward Asia”) and China’s various other neighbors, albeit with different degrees of intensity. More globally too, China’s rise and the concomitant perception of China as a threat began around 2000 and picked up pitch around 2004 onward, with various countries beginning to announce hedging strategies. It would be no overstatement to describe hedging policies in relation to China as a major factor in the Japan-India rapprochement.14
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was keenly aware of the need to engage China as well, and during his visit to Japan in October 2010, when Prime Minister Kan asked him about the key to India’s China policy, he answered “deep analysis, close engagement and a lot of patience.”

Also in Japan, Defense of Japan 2006 observed that “many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, against the background of economic growth, have been expanding and modernizing their military capabilities by increasing defense budgets and acquiring new equipment. Moves in this regard by China, a major power with significant economic and political influence in the region, are drawing particular attention from other countries” (Japan Defense Agency 2006: 3).

The Annual Report 2005-2006 from India’s Ministry of Defence expressed its concern at China’s growing defense capacity as follows: “China’s military modernisation, with sustained double digit growth in its defence budget for over a decade, as also development of infrastructure in the India-China border areas, continues to be monitored. Close defence exchanges and nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan continue to elicit concern” (Ministry of Defence 2006: 10).

There is no need here to detail Japan’s China hedging, but India’s long-standing wariness of China does require to be noted. While India and China may have proclaimed peaceful coexistence in the 1950s, their relationship began to deteriorate with the India-China border dispute in 1962, which coincided with a new closeness in relations between China and Pakistan, India’s sworn enemy. This ongoing source of irritation for India saw India-China relations settle into a protracted freeze.

Subsequently, since the 1990s, the relationship gradually improved, and the 2000s evinced a substantial pickup in trade in particular. However, frequent border skirmishes continued, while India also viewed China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean along with “One Belt, One Road” initiative and its development of stronger relations with Pakistan and other South Asian nations as amounting to the strategic encirclement of India.

What is interesting is that China was equally concerned about the possibility of strategic containment. China set out to improve its relationship with India in the early 1990s and gradually developed a strong interest in India. That changing perception of India appears to have arisen from India’s growing clout and India-US rapprochement, as well as China’s strong strategic interest in the Indian Ocean (Gordon 2012: 4) and its desire to keep India out of the China containment camp.

The bilateral relationship between India and China could be characterized as shaking hands with the right hand (economic relations) while preparing for attack with the left (military hedging). Moreover, India’s distrust of China remains deep-rooted. A 2010 survey of global views on China undertaken by US public opinion survey institute Pew Research Center found that 52 percent of the Indian public had an unfavorable opinion of China, 34 percent a favorable opinion (the same figures in the case of the Japanese public were 69 percent and 26 percent respectively).16

2. Japan-India Cooperation on China

India accordingly sought to build its strategic relationship with Japan as a country sharing its wariness of China. For example, leading Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan (Mohan 2007) notes the important security role which India has gradually come to play in Asia, stressing the importance of India and Japan develops cooperative relations as key players in Asian security. The thought seems to be that while the Indian public would resist working with the US to counteract China, it would be relatively receptive to partnership with Japan (Rajesh 2014).

At a dialogue between Japan and India held in Tokyo in October 2011, one Indian participant stated frankly that India was aware of being the weakest country among the major powers, placing it in a weak
position in terms of changes in the US-China relationship. He further said that, at the same time, the strategic disparity between India and China was growing, with India acutely conscious of the need for a partner to counterbalance China at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{17}

That partner is apparently Japan. Table 1 (List of key events in Japan-India relations since 2000) reveals the gradual development of security-related mechanisms between the two countries. At the Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2011, it was agreed to hold bilateral training between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy, and the first Japan-India joint training exercise, as the Japanese Ministry of Defense calls it, was held on June 9-10, 2012 in Sagami Bay off Kanagawa Prefecture.

The first country to respond to the joint exercise was China. The June 11, 2012 edition of the \textit{People's Daily} ran an article titled “First Japan-India joint naval exercise: Containing China and maintaining balance,” reporting in the form of a quote from a Japanese analyst that “Japan aims to strengthen its ties with India through this joint exercise as a means of containing China's growing military strength. India plans to make a friendly visit to China after the joint naval exercise in order to maintain a balance between Japan and China. … For India, deepening cooperation with Japan is consistent with the needs of its Look East policy.”

The article that deepening Japan-India cooperation was consistent with India's Look East policy was the point. Look East policy originally focused on strengthening economic ties with the countries of Southeast Asia and then East Asia. Nevertheless, around 2005 onward, the economic aspect was extended with the addition of the broader strategic aim of security. This policy shift was strongly oriented toward responding to the India encirclement strategy which China was pursuing in South Asia.

India's response suited Japan well, adding a wide-area aspect to the previously bilaterally-focused Japan-India relationship. Accordingly, if economic matters formed half of the Japan-India relationship, the other half was security, which rose to an even more important position. The development which illustrates this change most clearly is “the quadrilateral framework”. Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj on August 26, 2014 declared to revise Look East policy for Act East policy.

In China, there has been strong criticism of the 2008 Japan-India Joint Declaration as a China containment strategy (Ryou 2009). Certainly, looking at the Asian diplomacy subsequently pursued by India, it would seem that this Chinese criticism is not off the mark. The emergence of a balancing coalition led by Japan and India (along with other countries) to check China's rise would present a deeply alarming prospect for China (Jaishankar 2014). Japan's China expert observed “India and Japan avoid direct opposition with China while having strong wariness for China and strengthen Japan and India relations for a check for China” (Mifune 2014).

Since Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to India in 2005, the Japanese and Indian prime ministers have been visiting each other's countries in alternate years. India is the only country with which Japan holds a regular bilateral summit, while for India, this is only its second regular summit after Russia. India is also working to build closer ties with South Korea. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak was invited to India's Republic Day in January 2010, when the two countries established strategic partnership, and their bilateral CEPA has also been put into force.

\textbf{IV. What Should Japan Be Seeking from Its India Policy?}

\textbf{1. Unlikely Japan-India Alliance}

Japan-India relations have made significant progress since the 2000s, achieving a degree of closeness once unimaginable in areas including economic and strategic relations. It looks that politicians and in-
Intellectuals in Japan have accordingly been expressing support for Japan-India relations. For example, when Shinzo Abe was Chief Cabinet Secretary, he observed that “just as no one predicted 10 years ago that Japan-China trade including Hong Kong would top the US, it would not be at all strange if Japan-India relations were to have outweighed Japan-US and Japan-China relations 10 years from now” (Abe 2006: 159). Hopes of even stronger ties between the two countries have also been articulated, as in this comment: “The countries best suited to articulating these values [of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law] are Japan and India. In Asia, it is in fact Japan and India that have sufficient latent strength to deploy their foreign policy on the basis of their values. I believe that in their partnership with the US, both countries will become cognizant of their own values and strength and forge the way forward for Asia” (Sakurai 2012: 21).

Some people go as far as to call for a Japan-India alliance. In a speech delivered in New Delhi in May 2013, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso responded to a question about Japan-India relations as a means of addressing China’s military rise with the comment that “I see India and Japan as an alliance, linked by their philosophy and moved by their values.”

How does India see Japan? The semi-official policy document NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century noted that an alliance with the US was attractive in terms of a China policy, but China perceived India’s US and Japan policies in zero-sum terms, on top of which a friendly relationship between the US and India was preferable to an alliance in terms of India realizing strategic autonomy. In other words, India’s semi-official policy document clearly argued against forming alliances with the US and Japan (NonAlignment 2.0, 2012: para. 131, 133, 134).

Expert on Japan-India relations Purnendra Jain (University of Adelaide, Australia) suggests that “India is unlikely to orient its foreign policy narrowly through Japan's strategic prism. India takes great pride in what it calls 'strategic independence'” (Jain 2013). According to survey results released by the Pew Research Center on July 14, 2014, responding to a question of India’s potential ally, 50 percent of Indian respondents think that India should choose the US as an ally, 29 percent Russia and 26 percent Japan. If India will not even ally with the US, the probability of it allying with Japan is low.

Moreover, there is India’s calculus and wariness vis-à-vis China. China views the various multilateral frameworks being pursued by the US, Japan and other countries—US-Japan-India, US-Australia-India, US-Japan-India-Australia—as China containment policies (Garver and Wang 2010: 258). Within the US-Japan-India framework, India is considered likely to be sensitive to Chinese concerns and weak under pressure (Singh 2013: 145). If so, to the extent that India is the most sensitive to its relationship with China, it is unlikely to enter into an alliance with Japan which might appear anti-Chinese. Their actual intentions aside, in public, senior Indian and US officials too have continued to stress that their aim in pursuing closer India-US bilateral relations is not to counterbalance China.

2. Japan-India Relations as an Asian Public Good

Compared to Japan’s China policy, the aim of Japan’s India policy is not so clear. In the case of the former, “the consistent policy line in Japan’s China diplomacy has been how Japan as a country upholding democracy and freedom can internationalize China as a country with different values and set it on a more normal development trajectory” (Kokubun 2012: viii). Japan did have hopes that India would pursue economic development under a democratic system, but during the Cold War period, the two countries remained estranged. When Japan finally sought to build a solid bilateral relationship after the Cold War, the structural change which China’s emergence had brought in Asian politics left Japan with no choice but to explore a bilateral relationship within a multilateral context.
Japan might well have to continue developing Japan-India relations in a narrow sense, and that indeed looks likely to happen, but the problem is how to construct the bilateral relations within a multi-lateral or pan-Asian framework against the backdrop of power shift in Asia. In that sense, it may be useful to consider Japan-India relations as a public good in Asia (Horimoto 2013: 35-36). Japan-US relations have long been framed as a public good for a stable Asia. However, doubts also exist as to the equality between the two countries in the Japan-US relationship, and it would be difficult to say that all Asian countries perceive the relationship in this manner.

Japan-India relations, by contrast, are equal on both political and economic fronts. Today both Japan and India are major Asian powers. It would be advantageous if Japan and India were to position the bilateral relationship as an Asian public good in the region and use their association for Asia’s overall benefit, including its prosperity and stability. Japan and India “need to work together to create the kind of architecture that can mitigate and contain this rivalry [of the US and China]” (Varadarajan 2013). In certain cases, a Japan-India-China framework could also be suggested, which would also cater to India’s desire not to provoke China. There is no need to heed jibes about alliances among the second- and third-ranked powers in Asia’s international politics. For example, to the extent that there is a shared recognition between Japan and India of sea lane safety as a public good, it is incumbent upon both to develop that shared recognition further as a first step in realizing their shared responsibility in the Asia-Pacific region (Izuyama 2013: 195).

Back in 2000, Japan and India agreed on construction of a Japan-India Global Partnership, which was elevated in 2006 into the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership. That strategic partnership should be used not just for the benefit of Japan and India but for global benefit (Hirabayashi 2011). Rather than considering the Japan-India relationship from the perspective of mutual benefit, it is the time now to have come to delineate a policy vision that embraces Asia as a whole. In other words, a change in orientation is needed, “reaching beyond the narrow contextualization of Japan-India relations as a means of containing China to examine whether the relationship can be elevated into a true ‘strategic and global partnership’” (Ito 2013: 92).

But what specific aims to adopt? The focal point for Japan, as well as India and also the US, will be how to address China. Neither Japan nor India is likely to agree to the proposal by Australian National University strategic studies professor Hugh White of a Concert of Asia (an Asian version of the Concert of Europe which rose out of the Vienna system) as a peacekeeping arrangement with the US and China as the central powers (White 2012: 125-151).

It depends basically on whether China can be persuaded to act in a manner which respects the rules of the international community (Kojima 2012). Sustained efforts will have to be made to stabilize Asia, using quadrilateral and trilateral frameworks to constrain China. In a similar vein, “whenever a major power with uninhibited ambition emerges, smaller states around its periphery tend to slowly gravitate towards it, unless other important players have helped establish power equilibrium on the continent (Chellaney 2011: 46). In that sense, the observation that “a multi-layered framework must be developed to constrain China from seeking hegemony in East Asia and redirect it on to a more constructive trajectory” is right on target (Tanaka 2012: 212).

On November 14, 2012, Prime Minister Singh commented to the Japanese media ahead of his visit to Japan (postponed because of the dissolution of Japan’s Lower House) that “Japan and India need to work together to ensure the peaceful rise of China in a manner which contributes to the security and prosperity of Asia.”

One such framework could be the revitalization of the East Asia Summit, which is aimed at
establishing an East Asian Community. The EAS comprises 16 members—the ASEAN 10, Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand—and is the most appropriate mechanism in terms of a creating a wide-area framework for Asia today. There is little chance of Japan building a new system singlehandedly. Rather, the combined efforts of Japan and India should be directed into creating an East Asian Community. Fortunately, the EAS 16 are working to complete negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by 2015 as a means of achieving trade and investment liberalization. Phased progress should be made toward the development of an inclusive, not exclusive, East Asian Community (Rajeswari 2014).

V. Japan-India Relations in the Years Ahead: Beyond Abe and Modi

Sanjaya Baru, media advisor to former Prime Minister Singh, wrote in his bestselling behind-the-scenes depiction of the first Singh government (2004-2009), *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh* (2014), that the greatest and only diplomatic achievement of the second Congress-dominated Singh government (2009-2014) was rapprochement between Japan and India (Baru 2014: 170, 275).

Prime Minister Modi, who essentially picked up where his predecessor left off, visited Japan in August-September 2014. Modi and Abe are not only acquainted with each other but also very much on the same wavelength, sharing much in common (Kesavan 2014). Both Abe and Modi could be characterized as rightwing nationalists while Abe’s proposal to “take back Japan” resonates with Modi’s “Shrestha Bharat” (Great India or Superior India), which was the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto. Both could be said to be aiming for economic development coupled with greater national strength—in other words, rich countries with military muscles.

Prime Minister Modi held a Japan-India Summit with Prime Minister Abe on September 2014, issuing a joint declaration which referred to strengthening both economic and defense cooperation. Key points in the declaration included implementing around 3.5 trillion yen in public and private investment and financing from Japan along with doubling Japan’s foreign direct investment and the number of Japanese companies in India within five years. The leaders also welcomed significant progress in the negotiations on an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, in the context of defense, called for the regularization of bilateral maritime exercises as well as Japan’s continued participation in India-US naval exercises.

Put in a nutshell, the two countries concurred in actively promoting economic relations, but differed in their opinions as to the extent of their enthusiasm on sensitive issues and policies that might provoke China. Among the various issues notwithstanding the declaration might have welcomed significant progress toward a nuclear cooperation agreement, though no progress appears to have been made on the acceptance which India sought from Japan on nuclear fuel reprocessing, or on future nuclear testing by India. The two sides also failed to agree on accelerating discussion toward the export of US-2 air-sea rescue amphibious aircraft to India or technical cooperation in relation to these.

In addition, where Japan had been pressing for the Two-Plus-Two Dialogue between deputy ministers for foreign and defense secretaries to be raised to ministerial level, the declaration went no further than noting that leaders had “decided to seek ways to intensify this dialogue”, probably as a result of India declining to provoke China. Japan conducts the similar ministerial-level dialogues with the US, Australia, Russia and France.

While Japan-India relations are now generally smooth, a few areas remain to be concerned. For example, the November 23, 2013 announcement by the Chinese government of the establishment of an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea was strongly denounced by the US, Japan and Korea, but India maintained a neutral attitude. When China clarified on November 28 that such zones were only for sea boundaries and that there was accordingly no question of one being established near the India-China land boundary, Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid took neither side, instead commenting on December 5 that India hoped the ADIZ issue would be settled peacefully. When Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera met with Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony during his visit to India early in January 2014, he apparently requested bilateral cooperation in relation to the ADIZ, but there was no reference to the ADIZ in the joint statement issued after the meeting. In the Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership which was issued following the Abe-Modi summit talks on September 1, the leaders “affirmed their shared commitment to maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, [and] civil aviation safety,” suggesting that they must have discussed the ADIZ.

The position taken by Indian Defense Minister Antony was that of the previous government, and it remains to be seen what China policy the Modi government will adopt. Sandy Gordon of the Australian National University has observed that Modi could also take the classic Indian foreign policy approach of “play[ing] both ends against the middle’…Under which scenario, India would possibly seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in terms of a border settlement, while attempting to maintain its hedge against a rise of China by cooperating with the US and Japan” (Gordon 2014). Modi’s China diplomacy has been characterized by a Japanese Indian expert as “pragmatic policy of utilizing while conciliating and restraining” (Takenaka 2014).

The rise of China has become a major driver of Japan-India rapprochement. Because the China factor seems unlikely to disappear in the coming years, the strong possibility exists that close Japan-India relations will continue. In terms of military power too, broadly speaking, Japan and India together roughly equal China, and Japan and India with the US added outweigh Chinese influence. Moreover, this situation is likely to continue. In other words, even beyond the personal relationship between leaders Abe and Modi (although the personal relationship between top leaders is important in terms of bilateral diplomatic relations), the bilateral relationship structure looks set to continue for the next several decades.

Additionally, we might not rule out the possibility that continued tension between India and Pakistan nudges India to opt for maintaining close relations with Japan in terms of quadrilateral relations among China, Pakistan, India, and Japan. Probably, the power gap separating India and China can be expected to decrease gradually. Thereafter, China, instead of direct confrontation with India, might choose to enhance its all-weather diplomatic relations with Pakistan to limit India’s expansion of international influence in Asia. China’s support to Pakistan would keep Indo-Pakistan tensions intensified or continued: tension by proxy. To cope with such circumstances, India might augment its relations with Japan as an important countermeasure. For Japan too, its close cooperation with India is desirable against the backdrop of declining US power in Asia vis-à-vis China.

Enhancing Japan-India ties would certainly advantage Japan as a country with little close bilateral ties with any country other than the US. For India too, there are merits in bolstering its relationship with Japan. The pivotal issue in the years ahead will be how the two countries utilize their bilateral relationship against the backdrop of power shift in Asia.

1 This chapter is a major revision of “Dai nana sho: Nihon no Minami Ajia Gaiko—Kinmitsuka Suru Taïin Kankei to Kongo no Kadai” [Chapter 7: Japan’s South Asia Diplomacy—Increasing Rapprochement with India and Future Issues] in Ryosei Kokubun (ed.), Nihon no Gaiko: Dai yon kan: Taïgai Seisaku Chiiki Hen [Japan’s Foreign Policy Vol. 4: Overseas Policy
2 In the first chapter "India's Contemporary External Strategy: Orientation toward a Major Power" of my book *Toward the World's Third Major Power: India's Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy* (in Japanese; Iwanami Shoten, 2015), I discuss India's foreign policy based upon India's foreign policy matrix after the Cold War.

This matrix consists of three levels—global, regional and sub-regional—each of which has its own objective and measures.

At the global level, India aspires to be a major power like the US and China. In order to achieve that objective, India needs to boost its national economic and defense capabilities—more specifically, to expand its GDP, acquire its own nuclear weapons, and strengthen its diplomatic infrastructure. India's ongoing cooperation with Russia and China in BRICS and SCO is basically designed to change the status quo in the present world system. Naturally, India tends to have a revisionist or pro-change orientation. Strategic partnership grounded in strategic autonomy is another stated objective for consolidating India's position as a major power.

At the regional level (Asia, Western Pacific, Middle East, Africa and Indian Ocean), India seeks to achieve a relative and dominant presence requiring cooperation with the US and Japan vis-à-vis China.

At the sub-regional level (South Asia), India would like to consolidate its hegemony through its own national power to the maximum possible extent while dealing with the China-Pakistan alliance and progressing sub-regional economic integration. At this level, India is basically a status quo power.


5 Interview with a person involved in Japan-India relations during the period.

6 Responding to nuclear testing by China in May and August 1995, the Japanese government "decided to freeze grant aid to China with the exception of emergency and humanitarian assistance until the cessation of Chinese nuclear testing* (*Diplomatic Bluebook 1996*) ([http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/96/seisho_1.html#2](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/96/seisho_1.html#2), accessed November 27, 2013).


11 The June 2006 report issued by the Japan-India Joint Study Group, established by both countries' governments toward the formulation of a bilateral economic partnership agreement, stresses the complementarity between the two economies. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/pdfs/jin_kenkyu.pdf#search=%E6%97%A5%E5%8D%B0%E5%85%B1%E5%90%8C%E7%A0%94%E7%9A%99%E4%BC%9A%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/pdfs/jin_kenkyu.pdf#search=%E6%97%A5%E5%8D%B0%E5%85%B1%E5%90%8C%E7%A0%94%E7%9A%99%E4%BC%9A%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8), accessed November 27, 2013.


13 In a dialogue between Yoshiro Mori and Hiroshi Hirabayashi, entitled "Nichi-In Koryunen: Indo Dokuritsu Rokujuu Shinen" [Year of Japan-India Exchange: 60th Anniversary of India's Independence] in *Jiyu Minshu* (Periodical of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan No. 657 (December 2007), then-Prime Minister Mori noted that "apparently a huge amount of groundwork was done. The main concern was the US. They evidently got approval from the US for a Japanese prime minister to visit India" (pp. 32-33).

14 Shamshad A. Khan argued though economy was dominant factor in the Japan-India relations while security was less dominant because of Japan's pacifist policies and the wariness of the two countries in trying not to affront China, their domestic changes of the two provided new opportunities of defense and security cooperation (Khan 2014).


17 Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security (an international symposium held in Tokyo by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation on October 27, 2011).

The Heads of State/Government of the RCEP participating Countries agreed to postpone by the end of 2016 at their meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on November 22, 2015.

Richard Armitage, the former Deputy Secretary of State, remarked “Abe Government is regarded as a right-wing nationalist government” at his lecture in Tokyo on May 30, 2013 (Asahi Shimbun, May 31, 2013). During his acceptance of the Hermon Kahn Award at the Hudson Institute in the US on September 25, 2013, Abe remarked “The country has increased its military expenditures, hardly transparent, by more than 10 percent, annually, for more than 20 years since 1989. And then, my government has increased its defense budget only by zero point eight percent. So call me, if you will, a right-wing militarist.” (http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/statement/2013/0925hudsonspeech.html). His remark has drawn a lot of comments and criticisms in Japan and abroad as well.

Asahi Shimbun, September 2, 2014.

From a discussion with an Indian journalist in New Delhi on February 21, 2014.
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