The Creation of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima
by the Korean Government*

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Introduction

In recent years, newly released and acquired diplomatic documents have provided the basis for numerous studies on the territorial dispute over Takeshima that manifested during the period from the end of World War II through the process of concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty into the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) diplomatic normalization talks from 1951 to 1965. Among documents acquired and released by ROK-based organizations and researchers in particular, a large number provided additional information regarding previously unclear matters. Particularly noteworthy in that regard was the Note Verbale (No. 187) sent by the US Embassy in the ROK to the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1952. It constituted an official re-iteration of the US position, invoking the so-called “The letter from Rusk”¹ (which notified the ROK government that Takeshima is a part of Japanese territory.). The Rusk letter had been sent in response to the ROK government’s protest against the September 1952 incident in which the US armed forces conducted bombing training using Takeshima as a target, thereby endangering people from Ulleungdo [translator’s note: a larger island to the west-northwest about 88 km away from Takeshima] who were allegedly fishing nearby.

A review of research, analysis, and assertions made by the government, researchers, and mass media in the ROK reveals that the main assertions are: (i) Dokdo [translator’s note: the Korean name for Takeshima, known in English as “Liancourt Rocks”] was the first Korean territory to fall victim to the Japanese aggression against Korea; upon the liberation of Korea, it returned to

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¹ United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) (RG59) Lot 54 D422, “Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles”, Box 8, Korea (in English). The content of this letter was first made public in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol.6, Part 1, 1951, p. 1203, Footnote 3, issued in 1977 and made publicly available in April 1978.
its country. It is a symbol of Korea's independence; historically it was a Korean territory but it was seized by Japan and returned to the ROK when Japan was defeated”;

(ii) Because it could not be a signatory to the Peace Treaty, the ROK became unable to receive any benefits or assurances whatsoever with regard to issues including the issue of territorial rights over “Dokdo”; and (iii) Up until the mid-1950s the United States strongly supported Japan’s position on Takeshima as a result of Japan’s vigorous diplomacy toward the United States and lobbying by Japanophiles such as William J. Sebald, US political advisor to SCAP, chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces Diplomatic Bureau, head of the Diplomatic Section of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, and chairman and member of the Allied Council for Japan (but the United States subsequently changed to take a neutral position).

The second session of Shimane Prefectural Government’s Takeshima Issue Research Group also focused on the post-war territorial dispute over Takeshima and actively acquired and studied related documents. According to those documents, there is no basis for the assertions above.

This research paper aims to critically examine the legitimacy of the ROK’s assertions by presenting new documents in addition to those already introduced in existing research to reconstruct the circumstances that led to Takeshima being omitted from the islands to be relinquished by Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Detailed examination of assertion (i) in particular highlights the process by which, despite a lack of clear historical evidence, the post-war government of the ROK asserted that Takeshima was historically the ROK’s territory and brought it inside the Syngman Rhee line, then distorted official letters and statements from the United States describing Takeshima as Japanese territory in order to fabricate new “evidence.”

(1) Pre-war—The Origins of the Territorial Dispute over Takeshima

At a routine press conference on August 12, 2011, the ROK’s minister of foreign affairs


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4 Jung Byung-joon, “William J. Sebald and the Dokdo Territorial Dispute”, Korea Focus Vol.13, No. 4, 2006, p. 80 (in English). Jung states that Japan spread inaccurate information and devised a variety of plots without the pre-ROK Korea knowing, using Sebald to actively lobby the United States in order to make it recognize Dokdo as part of Japan’s territory (p.77).
and trade, Kim Sung-hwan, alleged that Dokdo was the first victim of Japan's aggression against Korea, and that upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo returned to its country’s embrace. It was indeed the symbol of Korean independence, he claimed, and whoever touched this island should be prepared to face stubborn strong resistance from all the Korean people. Any attempt by Japan to seize Dokdo would signify re-invasion of Korea.

Kim was said to be directly quoting the official letter of 57 years earlier by former minister for foreign affairs Byun Young-tae. Likewise, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the Cairo Declaration (of 1943) regarding territories “which Japan has taken by violence and greed” as its foundation to assert the illegality of Japan’s claim to ownership. However, no old maps or documents have yet been found to prove categorically that Korea historically recognized Takeshima as its territory prior to the formal incorporation of Takeshima by Japan in 1905. In order to establish that Takeshima was “the first victim of Japan's aggression against Korea” and Japan had “taken” the islands, the ROK’s historical records must prove categorically that Takeshima was a territory of the ROK before it was incorporated into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture.

However, from the 18th century, when inspectors began to be posted regularly to Ulleungdo, old maps of Korea compiled by the government depict Usando [translator’s note: alleged by the ROK to be the previous Korean name for Dokdo] not as Takeshima(Dokdo) but as Chikusho (called “Jukdo” in the ROK) and Takeshima itself was not included in any of the geographies, old maps, and maps of coordinates produced from the end of the Kingdom of Joseon until the

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5 Supra note 2.
6 (omitted) “in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which had been triggered by Japan’s imperialistic invasion scheme toward Northeast Asia since the 1890s, disseized Dokdo and incorporated the islands into the Shimane Prefecture by issuing the Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40(1905). Japan’s annexation of Dokdo constituted a violation of international law, and cannot be justified under any circumstances, for it is a clear infringement on the undeniable sovereignty of Korea over the islands from ancient times to the recent Empire of Korea. More importantly, Japan’s actions carry no legal validity under international law.” “Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910 and the colonial rule ended in 1945 with Japan’s defeat in World War II. In 1943, while the war was still being fought, the three Allied Powers—the United States, Britain and China—issued the Cairo Declaration, vowing that Japan would “…be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” In 1945, when Korea regained its independence, Dokdo, too, was returned to Korea as a matter of course.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Dokdo: Korean Territory—The Basic Position of the Government of the Republic of Korea on Dokdo”, 2008, p. 6–7 (in English).
7 Park Chang-seok, Ulleungdo Do-hyeong (Map of Ulleungdo), 1711; “Ulleungdo Jido” (Map of Ulleungdo), Joseon-jido (Map of Korea), around 1770, etc. (all in Korean). Until then Usando had generally been depicted on the west side of Ulleungdo.
The “Seokdo” referred to in the Empire of Korea’s Imperial Edict No. 41 issued on October 25, 1900 (Seokdo being the old name for Takeshima according to the government of the ROK) has never once been directly proved to correspond to Dokdo and even in printed materials written by those not under the sway of the Japanese government, such as Korean independence campaigners under exile overseas or the Korean diaspora living in the United States, there is no mention of Takeshima as being a seized territory as far as I am aware.

Following a Cabinet decision on January 28, 1905, to incorporate Takeshima into Japan, and Shimane Prefecture’s subsequent Notification No. 40 of February 22, Takeshima’s incorporation into Shimane Prefecture was frequently reported in newspapers and academic journals. It was, moreover, the year in which the Battle of Tsushima took place, and on May 28 the outcome of the battle was decided in the vicinity of Takeshima, so the name and its location on maps came to be known throughout Japan via official gazettes, newspapers, and academic journals.

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8 Lee Kyu-won, *Ul-leung-do-oe-do* (Survey map of outer Ulleungdo), 1882; Heul-beop (Homer Hulbert), *Sa-min-pil-ji* (Knowledge necessary for all) (Baek Nam-kyu and Lee Myung-sang, Trans.), 1895; Hyun Chae, *Dae-han-ji-ji* (Geography of the Korean Empire), 1899; *Dae-han-Jeondo* (Complete map of Korea), 1899; *Dae-han-yeu-ji-do* (Map of the Korean Empire), around 1900; Jang Ji-yeon, “Ji-ri-il” (Geography 1), *Dae-han-ja-gang-hoe-wol-bo* (Korean Self-Strengthening Society monthly magazine), No. 3, 1906, pp. 25–28; Jang, *Dae-han-sin-ji-ji* (A new geography of Korea), 1907, etc. (all in Korean).

9 Even in the ROK, scholars have not been aware of this historical record for very long. It was first introduced in Lee Han-ki, *Territory of Korea*, Seoul National University Press, 1969, p. 57 (in Korean).


11 Tae-Baek-Gwang-No, *Han-guk-tong-sa* (Painful history of Korea), 1915; Park Eun-sik, *Han-guk-dok-lib-un-dong-ji-hyeol-sa* (The bloody history of the Korean independence movement), 1919–20 (both in Korean). Tae-Baek-Gwang-No was the pen-name of Park Eun-sik, the second president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. The former work put the eastern boundary of Korea at 130°50’ east longitude, while the latter work records the 1906 incident in which the party from Shimane Prefecture visited Ulleungdo and reported the news of Takeshima’s formal incorporation into the prefecture as an event pertaining to Ulleungdo. *Sin-han-min-bo* (The new Korea) (San Francisco 02.10.1909–1980) was a newspaper published in San Francisco by North and South Koreans living in the United States. All these publications had a strongly nationalist bent.

12 “Oki no shinto” (Oki’s new island), *San-in shimbun* (San-in newspaper), February 24, 1905; “Shogen,” ibid., February 25, 1905; “Oki-no-kuni kyodo no bocho” (Oki boundary expanded), *Oki Shimpo* (Oki news), No. 16, March, 1905, etc. (all in Japanese). Thereafter, the *San-in Shimbun* continued to include frequent articles relating to Takeshima.


14 “Correction,” *Official gazette*, June 5, 1905 (in Japanese). The initial account of the report of Togo
magnets. The name Takeshima would naturally have come to the notice of the more than 300 Koreans including members of legation staff and foreign students said to be living in Japan in 1905, and the official gazettes were also reported in Korea. However, there is nothing in the historical records to suggest that Koreans appeared to harbor any reservations with regard to the territorial incorporation of Takeshima by Japan.

In March 1906, a party from Shimane Prefecture stopped off at Ulleungdo as it was going to inspect Takeshima and informed Sim Heung-Taek, the magistrate of Uldo-gun [translator’s note: the Korean county within which Ulleungdo was located], of the incorporation of Takeshima. The magistrate filed a report notifying the government of the Empire of Korea about the incorporation of Takeshima, and the government ordered an investigation, but there is no evidence of the Japanese resident-general of Korea subsequently being approached with any inquiry regarding the matter, let alone any protest. The ROK government and the researchers who support its position assert that “Korea’s situation was such that it had been deprived of its diplomatic power and it was therefore not able to lodge any diplomatic protest”, but this assertion is not based on historical records.

Heihachiro, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, received by telegram on the morning of May 29 of the same year, had referred to Liancourt Rocks, but this was corrected to Takeshima.

“Riyankorudo iwa” (Liancourt Rocks), Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), June 1, 1905; “Tenchi genko” Niroku Shimbun (Niroku newspaper), June 16, 1905; “Daikaisen no ato (matuse)” (The site of a great sea battle (Matsue)), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo Asahi newspaper), June 25, 1905; “Shin sagamimaru to takeshimamaru” (The new Sagami-maru and Takeshima-maru vessels), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 1905, etc. (all in Japanese).


Indeed, the Empire of Korea was at that time frequently lodging protests and taking other administrative and diplomatic measures to address tree felling and other acts by Japanese citizens that had become common on Ulleungdo since before 1900. However, right up to the Uldo-gun rule book (Uldogunjeolmok; 1902), a document of the Empire of Korea’s Ministry of Home Affairs indicating administrative guidelines for Uldo-gun that was discovered in Korea in 2010, there were no statements whatsoever indicating that islands such as Takeshima, which was 90 km away, were included within Korea’s area of administration21. Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that any measures were taken to tackle fishing by Japanese citizens around Takeshima, which had most likely already started by 1903, or surveys by the Ministry of the Navy of Japan22.

Moreover, a Japanese diplomatic note of October 1905 records that the Korean minister for foreign affairs, Park Che-soon protested verbally to Hayashi Gonsuke, Japan’s deputy ambassador to Korea, as well as in a letter to the British deputy ambassador23, about the description of Korea’s status included in the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequently, in February 1906, a Japanese resident-general of Korea was appointed, and from March 13 the Council for Improvement of Korean Administration met every Tuesday, providing a forum for ministers of the Empire of Korea’s State Council to directly discuss a genuinely diverse range of matters including Korea’s judicial system with residents-general such as Ito Hirobumi and Japanese advisors24. Moreover, the historical records of the Empire of Korea’s State Council (the Ministry of Home Affairs) include records stating that enquiries were made to the resident-general and others on the Japanese side with regard to a wide range of matters that came up involving the Japanese. Particularly notable in this regard was the fact that the Empire of Korea

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24 JACAR, Ref. A04017269100, Tankosho—Kankoku shisei kaizen ni kansuru kyogikai yoryo hikki—kankoku genro no ito tokan shotaikai sekiyo danwa yoryo (Monograph—Notes on key points from the Council for Improvement of Korean Administration—Key points of discussions at banquet of Korean elder statesmen attended by resident-general Ito (National Archives of Japan) (in Japanese).
made inquiries to the resident-general about a land transaction at Jukbyeon coast, Uljin-gun. In December 1905, the Korean minister of internal affairs, Lee Ji-yong, suspected that a Japanese citizen had illegally obtained land on the former site of the Japanese Navy’s watchtower. He reported it to Park Che-soon, who was by then prime minister, and unlike with Takeshima, Park made an inquiry to the resident-general. As a result, Park received the response that no land transaction had taken place, and in April of the same year Lee received a report to that effect25.

In July 1906, soon after the incorporation of Takeshima, when Ikeda Juzaburo, chief of the Administrative Bureau of Communications of the Japanese resident-general, inquired about the islands belonging to the county of Uldo-gun and the year and month of the county office’s establishment, the official response of the Empire of Korea was “The islands under that county’s jurisdiction are Jukdo and Seokdo, and the county extends 60 ri from east to west and 40 ri from north to south, totaling over 200 ri.” Thus the response excluded Takeshima, at a distance of 90 km from Ulleungdo, from the area included in Uldo-gun26. Yet, if one follows the ROK government’s subsequent assertion [translator’s note: that Takeshima was originally under Korean jurisdiction], the Uldo-gun magistrate Sim Heung-Taek would have committed a blunder by overlooking the incorporation of Takeshima into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture for more than a year. However, there was no evidence that he suffered any kind of punishment by the Korean central government, and what is more, he continued to receive pay rises and promotions steadily thereafter27.

In light of these facts, it would be most natural to infer that the investigation by the government of the Empire of Korea after it had received the report from the magistrate referring to

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26 “Facts on arrangement of Uldo County,” Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwangsung newspaper), July 13, 1906 (in Korean); this document was discovered by Sugino Yomei; “Ishijima=Dokdo setsu hitei no kijutsu mitsukaru” (Description negating the theory that Seokdo corresponds to Dokdo discovered), San-in Chuo Shimo (San-in Chuo News), February 22, 2008 (in Japanese); “Ikeda’s official letter,” Dae-han-mae-il-sin-bo (The Korea daily news), July 13, 1906 (in Korean).

27 Sim Heung-Taek was appointed to the post of Uldo-gun magistrate and sonin (senior official) of the 6th rank on January 26, 1903 (Dae-han-je-guk-gwan-bo (Official gazette of the Empire of Korea), January 29, 1903) and was promoted to the post of Hoengseong-gun magistrate and sonin (senior official) of the 3rd rank on March 13, 1907 (ibid., March 15, 1907). Furthermore, on October 1, 1906 he received a pay increase to wage grade five (ibid., October 13, 1906), and a further increase to wage grade four on March 14, 1907 (ibid., March 27, 1907). I was informed about this document and related information by Matsuzawa Kanji.
“Dokdo…being under our jurisdiction,” revealed that Dokdo was neither an alternative name for Ulleungdo, nor was it Chikusho (Jukdo), which was 2 km off the east coast of Ulleungdo, nor was it any of the islands or reefs in the waters around Ulleungdo. It was, rather, an island outside the Empire of Korea’s territory that had never before appeared in any maps of Korea. Thus the central government must have noticed the report by the local official was mistaken in saying Dokdo was an island “under our jurisdiction,” and it did not lodge any protest.

This is also evident from the petition of the Korean minister of internal affairs, Lee Geon-ha, for Imperial Edict No. 41 of 1900, which raised the status of Ulleungdo to a gun (county). He stipulated an area that excluded Dokdo from the new Uldo-gun, saying “the area of the islands concerned should be 80 ri in length and 50 ri in width.” The name Dokdo that first appeared as the written name for Takeshima in the magistrate’s report had not existed in any Korean records until then, and despite the fact that newspaper articles and other sources publicized the magistrate’s report and the directive from the Empire of Korea’s Ministry of Home Affairs immediately afterwards, there were no records of this matter whatsoever subsequently. Even during the period when Korea was annexed by Japan, the issue of territorial rights was raised with regard to another island, Tsushima, but in the records relating to the issue of Ulleungdo’s ownership, there is nothing referring to Takeshima. This is further underlined by the fact that...

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28 "Mu-byeon-bu-yu“ (無変不有), Dae-han-mae-il-sin-mun (The Korea daily newspaper), May 1, 1906 and “Ur-sui-bo -go-ne-bu”(鬱倅報告内部), the Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwang sung newspaper), May 9, 1906 reported Sim’s report and the content of the directive by the ministry of internal affairs, but the accounts show no accurate understanding of the location of “Dokdo” or the fact that it was an uninhabited island. Hwang Hyun’s O-ha-gi-mun (梧下記聞) and Mae-cheon-ya-rok (梅泉野録) (Vol. 5, April 5, 1906) (both 1906) also record the articles in the Hwang-sung-sin-mun, but the same applies (all sources in Korean).

29 “The appeal of an isolated island—Visits to Tsushima Island (5)—Tsushima Island definitely Korean territory in ancient times,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), August 7, 1926 (in Korean). Moreover, according to Morita Yoshio, Syngman Rhee cited the restoration of Tsushima Island as one item when describing the provisional government’s policy toward Japan in his letter of November 1942 to 胡世沢, vice-minister for foreign affairs of the government of the Republic of China (Morita Yoshio, “Nikkan kankei” (Japan-Korea Relations), edited by Yoshizawa Seijiro, NIHON GAIKO SHI DAI 28-KAN—KOWAGO NO GAIKO 1—TAI REKKOKU KANKEI (JO) ((Diplomatic history of Japan) Vol. 28—Diplomacy after peace 1—Relations with other nations (first part)), Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973, p. 23.

30 There were many articles that referred to territorial disputes with Japan during Ulleungdo’s history: Lee Eul, “Ul-leung-do-tam-bang-gi” (Ulleungdo report), Gae-Byeok (開闢) No. 41, 1923; Lee Yoon-jae, “The marvellous An Yong-bok—Korean diplomatic issues of two hundred years ago, focusing on Ulleungdo,” Dong-gwang (Eastern Light), No. 1 & No. 2, 1926; “Island pilgrimage toward Ulleungdo (6)—Lush forests on every cliff, just like an enchanted land at sea,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), September 6, 1928; Su-chun-san-in, “An Yong-bok—The pleasant hero of the sea who won back Ulleungdo with his eloquence,” Byeol-Gun-Gon (別乾坤) No. 65, 1933; Chwi Un-saeng (翠雲生), “Seol-hwan Ul-leung-do-bi-sa” (Seol-hwa (雪禍)—A secret history of Ulleungdo), Byeol-Gun-Gon (別乾坤), No. 70, 1934, etc. (all in Korean). Most of these articles alleged that Ulleungdo had come close to being seized by Japan, but Korea had managed to take the island back; however,
even among independence campaigners and the diaspora living in the United States, there were no Koreans who asserted Korea’s territorial rights over Takeshima.

As the above account shows, the Korean historical records found to date contain no evidence that Korea officially owned Takeshima in 1905 or earlier. When the ROK government claims that Takeshima was “the first victim of Japan's aggression against Korea,” or that Japan took Takeshima “by violence and greed” or “invaded” the island, it is therefore alleging actions that were by definition impossible.

(2) From the War’s End to the Signing of the Peace Treaty

So, is it true to say that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo returned to its country’s embrace”? In fact, even during the period of US military administration immediately after the war, when Korea was supposedly “liberated” from Japanese rule, Takeshima was still not depicted in Korean maps and documents. It was not included within the eastern limit of Korean territory specified in geography textbooks and other references of the period. Indeed, Korean textbooks and maps during the US military administration set Ulleungdo as the country’s eastern limit, placing Takeshima outside the national territory.

This lack of awareness of Takeshima finally changed in the summer of 1947, when the citizens of Ulleungdo complained to the military government in North Gyeongsang Province that Japanese citizens had traveled over to Takeshima and asserted their proprietary rights over the island. This was the beginning of the Takeshima issue in the post-war ROK. Subsequently, a range of research was conducted within the ROK, including surveys by the Corea Alpine Club, there was no mention whatsoever of the present-day Takeshima.

31. Kim Jin-bok, Complete map of Korea, Joong-ang Publishing, 1946; (in Korean), etc. According to Jung Byung-jun in “The Post-Liberation ROK’s Awareness of Dokdo and Policy Toward It (1945–51)”, Journal of Northeast Asian History 5-2, 2008, p. 3 (in English), the first map issued in hangul (the Korean alphabetic script) after liberation was the (Map attached to the geography of Korea) published by the interim government’s printing office and edited by the education ministry’s editorial office. He states that he was not able to view the map itself, but it is very likely that Dokdo was not included in it.

32. Jung Hong-heon et al., Jo-seon-ji-ri (Geography of Korea), Jeong-eum-sa, 1946, etc. (in Korean).

33. Supra notes 15 and 16, No Do-yang, Jung-deung-guk-to-ji-ri-bu-do (National geographic student atlas for middle school), Mun-u-sa, 1947; Choi Nam-sun, Jo-seon-sang-sik-mun-dap (Questions and answers regarding common knowledge of Korea), 1947; Choi, Jo-seon-sang-sik (Common knowledge of Korea), 1948, etc. (all in Korean).

34. Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008), pp. 3–5.

but historical evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima remained inconclusive. Up to 1952, the year the peace treaty went into effect, the ROK identified Sambongdo, which was another name for Ulleungdo, as the old name for Takeshima\(^{36}\), and the key current assertion that the island referred to as Usando in old maps and documents is the modern-day Takeshima did not appear until 1953, once the territorial dispute had erupted\(^{37}\).

On June 8, 1948 an incident occurred in which a large number of Korean fishermen who had landed on Takeshima were killed or injured by US armed forces bombing. The US forces apologized and paid compensation to the victims or their families, and subsequently the ROK used this as grounds to assert that the United States recognized the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima. According to reports at that time, it claimed that Takeshima was the ROK’s territory for a number of reasons, including the facts that (i) Takeshima had been called Sambongdo since ancient times, (ii) as a result of the local dialect, the name Dolseom (Seokdo) had changed to Dokseom (Dokdo), and (iii) the victims were Korean citizens and the US forces dealt with the ROK to resolve the matter\(^{38}\). However, the key assertions of the ROK government during negotiations with the United States over reparations immediately after the signing of the peace treaty were that Takeshima was under Korean jurisdiction and comprised islets that “belonged to” Ulleungdo, that in 1905 Japan “seized” Takeshima for the purposes of the Russo-Japanese War, and that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) 1033 to Japan placed Takeshima in the “Korean fishing zone.”\(^{39}\)

SCAPIN 1033 demarcated the boundary within which Japanese fishing boats could operate. According to the so-called “MacArthur line,” Japanese vessels were prohibited from approaching or landing on Takeshima, but it did not designate the waters outside the line (i.e., on the Korean side) as an area in which Korean fishing boats could operate exclusively, and it also did not stipulate territory. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was not authorized to transfer territory, and the fifth paragraph of SCAPIN 1033 specified that “[t]he present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of

\(^{36}\) Song Seok-ha, “Seeking the ancient, historic site of Ulleungdo,” Guk-je-bo-do (International Report), January 1948, Part 3, No. 1 (new year’s issue; in Korean), etc. In the section on the “Ulleungdo-Jaeng-gye” (Ulleungdo dispute) in his set of books entitled Chun-gwan-ji (春官志) (1745), which comprised a compilation of the records of the ministry of rites (the governmental department charged with diplomacy and protocol), Lee Maeng-hyu stated that Sam-bong-do was Ulleungdo.


\(^{38}\) Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008), pp. 18–21.

\(^{39}\) Supra Note 37, p. 53.
national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area.” This was backed up by the August 1947 activity report by the US armed forces administration and the November 27, 1952 letter to the US Embassy in Korea from the US Army Forces Far East (communicated as the opinion of Mark Clark, commanding general, US Army Forces Far East and commander in chief, UN Command). Both of these documents stated that SCAPIN 1033 did not stipulate territory.

In 1951 the ROK government asserted its basis for the ownership of Takeshima by employing SCAPIN 677, which excluded Takeshima from the scope of Japanese administrative authority. However, the sixth paragraph of this instruction note again stated that “[n]othing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.” Furthermore, the fact that this instruction note bears no relation whatsoever to territorial rights over Takeshima is indicated by the fact that on February 13, 1946, the officer in charge of the Government Section at the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) replied to an inquiry by a liaison officer of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “the directive relating to administrative separation was issued merely for the administrative convenience of the Allied Powers and it had nothing to do with the territorial issue, which should be decided by means of a peace treaty to be concluded at a later date.” Moreover, the article reporting SCAPIN 677 in The Dong-a Ilbo (East Asia daily), then the leading Korean newspaper, did not mention that Takeshima had been specifically cited in the instruction note; thus Takeshima

40 NARA (RG331), GHQ/SCAP Records, United States Army Forces in Korea, No. 1, Aug. 1947 (U.S. Army Military Government—South Korea Interim Government activities; in English). According to this report, “Formerly belonging to Japan, a recent occupation directive which drew an arbitrary line demarcating Japanese and Korean fishing waters placed Tok-to within the Korean zone. Final disposition of the islands’ jurisdiction awaits the peace treaty.” However, the US armed forces administration in Jeoson (Korea) was misunderstanding the nature of the MacArthur line (M line) when it described the seas that lay outside the M line from the Japanese point of view as Korean fishing waters. The M line was drawn up under the exclusive authority of SCAP and was supposed to be beyond any interference by other countries (Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki—Ri shoban rain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime perceptions of South Korea—Centered on the Syngman Rhee line problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta nenpo (Annual report, the Research Center for Korean Studies), 2011, p. 55 (in Japanese).


42 Supra note 37, p. 53.


44 “Reduced Japanese territory—Only the mainland remains as the country is torn apart,” The Dong-a
was clearly of no concern to Korean people at that time. Subsequently, on July 6, 1951, SCAPIN 2160 designated Takeshima as a bombing range, and this was notified to the Japanese government.

Meanwhile, on November 21, 1945, the Japanese government established the Research Committee on Peace Treaty Issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and started preparing for the upcoming treaty signing. The committee prepared seven booklets of documents regarding territorial issues, which it submitted to the United States. Included among these was a document entitled “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV. Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea” (June 1947), which cited the two islands of Takeshima and Ulleungdo in the Sea of Japan, describing their relative geographies, histories, and industries in turn. It stated that Korea could not assert its territorial rights over Takeshima because, unlike Ulleungdo, “Liancourt Rocks” had no Korean name and did not appear on any maps drawn up in Korea. On the last page of the relevant booklet an old map by Nagakubo Sekisui (Revised Complete Map of Japanese Lands and Roads) was attached. In 1946 the election regulations for the lower house of the Japanese Diet (the national legislature) stipulated “Takeshima within Goka Village under the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture” (Imperial Ordinance No. 97) and in the same year the Ministry of Commerce and Industry recorded prospecting rights for two Japanese citizens including Hidaka Fusaichi to mine such resources as silver, copper, and iron sulfide.

As it dealt with the aftermath of World War II, the Korean government at the time was focusing especially on issues relating to the return of national assets and demands for reparations from Japan; its demands in terms of territorial issues centered on frequent demands for the “return” of the island of Tsushima, rather than Takeshima. On January 23, 1948, 60 members of the South

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ilbo (East Asia daily), February 5, 1946 (in Korean).

45 On March 22, 1951, the US Pacific Air Force Headquarters drew up the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) to include Takeshima, and on June 20 the second-in-command of the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) requested the ROK government for permission to use Takeshima as a bombing range. The ROK’s view is that this action by the US armed forces constitutes proof that the United States recognized Takeshima as Korean territory. However, the US forces had no authority to determine territorial boundaries, and as stated in the aforementioned activity report by the US armed forces administration, they assumed that territorial boundaries would be defined in the subsequent peace treaty.

46 JACAR, Ref. A04017805000, “Showa niju nen chokurei dai nana hyaku nana go (Shugiingiin senkyo ho shikorei chu kaisei no ken)” (1945 Imperial ordinance No. 707 (Amendment of enforcement ordinance for election law of the members of the House of Representatives)), Original with imperial signature and seal; “Showa nijuichi nen chokurei dai kyuju nana go” (1946 Imperial ordinance no. 97) (National Archives of Japan; both in Japanese).

Joseon Interim Legislature signed and submitted a “petition for the return of Tsushima Island”\(^{48}\) and in the Diet on February 17 the same year they proposed requesting the return of Tsushima Island at the peace conference with Japan\(^{49}\). In a press conference immediately after the new government of the ROK was established on August 17, 1948, Syngman Rhee stated that “Tsushima was the ROK’s territory”\(^{50}\), and in response to that statement, on September 10 of the same year, the presidential envoy held a press conference in Tokyo, where he proposed that Tsushima should belong to the ROK\(^{51}\). Moreover, on January 7, 1949, Syngman Rhee strongly asserted his country’s territorial rights over Tsushima, saying in his new year’s press conference that “Tsushima should be returned”\(^{52}\). Meanwhile, on August 5, 1948, members of a private organization called the Patriotic Old Men’s Association sent a petition to Douglas MacArthur [translator’s note: the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] in which they called for the return of Dokdo and Parangdo, as well as Tsushima\(^{53}\).

This demonstrates, therefore, that there was no evidence the Korean government recognized Takeshima as part of its own country’s territory immediately after World War II and it was only after an incident relating to territorial rights occurred in the summer of 1947 that it became aware of the existence of “Dokdo” for the first time. Moreover, Japan had clearly indicated the historical basis for its sovereignty of Takeshima to the Allied Powers early on, whereas Korea (which continually insisted on the return of Tsushima from Japan) failed to give a clear historical basis for ownership of Takeshima—an island which did not appear on any of its own maps—instead relying mainly on SCAP’s directives to provide the basis for its territorial claims. Thus the ROK’s assertion that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo came back to its country’s embrace” does not hold true either.

\(^{48}\)“Tsushima Island was originally Korean territory—Should its return be demanded in the peace conference with Japan?” Seoul-sin-mun (Seoul newspaper), January 25, 1948 (in Korean).

\(^{49}\)“Proposal to request the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 19, 1948 (in Korean).

\(^{50}\)“Tsushima no katsujo—Ri daitoryo yokyu” (President Rhee to demand that Tsushima is ceded), Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), August 19, 1948. The Asahi Shimbun (Asahi newspaper) article of August 19, 1948, “Tsushima no henkan—Ri daitoryo yokyu” (President Rhee to demand that Tsushima is returned), reported that on August 18 Rhee responded to a question by an AP reporter, saying that he would demand the return of Tsushima.

\(^{51}\)“Tsushima Island was Korean territory 300 years ago: Its return to the ROK is reasonable in terms of national defense,” Kyung-hyang-sin-mun (Kyunghyang newspaper), September 12, 1948 (in Korean).

\(^{52}\)“Plans for participation in peace conference with Japan—President Rhee states in new year press conference that he will demand the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), January 8, 1949 (in Korean).

\(^{53}\)“Request for Arrangement of Lands Between Korea and Japan” (Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Japan, 1945–1949: Department of State decimal file 894; in English).
(3) Preparation of the draft peace treaty and the ROK government’s actions

The draft peace treaty went through several rounds of revisions\(^\text{(54)}\), after which the US draft dated March 23, 1951, was passed on to the ROK government. The ROK government then sent a letter dated April 26 requesting amendments to the draft\(^\text{(55)}\). These included a request to specify Tsushima as ROK territory, but there was no mention of Takeshima, and the activities record of the Committee to Investigate Peace with Japan established by the Korean diplomatic mission in Japan made no mention of Takeshima in connection with any territorial issue\(^\text{(56)}\). The islets were also not mentioned in the various countries’ opinions with regard to Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the joint US-UK peace treaty draft of May 3 (which excluded the ROK’s request regarding Tsushima). Subsequently, on July 9, the revised US-UK draft dated June 14 was presented to Korea via Yang You-chan, the ROK ambassador to the United States. As the request for Tsushima had been rejected out of hand by the United States, on July 19 the ROK agreed to withdraw it, but sent a letter requesting that Takeshima and Parangdo instead be deemed to belong to Korea\(^\text{(57)}\). Around the same time, Rhee sent a personal letter dated August 3 to ambassador Yang expressing fury that the request for Tsushima had been rejected\(^\text{(58)}\). Yet there was nothing in the eight-page letter referring to Takeshima. Thereafter, the opinions of the various countries relating to the US-UK joint draft were compiled into the “Treaty Changes” document dated August 7, and the ROK’s requests for Takeshima and Parangdo were included.

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\(^\text{57}\) Supra note 54. The ROK government currently asserts its territorial rights based on the reasoning that Takeshima is an island belonging to Ulleungdo, but this written opinion indicates that in fact there was no such recognition. Prior to this, moreover, the letter from Mr. Boggs of the Department of State’s Geographical Office to Robert A. Fearey dated July 16, 1951, stated “If it is decided to give them [the Liancourt Rocks/Takeshima] to Korea, it would be necessary only to add ‘and Liancourt Rocks’ at the end of Art. 2, par. (a).” This again makes it clear that Takeshima was designated as Japanese territory in the peace treaty (NARA [RG59], Department of State, Decimal File 1950–54, 694.001/7-1351; in English), and the preamble to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed in 1965 also invokes the peace treaty provisions.

\(^\text{58}\) Supra note 55, pp. 330–331.
in Article 2, Paragraph a\(^{59}\). However, other countries’ opinions with regard to the paragraph were not recorded.

In talks on July 19, the ROK requested John Foster Dulles to specify Takeshima and Parangdo as territories to be relinquished by Japan in the peace treaty. Dulles replied that provided there was historical justification, that would not be a problem, but a subsequent investigation conducted within the Department of State revealed that the ROK had no historical basis whatsoever for its requests. Robert A. Fearey of the US Embassy in Japan wrote a letter dated August 3 to the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, John M. Allison, informing him that Mr. Boggs, a geographer in the Department of State had “tried all resources in Washington, but had been unable to identify Dokdo (Takeshima) and Parangdo”. Fearey said he also “asked the Korean Embassy and they told him they believed Dokdo was near Ulleungdo, or Takeshima Rock, and suspected that Parangdo was too. Apparently, he said, that was all they could learn short of sending a cable to Muccio”\(^{60}\). In response, on August 7, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson notified Muccio that “Neither our geographers nor [the] Korean Embassy have been able to locate Dokdo and Parangdo Islands. Therefore unless we hear immediately [we] cannot consider this Korean proposal to confirm their sovereignty over these islands.”\(^{61}\) The following day Takeshima’s coordinates latitude and longitude were received, and at the same time the US was notified that the ROK government had withdrawn its demand for Parangdo. Thus it was as a result of this course of events that finally on August 10 the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs Dean Rusk formally notified Ambassador Yang of the US view that Takeshima was Japanese territory, stating (in the Rusk letter) that Takeshima had not been

\(^{59}\) NARA (RG59) Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Records Relating to the Japanese Peace Treaties, 1946–1952, Lot 78D173, Box 2 (in English). In recent years there have been occasional comments on the Internet to the effect that the Rusk letter is invalid because it was not disclosed to the Allies and the Japanese government at the time and because Secretary of State Dulles wrote in an internal memorandum a couple of years later that the US view regarding Takeshima was simply that of one of many signatories to the treaty. However, the Rusk letter was a diplomatic document exchanged between the US and the ROK in the process of drafting the peace treaty and it serves only as a supplementary means of interpreting the treaty, attesting to the course of events by which Takeshima was designated as Japanese territory as a result of the two governments discussing the issue of the attribution of Takeshima. As such, it was not the type of document that would usually have been made available to third parties, let alone one for which the issue of validity or invalidity was applicable. Bearing in mind, moreover, that the treaty was drafted, agreed, and signed after incorporating the opinions of the relevant countries other than the United States to which the draft was sent, it is clear that these assertions do not hold true. It is also significant that the 1965 preamble to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea invokes the relevant peace treaty provisions.

\(^{60}\) NARA Confidential U.S. Lot 58 D118 and D637, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Reel 39 (in English). “Muccio” refers to John J. Muccio, the US ambassador in the ROK’s Pusan.

\(^{61}\) Supra note 55, p. 110.
claimed by Korea as its own territory prior to 1905. Subsequently, on August 16, Yang and Rusk held talks, but no opinions relating to Takeshima were recorded.

Thus, up until July 19, 1951, there was no evidence that the ROK government made any official assertions of territorial rights over Takeshima directed toward third parties. Moreover, the peace treaty was signed without any of the other countries involved raising any objection to the fact that Takeshima was excluded from the territories to be relinquished by Japan. However, perhaps in an attempt to avoid US intervention in a dispute between the ROK and Japan, The Rusk letter notifying the official view of the United States was not made public until 1978. As a result, therefore, it failed to prevent the ROK’s illegal occupation of Takeshima and perpetuated the cause of conflict thereafter.

The only historical document of this period indicating the Japanese government’s assertions with regard to the sovereignty over Takeshima is “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV. Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea,” and no records have been found to suggest that Japan “actively” lobbied the Allied Powers. As demonstrated by a series of US Department of State documents, the Korean government asserted its territorial rights over not only Tsushima, but also over Takeshima at the treaty drafting stage. And despite the fact that it was given the benefit of an opportunity to explain the historical evidence for its ownership of Dokdo (Takeshima), which did not appear on any of its maps, it failed to do so. These, therefore, are the likely reasons why Takeshima was designated as Japanese territory in the peace treaty. Accordingly, the ROK’s second and third assertions as described in this research paper’s introduction are also incorrect.

Having had both its ownership of Takeshima and the continuing existence of the MacArthur line rejected during the peace treaty drafting process, the ROK government then decided on the day before the treaty’s signing to establish a fisheries protection zone. This fisheries protection zone added a vast expanse of the Sea of Japan that was not a major fishing area, but included Takeshima, to the fisheries jurisdiction zone already created by the ROK’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That fisheries jurisdiction zone had already added Socotra Rock (a submerged rock that the ROK asserted was Parangdo, located in a valuable fishing area in the

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62 For more details of the series of events, see supra note 54.

63 The actions taken within the ROK government at the time are analyzed in detail in Fujii Kenji, “Ri shoban rain senpu e no katei ni kansuru kenkyu” (Research on the process leading to proclamation of the Syngman Rhee line), Chosen gakuhō (Journal of the Academic Association of Koreanology in Japan), Vol. 185; 2002, and Fujii, “Ri shoban rain sengen to kankoku seifu” (The declaration of the Syngman Rhee line and the ROK government), Dai-ni-ki Takeshima Mondai ni Kansuru Chosa Kenkyu Saishu Hokoku-sho (Final Report of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue (second session)), Shimane Prefecture, 2011 (both in Japanese).
Yellow Sea) to the area within the MacArthur line. Kim Dong-jo, leader of the Government Affairs Bureau in the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalls that the reason they included Takeshima within the Syngman Rhee line despite opposition from some quarters was that they had become convinced it was necessary to create a precedent for exercising sovereignty.

As described above, therefore, a mere two months before the signing of the peace treaty, the ROK demanded that Takeshima, rather than Tsushima, be specified as one of the islands to be relinquished by Japan. However, it was unable to respond to inquiries regarding Takeshima’s exact location and a clear historical basis for its sovereignty over the islets, and consequently its demand was rejected by the United States. Then, immediately before the peace treaty was signed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to expand the ROK’s territory by making preparations to incorporate Takeshima into its territory by force under the name of fisheries protection.

(4) Actions after the signing of the peace treaty and the ROK’s tricks

The capture and detention of Japanese fishing boats by the ROK that had started in 1947 took place even more frequently after the Syngman Rhee line was declared, while the ROK government maintained an uncompromising stance with regard to Takeshima, and started to construct an ex post facto basis for its actions to make up for the weakness of its historical grounds.

On September 21, 1951, following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, the ROK minister for foreign affairs, Byun Young-tae, again contacted Muccio to assert his country’s ownership of Takeshima. The “definitive” grounds he gave for his argument were largely based on SCAPIN 677, followed by the fact that Takeshima had been placed on “the Korean side” of the MacArthur line, and also the fact that after the bombing incident by the US military aircraft over Takeshima in 1948, the US armed forces had apologized to the Korean victims. He also alleged that substantial documented evidence existed to demonstrate that Takeshima was a Korean territory during the several hundred years before it was “surreptitiously incorporated into Japan” in 1905. However, in a letter dated October 3 from the US Embassy in the ROK’s Pusan to the Department of State, the embassy official who dealt

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64 Kim Dong-jo, Hoe-sang-30-nyeon Han-il-hoe-dam (30 Years of ROK-Japan talks recollected), Joong-ang-ilbo-sa, Seoul, 1986, p. 16 (in Korean), translated into Japanese by Hayashi Takehiko, “Kan-nichi no wakai—Nikkan kosho 14 nen no kiroku” (Reconciliation between the ROK and Japan—A record of 14 years of Korea-Japan negotiations), Simul Press, 1993, p. 11.

with the matter wrote “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not possess a compilation of such ‘evidence’ at this time. Although it was pointed out to the Minister that the Embassy would welcome the submission of such ‘evidence’ for transmittal to the Department, it appears doubtful that such information will be forthcoming.” Subsequently, in the preparatory discussions held from October 20, 1951 prior to the ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks, the ROK’s proposal to replace the MacArthur line with an alternative zone excluding Japanese fishing boats from international waters was rejected. In a special committee meeting of the House of Representatives on October 22, Kusaba Ryuen, the parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, who served as plenipotentiary advisor to the San Francisco peace conference, expressed the opinion that the peace treaty clearly confirmed Takeshima as Japanese territory. Spurred by his words, an Asahi Shim bun newspaper reporter went ashore on Takeshima and had an article printed in the newspaper on November 2466. The ROK government issued a condemnation following the article, but the grounds it gave for Korean ownership were SCAPIN 677 and the fact that the governor of the ROK’s Gyeongsang Province had built a memorial monument to the 1948 bombing incident67.

Then on January 18, 1952, the ROK declared the Syngman Rhee line. The line excluded Japanese fishing boats from valuable fishing areas in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, while at the same time asserting national sovereignty over an extensive area of international waters included within the line and also designating Takeshima and Socotra Rock as ROK territory. By declaring the line, the ROK asserted its intention to maintain and wield its national sovereignty, as well as its fisheries jurisdiction rights placing the marine products and fisheries industries under the control of the government in order to preserve resources68.

66 “Nihon ni kaeru mujin no takeshima—Kuhaku junen no shima no zenyo o saguru” (The uninhabited Takeshima returns to Japan—Exploring 10 blank years in the island’s full story), Asahi Shim bun (Asahi newspaper), November 24, 1951. For more details, see Terao Munefuyu, “Hi wa tsuketa kedo—Takeshima shuzai ho” (I did light it: Supplement to Takeshima reporting), Asahi Shim bun Osaka head office local news section, ed., Osaka Shakai-bu Sengo Nijunen-shi Nakanoshima Sanchome San-banchi (Osaka local news section history of the 20 years after the war, Nakanoshima 3-chome, 3-banchi), 1966, pp. 168–175 (both articles in Japanese).


68 Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki—Ri shoban rain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime perceptions of South Korea: Centered on the Syngman Rhee line problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta nenpo (Annual report, the Research Center for Korean Studies), 2011, p. 58 (in Japanese). Socotra Rock is a submerged rock located southwest of Jeju Island in the East China Sea. At the time the Syngman Rhee line was declared, the ROK government called this submerged rock Parangdo and asserted that it was Korean territory. The ROK has now named it Ieodo and built a maritime research station there. This has resulted in friction with China, which calls it the Suyan Rock.
In response, the Japanese protested by sending a Note Verbale dated January 28, 1952, indicating their concern about the illegality of the Syngman Rhee line and the occupation of Takeshima. The United States also sent a letter on February 11, expressing considerable concern about the ROK wielding administrative authority over an extensive area of international waters\(^69\). On February 12, the ROK government issued a Note Verbale rebutting the Japanese government’s concerns, but with regard to Takeshima it made only a brief assertion of its territorial rights based on SCAPIN 677 and the MacArthur line. On April 25 of the same year, three days before the peace treaty went into effect, the MacArthur line was abolished, and on the same day the Japanese government issued a rebuttal to the ROK government’s Note Verbale. However, the ROK government was unable to respond to the rebuttal with any clear indication of the historical basis for its sovereignty over Takeshima. On May 20, the Shimane prefectural government submitted a petition to the minister for foreign affairs and the minister for agriculture and forestry asking for Takeshima, which it described as within the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture, to be excluded from the bombing exercise range of the US armed forces in Japan\(^70\). However, on July 26 1952, notification was received that, pursuant to an administrative agreement between the United States and Japan, Takeshima had been re-designated as one of the marine exercise and training zones to be provided to the US forces in Japan by the Japanese nation\(^71\).

On September 15, 1952, an incident occurred whereby some people from Ulleungdo who were fishing around Takeshima narrowly escaped injury by a US bomber conducting exercises over the islets. At the time, the second Ulleungdo/Dokdo academic survey team sponsored by the Korea Alpine Club was staying in Ulleungdo to conduct a survey; they reported the incident to the ROK government on September 20, and on November 10 the ROK government issued a protest to the US Embassy in Pusan alleging that the bombing had targeted “ROK territory”\(^72\).

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\(^69\) “Issues associated with the proclamation of the peace line 1953–55” (Documents of the ROK relating to the Japan-ROK talks), 0119–0122 (in Korean).


\(^71\) For more details, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/g_beigun.html (as of February 16, 2012; in Japanese). http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html (in English)

The correspondence between the US Embassy and the Department of State relating to territorial sovereignty over Takeshima in relation to this incident are explained in the final report of the first session of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue\(^73\). It indicates that the content of the Rusk letter of August 10, 1951 (i.e., the US position that Takeshima was Japanese territory) had been communicated to diplomats in diplomatic missions overseas, and had been notified to the ROK government for a second time on December 4. The original text of the Note Verbale of December 4, 1952, written by the US Embassy in reply to the ROK government’s protest, was not available when the final report of the research study’s first session was compiled. However, it focused on the claim in the ROK government’s protest that Takeshima was ROK territory and stated that the US position remained as described in the Rusk letter of August 10, 1951. It therefore reiterated to the ROK government the official view of the United States that Takeshima was Japanese territory\(^74\).

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\(^{74}\) Supra note 65, p. 255.
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latter’s note of November 10, 1952 stating that a single engined airplane described as being under the command of the United States Forces in the Far East dropped bombs on Dokdo Island on September 15, 1952. The Embassy is advised that the limited amount of information provided in the Ministry’s note as well as the very long time which has elapsed since the incident is said to have taken place make it virtually impossible for the United Nations Command to determine the facts in the case. Preparations have, however, been expedited to dispense with the use of Dokdo Island as a bombing range.

The Embassy has taken note of the statement contained in the Ministry’s Note that “Dokdo Island (Liancourt Rocks) is a part of the territory of the Republic of Korea”. The United States Government’s understanding of the territorial status of this island was stated in Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s letter to the Korean Ambassador in Washington dated August 10, 1951.

American Embassy,  

Pusan, December 4, 1952
No. 187

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the letter's note of November 30, 1952, stating that a single engine airplane described as being under the command of the United States Forces in the Far East dropped bombs on Dokdo Island on September 15, 1952. The Embassy is advised that the limited amount of information provided in the Ministry's note as well as the very long time which has elapsed since the incident is said to have taken place make it virtually impossible for the United Nations Command to determine the facts in the case. Preparations have, however, been expedited to dispense with the use of Dokdo Island as a bombing range.

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The United States Government's understanding of the territorial status of this island was stated in Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk's note to the Korean Ambassador in Washington dated August 10, 1951.

American Embassy,
Korea, December 4, 1952.

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This Note Verbale was included as an annex to the book entitled *Introduction to Dokdo Issue* published by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau in 1955. It was used as a basis to argue that, since the US armed forces had responded to the ROK’s protest by deciding that Takeshima would no longer be a bombing range, it had recognized that Takeshima was ROK territory. Kim Dong-jo, leader of the Government Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained in the preface to *Introduction to Dokdo Issue* that its purpose was not to notify the general public of the Dokdo issue, but to enable the heads of diplomatic missions overseas to correctly understand the matter and to provide them with information necessary to counter the unwarranted propaganda of the Japanese, for which purposes he hoped the book would be put to frequent use. Shockingly, however, the book in fact omitted the section of the Note Verbale reaffirming the Rusk letter, thereby concealing the fact that the US considered Takeshima to be Japanese territory not only from ROK citizens, but also from its own diplomats.

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75 *Supra* note 72, Annex 6.

Fig. 2  Note No. 187 from the United States Embassy to the ROK government, December 4, 1952, as it appeared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau Introduction to Dokdo Issue (1955). The final paragraph reaffirming the letter from Rusk has been abbreviated to “etc.”

APPENDIX 6

No. 187

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latter’s note of November 10, 1952 stating that a single-engined airplane described as being under the Command of the United States Forces in the Far East dropped bombs on Dokdo Island on September 15, 1952. The Embassy is advised that the limited amount of information provided in the Ministry’s note as well as the very long time which has elapsed since the incident is said to have taken place make it virtually impossible for the United Nations Command to determine the facts in the case.

Properly have, however, been expedited to dispatch with the use of Dokdo Island as a bombing range, etc.

American Embassy,

Pusan, December 4, 1952
Meanwhile, E. Allan Lightner, Jr., the ad interim charge d’affaires of the US Embassy in Korea, made inquiries to establish the facts about the bombing following the ROK government’s protest. He received a reply from a representative on behalf of the commander-in-chief of United Nations Command, Mark W. Clark, stating that, although they had been unable to confirm the facts regarding the bombing, if the use of Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) as a bombing range were to be suspended, the ROK as well as other interested agencies would be notified, but that territorial sovereignty was beyond the scope of SCAP’s authority. The letter also pointed out that SCAPIN 1033, relating to fisheries, specified that “it was not to be construed as an expression of Allied policy relative to the ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned.” Lightner replied enclosing the December 4 notification to the ROK government, urging attention to the section invoking the content of the Rusk letter.

On December 13, 1952, the commander in chief, Far East Command (CINCFE) decided to revoke the designation of Takeshima as a bombing range and the US Embassies in Japan and the ROK deliberated with the commanding general of the Korean Communications Zone (KComZ), Thomas W. Herren, about whether they should notify the ROK of this. On January 20, 1953, Herren notified the ROK’s minister for foreign affairs, but despite the fact that the Note Verbale of December 4 clearly notified the ROK government that the United States recognized Takeshima as Japanese territory, the relevant Note Verbale was in the end appended as documentary material to a publication compiled for the ROK government’s embassy officials to use as grounds to assert the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima. Furthermore, the Note Verbale had been falsified by omitting the section reiterating the Rusk letter to give the impression that the United States had acknowledged the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima and revoked the designation of Takeshima as a bombing range as a result of the ROK government’s protests and demands. Its inclusion in the publication was intended as evidence that the United States had acknowledged the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima.

Subsequently, on February 4, 1953, there was an incident in which the Japanese Dai Ichi Daihomaru fishing boat was fired at by the ROK navy in international waters near Jeju Island.

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77 Supra note 65, p. 251.
78 Supra note 65, p. 252.
79 Supra note 65, pp. 262–264.
80 Supra note 72, Annex 7.
81 Supra note 72.
resulting in the death of its chief fisherman. On February 13, the Japanese government protested by sending a Note Verbale to the ROK legation, and on the 18th it demanded compensation and measures to prevent reoccurrence. On the 23rd, after the incident was addressed in the Japanese Diet, the ROK presidential secretariat sent a letter to the Japanese government stating that it had established the sovereignty line [translator’s note: the Syngman Rhee Line] for the sake of peace. This was followed on the 24th by announcement of “the truth about the incident” by the ROK Government Information Agency, and on the 26th, the secretary of the interior’s comments relating to the incident were announced. Thus tensions were building between Japan and the ROK, and it was within this context that, on the 27th, newspapers reported that the ROK Defense Ministry had issued a statement alleging that the commander of the Far East Air Force (FEAF), Otto Paul Weyland, had sent it a letter acknowledging Takeshima as ROK territory, and this became a major issue within Japan. On March 3, Ellis O. Briggs, of the US ambassador in Korea filed a report with the Department of State saying that he hoped any future communications relating to Dokdo would be transmitted through the Embassy, thus ensuring there could be no distortion of the US position that the islets were not subject to Korean jurisdiction. He added that the Embassy had not obtained an original copy of the ROK defense minister’s statement, but it was clear that the ROK government (or at least certain elements within it) had distorted the meaning of any such note from Weyland to suit its own purposes. On March 5 (or 4), the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the
US Embassy about whether or not Weyland had actually acknowledged Takeshima as ROK territory, and the Japanese Diet also deliberated on the matter. On March 12, secretary of state Dulles sent notification to the US Embassies in both Japan and the ROK that the Department of State and the Department of Defense had conducted thorough investigations, but they were unable to discover Weyland’s letter. He also indicated that the Department of State would maintain its position as outlined in Note No. 365 to Pusan and Note No. 1360 to Tokyo, both dated November 26. In future, he said, any formal statements affirming or denying the matter would need to be reviewed before being made public. Note No. 365 to Pusan states that the reiteration of the Rusk letter serves only to repeat the existing position of the United States, so it distances the United States from the dispute and might dissuade the ROK from introducing a futile issue into Japan-ROK negotiations that have already fallen into considerable difficulties. In the end, the ROK government never offered the Weyland letter as evidence of territorial rights and consequently it is assumed that it was a falsification by the ROK Defense Ministry.

On March 19, 1953, it was agreed at the Japan-US Joint Committee’s Marine Subcommittee that the bombing training area at Takeshima would be eliminated, and following approval by the Japan-US Joint Committee, Takeshima was formally removed from the exercise zone. But the
agreements of the ROK government is not bear on the facts ROK asserts that the United States and its armed forces acknowledged Takeshima as ROK territory as a result of the agreement. It is evident that the US government was treating Takeshima as a Japanese territory. Subsequently, a letter from R. B. Finn of the US Embassy in Japan to a Mr. Leonhart, assumed to have been written in April 1953, suggested that, when the time was right, the US government might consider issuing a statement to clarify the fact that, according to the US interpretation of the peace treaty, sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks remained in Japan.

As outlined above, therefore, the ROK government, having been denied its sovereignty of Takeshima under the peace treaty, used the Syngman Rhee line to forcefully incorporate Takeshima into its own territory just before the ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks were to be held and the peace treaty was to enter into effect. Then it attempted to gloss over its illegal action by concealing a part of an official US document to twist the truth, and even going so far as to distort the words of the US armed forces commander to provide a basis for its assertion that the United States had recognized the ROK’s territorial rights over Takeshima.

In September 1953, the ROK government sent a Note Verbale to the Japanese government stating for the first time the historical basis for Takeshima to be considered as ROK territory. However, the legitimacy of that alleged historical basis has already been empirically denied for a number of reasons, including the claim that the present-day Takeshima was identified as Usando, an island that appeared on old maps of Korea. The Note Verbale was therefore just another attempt by the ROK government to fabricate a historical basis for its claims.

Conclusion

The ROK government asserts that “Dokdo is an historic land that was invaded in the process of Japan’s imperialist invasion of the Korean peninsula, but then recovered”. This assertion comes from the “official letter of 57 years earlier” by former minister for foreign affairs Byun Young-tae, mentioned at the beginning of this research paper, which is thought to be the Note Verbale of February 27, 1953, or the notice of December 24, 1952.


Note that I was also not able to locate the official letter sent by the ROK government on February 27, 1953, or the notice of December 24, 1952.

96 Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008).

97 NARA (RG 84) Memorandum by R. B. Finn to Leonhart, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Classified General Records 1952-63, Box 23, folder 322.1 (in English).

98 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Refutation of the assertion of territorial rights over Dokdo by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008 (in Japanese).
Verbale sent by the ROK government on October 28, 1954. However, as this study has demonstrated, sensationalist remarks such as these that incite nationalism run counter to the facts of the matter. Nonetheless, the ROK government has for more than 60 years repeatedly incited anti-Japanese sentiment among its citizens and stirred up public opinion in this way to use for political purposes, or to put diplomatic pressure on Japan.

After World War II, the ROK shocked Japan by petitioning the United States to demand the “return” of Tsushima, an inherent part of Japanese territory. Although the ROK made another formal demand just before the peace treaty was signed, it was denied by the United States. The ROK then immediately asserted its territorial rights of Takeshima instead, and despite lacking any basis in the form of geographical or historical documents, it adopted the unquestioning belief that Takeshima was its own territory by rights and demanded that Takeshima be specified in the peace treaty alongside Ulleungdo as one of the islands Japan would relinquish. With inadequate historical documents or knowledge relating to the island, however, the ROK was unable to secure US support, and instead ended up prompting the decision to make Takeshima Japanese territory under the peace treaty. The ROK then used force to occupy Takeshima illegally—still without any legal basis—thereby creating a future source of trouble between itself and Japan. Furthermore, as this research paper has demonstrated, the ROK did not present documents as they were, but knowingly falsified them prior to inclusion in official publications, distorting or stretching the meaning of the US armed forces commander’s words in an attempt to create new evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima. Consequently, for nearly 60 years, the ROK’s researchers were forced to write studies and research papers based on erroneous information, thus depriving ROK citizens of their right to know the truth.

99 Hyun Dae-song maintains that the minister for foreign affairs, Byun Young-tae also made a verbal comment in September 1954 refuting Japan’s assertion of territorial rights over Dokdo, and his comment indicated “a heroic resolve to fight to the last in defense of Dokdo.” (Hyun, The Birth of Territorial Nationalism: The Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Issue, 2006, p. 278 (in English)).

100 “Tsushima henkan wa gensoku ni kaesu” (The return of Tsushima goes against fundamental principles), Asahi Shim bun (Asahi newspaper), August 28, 1948 (in Japanese). In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of historical documents indicating that the official responsible for the matter at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time was considering measures to counter the ROK’s demand, in addition to reports of testimony by archaeologists (“Tsushima wa kankokuryo ni taio: shiryo hakkken” (Dealing with the assertion that Tsushima is ROK territory: Documents discovered), NHK Nysu (NHK News), July 3, 2008; “Kuni o tadorite—kokkyo to ryudo no kokogaku, daini-bu (2)—Tsukushiboko nihon wo urazuke” (Tracing the nation—the archaeology of borders and territories, Part 2 (2)—Tsukushiboko (ancient bronze pikes) provide evidence for Japanese territory), Sankei Shim bun (Sankei newspaper), May 5, 2011.

101 Kim Myung-ki, “A critique of Paragraph 3 of the items relating to the peace treaty with Japan in the “10 issues of Takeshima” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” Dok-do-yeon-gu (Dokdo Research), 2009 fall issue (No. 7), 2009, pp. 62–70 (in Korean). In this article, Kim states that following the response from the US Department of State, the official intent of the United States was to
Now, however, fewer sources assert that the United States discontinued use of Takeshima as a bombing exercise site and recognized the ROK’s ownership of the island in response to the ROK’s protest. In recent years, even some of the ROK’s researchers are recognizing Usando in the old maps as Chikusho (called “Jukdo” in the ROK)\(^{102}\), and we are also seeing researchers who, as a result of analyzing official US documents and the ROK’s historical documents from the period of military administration, acknowledge that the ROK had only a tenuous awareness of Takeshima at that time. And there have been other new developments: In September 2011, for instance, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade invited a judge who had written a novel imagining that the Takeshima issue had been referred to the International Court of Justice to join the ministry\(^{103}\) and requested budget to set about researching litigation and preparing English-language documents\(^{104}\). Following on from the discovery of the Uldo-gun rule book, there was another announcement of the discovery of new documents during the writing of this research paper with the unearthling of civil service examination questions and corresponding answer sheets regarding measures to deal with the Ulleungdo Dispute (known in Japan as the Takeshima Incident) that occurred during the reign of King Sukjong\(^{105}\). If one reads the texts released, neither the questions nor the answers include any information about Takeshima and it is only Ulleungdo that is mentioned in connection with the borders of the Kingdom of Joseon and the subsequent Empire of Korea, as well as in territorial disputes with Japan. If anything, therefore, the texts seem to attest to the fact that the recognition of Korea’s central government, regional officials, and the intellectuals of the day did not extend as far as Takeshima. It is to be hoped that the results of further document collection and empirical research such as this on the view Dokdo as ROK territory, “as shown below.” He then quotes Annex 6 of *Dok-do-mun-je-gae-ron* (the Introduction to Dokdo Issue), which omitted the section relating to the Rusk letter.

\(^{102}\) Oh Sang-hak, (The change in perception of Ulleungdo and Dokdo represented in maps of the Joseon Dynasty), *Mun-hwa-yeok-sa-ji-ri* (Journal of cultural and historical geography), Part 18, No. 1, 2006, p. 92; Kim Hwa-kyung, (Research on perception of Dokdo as it appeared in old Korean maps), *Dok-do-yeong-ye gwon-hwak-lib-eul-wi-han-yeon-gu* (Research to establish territorial rights over Dokdo), edited by Yeungnam University Dokdo Research Institute, 2010, p. 25 (both in Korean), etc.


part of the ROK will be forthcoming.

Japan’s budget for Takeshima is less than 50 million yen, including the budgets for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Shimane Prefecture. The ROK, on the other hand, expends an enormous budget equivalent to more than 5 billion yen annually. And even greater sums will soon be required: It has been reported that there are plans to refurbish accommodation and to construct sightseeing facilities to enable visitors to observe the maritime research station and undersea views, as well as to construct other facilities such as a quay where 5,000-ton class vessels can berth. Meanwhile, the Japanese government constantly protests and, while these types of actions by the ROK not result in Takeshima becoming ROK territory, there is a concern that it may make headway in establishing de facto occupation. Japan therefore needs to respond adequately. As explained previously, what the ROK is doing is illegally occupying Takeshima without any evidence based on historical documents. However, as the number of researchers and government officials within the ROK who debate on the basis of historical documents is increasing, it is to be hoped that a considerable number of people will emerge who see through the government’s tricks and are concerned about taxes being squandered in this way.

When Shimane Prefecture established local regulations for Takeshima Day in 2005, many voiced their concerns about the impact on Japan-ROK relations, and in fact there was a temporary deterioration in sentiment toward Japan among ROK citizens. Subsequently, however, as the empirical research of Shimane Prefecture’s Takeshima Issue Research Group proceeded, the loud, emotional reaction dropped off and instead empirical research even became evident here and there in the ROK as well. Meanwhile, there also seems to be a shift toward lobbying the Japanese political world and academic circles. The people of Japan need to be aware of the fact that Japan’s inherent territory, Takeshima, has been occupied and Japan’s state sovereignty has continuously been encroached upon. Meanwhile, the government needs to make even greater efforts to resolve the issue peacefully by investing funds in empirical research and activities to inform the public.

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106 “Possibility of Dokdo being misused politically because Japan’s democratic party administration is weak—Interview with Northeast Asian History Foundation,” Juggan Chosun (Weekly chosun), No. 2136, 2010, pp. 22–23 (in Korean).

107 Kyoto Sangyo University Institute for World Affairs, ROK and northeast Asia history foundation, Joint academic seminar, “Kagami no naka no jiko ninshiki—nihon to kankoku no rekishi, bunka, mirai” (Self perception in the mirror—The histories, cultures, and futures of Japan and the ROK), (October 9–10, 2010) (in Japanese).