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Rise of Emerging Countries and Transformation of the International System*

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Introduction

International political discussions on the rise of emerging countries have tended to fall into two categories. In one, it is widely believed balance of power is the primary determinant of order among major powers, with differences in the stability of order mainly attributed to distribution of power, difficulty in calculating equilibrium, and functioning of balancing mechanisms. The other is more of a long-term view that maintains advantages of specific countries create order in the system; this is illustrated by the cycle of change in dominant powers, stability (with possibility of war) during the dominant power transition period, and characteristics of dominant powers/challenging powers in the transitional period (level of satisfaction with the status quo).¹

Organski, who can be thought of as a proponent of the latter viewpoint, criticized the balance of power theory and instead advocated the “power transition” theory, although the two are not necessarily in opposition to each other. The distinction lies in how differences in power are assessed. Even if there is a power differential, the focus is on balancing if you think order mechanisms such as attack/defense or deterrence will come into play while you classify and analyze the time period centering on the dominance of the specific country if you consider the power differential to be an order mechanism.²

The problem with an emphasis on balance-imbalance is that it leads to a focus on bipolar or multipolar theory, whereas in “power transition” interest is concentrated only on the final transitional stage, thus excluding the possibility that a single dominant power can create a stable system. Applying this type of macro-perspective to the ascension of emerging countries yields only rough interpretations that provide no clues beyond multipolarity or a US-China Cold War/ hegemonic war scenario. In this paper we look at implications from the rise of emerging countries that differ somewhat from conventional views by taking into account factors we consider important but that have been overlooked. We will focus on two factors in light of space limitations.

One factor is environmental variables for emerging countries, namely, how they view characteristics of the current system. In particular, focus is on the type of political structure supporting the current system.

Additionally important are the types of values and norms that form the basis of the system, and to

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what extent they have been institutionalized. These all affect the approach emerging countries take with the system. Another factor is internal circumstances within the emerging countries, which can be viewed as a determinant of whether a challenging power is satisfied or not, a key focus of Organski's theory.³ A nation undergoing rapid growth experiences tremendous social change, and key variables that can shape attitudes of the current system include sustainability of growth, the level of economic and social system development, and compatibility with the current international order.

1. Characteristics of the current system

There has been no shortage of discussions on how the international system will change, but hardly any questions about how the changed system should be perceived. The first issue is to understand the structure of the system. The conventional view, including among journalists, is that the international system was based on a unipolar structure for 10 years after the Cold War. Then from the 21st century, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has been transitioning into a multipolar structure as relative US power has been receding, replaced by the rising power of emerging countries. Since "multipolarization" is currently in the development stage, the world is still in a unipolar structure, at least for now. Issues yet to be addressed to any significant degree include whether the shift to multipolarity is inevitable, and if the stable order that was established under the unipolar structure can be replicated.⁴

The tendency to view the current situation as multipolarization may stem from the lack of a theoretical framework for the order mechanism in a unipolar structure. In reality, the fact that major wars were prevented in the 20 years following the Cold War preempts any argument that the order mechanism did not function. There were an exceptionally high number of armed conflicts, though some were characteristic of unipole-led "sanctions" against nations that would be classified as a special category. Under the leadership of a unipolar state, major powers divide into camps of cooperation, acquiescence, neutrality, or opposition/resistance to form a pattern of cooperation and conflict. A series of conflict resolutions (regardless of effectiveness) demonstrated to some extent the strengths and weaknesses of this system, and those are the foundation of the international order. It would be meaningful to extract the order mechanism of the unipolar structure based on these points, even as a thought experiment.

Firstly, as unipolar structures by definition manifest a basic imbalance (at times asymmetric), the familiar remedy of balancing does not act as a major mechanism of order formation.⁵ While bipolar and multipolar structures are in fact hierarchical, the hierarchy has not been emphasized because balancing among major countries functions as an order mechanism. Aspects of confrontation seen in other structures do not emerge in a unipolar structure because the primary pattern is of agreement (to varying degrees) between the unipole and other major countries. Mutual interaction such as orders, instructions, persuasion—cooperation, tacit acceptance and resistance based on an (implicit) hierarchy functions as the order mechanism. The unipolar state provides rewards and security for cooperation and metes out retribution for strong resistance. The rewards and security are more likely to take the form of an acceptance of informal spheres of influence under the unipolar structure rather than recognition of military balance and status as was the case during the Cold War.

The order mechanism under this structure naturally is in large part linked to acceptance of the unipole's initiatives. There are two characteristic approaches to foreign policy⁶ as restrictions from opposing forces are not especially effective deterrents to unipolar states. One is a liberal approach wherein the objective is presented as being in the general interest of the system and the unipole exercises its power under a multilateral framework. The other is a unilateral approach in the pursuit of national interests or ideology that is not subject to international restrictions, and for which force may be resorted to if necessary. The latter approach is described as imperialistic if it results in regime change of the state challenging

the international order.⁷ That being said, imperial policies are typically not durable because they rapidly increase the burden on the unipole and establishing legitimacy is difficult because the unipolar structure is based on an anarchic sovereign state system. The unipole retreats from there, then the lack of focal international political issues during that time makes it easy for the debate to shift to issues such as hegemonic decline, multipolarization, and nonpolarization. However, this may be less about a change in the distribution of power, and more about the process of a return to multilateralism by the unipole. Although actions by the unipole may be arbitrary, they do highlight the system's vacillations and resilience.

Secondly, there is a strong normative characteristic to the current system, which is grounded in the pronounced trend of globalization from the 1980s that led to establishment of diverse rules and institutions that have become essential to operation of the international system. At the same time, dismantling of the bipolar structure resulted in the values and norms of the unipolar state and collaborating major western powers becoming deeply entrenched in the system. Widespread diffusion of marketization was especially rapid, and transparency based on the rule of law is essential for its stable function. Moreover, the values are inseparable from liberal norms that integrate individual freedom and freedom of expression. The level of these norms in the post-Cold War international system has expanded beyond the Westphalian system centered on traditional sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and spread to trade, environmental, human rights and humanitarian issues, and even national internal affairs.⁸ This is one of the backdrops behind the rise of global governance theory.

The problem is that such Western values have come to have a strong impact in a milieu that has become highly diverse and complex—including in cultural terms and from the developmental stage—as a result of worldwide expansion of the international system within the context of broader globalization. These values are proclaimed as universal, and as the order extends to involvement in national affairs, there is broad potential for friction within the international system. Consequently, countries aligned with these values and norms form a strong value alliance, while other countervailing major countries with differing values can either cooperate/acquiesce or oppose on an issue-by-issue basis. This likely reflects an extremely discriminatory system for emerging countries with differing values.⁹

Finally, it would be add that the current system as a sovereign state is institutionalized to an unusually high degree. One feature of international relations after World War II is the dramatic evolution of organizations compared to the British-led informal consultation system used in the 19th century. Various international organizations were established such as the United Nations, formal alliances of states, and the Bretton Woods institutions¹⁰ that ventured into national security, trade, and finance: areas that prior to the war had been the purview of informal negotiations between states. Finally, linkages created through financial globalization have integrated many fields with markets, institutions, and international specifications and standards, and as a result they have become inseparable and can no longer function individually.

This institutionalization and the aforementioned unipolar structure are deeply interrelated. Through collaboration with 50 allies and friendly nations, the US deploys aircraft carrier troops in the oceans of the world, has secured 150 bases and supply depots, and links them all via cyberspace, even in outer space.¹¹ This is the infrastructure for the international system. Structured US dominance was inherent in many international institutions at the time they were formed. Exclusion from the system has substantial disadvantages owing to its functional nature and effects of scale economies while the value of the system is increased and US influence maintained if many nations use it. The current system is not solely supported by the US, even though it has sufficient power to do so, thus strengthening the foundation of order. It also supports the resiliency of the system.

In this way, the loose ties, or flexibility, of the system are not adequately captured by the balance of power theory, and the power of the dominant country is not readily apparent because it is shrouded in

this massive system. The system was ultimately organized through responses, including compulsion, at times of crisis. Although there are many points to consider, this system seems to have traits that do not fit conventional views of international politics.

2. Rise of emerging countries

Historically, the rise of emerging countries is not rare, but the pace and number has accelerated sharply due to globalization. Access to cross-border capital, technology, and markets has facilitated rapid economic growth even without the precondition of steadily expanding national economies.

How will emerging countries change the system? Will an increase in their number lead to reorganization of the international system? There are currently many countries with rapid growth potential, for example, Goldman Sachs announced in 2007 its “NEXT 11” growth countries for 2050.¹² Many African nations such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia rank among the top-ten countries in growth, but we think these countries are unlikely to change the system given their economic scale, industrial structure, comprehensive national strength, and scope of foreign policy. The number of emerging countries does not represent a significant problem for the international community.

States important to the system are large in scale, viewed as having the will and ability to change current regulations and systems, and exhibit behavior that diverges from the general norm. In that sense, they would be the countries that rapidly emerged after the post-Lehman shock and were members of the G20 group of economies.¹³ The 20 countries/regions of the G20 account for over 80% of world GDP. Global share of GDP held by the three major nations of Japan, Europe, and the US (i.e., the seven major G7 countries) has declined to about 50%, and thus they lack legitimacy to represent the international system. Consequently, the 20 participating nations—which include the BRICS, large-economy countries Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia, and major oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia—are in a position to modify the system.

In fact, G20 meetings were held seven times (13 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors since 2008), but there have been virtually no instances of these countries compiling policy documents and leading the world economy.¹⁴ One reason is the high reliance of participating countries on the status quo; they benefit from actively supporting the current system. We cannot imagine a scenario in which emerging countries form some type of collective bargaining unit within the G20 that can change the current system. Crafting a joint declaration requires a high level of abstractness given fundamental conflicts of interest between developed countries and large developing countries focused on hastening modernization.

The same can be said even for the BRICS, which represent the core of emerging countries. Looking back one or two centuries, the BRICS include the state that built the governance system of the civilized region known as the Eurasian Empire, so it is easy to imagine how a sovereign state system of Western origin or the highly normative system following the Cold War would not be seen as compatible. In fact, some BRICS members champion the positions of developing countries, including countries that strongly dislike the US hegemonic regime. They have also standardized their own summit meetings in line with the G20 meeting and appear to be making efforts to unite on an economic front through formation of a group currency swap agreement and a plan to establish a BRICS bank.

While BRICS sometimes unite against the US and developed countries, significant conflicts of interest among BRICS members become apparent when looking at responses to individual issues. For example, Brazil has strongly criticized China for currency manipulation even to the point of raising the issue before the World Trade Organization (WTO). Easing of US monetary policy has weakened the US dollar and resulted in depreciation of the Chinese yuan, which is linked to the US dollar, thereby

obstructing Brazil's exports. From a national security perspective, India's biggest concern is its borders with China along the Indian Ocean and Bengal Bay. Nor has there been any easing in wariness by Russia over China's investment in, leasehold management of, and labor force influx into Siberia. Aside from local issues, Brazil and South Africa have no major security problems, so there is almost no chance of unity on security issues. As for domestic political systems that determine the attitude towards the current system, India, Brazil, and South Africa have adopted democratic regimes, and participate in a different group called IBSA in areas such as humanitarian, human rights, and democratization issues, often aligning with developed countries.¹⁵ In an international community without unified authority, emerging countries are unlikely to be able to close ranks and form a united front simply because they are prominent; even if the number of fast-growing countries increases, we do not envision them usurping political power under the banner of "third-class status" or "working class."

In that event, it is the behavior of individual emerging countries that will affect the current system, in which case China is the most likely candidate. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecasts global GDP share of 18% for the US and 28% for China in 2030 and 16% and 28% respectively in 2060.¹⁶ China has dramatically augmented its naval and air forces as there are many conflicts with the current system on issues such as trade, environment, human rights, and national security. There are already numerous predictions of how the rise of China will impact future of US-China relations based on arguments such as the power transition theory, so rather than reiterate those predictions here, we will touch upon the first factor that we noted is shared among emerging countries: change in the domestic state of affairs accompanying rapid growth.

A country that has experienced rapid economic growth also undergoes major social change, and this growth brings about exceedingly difficult to navigate economic and political phases —i.e., the "middle-income trap."¹⁷ Though initial conditions are also a factor, an economy that has experienced rapid growth for nearly 30 years under the same growth model typically faces a peak due to limits on labor supply, rising wages and land prices, and widening inequality. A soft landing to future stable growth requires a number of measures such as transition to consumption/domestic demand growth, enhancement of the industrial structure and labor mobility, design of a tax system aimed at income redistribution, and strengthening of the welfare system. However, it is precisely because these are so difficult to achieve that it is referred to as a "trap."

Even though the growth rate has declined and the unemployment rate is beginning to rise, structural reform will not immediately lead to growth. The high growth of emerging economies was prompted by government-led promotion of foreign capital investment and reliance on exports, but this created a layer of middle management at bloated, non-market state-owned and public enterprises and administrative agencies, which have become huge vested interests that resist structural reform. If the government focuses on protecting incumbents rather than implementing painful but necessary reforms, and instead looks to maintain growth through fiscal stimulus centered on labor-intensive industries, it will further complicate structural reform as state-owned and public enterprises become even more bloated, thereby exacerbating inequality and corruption.

For example, China stimulated its economy with 4 trillion yuan (51 trillion yen) in fiscal spending after the Lehman financial crisis and was internationally praised for contributing to the recovery of the global economy. By preserving the old growth model, however, it further expanded inequality and corruption, and accelerated the land bubble. Hu Jintao, in the political report from his regime's final Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (November 2012) session emphasized on the one hand that China is becoming a major power while on the other hand repeating the two themes initially launched in 2003 of "scientific development" and building a "harmonious society" that focused on shifting to a

domestic-demand oriented economy, rectifying inequalities, and strengthening welfare. In particular, he revealed a sense of crisis, noting that failure to crack down on corruption could deal a devastating blow to the party and state. According to the report, there were 100,000 protests called “collective incidents” for the year.

This problem is especially pronounced in China now, but is one that emerging countries eventually face, although the extent of the problem varies. Similar to China, transparency in the business environment is severely lacking in Russia and India.¹⁸ Russia’s growth was supported by soaring resource prices which increased the influence of state-owned enterprises. The spread of popular demonstrations against the March 2012 presidential election when Putin returned to power was indicative of the strengthened authoritarianism in the system. The challenge is to engineer a soft landing for the new economic system while maintaining growth, but there is the potential that it will lead to democratization as a result of strengthening the “rule of law,” which is a sensitive issue for authoritarian regimes (President Hu Jintao described European and US democratization as an “evil path” at the party convention). However, if postponement further exacerbates discontent, fomenting nationalism could turn to criticism against the government. If those in power refuse to respond, it could even lead to dramatic political changes.

Thus, the potential for emerging countries to effect change on the international system would not appear to be that great. That being said, once entangled in the “trap” domestic regimes of emerging countries will become increasingly out-of-sync with the international system and continue to produce friction for a long time.

3. Coordinating interests of the uni-multipolar complex system

Taking into account the aforementioned points, what are the possible scenarios of change in the international system? Even though growth rates of emerging economies look likely to decline, there is still sufficient growth potential to facilitate continued change in the distribution of power. Therefore, the G7 countries, coupled with the BRICS and other countries with large economies (for now the G20) will take the lead of the global economy and international system. How it affects the system will depend on the approaches adopted by emerging countries. Two scenarios could be considerable: one in which reasonable policies based on a state’s development stage and national strength are adopted, and the other, where rational policies are blocked by various internal problems. This paper first looks at the moderate and rational approach, and then deals with the latter scenario in the next section.

By “reasonable,” it means the emerging country sets targets and formulates policy based on limitations of its power and the environment it faces. As for the country’s influence, it is needed that factor substantial reliance on the system given that emerging countries basically grow within the current system. The growth rate of the BRICS has declined across the board since 2012. This is largely attributable to the adverse impact on the export-dependent states from stagnation that started from 2011 of the three main regions—i.e., stagnation of the European Union (EU) triggered by the Greek financial crisis; the flat American economy in the post-Lehman shock period; and the downturn of the Japanese economy in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Clearly emerging countries cannot easily withdraw from the current system. Even if they oppose liberal values, they have no globally acceptable alternative value system to offer in its place, and we also doubt they could construct an alternative economic system. Emerging countries would not be able to maintain growth if they became isolated from the global economy. China has the world’s second largest GDP, but access to foreign markets and the global financial system are indispensable even for this giant developing economy. Furthermore, emerging countries face the structural turning point we mentioned earlier, and while GDP is huge, it remains on par with that of a developing country when viewed on a per

capita basis (nearly \$6,000 in China). Emerging countries are more exposed to social and political damage from a slowdown in the global economy because of their weak economic and social systems, including welfare. Therefore, emerging countries benefit from stable expansion of the current system.

Emerging countries will thus approach each issue differently under the current system. The post-Cold War liberal international system includes practices that emerging countries (especially China and Russia) could never agree to follow—essentially, issues that would be problematic for their domestic regimes such as human rights, involvement of domestic institutions in peace building, international intervention in domestic conflicts accompanying democratization, and UN Security Council sanctions on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The response has been consistent to issues that could signal a possible scaling back of the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs: either exercising veto rights against Security Council resolutions or working to dilute decisions (resolutions). This arises from the inherent incompatibilities that we touched upon earlier between emerging countries' domestic regimes and the international system, and we doubt this will change much in the future.

On the other hand, the current system includes institutions that are highly advantageous for emerging countries. For example, no institution is more important in conveying the status of a major power to China and Russia than United Nations Security Council veto rights. In the past decade, China has seen its GDP quadruple while trade increased six-fold, a level of growth that would not have been possible without accession to the WTO in 2001. Moreover, the WTO's legalized enforcement mechanism can be viewed as a barricade that protects trade interests of emerging countries. Emerging countries with expanding economies are automatically allotted greater say in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which utilizes a weighted voting system based on financing quota. Emerging countries might consider strengthening this system, but would not likely contemplate dismantling or modifying it.

It is regarded that one of the most common behavioral patterns is for emerging countries to take an approach whereby they leverage their status as developing countries to both maximize benefits and minimize burdens in “negotiation of conditions.” Typically they seek the broadest possible application of special and differential (S&D) treatment for trade as developing countries while using “common but differentiated responsibility” as a shield to refuse/mitigate the burden in regards to environmental issues. As a result, virtually no prospects for agreement emerged from the WTO Doha Round or in negotiations for greenhouse gas reduction following the Kyoto Protocol. The impact of the rise of emerging countries will thus appear for the time being as the so-called stagnation of global governance.

When viewing the impact of emerging countries on the system in this way, it does not diverge materially from standard practice in international politics with emerging countries sometimes on the same side of negotiations with developed countries and at other times on the opposing side depending on the issue. It is more advantageous for emerging countries to remain in a subordinate position and make demands of developed country leadership and system operations than it is to completely overturn and replace the current system as continuing negotiations entails no costs. In the current system based on a unipolar structure (unipole with its allies and partners), emerging countries are not faced directly, but rather are accepted based on time-consuming negotiations through various institutions that have qualifying conditions. As evidenced by the WTO accession of China and Russia over the past 20 years, the current system can be said to have been responding flexibly.

Developed and emerging countries do not build a single system because social and economic systems, their respective positions, and values supporting domestic regimes remain far apart. The international system operates as a developed/emerging country complex for a long time.¹⁹ This works because emerging countries are able to grow within the system and believe they will benefit from increased prestige commensurate to their growing national strength. On the other hand, developed countries push for

emerging countries to graduate from their “developing country status” while at the same time gradually striving to make the international system fairer for emerging countries.

4. Crisis management and the current system

The rational and moderate scenario is cited, however below, mainly considering China, and despite differences in scale, a phase of military-backed diplomacy is inevitable. Of course, emerging countries face challenges of varying levels. Based on the recent deterministic arguments of power, which really stand out in recent years, ambition on the part of emerging countries to control the system in proportion to increases in their power is almost instinctive, and eventually hegemonic change itself becomes the goal, at which point there remains little room for diplomacy. On a somewhat specific note, a global empire under the current sovereign state system is completely unthinkable even for the fastest-growing power, China. A more realistic territory, as noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, would be the former Qing dynasty and surrounding waters (East and South China Seas), excluding Central Asia; this territory shares borders with Russia, Central Asia, India, Southeast Asia, and Japan.²⁰

Even though a challenge for emerging countries, it is akin to the problem of how to carve out local spheres of influence and economic zones with a degree of autonomy within a unipolar structure or a liberal economic system. Therefore, although compositionally a rational calculation is not impossible, conflicts cannot be easily localized. So far, China has shown a strong tendency to seize international political hierarchy through force, meanwhile the unipole (US) pursues global primacy and has not abandoned its policy that deems formation of a system that excludes the US from major regions of the world as unacceptable.²¹ A US-China Cold War scenario is not far-fetched. Wariness over the strengthening of China’s navy, its maritime expansion, and the anti-access and area denial (A2-AD) strategy against the US suggests that such geopolitical interplay has already begun.

While military-backed diplomacy is inherently rational, once a crisis has escalated, managing momentum or even miscalculations is not easy. Moreover, emerging countries could suddenly face internal and external problems, including domestic difficulties accompanying the aforementioned “middle income trap,” elevated nationalism that leads to criticism of the government, and international demands for a “responsible stakeholder” or normative actions appropriate for a major power. Historically, the easy response in this situation has been to adopt a hard-line foreign policy and centralize power in domestic politics to relieve the crisis. When survival of the domestic regime is at stake policy decisions can suddenly become uncertain.

If the situation escalates to this state, the only viable response will be a policy of deterrence and augmenting deterrence capabilities and maintaining a system that constantly makes the opponent aware that the objective is not achievable without costs exceeding the benefit. This policy, however, which is like returning to the pre-war modern era, is probably the most difficult to implement for post-modern nations (developed countries) in light of domestic politics. It may well be one cause for failure to respond appropriately to emerging countries. Postmodern liberal values and norms make management of the globalized world possible, but maintaining it requires “cooperation” with emerging countries (modern nations), and the abilities needed to achieve that cooperation are hedging (and deterrence) and crisis management. Other means of inhibiting national behavior such as democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions have not historically been effective in tense situations such as this.²²

A major focus going forward will be the scope of the sphere of influence and how closed it will become. Determining this is beyond general reasoning because it requires accurate situational judgment and skillful utilization of military power and diplomacy. What is essential is the ability and commitment of the unipole to maintain regional stability. The scope of the sphere of influence under a unipolar structure largely

depends on whether regional allies and cooperating countries maintain their resolve to not retreat in the face of intimidation, and if specific adjustments can be made to divisional roles shared with the unipole. Even a unipole cannot make a commitment without the resolve and capabilities of regional countries. If maintained, furthering mutual economic dependence, multilayered regional organizations, institutions and forums will all be relevant in restraining emerging countries. This is because in a globalized world, the flow of capital, goods, and people are influenced by the reputation of a state in such a situation.

Since tensions will be protracted, the immediate issue to be dealt with through continuous crisis management is creating a sense of non-belligerency and opening communication channels for times of crisis. Reaching agreement with a country that believes in power and does not doubt its own righteousness is extremely difficult, but failure at crisis management is not an acceptable option. In the 1960s, the US explained the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and persuaded the former Soviet Union to go along and as a result was successful in achieving arms control. As both developed countries and emerging countries enhance their crisis management capabilities, opening channels for crisis management, even informal ones, is essential for the long term.

Thus the rise of emerging countries with associated military confrontations could create a uni-multipolar complex system incorporating several autonomous spheres of influence into the international system supported by the global unipolar structure.²³ Equilibrium of strategic forces is not an order mechanism under the unipolar structure like it was during the Cold War. Order mechanisms other than geopolitical agreement are not effective given power differentials, fundamental differences in domestic regimes, and emerging countries with countervailing power. In fact, US-Russia relations have already moved in that direction over the Russian sphere of influence in Europe. The Asian-Pacific ocean boundaries are exceedingly difficult, but because something akin to agreement is necessary, confidence building measures such as maritime rescue, prevention of maritime accidents, and marine standards of conduct are run in parallel with the deterrence system.

Conclusion

No clear order mechanism such as balance of power exists in the current system due to its unipolar structure. Order mechanisms are subject to the behavior of the unipole; when the unipole takes aggressive offensive action, it is seen as being hegemonic or even imperialistic, and when it is not taking aggressive action (defensive or disengagement), it evokes a view of a declining hegemony, multipolarization, and nonpolarization.²⁴ However, discussions are not that different from those after the Korean and Vietnam wars. The view that the rise of emerging countries will create a multipolarization situation that eventually takes over the current system needs to be examined in more detail taking into account the several conditions mentioned here.

Emerging countries depend on the current system, but developed countries are also heavily dependent on emerging markets so the international system is already changing into what could be dubbed a developed/emerging country complex. Because the current system is highly institutionalized, the complex generally works to absorb the impact of emerging countries over time through integration into various institutions. At the same time, developed countries and emerging countries are at different stages of development and have widely different fundamental ideologies, so a single system for them to interact under the same conditions will not be formed. We expect the international system to function as a complex of multiple states with close economic ties but different political systems for a long time.

As such there will always be the possibility of heightened tensions over the system management between emerging and developed countries. The situation could rapidly escalate if emerging countries face persistent problems such as nationalism and regime sustainability due to social changes. At that

point, strengthening deterrence and the crisis management system will be essential, but even if successful, the system will still basically be a unipolar structure and thus will likely strengthen the uni-multipolar complex system, including several autonomous spheres of influence. Because of the huge differences in political regimes, the current system with its post-modern emphasis on efficiency and functionalism will likely have a greater geopolitical bias.

In this process, it cannot be ruled out the possibility of a significant collapse in the current system and transition to a multipolar structure. A failure in system resilience could lead to the unipolar structure ending up as a one-off event and even institutionalization of the international system will continue to be ineffective in the face of power conflicts. However, there is still a chance that the resilience will be effective in averting a crisis to the system. It may only be apparent during the final stage of a crisis escalation because the international system was created in a democratic way by the liberal democratic unipole and developed countries. It goes without saying that operation of the system is not guaranteed, but from the points considered in this paper, resources and infrastructure are still available if the unipole and major developed countries are intent on maintaining the system.²⁵

Importantly, while the current liberal system has created some problems, it has also made substantial progress ranging from economic growth to respect for human rights, and it is ideally suited to cope with so-called global issues such as the worsening environmental, financial and humanitarian crises based on conformity of norms and the power to create institutions and procedures. It could be thought, hence, that maintaining this system would represent progress for the international community despite any change in the distribution of power.

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1. K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, 1979, Ch. 5; A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, A.A. Knopf, 1958; R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1983; George Modelski (Translated by Tatsuo Urano and Takashi Shinobu) *Sekai Shisutemu no Dotai—Sekai Seiji no Choki Saikuru* [Dynamics of the World System: Long Cycles in World Politics], Koyo Shobu, 1991.
 2. In reality, two phases often overlap. In the 19th century, it was the period of British hegemony Pax Britannica and the balance of power system known as the Concert of Europe, while in the 20th century, it was a balance of power under the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the US hegemonic regime.
 3. Organski, op. cit., pp. 363-371.
 4. Causes that were not discussed are relatively simple. A realistic framework centered on actual distribution of power and policies of major countries for balancing power exerts a strong influence, so theoretically even if one country becomes dominant, opposition forces will emerge sooner or later making the unipolar structure transient. Thus it is meaningless to discuss the order in that situation. The realist view that the unipolar structure is transient because opposing forces will arise is reflected in C. Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/91), p. 23; K. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 45; C. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7-41. On the other hand, views that it is stable include W. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), p. 8; R. Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, A.A. Knopf, 2008, pp. 86-87.
 5. Numo P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), p. 9.
 6. G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 42.
 7. Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Teikoku" no Kokusai Seijigaku [International Politics of "Empire": The Post-Cold War International System and the United States], Toshindo, 2006, page 155.
 8. As a critical review of this point, Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International*

- Society*, Oxford University Press, 2007.
9. Speaking of the order mechanism for the unipolar structure, the most difficult situation is when survival of the unipolar system is threatened by countries with huge disparities in power and that are normatively screened, and other major powers to protect the system under a unipolar structure cannot be found. This leads to the unipole making maximum efforts to resist with a strategy to offset the asymmetry (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). While that is the most difficult point of conflict in the current system, the international community has basically responded with "sanctions." Monteiro, op. cit.
 10. M. Kahler and D.A. Lake, "Economic Integration and Global Governance," in W. Mattli and N. Woods, eds., *The Politics of Global Regulation*, Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 242–275.
 11. There are an abundance of indicators of US power after the Cold War. S. Brooks and W. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 27–35.
 12. NEXT-11 is 2050 economic forecasts for Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam.
 13. G7 + Russia, BRICS, and Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Australia, Mexico, and Argentina.
 14. We do not yet know if the G20 will function as the primary forum. Akio Fujii, *G20: Senshinkoku Shinkyokoku no Pawa Gemu* [G20: Power Games of the Advanced and Emerging Countries], Nikkei Publishing, 2011. M. Beeson and S. Bell, "The G-20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both?" *Global Governance*, No. 15 (2009), p. 67–86.
 15. In democracy rankings of emerging countries, South Africa stands at 30th, India 40th, Brazil 47th, whereas Russia ranks 107th and China 136th. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat*, Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010.
 16. OECD, *Looking to 2060: A Global Vision of Long-Term Growth*, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 15, November 2012.
 17. Dani Rodrik, *Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy*, NY: Norton, 2011; Michael Spence (Translated by Nami Hijikata) *Maruchisupidoka Suru Seikai no Naka de: Tojokoku no Yakushin to Gurobaru Keizai no Daitenkan* [The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World], Hayakawa Publishing, 2011, pp. 320–336.
 18. US *Forbes* magazine's business environment ranking for 2010 places South Africa at 34th and Brazil at 62nd compared to 77th for India, 90th for China, and 97th for Russia (http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml accessed February 15, 2012).
 19. On the status of complexes, see PHP "Japan's Grand Strategy" Study Group, *Nippon no Daisenryaku* [Japan's Grand Strategy], PHP Institute, 2012.
 20. Z. Brzezinski (Translated by Yoichi Yamaoka), *Chiseigaku de sekai o yomu: 21 Seiki no Yurashia Haken Gemu*, Nikkei Publishing, 2003, pp. 314–317 [*The Grand Chessboard*, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 158–173].
 21. Typically, *Defense Planning Guidance of 1992*; P. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.
 22. The three-period theory of premodern, modern, and postmodern from R. Cooper (Translated by Kitazawa) *Kokka no Hokai—Shin Riberaru Teikokushugi to Sekai Chitsujo* [The Breaking of Nations—The New Liberal Imperialism and World Order], Nikkei Publishing, 2008, pp. 46–90.
 23. See Brzezinski (note 20).
 24. On the classification of unipole strategies, Monteiro, op. cit.
 25. M. Beckley, "China's Century?: Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41–78.