A New Security Strategy for Addressing the Challenges in the Turbulent International Order

11 Recommendations for the Defense of Japan

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Introduction

Over the course of the approximately five years since the adoption of the current National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) at the end of 2013, the security environment surrounding Japan has become ever more severe. Japan requires a security strategy that will enable it to respond resolutely to the increasingly serious situation and maximize national interests. This is not simply an issue relating to the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), but is rather one that calls for a review of overall foreign and defense policies. It is for this reason that a review of the current National Defense Program Guidelines alone would be insufficient; what is also needed is the revision of the NSS.

In FY2017 the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) launched a study group to review the requirements for Japan’s security strategy and defense policy in light of the increasingly serious security environment. This booklet comprises a general proposal that reflects the discussions that have taken place in the study group under the leadership of the chair, and also a set of individual recommendations by the project members about items of particular concern when reassessing Japan’s security situation. It should be noted that while the general proposal is the work of the JIIA, the individual recommendations represent the opinions of their respective authors alone and not the opinions of the organizations to which they are affiliated. It is hoped that these recommendations will provide insights and advice for the review of the NDPG and for considerations on Japan’s future security strategy.

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A. Situational Assessment

1. Whither the established international order?

The postwar international order formed under the leadership of the United States was predicated on the assumption that all countries, large and small alike, would comply with international law, and sought to disseminate liberal values throughout the international community, from freedom, democracy and human rights, to respect for the rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and free trade. This international order served to transform the tone of international relations from a “zero-sum” to a “plus-sum” game, forming a foundation for global peace and prosperity.

However, in recent years some countries that harbor dissatisfaction with the existing international order, China and Russia included, have sought to create an environment advantageous to authoritarian states through unilateral attempts to change or deny internationally established rules and norms. These countries have either used or threatened force, or methods referred to as “gray zone” or “hybrid” coercion that have the same effect as the use or threat of force, to try and redraw national borders. There have also been increased restrictions placed on personal freedoms and rights in the domestic context in such countries. Some democratic nations in the developing world are also being seen to indicate their support for these kinds of actions by China and Russia in the forum of the United Nations or at other international organizations.

At the same time, advanced democracies have seen distrust in politics, divisions in society, and income disparities cause political turmoil, which has become an internal factor that has contrived to undermine the legitimacy of the postwar international order. These developments have been further exacerbated by China and Russia’s efforts to manipulate public opinion and intervene in electoral processes in democratic nations, using such means as election and education systems, cultural exchange and media outlets. Such inveigling attempts to influence national discourse in democratic nations have become known as “sharp power,” with China’s focus being to crack down on voices critical of its own policies, while Russia’s priority to is to delegitimize democracy.

The “America First” Trump administration views China and Russia as “revisionist states” and has chosen to adopt strategic competition with these countries. However, the Trump administration is itself also lambasting the current international order as being against the United States’ national interests and is engaged in blunt attempts to prioritize its own interests rather than support the existing order.

Global peace and stability have for many years been maintained through a network of alliances centered on the United States. As a super power the United States has at times made sacrifices of its own to contribute to the defense of allied nations. However, when viewed from the perspective of “America First,” alliance relationships are deemed to be unfair, with the United States providing benefits to allies in one-way transactions. The Trump administration has therefore called on some
allies to increase defense spending and bear a greater burden of the costs for stationing U.S. forces, with the implied threat that non-compliance with demands will result in the United States abandoning its defense obligations, or withdrawing U.S. forces. These actions could undermine the credibility and deterrence of alliances.

In the international economic order, too, the Trump administration is calling for trade imbalances to be corrected and turning its back on multilateral economic regimes, instead seeking to oblige countries to enter into bilateral trade agreements and engaging in moves to protect U.S. industries. Not only is the Trump administration engaging in a trade war with China, the country with which it has the largest trade deficit, it is also increasing pressure on allies and friends such as Japan, the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico.

2. Geopolitics resurgent
In the Indo-Pacific region too, countries such as China and North Korea are engaging in unilateral actions with the express purpose of making their aspirations to change the status quo a fait accompli.

Firstly, presenting a revisionist vision for the international order based on its “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” China is seeking to expand its sphere of influence across Eurasia and into the Indian Ocean, offering assistance for port development in countries that border the Indian Ocean, including Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Djibouti. As China provides massive amounts of economic assistance that are essentially impossible for developing countries to repay, this results in inequality in diplomatic relations between China and the debtor nation. For example, faced with default on its debt repayments, Sri Lanka was obliged to hand over the Port of Hambantota on a 99-year lease to China. There are growing criticisms of this kind of “debt trap” as being a form of “Chinese-style colonialism.”

China is also attempting to restrict freedom of the seas in the East China Sea and South China Sea through moves to unilaterally alter maritime borders. China is also enhancing its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities from the East China and South China Seas, with its militarization of the South China Sea in particular also posing a threat to freedom of navigation.

Furthermore, in the face of China’s attempts to forcefully press its claims using a hybrid warfare that utilizes not only military personnel, but also government vessels, fishing vessels and maritime militia, those countries that find their sovereignty threatened by such actions are unable to respond effectively, instead being forced to go on the defensive. With the transfer of the China Coast Guard to the command of the Armed Police Force, as well as the introduction of drones, it can also be anticipated that “gray zone situations,” while not constituting war, will become more acute.

China is also looking beyond the East China and South China Seas, with a view to expanding its military presence in the Western Pacific, and even to the Pacific Islands region and Indian Ocean and in so doing alter the maritime power balance. There is a possibility that China’s military presence in
the Indian Ocean and South Pacific could threaten the safety of Japanese maritime transportation in the future.

China is also increasing pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party administration in Taiwan, and its efforts to diminish Taiwan’s diplomatic presence and frequent military operations in Taiwan’s immediate vicinity are serving to stoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese naval and air forces are also increasingly using the Bashi Channel as means of passage from the South China Sea to engage in exercises in the Western Pacific and East China Sea, making surveillance and monitoring difficult for Japan as well.

North Korea has moved rapidly to develop its nuclear missile capability, which, combined with its existing heavy artilleries and special operations capabilities, present a grave threat to the Northeast Asian region. Although tensions on the Korean Peninsula have currently subsided due to North Korea’s decision to engaged in dialogue with the United States, no clear path to denuclearization has as yet materialized, nor can it be taken for granted that denuclearization will be the ultimate outcome of dialogue. Through the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” North Korea is attempting to maintain its position as a de facto nuclear weapons state and reduce the presence of U.S. forces on the peninsula. If U.S. forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK) were to be reduced or withdrawn without progress towards denuclearization of North Korea first being achieved, this would transform the military balance in Northeast Asia, with serious implications for Japan’s security situation.

3. Intensifying military competition
The United States and China are already competing with each other over innovative military technologies, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned and automated technologies that have the potential to be game changing. Both countries are investing in technology development and are also taking measures to prevent leakage of technological information. In its National Security Strategy the United States is calling for the promotion and protection of the National Security Innovation Base (NSIB), whereas China, under its “Made in China 2025” initiative, is aiming to become an “industrial superpower” through the home-grown development of advanced technologies. The trade war between the United States and China may ostensibly be about trade, but it is nonetheless also part of broader competition over advanced technologies.

China is aiming to complete the modernization of its military forces by 2035 and the integration of the People’s Liberation Army and the application of advanced technologies for military purposes is likely to result in the U.S.-China/Japan-China military balance swinging significantly in favor of China by mid-century. In particular, large-scale vessels, fixed bases and short-range strike capabilities are likely to become increasingly vulnerable in the face of China’s A2/AD capabilities.

Cyber threats are present at all levels, not just at the state and military levels, but also extending to
key infrastructure, as well as the corporate and individual levels. China, Russia and North Korea are among countries seeking to use cyberattacks to acquire information about the decision-making processes for national security in other countries, as well as military operational plans and advanced technologies. They are also engaging in covert operations for military and political purposes. North Korea is also using ransomware and other means to subvert economic sanctions and acquire funds by illicit means.

There are also growing threats to the free use of outer space. China and Russia are engaged in development and testing of anti-satellite weapons and also offensive capabilities from orbit. There is also a possibility that courtiers that do not possess such capabilities could use electronic jamming and cyberattacks to threaten space systems.
B. Basic Policy

Based on the assessment of the situation as detailed above in Section A, it is the case that Japan’s security and defense policies from now will need to systemically incorporate specific measures that address the key points set out hereunder.

1. Response to China’s attempts to disrupt the international order and U.S. “America First” policy
In an environment in which China is attempting to disrupt the international order and the United States is prioritizing its own interests, Japan should play an active and leading role, including in military aspects, in order to maintain the existing international order and prevent U.S. disengagement.

2. Whole of nation self-defense posture and deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. alliance
As the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) cannot be expected to defend the nation alone, Japan should build an effective defense posture that brings together the combined might of the nation. At the same time, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship remains the most important pillar of Japan’s security, in light of the new adjustments that are being made, the alliance should not remain inert, but should be further enhanced, with Japan taking a larger role.

3. Deterring and engaging China
With the United States embroiled in strategic competition with China and also given the necessity for Japan to make a realistic response of its own to China’s moves to expand its national power and change the status quo, Japan should strengthen required deterrent and adopt a cost-imposing strategy that would make it difficult for China to change the status quo or expand its A2/AD capabilities. At the same time, Japan should work to deepen trust with China and enhance crisis management structures to ensure that differences over individual issues, including territorial and history-related problems, do not adversely affect Japan-China relations overall.

4. Improving the security environment in Japan’s vicinity and contribution to the security in the Indo-Pacific region
Ensure sufficient resources are allocated for Japan’s defense and enhance cooperation with other countries to improve the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and secure the safety of sea lanes.

5. Deterring and engaging North Korea
Even through U.S.-North Korea relations may change and tensions on the Korean Peninsula are defused, unless there is a demonstrable reduction in the North’s military capabilities it will continue to be necessary for Japan to enhance response capabilities. At the same time an engagement strategy should be formulated with a view to resolving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues.

6. Reforms of the present situation and investment in the future
The foundations that support Japan’s defense force are already extremely vulnerable and can under no means be further neglected. In addition, although the target level for Japan’s defense expenditure should not be formulated on the basis of simple comparisons with other countries in a way that does not relate directly to Japan’s defense needs, in view of the fact that, for example, China’s publicized defense expenditure alone has risen 15-fold in the past 30 years, and approximately 2.7-fold in the last 10 years alone and is already more than three times greater than Japan’s expenditure, it is patently clear that the marginal increases in defense spending that have been implemented to date are in no way sufficient if Japan is to maintain independence in the truest sense and ensure its own stability and prosperity. Based on the current situation, Japan should engage determinedly in measures to strengthen all foundations of defense—personnel, material, technological, intellectual, and financial—and should engage in technological innovation and defense spending based on a perspective of investing in the future, in anticipation of the security environment around 2035.
C. Japan’s Own Efforts

1. Clearly articulating Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace
In order to continue to advance security policy based on Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace, maintaining the existing international order, with its focus on peaceful resolution of disputes and free trade, should be made a strategic goal and the necessary legislation should be formulated (see Recommendation 1). Furthermore, in order to maintain the international order and ensure a military balance in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan should engage in realistic diplomacy. Japan should also work with the international community in calling for improvements in cases where individual rights are suppressed by authoritarian states. In addition, the content of international peace cooperation activities should be enhanced and deepened, moving from capacity building assistance like the provision of equipment and training to developing countries, to assistance focused on building security foundations, which affords recipient countries the opportunity to effectively utilize the capacities and skills they have acquired.

2. Developing defensive capacity
While maintaining the direction towards a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, in order to out the adversary on the defensive, a multi-domain battle concept must also be incorporated that would enable operations to be simultaneously executed in all domains, with units able to maintain a degree of autonomy even in situations where an A2/AD environment has rendered command communication systems unusable (see Recommendation 2). A permanent joint operation command should be established in order to further strengthen the integration of the SDF. In addition to constructing integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) to enhance simultaneous response capabilities against airborne threats, counterattack capabilities should be introduced to respond to missile threats (see Recommendation 3). In addition to significantly strengthening Japan’s cyber-defense structures, a cyberattack capability should also be introduced that would act as a deterrent. In outer space, it will be necessary to heighten monitoring capabilities for threats to satellites and strengthen early warning and communications capabilities. Electronic warfare capabilities also need to be strengthened and the effective utilization of electromagnetic waves promoted. Sufficient budgetary allocation needs to be made available for these programs and other expenses, including logistical expenses, in order to construct a defensive capability that can respond assuredly in a severe international environment.

3. Cost-imposing strategy and engagement with China
In order to improve response capabilities to China’s A2/AD capabilities and heighten the cost to China of its attempts to change the status quo, Japan should strengthen its own A2/AD capabilities,
including air defense and anti-ship/anti-submarine capabilities. Furthermore, enhancing the capabilities of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) would serve to support the existing law and rules-based order at sea through policing powers (see Recommendation 4). A structure should be constructed that would enable the government as a whole to respond appropriately to gray zone situations and hybrid coercion in armed attack situations (see Recommendation 5). Furthermore, efforts need to be made to alert international public opinion to the lengths that China is prepared to go to unilaterally change the status quo by force. On the other hand, it is critical that efforts be made to develop crisis management structures and build trust between Japan and China and to this end it is necessary to ensure that the Japan-China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism is put into steady operation.

4. Promotion of Indo-Pacific strategy
Efforts should be made to enhance public diplomacy with the countries of Southeast Asia, countries bordering the Indian Ocean and Pacific Island countries regarding Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Japan should enhance its presence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean in order to maintain the rule of law at sea and freedom of navigation. Japan should promote high-quality infrastructure that seeks to expand connectivity and invigorate flows of people and goods, and demonstrate alternatives to the BRI “debt trap,” working with China in economic cooperation consultations to encourage it to adopt international standards in its economic assistance activities. Furthermore, priorities for foreign aid strategy need to be clearly defined and efforts should be made to improve the overall capabilities in ASEAN countries (see Recommendation 6).

5. Response to situation on the Korean Peninsula
In order to enhance response capabilities against North Korean military capabilities, further measures should be taken to enhance missile defense, civil defense, rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, cyber defense, and counterattack capabilities in response to missile threats. The policy of maximum pressure should be maintained until progress is made towards denuclearization and independent sanctions and countermeasures against ship-to-ship transfers need to be strengthened. In order to build Japan-North Korea relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, Japan-North Korea dialogue should be advanced in parallel with developments in U.S.-North Korea negotiations.
D. Japan-U.S. Alliance and Partnership

1. Maintenance of the international order
In order to promote the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the international community, Japan should enhance cooperation with bodies such as the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), and oppose attempts by authoritarian states to change the status quo and block any attempts at appeasement of such policies. Japan should also work through multilateral bodies such as the G7, G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to oppose protectionism, and work to resolve various issues that are brought about by globalization. Support for democratization needs to be provided to democratic nations that are vulnerable to the sharp power of China and Russia, and a contribution made to enhancing systems that could prevent manipulation of public opinion and intervention in elections.

2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and overcoming asymmetry
Cooperation between the JSDF and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command should be enhanced in the command/control and operations, and Japan and the United States should constantly update flexible deterrent options and joint plans so that they can appropriately respond the escalation from peace time to gray-zone and armed conflict. As the realignment of U.S. Forces proceeds, efforts should be made to promote joint use of bases and facilities, and also expand access to commercial facilities in Japan by U.S. Forces. Operational cooperation should be maximized, based on the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and efforts made to overcome asymmetry in the alliance relationship. In terms of extended deterrence, in addition to maintaining and strengthening credibility in deterrence by retaliation, a concept of damage limitation should also be incorporated (see Recommendation 7). In addition, in order to enhance measures to ensure bases for U.S. support in an A2/AD environment, Japan-U.S. cooperation should be strengthened in the areas of surveillance and monitoring, IAMD and anti-submarine operations.

3. Adopting a balancing strategy in response to China
To ensure that the military balance with China does not deteriorate, Japan should cooperate with the United States and the countries of Europe, etc., to prevent efforts by China to force foreign companies doing business in China to transfer technologies, or to prevent the illegal acquisition of technologies by cyber theft or other means. To counter the militarization of the South China Sea, Japan needs to enhance partnership with the United States and other allies to establish a stronger presence in the region that would maintain freedom of navigation. Maritime law enforcement cooperation should be expanded at bilateral and multilateral levels in order to strengthen the rule of law at sea. In the East China Sea too, Japan should enhance its presence jointly with the United
States and other maritime nations, by engaging in training and exercises.

4. Promotion of a multilateral Indo-Pacific strategy
Stable Japan-China relations are essential for the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and from a broad mid- to long-term perspective Japan and China should build a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” in all areas, including security. On the other hand, in order to maintain a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure safety of maritime transportation and freedom of navigation, Japan should support the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. cooperation framework (known as the “Quad”) and further promote the creation of alliance networks around the United States. In addition to cooperation with Australia, moves should be made to enhance partnership with the United Kingdom, which is a core member of the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and the UK-USA Agreement (Five Eyes), and also with France, which possesses territories in the Indo-Pacific region (see Recommendation 8). Furthermore, Japan should, with the United States and its allies and friends, call on China to correct external assistance policies that diverge from international standards, in order to avoid the BRI “debt trap.” Working with the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, France and other countries that are providing capacity building assistance to developing countries that fall within the Indo-Pacific strategy, roles should be divided in such a way as to create an effective assistance structure. Furthermore, in view of the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the strategic importance of a democratic Taiwan should be reappraised and exchange strengthened.

5. Sustaining pressure on North Korea and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation
Until such a time that North Korea moves to engage in denuclearization, international cooperation should be strengthened in order to maintain maximum pressure. In particular, efforts should be strengthened to eliminate sanctions loopholes, such as ship-to-ship transfers. Furthermore, in addition to strengthening defense cooperation between Japan and the ROK, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and the ROK should be deepened in missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, counter-proliferation efforts, and non-combatant evacuation operation. In the event that moves are made towards denuclearization, trilateral cooperation will need to be enhanced to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and a common recognition will need to be confirmed concerning the role and importance of U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK in such an event.
E. Strengthening the National Security Base

1. Strengthening the defense industry base
In order to enhance the defense industry base that supports Japan’s defensive capacity, in addition to concentrating resources in priority technological areas and bases that need to be supported and heightening national manufacturing capacity for defense-related equipment, the realignment of the defense industry will require the establishment of robust companies or corporate entities, and necessitate the development of an industry base that is capable of developing and manufacturing better high-performance equipment and nurturing international competitiveness. Furthermore, the transfer of equipment should be promoted using the framework of the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and efforts should be made to expand markets and lower equipment costs (see Recommendation 9).

2. Development and utilization of advanced technologies
Based on trends in the defense technology environment, in addition to developing structures to identify, protect and nurture advanced technologies developed in Japan, a roadmap should be formulated that sets out how such technologies are to be adopted by the Ministry of Defense or the JSDF (see Recommendation 10). Furthermore, in view of Japan’s population trends, cutting-edge technologies should be utilized in order to respond to personnel shortages arising from the declining birthrate. In addition, from the perspective of realizing more efficient defense expenditure, investment in platforms that are vulnerable in modern warfare needs to be reviewed, and unmanned systems that operate autonomously using artificial intelligence utilized instead.

3. Opposing sharp power
In order to alert people to the threat to democracy in Japan posed by the wielding of sharp power by China and Russia, and to avoid the manipulation of public opinion and intervention in elections, a system should be developed whereby concerted and whole of government efforts are made to collect information and prevent the exercising of influence through the provision of funds to political, governmental and academic bodies and prevent the dissemination of false information through the media (see Recommendation 11).

4. Establishment, enhancement and strengthening of a security community in Japan as a knowledge base
In order to ensure that the ever-increasing complexity of the security environment can be accurately analyzed and effective response policies formulated, bases for security-related research should be enhanced within research organizations and higher education institutions, and human resources
developed who can contribute to governmental decision making, promote public understanding and are effective in putting a message across. As a part of efforts to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship, American studies at think tanks and other bodies should also be enhanced, in order to ensure a full understanding of the diversity and complexity of U.S. society that has emerged under the administration of President Donald Trump.
**Recommendation 1**
Japan needs to demonstrate the necessary changes in order to promote security policies based on Proactive Contribution to Peace. Maintaining the liberal international order should be considered to be a key strategic goal for Japan going forward, and by further strengthening legal foundation for security policy, Japan must adopt measures that will enable it to fulfil an active international role in security-related areas that it has been unable to fulfil to date.  
(Matake Kamiya)

**Recommendation 2**
While further developing the existing Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which focuses on preventing further escalation of situations and minimizing damage after a situation has arisen, Japan should introduce a multi-domain battle concept and establish a permanent joint operation command in order to enhance response to situations that have already escalated.  
(Bonji Ohara)

**Recommendation 3**
In view of the diversity of missiles and launch platforms held by countries the region, Japan should build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), including counterattack capabilities against missile threats, in order to enable a response not only to ballistic missiles, but pluralistic simultaneous or successive attacks in which missiles with different flight characteristics are used, such as cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles.  
(Masashi Murano)

**Recommendation 4**
In addition to securing maritime safety and strengthening efforts to maintain the maritime order the Policy on Strengthening of the Maritime Security System as decided by the relevant ministerial council should be speedily and assuredly implemented in order to prevent unforeseen situations occurring or escalating. In addition, in order to strengthen the maritime order based on the rule of law, further efforts should be promoted to implement partnership/cooperation/support on a bilateral/multilateral basis between coast guard agencies.  
(Shigeo Akimoto)

**Recommendation 5**
In anticipation of hybrid coercion by Chinese naval vessels, government vessels and maritime militia in the East China Sea and the waters around the Nansei Islands, in addition to implementing preparations based on various scenarios that will facilitate swift government decision making,
inter-ministry/agency cooperation should be enhanced between the Japan Self-Defense Force, Japan Coast Guard and police force in order to ensure an appropriate response to various situations, including armed attack situations.

(Tetsuo Kotani)

**Recommendation 6**

The Government of Japan should work to improve the overall maritime security capabilities of coastal nations of ASEAN (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam). Above all, efforts should be made to: 1) enhance joint military exercises and training, 2) engage in funding and technical cooperation for defense-related infrastructure, and 3) engage in active exports of defense-related equipment.

(Ken Jimbo)

**Recommendation 7**

The following passage from the current National Defense Program Guidelines should be maintained: “With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.” In addition, efforts should be made to maintain and strengthen credibility of deterrence by retaliation through U.S. deterrence capabilities, and the concept of damage limitation should also be enhanced.

(Sugio Takahashi)

**Recommendation 8**

In order to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law in the maritime region stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, Japan should promote the development of multi-layered frameworks of the Japan-U.S. alliance cooperation and multilateral cooperation that aim to secure safety for maritime transportation and freedom of navigation.

(Eiichi Funada)

**Recommendation 9**

In addition to concentrating resources in technological areas and bases that need to be supported and promoting national manufacturing capacity for defense equipment, Japan should establish robust companies or enterprises through the realignment of the defense industry, and develop an industry base that is capable of developing and manufacturing better high-performance equipment and...
nurturing international competitiveness. Furthermore, the transfer of equipment should be promoted using the framework of the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and efforts should be made to expand markets and lower equipment costs.

(Kouji Shimohira)

**Recommendation 10**

Based on trends in the defense technology environment, Japan should develop systems to identify, protect and nurture advanced technologies developed domestically, and a roadmap should be formulated that sets out how such technologies are to be adopted by the Ministry of Defense or the Japan Self-Defense Force.

(Satoru Mori)

**Recommendation 11**

Adequately understanding the rising sense of international caution against direct and indirect interference by Russia and China in the elections and policy processes of democratic countries, Japan should construct measures that will protect its own free and democratic structures and those of other countries and also the economic and social activities that are built on such democratic structures.

(Ryo Sahashi)