

Preface

This report contains a record of the speeches, research reports, comments and questions/answers from the symposium on “ Different *Springs* in the Arab Countries - Questions Raised by the Popular Movements and Political Changes” held on January 29, 2012 at Sophia University jointly by The Japan Institute of International Affairs and the National Institutes for the Humanities Program: Islamic Area Studies with the support of the Japan International Cooperation Foundation, and from the workshop on “The Arab *Springs* and the Future of the Middle East” held the following day (January 30) at The Japan Institute of International Affairs, again with the support of the Japan International Cooperation Foundation.

Major political changes have been underway in the Arab countries of the Middle East since January 2011. The dictatorial President Ben Ali in Tunisia and President Mubarak in Egypt were forced to step down by mass demonstrations primarily comprising younger citizens, while Gaddafi’s dictatorial regime in Libya was toppled by a grass-roots movement. In Syria and Yemen, however, ongoing fighting between pro- and anti-regime forces has generated large numbers of casualties. This sequence of events in which the rise of people’s movements has undermined or even brought down dictatorial regimes continues to be highly regarded as the “Arab Spring,” a wave of democratization that swept aside long-standing authoritarian dictatorial regimes in certain Arab states, but it has also given rise to concerns that these events will further destabilize the Middle East, a region rife with ethnic and sectarian disputes and other elements of instability.

Held just about a year after the “revolution” in Tunisia set these events in motion, this symposium/workshop brought together mostly younger participants – researchers from Japan and the Arab countries as well as activists who are actually taking part in the pro-democracy movements – to discuss how the popular movements and political changes in the Arab Middle East should be understood and how both the countries involved and the international community (inclusive of Japan) should respond to ensure both democratic societies and political stability in the Middle East. Through discussions among the participants in the pro-democracy movements and the researchers engaged in front-line research, the symposium/workshop proved a major success in deepening understanding of the realities, prospects and problems of the people’s movements in the Arab countries that are difficult to discern from outside and in giving back broadly to the Japanese public. The mutual exchange that took place between the young researchers and activists will not only contribute to future progress in Middle East research but will also improve Japan’s presence in Arab countries.

It should be noted that the opinions herein are solely those of the individuals expressing them and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

In closing, I would like once again to express our deepest gratitude to the speakers, rapporteurs, and discussants who enthusiastically participated in the symposium/workshop and offered extremely meaningful presentations, reports and comments, as well as to everyone else who assisted in organizing and running the symposium/workshop.

September 2012

Yoshiji Nogami
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Participants List

Name	Affiliation
Nabil Abdel Fattah	General Director, Al-Ahram Center for Sociological Studies
Mohamed-Salah Omri	Lecturer, University of Oxford
Mohammed Al-Asaadi	Board Member, Coordinating Council of Youth Revolution for Change (CCYRC), Yemen / Freelance Journalist
Obaida Fares	Director, Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship (AFDC) / Member, Syrian National Council
Nadhem Mtimet	Assistant Professor, University of Carthage
Omar Bouissi	Democratization activist
ASARI Hideki	Deputy Director General, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
EZAKI Chie	Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan
HOSAKA Shuji	Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Director, JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
HORINUKI Koji	Research Fellow, JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
IKEDA Akifumi	Professor, Toyo Eiwa University
IMAI Kohei	Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Law, Chuo University
IWASAKI Erina	Associate Professor, Kyoritu Women's University
KISAICHI Masatoshi	Professor, Sophia University
KAWASHIMA Junji	Adjunct Lecturer, the Open University of Japan
MATSUMOTO Hiroshi	Professor, Daito Bunka University
MORIYAMA Teruaki	Research Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
MIYOKAWA Hiroko	Research Fellow, Center for Area Studies, National Institutes for the Humanities
NAGASAWA Eiji	Professor, the University of Tokyo
NOGAMI Yoshiji	President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
SAKANASHI Sachi	Senior Researcher, JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
TATEYAMA Ryoji	Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

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Symposium

Different *Springs* in the Arab Countries

- Questions Raised by the Popular Movements and
Political Changes –



Symposium
Different *Springs* in the Arab Countries
- Questions Raised by the Popular Movements and Political Changes -
Jan 29, Sunday, 9:45am – 5:30pm, @ Room 911, Library, Sophia University

【Program】

9:45 - 10:00 Opening Remarks: NOGAMI Yoshiji

10:00 - 12:15 First Panel

“Two Revolutions: Successes and Challenges in Tunisia and Egypt”

Moderator: KISAICHI Masatoshi

Lecturers: Mohamed-Salah Omri

“In What Ways is the Path of the Tunisian Revolution Singular?
And Why Does this Matter?”

Nabil Abdel Fattah

“Wounded Religious freedom in Egypt:

Distressed Transition in a Troubled Reality”

Discussants: Nadhem Mtimet, Omar Bouissi, NAGASAWA Eiji,
HOSAKA Shuji, IWASAKI Erina

13:00 - 15:00 Second Panel

“Democratization or Chaos? The Uprisings in Syria and Yemen”

Moderator: MATSUMOTO Hiroshi

Lecturers: Mohammed Al-Asaadi “Democratization or Chaos?
The Uprising in Yemen”

Obaida Fares “Uprisings in Syria”

Discussants: Obaida Fares, KAWASHIMA Junji, MORIYAMA Teruaki,
IMAI Kohei

15:15 - 17:15 Third Panel

“Around the Springs: Influence and Involvement of the US, Palestine,
Israel, GCC and Iran”

Moderator: TATEYAMA Ryoji

Lecturers: EZAKI Chie –

“The Arab Uprising and the Palestinian Political Arena”
SAKANASHI Sachi –“Iran’s response towards the Arab
Spring”

Discussants: IKEDA Akifumi, , HORINUKI Koji

17:15 - 17:30 Closing Remarks: KISAICHI Masatoshi

Summary

Opening Remarks

Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), opened the meeting, remarking how pleased he was to be taking up the topic of the Arab Spring for JIIA's annual symposium on the Middle East. He explained that the plural "springs" was being used in the symposium's title to signify that a different situation existed in each country. He stated that it was still unclear where the region was headed, and that no one yet knew whether the Arab Spring would develop into a complete, regional democratization process or not. He posited that democracy was not exactly functioning well in the West, and that thus the topic of democracy and public dialogue would likely continue to be an issue of major and global importance, one that JIIA would continue to study in every region moving forward.

First Panel:

"Two Revolutions: Successes and Challenges in Tunisia and Egypt"

Moderator Masatoshi Kisaichi, Professor, Sophia University, introduced the topic of the first session, pointing out that the two countries of Tunisia and Egypt had been trailblazers for the Arab Spring movements that later occurred elsewhere. That noted, he invited Prof. Mohamed-Salah Omri, Lecturer, University of Oxford, to give the panel's first lecture.

Prof. Omri began by addressing the claim that powers in the West were somehow behind the revolution in Tunisia, a claim which he admitted was understandable given historical action on the part of the United States and others, but that he argued was unfounded given evidence that Western nations were surprised by the uprisings. He also commented that the process of each uprising was such that: 1) even if the West had been involved, it would have had little control over the situation; and 2) each country was going through very distinct and different situations, suggesting a lack of behind-the-scenes choreography. He argued that it had proved perilous to over-generalize the region in the past, and that this continued to be true.

Tunisia had few models to emulate when it started on its path toward revolution. This has made the country an experiment, a testing ground for revolution. The progress of the revolution thus far suggests the existence of a unique, Tunisian model of revolution – one that was not emulated and which cannot be emulated. The country has therefore

inspired a lot of study, with many now watching it closely in the hope of discovering something new about the nature of independent revolution.

Prof. Omri read the meeting a poem by Mohamed Sgaier Awlad Ahmad. He explained that the metaphors of the poem conveyed the reasons behind the revolution in what had previously seemed to be a country of relative peace and stability: discontent over the nation's prospects and the feeling that Tunisia's rulers were out of touch with its people.

There were many differences between the revolution in Tunisia and those elsewhere. For instance, unlike the Egyptian revolution, which was mostly urban, the uprising in Tunisia had a strong rural component. Regional towns and cities that operated primarily agricultural economies and yet shared many of the same problems faced by urban centers were the main drivers of the revolution. Unlike in many other countries, the army was not a big player in the revolution. It was neutral, and if anything, it was protective of the revolution. Labor unions, on the other hand, particularly the General Tunisian Labor Union (UGTT), played a major role in organizing protesters. Finally, unlike some other struggles, by the later stages of the revolution, protests were being heavily covered in international media.

Unique characteristics of the process toward the creation of a new constitution include an electoral code that bans former officials from running for office in the new government, parity between women and men, and an election system designed to encourage the participation of smaller parties and independent candidates. There were literally hundreds of independent candidates during elections, and this meant an increasingly political transitional period rather than one stressing ideology.

The Tunisian revolution focused on solidarity and political-cultural production. The people banded together against the old regime. Post-revolution elections were successful, although voter turnout was surprising low at 49 percent. Nevertheless, elections were free, transparent, and safe. Islamists gained a number of votes, and not only Nahda, but also some Salafi candidates. In the end, the government was split in such a way that the major party cannot do anything without the cooperation of minor parties.

Alliances and fusions among parties have now started, and these are likely to progress further as the country moves toward writing its constitution. Tunisia has entered a period of unregulated democracy. For a society that lived under state secrecy and social conservatism for so long, this is both a welcome development and a challenge. The economic model of Tunisia has not changed that much. If anything, issues of

employment and regional imbalance are even worse than they were before, but these issues are at least being addressed, and by every party.

One year on, it seems clear that the revolution has meant different things to different people. This is the expected outcome for a leaderless revolution. The leading Nahda Party now has many choices to make. The world must wait and see whether the Party and the country will decide to appease Islamists or secular forces.

The second lecture was given by Mr. Nabil Abdel-Fattah, Director, Al-Ahram Center for Sociological Studies, on the situation of the revolution in Egypt. He began by stating that he wished to discuss the different stages of the revolution, its implications, and history.

The background to the revolution in Egypt lies in the clash occurring in society between Egyptian and Muslim identities, tension between religious groups, the problems of urban areas, and the increased use of religion as an expression of social and political status. The uprising on 25 January 2011 set Egypt on a path toward a limping transformation process, following which authority will be transmitted to representative institutions elected democratically.

The protests succeeded in transferring power from President Hosni Mubarak to the military and brought about the creation of a roadmap toward the creation of a new constitution and election of a new president. The roadmap was based on a partial amendment of the 1971 constitution. Controversy has emerged about this roadmap. Of particular note is Article 2 of the constitution, which declares that Islam is the state religion. Whether Egypt will turn to modern law or remain in Islamic law is a definite question right now. Doing away with Article 2 will not solve the problems of the legal system, as over the years a religious and socialization process has occurred. How to handle religion is always an issue, and just subtracting or adding amendments will not solve this.

There is the possibility that religious freedom is going to be threatened in Egypt. What can the people do to prevent this? There are a number of measures that should be taken. First, exclude the common conspiracy theory from the public discourse that foreigners are behind the actions in Egypt and Arab countries. Second, do away with customary councils, extralegal religious bodies used in some parts of Egypt to deliver judgments on financial disputes or other problems that arise between citizens. Decisions should be made by higher legal powers to prevent religious discrimination in disputes. Until the election of the next president, the Higher Council for Religious Affairs should contain people of high integrity who are known by the public and who can support religious

freedom. These are just some of the many ideas for dealing with constrained religious freedoms.

Discussion

Prof. Erina Iwasaki, Associate Professor, Kyoritsu Women's University, was asked to give the panel's first comment. She remarked on the differences pointed out between the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, particularly noting that the Tunisian revolution started in the countryside while the Egyptian one started in the cities. She explained that a major difference between the two countries was that the Tunisian countryside was a little more developed and urban than the Egyptian countryside, containing a number of small- to medium-sized cities, within which around 60% of the Tunisian population lived. That point made, she questioned what was to be learned from the gains made by the Nahda in the elections. Noting that the party had been absent from the political scene in Tunisia for some time before the revolution, she suggested that their gains showed that either the party was simply better than secularist organizations at organizing voters and grassroots campaigns, even from abroad, or that the relationship between Tunisian society and Islam was changing.

Next, Mr. Omar Bouissi, Democratization activist, was requested to give a comment. He brought up the idea that the Arab Spring was a Western or US conspiracy, stating that this could not be the case because: 1) the US was surprised by the revolutions; 2) the US tended to attempt to contain revolutions when it was involved in them; and 3) Tunisia was not a particularly important country in terms of US investment. That said, he conceded that the country might be strategically important to the United States as a door to Africa and the Arab world. He also commented that France had recently appointed a new ambassador to Tunisia, and that it seemed the country was trying to stir up tension between secular and religious groups. He suggested that the discourse about differences between secular / religious groups, conflict, and terror, could open the door for the return of dictatorship or rise of army power.

Prof. Eiji Nagasawa, Professor, the University of Tokyo, served as the panel's third commentator. He remarked that it was surely no accident that Egypt and Tunisia were among the first to see democratization revolutions, as they were also among the first to create constitutions in the region. He questioned what model Tunisia could use for economic reform, and whether Egypt would become a secular or Islamic state. On the second point, he noted that Egyptian society was home to a number of different forces, and that it was likely religion would continue to play an important role in the future.

The panel's fourth commentator, Mr. Shuji Hosaka, Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Director, JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, announced that he

wanted to say a few words about the perspective of Japan on the revolution in Tunisia. He remarked that it was common for people in Japan to call the events in Tunisia the “Jasmine Revolution,” and that it was incorrectly said that this was because the national flower of Tunisia was the Jasmine. Mr. Hosaka commented that this was not true, and that originally the French had created the name based on the image that Tunisia was a location for pleasure trips. He then brought up the story of Mohamed Bouazizi, whose act of self-immolation was said to have been the starting point for the revolution. Mr. Hosaka noted that in Japan it was said that this was because he was depressed about not being able to find a job after graduating college, or that he had been beaten by a female police officer. Mr. Hosaka stated that both of these stories had proved false as well. He explained that these stories all showed that the information spread by social media was not always trustworthy. He expressed concern over how the countries were dealing with this issue, and in addition, asked what the youth in each country intended to do next along with the end of each revolution.

The last panel’s comment came from Prof. Nadhem Mtimet, Assistant Professor, University of Carthage. He began by commenting on the use of the term “Middle East,” requesting that the terms “middle region,” “North Africa,” or “Middle East and North Africa” be used instead given that Tunisia was located in the north part of Africa. He brought up the point that with Nahda gaining the most votes in the Tunisian election, it might be said that not much had changed as a result of the revolution. Prof. Mtimet argued that this had a lot to do with Nahda’s ability to organize and encourage people to vote. The result of this, he stated, was that many very poor people voted for a party that believes in liberal economics. He explained that many in Tunisia did not realize this, and would likely say that they had cast their vote for religious or sentimental reasons. Bringing up the Egyptian revolution, he commented that it differed interestingly from the revolution in Tunisia, in that in the latter, the army had served to protect the protesters.

Prof. Kisaichi read off some questions from the audience, and invited the panel to answer any that they wished.

Prof. Omri took the first turn at answering questions. In response to a question about the rural nature of the revolution in Tunisia, he remarked that it was incorrect to say the revolution was rural as many of the “rural” areas of Tunisia contained highly populated cities. Asked to comment on any forces working behind the scenes during the revolution, he remarked that if the country was to assume that there was a conspiracy behind the move toward civil society, then they might as well just give it up. Asked about whether an Islamist party like Nahda would be good for the economy, he replied that the revolution would definitely be good for the economy and that there was no relation between Islam and anti-capitalist policies. He remarked that there may

continue to be discrimination in policy against certain regions and the poor, however. On the issue of whether social media was trustworthy, he proposed that Tunisia was in the midst of a propaganda war, and that many different groups were attempting to use media to their own advantage. As for why there was a relatively low turnout in the elections, he answered that many did not perhaps understand what the elections were for and how important they were, and that among the older population, many did not perhaps vote because no one told them to.

Mr. Abdel-Fattah was then asked to respond to questions. Asked why there had been an election in 2011 of all years, and not before then, he answered that until then it seemed that many of the components of the old regime were working well. He remarked that discontent over government policies and the ability to use social media and the internet to communicate and publicize protests drove the revolution forward. In response to a question on what the main force behind the revolution was, he answered that it was the urban middle class in Cairo and other cities, along with some factions from the industrial worker class. Asked why the Muslim Brotherhood had achieved the most success in elections, Mr. Abdel-Fattah responded that the simple language used in campaigns around Islam was once reason, along with the excellent organizational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood, the lack of a serious plan from other parties about how to solve Egypt's problems, and the excellent use of social media by the Brotherhood. Asked whether Egypt would see fundamental economic reforms, Mr. Abdel-Fattah stated that he did not expect any, and that there was no real difference between the old regime and economic policies of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turning to the issue of how trustworthy media was, Mr. Abdel-Fattah argued for the need for a public investigation into who controlled what in the media, proclaiming that the mass media was financed by the wealthy in Egypt. Asked whether the revolution and rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood would affect relations with Iran, Mr. Abdel-Fattah said that he did not think relations would be affected, but that it was likely the country's relationship with Hamas in Palestine would change.

Second Panel:

“Democratization or Chaos? The Uprisings in Syria and Yemen”

Moderator Prof. Hiroshi Matsumoto, Professor, Daito Bunka University, opened the second panel, reminding the audience that unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings in Syria and Yemen were ongoing affairs. That noted, he asked for a lecture from Mr. Mohammed Al-Asaadi, Board Member, Coordinating Council of Youth Revolution for Change (CCYRC), Yemen / Freelance Journalist, on the situation in Yemen.

Yemen faces a number of serious social and developmental issues, among them an amendment proposed to the constitution allowing the president to serve for life. The

combination of these factors led the youth to revolt. On 3 February 2011, there were huge demonstrations against the regime and the constitutional amendments proposed by the ruling party in 10 cities. These demonstrations were not an expression of revolt, but were simply against the regime and the amendments. There first started to be calls for the overthrow of the regime on the night Mubarak was overthrown in Egypt. These calls were peaceful, and simply asked President Saleh to step down.

Protests have been based out of what is called “Change Square.” The Square was begun by a group mostly composed of youth, but now there are also opponents to change, security forces spying on the youth, defected army members who have joined the protests, and an assortment of other players, including tribesmen, the media, resigned officials and civil society.

On 23 November, a new political deal was proposed in Yemen that asked Saleh to transfer all his power to his vice-president and also reallocated political power in parliament. This agreement was the result of many months of unrest in Sana’a. With the signing of the deal, Yemen now has a reconciliation government. It is still very weak. A reconciliation president election is scheduled for 21 February. There continues to be sit-ins and protests in Yemen at various government facilities. Al-Qaeda is expanding its influence in Yemen, and those formerly in power are threatening that the group could gain even more traction if the country does not return to the old regime. President Saleh has left Yemen and is now in the United States. Before leaving, he was granted immunity from persecution by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a move that did not please the youth, and that went absolutely against international human rights law. That said, some are of the opinion that this move was the only way to see the quick deposal of Saleh.

What makes Yemen different from other countries in the region? Demographically, Yemen has a high illiteracy rate of 55%, with over 50% living below the poverty line. The country is said to contain 60 million arms, over 50% of the population is under 18, there is a weak central government, and corruption is rampant. The military continues to be mostly under the command of Saleh. This includes 60% of the military, 100% of security forces, 100% of the air force and 100% of intelligence units.

Against these forces and Saleh are the rebel groups, the Southern Movement – a group that wishes to secede, independent politicians, tribal figures, Salafists, and many external forces.

The uprising has led to major change in Yemen. Yemenis now believe in the possibility of change. They no longer fear the government, and have become more united within their diversity. There are thousands of people living in Change Square who have been

there for months without ever leaving. The uprising is peaceful, it recognizes a leading role for women, it's media-savvy and it is organizing demonstrations to show the resilience of Yemenis, including the Life March movement.

The opposition of course faces many challenges. The running cost of the sit-in at Change Square is large. There are some internal disagreements, and the group has inherited ignorance and mistrust towards authority. There is a lack of unified leadership. Many groups have different interpretations of what a civil state should be. There are electricity and water shortages throughout Yemen, and fuel prices are rising. It remains to be seen what will happen in the country.

The panel's second lecture was given by Mr. Obaida Fares, Director, Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship (AFDC) / Member, Syrian National Council. He explained that he would begin with an overview of the situation in Syria over the past 50 years.

When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 he decided to try and build a closed state. When there were protests against his regime, such as in 1982 when the Muslim Brotherhood rebelled in the town of Hama, the regime cracked down and massacred its opponents. Information on the conditions in the country did not go into the outside world. It has been said that in 2010 it was not possible to find television footage on human rights in Syria, but as of 2012 there is now enough footage to start a 24-hour broadcast.

What happened in Syria? For one thing, the world saw revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and the start of uprisings in Yemen and Libya. And as such, people began to look toward Syria, expecting change. In late 2010, young Syrian activists created a Facebook page on the Syrian uprising against the president. This page was initially treated as a joke. Activists did not have a clear plan for their uprising. No one came out for the first call to protests, but stress levels clearly rose once the idea was out into society. In the beginning of March 2012, two young children in Daraa wrote a protest message on a wall in their school and were arrested for it. The head of the security branch in the city, who was the cousin of the president, took the children, removed their fingernails, and told their parents to forget about them. This action made Daraa into the center of the uprising.

The revolution in Syria is now one of the world's longest running uprisings. New media has played a significant role in its continuation. The uprising has teams for social media communication, including Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. It is the Syrians from outside of the country that have made all of this possible. Many Syrians left the country after 1982. Those on the outside were almost completely uninvolved in

the situation in the country after leaving. But once the protests started, suddenly those on the outside were quick to offer their help and support.

Around 6,000 people have been killed since the start of the revolution. Around 50,000 have been arrested or gone missing, and over 250,000 have been injured. Yet the uprising continues to gain momentum.

The regime in Syria continues to be supported by Russia and Iran. The situation is tied in with other situations in countries around the region, and this makes international action difficult. Syria will not be able to overhaul its social and developmental conditions overnight even if the revolution succeeds.

Discussion

Mr. Junji Kawashima, Adjunct Lecturer, the Open University of Japan, offered the first commentary on the two lectures. He noted that compared with other countries, Yemen was unique in the way that the president was maintaining influence, and that the former-vice president was likely to become the next president. He raised a question about a proposed explanation council being set up, inquiring what information points Change Square would seek an explanation on from the new government. He also remarked that the support from the international community was interesting, and asked what kind of support Yemen was looking for from the international community.

Mr. Teruaki Moriyama, Research Fellow, JIIA, commented next, noting that President Assad had been originally regarded as progressive compared to his father, as he opened up the Internet and other forms of media. He commented on internal support for the regime in Syria, questioning why considerable number of the people living inside Syria continued to support the president. He asked how ethnic and sectarian issues could be solved if the revolution succeeded.

Mr. Kohei Imai, Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Law, Chuo University, commented on the position of Turkey regarding the revolutions. He stated that Turkey was working very diligently to assess the situation. He noted that Turkey was careful to plan its global and regional policies, and that the country was making use of both soft and hard power, centering on soft power. He stated that the dilemma for Turkey was how to help the people of the region while maintaining support its regional neighbors. He explained that Turkey had signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Syria in 2009, and had other agreements for economic cooperation and joint military operations as well. Mr. Imai asked what each country expected from Turkey.

Mr. Fares was asked to take the first turn at answering questions. He commented on the connectivity between the Syrian and Libyan revolutions, noting that many in Syria were hoping to emulate the sequence of events in Libya by attracting military intervention. In response to a question on Assad's popularity in Syria, he remarked that he was still popular in certain areas and among certain social groups. Mr. Fares pointed out that there was in fact concern that the group supporting Assad would attempt to start a civil war. In terms of what Syria expected from Turkey, Mr. Fares admitted that in the beginning it was hoped Turkey would offer support to the revolution, but it seemed that Turkey had backed off due to the suggestion that the United States was not interested in an intervention in Syria. Answering a question on what the Syrian National Council (SNC) was doing to reach out to the country's many sects, Mr. Fares responded that the SNC was meeting with Kurdish parties and other groups on a regular basis to share information. Responding to a question on the role of the defected army, Mr. Fares explained that it was expected that the soldiers would help protect the revolt and lead the people to build the basement of the new national army. On a question about economic sanctions, Mr. Fares argued that sanctions hurt a country's people more than its leaders. Asked who supported the defected army, Mr. Fares answered that Syrians covered most of its expenses.

Next, Mr. Al-Asaadi took questions. Commenting on whether the Saleh would continue to exert influence after returning to Yemen from the United States, he stated that it was likely he would not be given too much power upon his return, as it was expected he would wish to take revenge on those who had deposed him. He further argued that any role Saleh might play politically would only trigger a new round of revolutions. In terms of the GCG explanation committee, he stated that it would more serve a role of communication than explanation, and that it had not quite started yet. In terms of support expected from Japan, Mr. Al-Asaadi requested grass-roots / community-level development support and educational/infrastructure reform support, as well as political support for the organization of dialogues around the country to ensure that each of the country's groups was accommodated in the building of a new Yemen. On a question regarding what policies the new Yemen would prioritize, Mr. Al-Asaadi answered the values of a civil state, with equal rights, social justice and partnerships among the people. Asked about the possibility of reforms within the Saleh party, Mr. Al-Asaadi argued that as long as Saleh was in power, there would be no reform. Asked was sort of leaders the youth of Yemen were putting forward, Mr. Al-Asaadi admitted that there was not yet one unified youth leader, largely due to the influence of Saleh's intelligence forces in the square. He explained that the youth did not want to have political power as much as it wanted a better, more equitable Yemen.

Third Panel:

"Around the Springs: Influence and Involvement of the US, Palestine, Israel, GCC and Iran"

Moderator Prof. Ryoji Tateyama, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan, introduced the topic for the third panel, noting that two planned speakers had been unable to make it to the meeting due to health issues and flight cancelations.

Ms. Chie Ezaki, Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, made the panel's first lecture, on the way in which the Arab Spring had affected Palestine. She explained that in the beginning, the political change happening in Egypt had been supported in Palestine. From 15 March 2011, youth movements occurred in the region calling for an end to the split between Fatah and Hamas. The youth movement did not offer support for any particular political party. Rather, the youth had said that they were inspired to select their own leaders, and to seek reconciliation.

Hamas initially tried to suppress demonstrations, but they occurred anyway. On 4 May, the two parties agreed to work toward reconciliation and promised to hold elections for a unity government. Thus, the Arab Springs did not so much dramatically change Palestine, but it did hasten reconciliation.

Aside from reconciliation matters, changes in Egypt have been taken positively by Hamas. The group believes that it is more likely to be supported by the new government. Conversely, there has been serious debate within Hamas about how to respond to the uprising in Syria.

It is said that Iran is supporting Hamas, and that it is also supporting the Syrian government. Looking at the relations between Hamas and Iran, balances of power among regional actors seem likely to change with the progression of the Arab Springs. There are many regional pressures toward change. As the peace process is slow in producing results, the issue of how to realize results in negotiations with Israel is a challenge. Leadership will hopefully take measures to further resolve acts of violence between Hamas and Fata.

It is unlikely that there will be much progress toward peace talks between Palestine and Israel this year with the election occurring in the United States. Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas needs to be further advanced in such a way that Hamas will agree to completely give up violence. It is necessary that before peace talks begin there be a strong foundation for a stable state in Palestine.

The panel's second lecture was made by Ms. Sachi Sakanashi, Senior Researcher, JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, on Iran's position and response to the Arab Springs.

The impact of the Arab Springs on Iran was domestically limited yet internationally great. Demonstrations in Iran were planned in 2010, but they were oppressed and did not spread further. On the other hand, the changes that have occurred in other countries have damaged many of Iran's diplomatic relationships. For instance, Bahrain has accused Iran of inciting protests among its Shiite population. Furthermore, the good relationship between the Syrian Assad regime and its use of that regime to contact Hamas and Hezbollah became liabilities with the onset of the Springs.

Iran has said from the beginning that it will not acknowledge the existence of Israel and that the future of the Palestinian people should be determined through a referendum in the region. The series of events relating to the Arab Springs have built up pressure on Iran. Ever since the summer of 2002, there has been international uproar regarding Iran's nuclear program. The United States and Israel have made various attempts to stop that program.

The current regime in Iran is attempting to strengthen its political base, arresting spies and cracking down on journalists, activists, and other opposition figures. At the same time, regime supporters are being given various benefits. There was a large-scale mass protest against the regime in 2009, claiming that elections had been fixed. This was called the green movement, and many of its protesters were arrested.

An issue in Iran is that it is unclear who should be the target of protest. There is a supreme leader, but there is also a powerful president. There is a lot of popular dissatisfaction, but the government cracks down on the people in a well-modulated manner – in other words, protests are halted but arenas for criticism are allowed to an extent. Depending on the day, the speed at which the Internet is available may vary, shutdown newspapers may continue to operate under different names, and so forth. Furthermore, those that oppose the regime may leave the country, and those that stay and support the regime may receive dividends from oil price hikes through various benefits.

At one time Iran would reach out to Shiite's in other countries, but this official policy was scrapped in the latter part of the 1980s. It is hard to say what involvement Iran has in protests abroad. Governments in other countries are nevertheless still likely to claim that Iran is at fault for various issues. Iran is likely not responsible for everything wrong in the region. It will be important for the country to respond adequately to criticisms from others and from their own people in order to maintain its status quo.

Dr. Koji Horinuki, Research Fellow, JIME Center, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), presented on the effect of the Arab Spring in the Gulf countries.

The GCC has been forced to respond to the uprisings in the Arab world. Since 14 February, large-scale anti-government demonstrations have been going on in Bahrain. There have also been demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The UAE and Qatar have been regarded as the most stable countries. As far as Bahrain is concerned, the country initially tried to solve the problems without playing up the Shiite factor too much. However, after some time both sides turned radical and there was violence.

It has been most important for the GCC to maintain monarchies in each nation. For this reason, GCC foreign ministers have met frequently to discuss how to suppress the protests in Bahrain and support Oman. At the same time, the organization has interfered in other countries as well, although mostly on the side of the people, quite opposite to what they are doing internally. The GCC has called for leaders to step down in Egypt, Syria and Libya.

Heightening oil prices in 2011 allowed the GCC countries to redistribute wealth without suffering financially. The countries have managed fairly well to deal with the dissatisfactions of the people by dispersing extra benefits.

Next, Prof. Akifumi Ikeda, Professor, Toyo Eiwa University, commented on the Israeli view of the Arab Springs.

Each country has its own unique domestic ailments that affect the way these countries view the world. In that sense, Israel has a complex by which it feels it is always faced with a threat, and the only way it can relieve itself of the threat is self-help. The Arab Springs are therefore thought of in terms of how they affect the security of Israel.

For a long time, it was viewed that Hezbollah and Hamas were being controlled by Iran to threaten Israel. The changes that occurred in 2011 appeared to the Israeli Government as a renewed threat from neighboring countries. The emergence of forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt made Israeli feel that it was surrounded by nations governed by Islamic militants. Israel's stability was previously upheld by its relationships with Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. The first two relationships were severely weakened by the end of 2011. The fear that everyone is an enemy is likely fueling the Israeli reaction to the Arab Springs.

Discussion

Ms. Sakanashi stated that a big influence on the actions of Iran was that the current regime was established by a revolution. Asked about the effectiveness of an oil embargo on Iran, she remarked that the EU had decided on such an embargo, but that it only imported 20% of the oil produced by Iran, and actually the largest importers of Iran's oil were China and India, two countries with a high demand for oil. With Iran continuing to sell oil to the two countries, she suggested it would not suffer much. Asked if the Iranian nuclear program had been confirmed or not, Ms. Sakanashi stated that it was because the program could not be confirmed that various sanctions had been implemented. Responding to a question about the Japan-Iran relationship, Ms. Sakanashi commented that the two countries maintained a good relationship, but that Japan was being pressured by the United States to choose between the Japan-US Alliance and relations with Iran. Iran understands the fact that Japan cannot give priority to relations with Iran over alliance with us.

Next, Ms. Ezaki responded to the questions she had received. Asked if the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood would strengthen relations between Egypt and Hamas, Ms. Ezaki answered that the matter was yet unclear. On the question of how to engage Hamas in the Israel-Palestine peace process, Ms. Ezaki suggested that the United States could help to bring each side to the negotiating table. She proposed that the real issue was how to define issues in a way that was satisfactory to all players. Commenting on the Arab Springs, Ms. Ezaki stated that the protests had likely been perceived by Palestinian leadership as threatening, and that this perhaps had caused them to be more open to the idea of reconciliation with Fatah. In addition, she noted that many in Palestine wished to achieve a more unified government before joining the United Nations.

Dr. Horinuki received a question on Qatar and what the country was trying to do with regard to protests. He stated that the country was supporting the intervention of the UN in Libya, most likely out of the hope that it would be able to enhance its international presence through such action.

Closing Remarks

Prof. Kisaichi was requested to offer closing remarks. He thanked each participant for their contributions to the fruitful debate. He explained that on 23 October he had participated in the election monitoring team sent by the Japanese government to Tunisia, and that he had truly felt the election to be transparent and fair. He stated that he was impressed by the resolve of the Tunisian people to not allow fraud in the

election. He also said that his impression was that the region was off toward a new and brighter future. He proposed that the Arab Springs not be viewed in terms of one or three years, but in terms of 10-20 years, and that doing so would lead to a different analysis. He noted that many revolutions in the region had been started by youth wishing to move away from religion and ideology, but that nevertheless, come election time, Islamic parties had gained ground. Prof. Kisaichi concluded by again thanking each participant and questioning what would become of the region in the futur

Closed Workshop

**The Arab *Springs* and the Future of the
Middle East**

Closed Workshop

The Arab *Spring*s and the Future of the Middle East

Jan 30, Monday, 9:55am – 6:05pm, @ JIA Conference Room

【Program】

9:55 - 10:00 Opening Remarks: ASARI Hideki

10:00 - 12:00 First Session

“Popular Movements and Authoritarian Regimes in the Middle East”

Moderator: NAGASAWA Eiji

Presenters: Nadhem Mtimet

“Tunisian Agricultural Sector during the Last Two Decades:
Issues and Criticisms”

Omar Bouissi “Tunisian Youth: The Engine of the Revolution”

MIYOKAWA Hiroko

“The 25th January Revolution and the Coptic Christians
in Egypt”

Commentator: Nabil Abdel Fattah

13:00 - 15:00 Second Session

“Spread of the Popular Uprisings: Their Indigenouness and Mutual Linkage”

Moderator: Mohamed-Salah Omri

Presenters: Obaida Fares

“The Popular Movement inside Syria and Its Relation with the
Movement outside Syria”

Mohammed Al-Asaadi “The Case of Yemen”

KAWASHIMA Junji

“Yemen’s Southern Movement Amid Winds of Change”

Commentator: TATEYAMA Ryoji

15:30 - 17:30 Third Session

“Backgrounds and International Factors of the Uprisings”

Moderator: IKEDA Akifumi

Presenters: HORINUKI Koji

“Surviving the Arab Spring: Political Reform and Economic
Allocation in the GCC States”

Ezaki Chie

“The Arab Uprising and the Palestinian Political Arena”

IMAI Kohei

“Turkish Policy toward the Arab Spring: Is Davutoğlu Doctrine at the End
of the Cliff?”

17:30-18:00 General Address

18:00-18:05 Closing Remarks: ASARI Hideki

Summary

Opening Remarks

Mr. Hideki Asari, Deputy Director General, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, reiterated the gratitude of JIIA toward the meeting participant's for the quality of the previous day's discussion. He stated that it was hoped the closed nature of the day's workshop would lead to a more candid discussion.

First Session:

Popular Movements and Authoritarian Regimes in the Middle East

Moderator Prof. Eiji Nagasawa, Professor, the University of Tokyo, opened the first session and introduced each of the presenters and the session's commentator. He then requested the first presentation from Prof. Nadhem Mtimet, Assistant Professor, University of Carthage.

Prof. Mtimet presented on the economic situation and agricultural sector in Tunisia over the last two decades. He explained that he wanted to summarize what had happened during the 23 years of Ben Ali's regime and in the one year since 17 December, when the Tunisian revolution began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi.

The demands of the revolution were: 1) economic; 2) for freedom; and 3) for social justice. Many Tunisians, poor and wealthy alike, felt that they had lost their dignity under Ben Ali's regime.

Prof. Mtimet presented a list of factors which had caused the Tunisian people to feel displeasure with the Ben Ali regime. Economic indicators show annual GDP growth of 4-5% from 1987 to 2010. It is suspected that this growth could have been 9-10% with better governance. Tunisia's economic development model was concentrated in the coastal regions, with low trade occurring between different areas.

A definite problem within the Tunisian government was accountability. Many important infrastructure projects were started, but they were not finished. Strategies were elaborated, but not implemented. This was a weak point of the Ben Ali regime over the past ten years. Transparency was another major weak point. There was little discussion on issues allowed from opposition. Efficiency and effectiveness were

problems, especially in the public health or transportation sectors. The middle class shrank in Tunisia since the end of the 90s.

Another issue was that the government was not responsive. After the first legislative elections in the 1990s, Ben Ali decided to change the results, swapping in political parties he preferred and oppressing the Islamist parties. It could be said that by 1995 there was no democracy in Tunisia.

The Ben Ali government did not seem to have forward vision. It failed to reduce the unemployment rate from 13%. The economy came to be based on low- and medium-skilled workers. Unemployment rates decreased for those without skills and nearly doubled for those with university educations between 1994 and 2010.

Rule of law was a problem. Many laws were elaborated and promulgated, but not upheld.

The agricultural sector in particular was a major point of contention. This sector accounts for 10% of Tunisian GDP and employs 18% of the labor force. However, there was no clear agricultural strategy between 1990 and 2010. The sector suffered low productivity and little support for small farmers. Agricultural research centers and higher education institutions were just not supported.

Since the revolution occurred, what has happened? Unemployment increased from 13% to 18%. The number of unemployed also rose from 500,000 to 800,000. GDP growth was 0% in 2011. The ruling political parties are incapable of ruling the country. Most opposition parties just wait for their defeat. Tunisia is in a delicate situation. Tunisia lost about 40% of its total capital in 2011. Many are watching what is happening in Tunisia, and if the country succeeds, it will encourage success in other countries. The situation is dire, but Tunisia has a historical responsibility to succeed.

Following Prof. Mtimet's talk, Mr. Omar Bouissi, democratization activist, gave a presentation on the role of Tunisian youth in the country's revolution.

Mr. Bouissi commented that there had been a number of protests in Tunisia throughout its modern history, and that he hoped to consider not why the protests had occurred but why they had turned into a full-blown revolution this time.

The revolution in Tunisia in 2011 was the first of its kind in the world. Organized without the guidance of political parties or organizations, Tunisian youth from diverse socioeconomic and political backgrounds acted as the engine for change in the country.

What factors led the Tunisian youth to work as the engine for the revolution? How were they organized, and how did they act?

The majority of young people who took to the street in the recent revolution were unemployed and dissatisfied university-graduates. They were skilled laborers who could not find work. The Tunisian educational system produced more graduates than the job market could hold. The youth felt the government was not considering what was really best for the country when implementing policy. On the government-side, the leaders underestimated the youth. They assumed the youth were emotional and uninterested in politics. However, the young are actually knowledgeable and full of energy – they simply had no jobs or outlook for the future.

The youth went around traditional media to organize and call attention to the protests, making use of alternative media such as Facebook and Twitter. The regime was really pushed out by cyber activists. The ability of young Internet users to grasp the smallest details about protests and the government's response created a single, unified narrative that encourage the protesters and unified them. Good documentation by the protesters fought against the disinformation spread by traditional media, winning the hearts of the general Tunisian populace. Online activists were able to inspire citizens and organize protesters. Cyber activists did not just share what was happening on the ground, but also distributed information on the corruption of the Ben Ali regime.

The government did not realize the level of dialogue being carried out on social networking sites, believing that control over the mass media would allow it to stamp out support for the protests. However, Tunisia has the most engagement on social networking sites of any African country. The youth created a virtual, interactive, and public space for dialogue that enabled a revolution without charismatic leaders. The Internet also served to expose the youth to greater information about other societies and their own country's regime, fueling anger about the lack of economic opportunity and freedom in Tunisia.

Mr. Bouissi closed his presentation by showing a video on the first Kasbah sit-in. He noted that after five days protesting, over 100,000 people were taking to the streets each day.

The third and final presentation of the first session was given by Ms. Hiroko Miyokawa, Research Fellow, National Institute for the Humanities, Sophia University, on the revolution in Egypt and its implication for the Copts.

One of the agenda items that the new ruling Islamist parties in Egypt must deal with is sectarian conflict. Clashes are occurring more often now between those of different religious beliefs than in the Mubarak era. These clashes mostly occur between

Islamists and Coptic Christians, a group of Egyptians that converted to Christianity around the second century and which now represents 6-10% of the Egyptian population.

During the Mubarak regime, there was some effort made to have Copts take up positions in the Cabinet and People's Assembly. Copts tend to be liberal and engaged in social activities. Coptic Pope Shenouda III was always supportive of the Mubarak regime, working to ensure that the regime protected the safety of his people. When the revolution started in February, many Copts went out to protest with the Islamists, prompting the Pope to issue a statement of support for Mubarak. However, after the deposition of Mubarak, he quickly issued a second statement praising the youth for their work to overthrow the regime. He seems to be trying to side with whoever is in power as a means of protecting the Copts. It is not clear just how many Copts went to protests. It is clear that ordinary Copts demanded revolution alongside their compatriots.

Ms. Miyokawa presented a table detailing major sectarian conflict before and after the Egyptian revolution, noting that strife occurred more frequently after the Mubarak era than before it, especially in the southeast part of the country.

Looking to the People's Assembly, many parties have elected or placed Copts in political positions to show that they are accepting of all groups. Ms. Miyokawa highlighted the major parties that had done so, including the Freedom and Justice Party.

It is now unclear who can protect the Copts in Egyptian society. The church issued a statement saying that it did not support any one party in the elections. However, it has been said that unofficially, the church supports the Free Egyptians Party. Some officials in the church have come out and said that there was nothing to worry about and that the moderate Muslim Brotherhood will deal with extremists and protect the Copts. At the moment, it does seem that the Brotherhood has the most power to counteract extremists and run the state in a proper way.

The session's commentator, Mr. Nabil Abdel-Fattah, Director, Al-Ahram Center for Sociological Studies, was asked to present his impressions of the discussion. He began by noting that there had not yet been an official transfer of power from President Mubarak to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). He commented on the relationship between the Copts and previous regimes in Egypt, explaining that the group had not been very active in the Egyptian political sphere since failing to form a Coptic political party at the end of the 1950s. He also remarked that politically active Copts tended to gravitate toward either Marxist movements or the work of the Church.

He noted that the friendship between the Coptic Pope and former President Nasser had been important for the group, opening the door to many opportunities and improving the social standing of lower- and middle-class Copts. He also explained that during the Mubarak regime, the government had used religion as a tool for social and political mobilization and had promoted balance between each group. He posited the increased political involvement of Copts, Salafis and other religious groups after Mubarak was the result of going from a situation when each group was part of the government into a situation where each group needed to fight for political power. He stated that the situation during the transitional period in Egypt was unstable, and commented that there was also activity going on abroad that was affecting the situation, including movement by Coptic Christians overseas and on the part of Saudi Arabia to support Islamists in Egypt. Remarking on the statement of Pope Shenouda III telling Coptic protesters to go home, he suggested that in the future the youth may be less likely to follow Church leadership.

Turning to the topic of Tunisia, Mr. Fattah asked a number of questions about the sociopolitical situation in the country. Questions were taken from the audience as well, and the presenters were then invited to answer any questions they wished to respond to.

Prof. Mtimet fielded questions first, choosing a question suggesting a possible relationship between Nahda and Salafi groups. He remarked that there did not seem to be any connection between the two. Asked why the revolution had not followed directly upon an uprising in Gahsa in 2008, Prof. Mtimet suggested that this was due to low media coverage of the protests then. He suggested that Internet activism helped to empower the latest revolution. Commenting on trade union activity during the revolution, he explained that top union leaders were not able to take the appropriate action for the revolution.

Mr. Bouissi commented on the role of the trade union in Tunisia as well. He explained that the country's unions were among the oldest in the Arab world and that they had always played an important social and political role. He remarked that if not for cooperation with the lower members of the trade unions, the protests would have likely been stifled by the police. Asked about the demographics of the revolution, he suggested that it could be said to be a revolution of the middle class. In the past few years, he further explained, the Tunisian middle class had been shrinking. He also noted that trade union leadership was trying to hide behind social justice actions to convince people not to investigate their past actions too much. Asked about the role of human rights activists in the revolution, Mr. Bouissi said that such activists had helped to expose the true face of Ben Ali to people and to governments abroad. Lastly, asked about the importance of social memory in Tunisia, Mr. Bouissi suggested that it was

the accumulation of social memory around past injustices that drove the Tunisian people forward during the revolution.

Ms. Miyokawa thanked Mr. Fattah for his comments, and said that she wished to further discuss issues with him at a later time.

Second Session: Spread of the Popular Uprisings: Their Indigenoussness and Mutual Linkage

Mr. Obaida Fares, Director, Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship (AFDC) / Member, Syrian National Council, gave the first presentation of the session, explaining that he hoped to present a more detailed explanation of the demographics behind the Syrian uprising.

Since the 1950s, people have been leaving Syria for a variety of reasons. Many have gone to Jordan, the United States or Latin America. More than 2 million Syrians now live in 140 countries worldwide. These overseas Syrians have been very active for the revolution. They are well educated, highly skilled, active, and often, they have never even visited Syria. With the start of the uprising, active groups of the overseas Syrians can be categorized according to their activities, the political team, the media team and the assisting teams.

The activities inside of Syria were organized by coordination committees of grassroots protesters. In each neighborhood and village was a separate committee. In Hama, for example, there were 50 coordination committees. By June 2011 there were around 550 coordinating committees. These committees were not well organized or registered in any way, and as such, in the same neighborhood there was sometimes two coordination committees. Communications between these different committees became very difficult by the end of June, and so it was decided that the committees of each city should join up to form a revolutionary council. In the end there were about 10-15 revolutionary councils. It was eventually decided that these councils should be reorganized again into revolutionary bodies. After some disagreement about what this council should be, the councils were organized into the Syrian Revolution General Commission. This is the organizational structure inside of Syria.

Outside of Syria, activists play a number of roles. They are organized into Media Groups, HR Groups, Funding Resources Groups, Political Activists, and Relief Work groups. In particular, there are more than 200 activists who are part of the media team in nine countries. It is difficult for unknown person to enter this team, as it must be ensured that information is secure. The team captures, distributes, and archives video.

It runs live streaming and does editing, research and media policy work. Challenges faced by the revolution regarding outside teams include the facts that most are outside of the country, and that many have never even been to Syria. Most belong to the upper/high classes, and they are influenced by the attitudes of their host communities. Therefore there is discrepancy between them and people living inside of Syria.

Mr. Mohammed Al-Asaadi, Board Member, Coordinating Council of Youth Revolution for Change (CCYRC), Yemen / Freelance Journalist, then presented on the youth movement in Yemen, the role of social media, and the protests that had been going on for freedom over the past few decades.

The protests really started in 2004, emerging out of six rounds of civil war begun by a Salafi group in the north. This rebellion encouraged those in the south, who began the Southern Movement in 2007. This was followed by teacher's strikes in 2008-2010. There was a series of human rights protests 2000-2010, and finally the Arab Spring protests in 2011. Thus, by the time the Arab Spring occurred, there was already an accumulation of experience for protesting and outrage against the regime.

Social media that has been used during the protests includes blogs, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, as well as Avaaz and other petition websites. Social media is used as a way of protecting the flow of information. It creates a means by which the group can feed news to media groups outside of Yemen. It also makes it possible to train activists easily over the Internet. Websites have been used to broadcast press releases, national songs, and TV shows. Over the Internet, letters with statistics and information are sent to world leaders and organizations as well.

Decision making in Change Square occurs in an organization committee. Social media is also used to make decisions, through such means as running polls and events within Facebook groups. Decisions are organized through text messages and calls as well. A challenge that has arisen is that people use anonymous names on the Internet, and it is thus hard to judge where opinions are coming from and whether they are being put forth by activists or security forces.

Aside from the Internet, networking occurs within the Square as well. There is everything one needs to live within the square. Delegations are sometimes sent out from Change Square to other cities. Focal points have been established in each city to ensure that truly accurate communication is being shared. Cross-border networking is being used to coordinate action with Syria, Egypt and Tunisia. Networking is useful to exchange ideas, debate issues, and offer moral support.

Networking has been basically simple because each group shares goals, causes, languages, age groups and communication spaces. Social media has made engagement,

participation, collective decision-making, education and work sharing easier. Challenges faced include the speed of development, the novelty of the experience, the tendency toward immature decision, and the inability to identify leadership.

The session's third presentation came from Mr. Junji Kawashima, Adjunct Lecturer, the Open University of Japan, on the Southern Movement in Yemen, a protest movement that started in 2007 as a peaceful rights-based protest. It is vital that the new government in Yemen work to meet the demands of the Southern Movement as it builds a new government in order to avoid secession.

The Southern Movement was begun when a group of retired military personnel began to protest for higher pensions. The protests were soon joined by civil servants who had been forced into retirement following the civil war in Yemen in 1994. From the view of southern Yemeni, they are spiteful of the government as they feel they are suffering punitive measures implemented following the 1994 civil war.

There are many groups and actors that have moved to get involved in the Southern Movement. In addition to the retired army members and former civil servants, southerners in the north, sociopolitical figures, political parties, Yemenis living abroad, armed separatists, and former leaders of the people's Democratic Republic of Yemen are involved. There is much disagreement among each group about whether they should call for the cessation of southern Yemen or not, especially in light of the recent uprising.

When the Arab Spring started in 2011, the Movement more or less stopped calling for separation, instead cooperating with the popular Yemeni uprising. The GCC initiative in Yemen calls for the holding of dialogue with all parties, including the Southern Movement. While issues of the Southern Movement will be discussed, the national government has said that the discussion will occur within the frame of preserving national unity, stability and security. There are basically three options placed before the Southern Movement now: reform in unity, reform within a federal system (including variations ranging from two-states to seven states solutions), and reform through separation. It is not now sure which position is favored by the majority of southern Yemeni. It is expected that if the government can meet the demands of the southern Yemeni to the extent that the people are satisfied, there will not likely be a separation.

Commentary was made by Prof. Ryoji Tateyama, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan. He commended the interaction that the Syrian revolutionaries had with outside forces, and asked a number of questions about each presentation. The floor was opened for questions, and a number of people made inquiries of the three

presenters as well. The presenters were then invited to answer any questions they could within the time allotted.

Mr. Fares noted that judging from the questions received, it seemed many people were interested in the Free Syrian Army. He explained that the Army was a group of 40,000 defected soldiers, and that most had defected due to a reluctance to kill civilians for the Syrian regime. He explained that while the media tended to think of the Army as one unit, it was in fact a number of groups united under the highest ranked officer in each respective area. He said that it was agreed at the end of October that the leaders of grassroots protest movements in each city would have control over the Army units in each area, and that this organizational structure was more or less working well. Asked if the Free Syrian Army could defeat the Syrian Army, Mr. Fares said that this was not the goal of the uprising, and that it was hoped that after the Syrian revolution succeeded, those in the Free Syrian Army would return to the ranks of the national army. Responding to a question suggesting a lack of unification among the goals of those in the Syrian revolution, Mr. Fares assured the meeting that the movement was unified behind the Syrian National Council, and that the idea that it was not was a tactic being used to break up the revolution. Asked why Russia continued to support Assad, Mr. Fares suggested that Syria was one of the last bases of power for Russia in the Middle East, and that the country wished to protect it as such. Finally, asked about funding for the revolution, Mr. Fares reported that most activities were funded by Syrian businessmen. He stated that no official money had been received from Qatar as far as he knew, but that this may not be the case on an individual or private basis.

Mr. Al-Asaadi fielded questions next. On the topic of freedom of communication in Yemen, he explained that in the Yemeni constitution, freedom of political affiliation and freedom of organization were guaranteed. However, he noted that freedom of the press had been demanded in the country for a long time, and that the regime was thus accustomed to protest on this. Asked about Army control of different areas in Yemen, Mr. Al-Asaadi explained that Sana'a was the center of life in Yemen, and that Saleh was likely to ignore problems in other regions as long as he maintained control over the capital. He explained there was some tension between the Army and Saleh, as the leader had once been quoted as saying that the only purpose of the Yemeni army was to protect him, to suppress any national movements and to show off on holidays. He also remarked that Army units in the capital were much better furnished than those in other areas. Asked about the high number of free arms present in Yemen, Mr. Al-Asaadi said that the United States had once tried to set up an arms repurchasing program, but that this had been unsuccessful. As for whether there would be a war in Yemen, Mr. Al-Asaadi suggested that the start of a war would likely mean a civil war that never ended.

Lastly, Mr. Kawashima addressed questions. Asked about financial resources for separatists, Mr. Kawashima reported that they in fact suffered from a lack of funds. He suggested that there was no major financial backer supporting Yemeni separatists from abroad. On which option among the three presented seemed most likely, Mr. Kawashima stated that he believed the Southern Movement was least likely to choose separation after the revolution, and most likely to work with other groups in unity.

Third Session: Backgrounds and International Factors of the Uprisings

The session's first presentation was made by Dr. Koji Horinuki, Research Fellow, JIME Center, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, on how political reform and economic allocation in GCC states were affected by the Arab Spring.

GCC states were largely untroubled by the protests with the exception of in Bahrain and Oman, which saw clashes between the government and protesters. Bahrain and Oman reached a crisis situation, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had problems, and the UAE and Qatar were stable. There was a small push for reform in the UAE. Qatar, while not affected itself, attempted to intervene and stop protests in Yemen, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Horinuki summarized the wishes of protesters in each country, highlighting the difference between Bahrain, where the people called for an end to the monarchy, and Oman, where people called for reforms without targeting the Sultan. He then presented an overview of reform plans proposed by each GCC regime. He noted in particular that Sultan Qaboos of Oman had shuffled his Cabinet three times, appointed ministers from the Oman Council and amended the constitution. In Bahrain, he noted that national dialogue had been started, and he remarked on the announcement in the KSA to grant voting rights to women. Dr. Horinuki presented a list detailing regional subsidy programs, underlining the 60-120% salary increase given to government employees in Qatar in particular.

In the long-term, the high expense of these policies and their dependence on funding from the oil market means that these moves could become destabilizing factors. The Arab Springs had implications for the Gulf States, but protests in other countries ultimately failed to mobilize the masses in the GCC. However, reforms implemented after the Arab Spring may have destabilized the region in the long run.

Next, the meeting heard a presentation from Ms. Chie Ezaki, Research Fellow, the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, on the how the Arab Spring affected Palestine.

On 15 March 2010, a protest movement was organized by Palestinian youth calling for an end to the internal split between Fatah and Hamas. These youth said that they were inspired by the movement of Tunisians to choose their own leaders, and that the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip aggravated by the split between Fatah and Hamas since 2007 was undermining the push by Palestinians for a two-state solution. The youth protesters pushed for a quick resolution to this issue.

Ms. Ezaki explained that the Arab Spring had resulted in definite consequences for the relationships between Hamas and countries neighboring Palestine. With the possible positive shift of Egyptian policy toward Hamas following the Arab Spring, many Palestinians have become more trusting of the party. The uprising in Syria on the other hand is a threat to the organization. There is the worry that the Arab Spring could harm the Hamas' ability to raise funds. This would surely change the power balance within Hamas.

At the same time as this is happening, over in Jordan, the opinion toward Hamas is changing. In 2011, leader of Hamas Khaled Meshal was allowed to visit the country for the first time in many years.

The Arab Spring has helped Palestine find a way out of a political impasse, has changed the relations between regional leaders and has established youth groups as new political actors. If reconciliation succeeds in Palestine, there will probably be an election soon afterward. It may be possible for Palestinians to utilize the reconciliation process as a means of pushing forward the peace process with Israel.

The day's final presentation was given by Mr. Kohei Imai, Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Law, Chuo University, on the Turkish response toward the Arab Spring, and the implications the movements in each country had for the Davutoğlu Doctrine of foreign policy.

Regional surveys show that most feel Turkey is playing the most constructive role of any nation in the Middle East. This result is the direct achievement of Turkey's Justice and Development Party and the advent of the Davutoğlu Doctrine.

The Davutoğlu Doctrine calls for accumulation of knowledge about world affairs and necessary resources for change, encouragement of global order, and use of smart power. Turkey has been trying to encourage stable global order through this Doctrine, becoming an active member in the United Nations, and promoting regional order. In terms of policy, this means that Turkey pursues a balance between security and freedom, takes a zero-problem policy toward its neighbors, works to develop relations

with neighboring regions, has a multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign policy and pursues proactive diplomacy.

The Turkish response to the Arab Spring won the trust of both the West and Arab countries. Turkey encourages Islamic-based political rule governing a secular democracy, believing in a conservative, moral society.

Surveys of regional opinion show that people believe Turkey to be a model country in the Middle East for its Muslim and democratic background. Surveying Egypt, more people said that they would prefer their future leader to resemble Recep Tayyip Erdoğan than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

When the uprising started in Libya, Turkish officials came out in support of opposition forces. The country encouraged Kaddafi to leave and for the country to shift toward democratic reforms. In the case of Syria, Turkey again encouraged Syria to respond to the demands of the public with reform. Syria did not respond, and so Turkey has imposed sanctions on Syria. However, unlike with Libya, Turkey is highly sensitive to the situation in Syria, with the problems in Syria affecting Kurdish, refugee, sectarian and economic issues in Turkey. Turkey's economic loss related to Syrian sanctions has thus totaled more than US\$ 2 billion to date. Turkey hopes that Assad will leave and that Syria will remain stable, but it is as of yet unclear what will happen.

The floor was opened for discussion. A number of questions were raised by the workshop's participants, and the presenters were invited to address those they were able to within the time allotted.

Mr. Imai took up a question of the economic effect of the Arab Spring. He noted that Turkey's economic growth was 8.6% in 2010, suggesting that Islamic democratization could be good for an economy. In response to a question on how Turkey's relationship with the West had affected its policy, he remarked that the Turkish relationship with the United States was complex, and that the country's relationship with Europe had helped it understand the need for reform.

Responding to a request to calculate the total cost of intervention in Arab Spring movements among the GCC states, Dr. Horinuki said that he had not calculated the cost, but that it was likely high given the gift policies implemented. In response to a question on the stability of Saudi Arabia, he posited that with the large wealth gap that existed in the country between the poor and rich, it was a possible candidate for revolution.

Ms. Ezaki chose to address a question on the influence of the Arab Spring on the peace process in Israel and Palestine, stating that if anything, the process would likely help Palestine gain traction with the Israeli side. In response to a question suggesting that young Palestinians were not interested in the ideological division between Fatah and Hamas, Mr. Ezaki stated that as long as there was Israeli occupation, even elites likely cared more than was thought about the need for reconciliation and work toward a two-states solution.

Closing Remarks

Mr. Asari was requested to give closing remarks. He thanked each participant for their contributions, commending how much each person had helped to deepen JIIA's understanding of exactly what was going on in the Arab Spring protests. He suggested that the Arab Spring had shown that democratization itself was not enough to provide economic prosperity and stability, and that the most important point would be how well each new regime managed to provide for its people moving forward. He remarked that the Japanese people would continue to be supportive of the region, and that the two day's of the symposium and the workshop had been a good starting point for dialogue to this end. He again expressed his and JIIA's gratitude to each symposium participant, and closed the meeting.

参加者略歴

Participants' CVs



Egypt

ナビール・アブドゥルフアッターフ / Nabil Abdel Fattah

アフラム社会学研究センター長 / General Director, Al-Ahram Center for Sociological Studies

- Born in Cairo 24/2/1952
- Worked as a Lawyer (1974-1979)
- Researcher at the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (1979-1987).
- Expert at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (1987-1990).
- Head of the Sociological and Legal Research Unit at the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (1990-till now).
- Visiting Researcher at ORSTOM French Institute (1993).
- Participant Editor of the Arab Strategic Report, issued by the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (1977-1994).
- Editor in Chief of the Books Published by the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (1994-till now).
- Editor in Chief of the State of Religion in Egypt Report (1996-till now).
- A Regular Writer in the Al Ahram Newspaper, Al Ahram Al Arabi Magazine, and other Egyptian and Arabic Newspapers.
- Assistant to the Director of the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (2000-till now).
- General Director of Al Ahram Center for Sociological Studies "History of Al Ahram" August 2009.

Tunisia

ムハンマド・サーリフ・ウムリー / Mohamed-Salah Omri

オックスフォード大学講師 / Lecturer, University of Oxford

Dr. Omri is Lecturer in Modern Arabic literature and Tutorial Fellow at St. John's College at the University of Oxford. He holds a BA from the University of Tunis and MA and PhD degrees from Washington University in the US. Dr. Omri taught at the Universities of Exeter in Britain and Washington University in St. Louis. From 1998 to 2007, he was Director of the Centre for Mediterranean Studies at Exeter. His publications include: *Trade and cultural exchange in the early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel's maritime legacy*, with Maria Fusaro and Colin Heywood, (2010) and *Nationalism, Islam and World Literature* (2006). Dr Omri has also published two books on Britain and the Maghreb in collaboration with Professor Abdeljalil Temimi in 2002 and 2003. He has several articles, interviews and lectures related to the Tunisian revolution in media outlets in Holland, the UK and Australia and in academic venues around Europe.

Yemen

ムハンマド・アル=アサディー / Mohammed Al-Asaadi

変革のための青年革命調整評議会諮問委員 / フリージャーナリスト / Member, Consultative Board, The Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change / Freelance Journalist

Mr. Al-Asaadi is a leading professional in the field of journalism in Yemen, after being Chief Editor of Yemen Observer, and founder and managing editor of Yemen Today. His media work and consultancy with international organizations over the past decade have engendered rich experience.

As a freelance journalist, he was involved in covering the developing news of the Yemen youth revolution for international media as a reporter, commentator and analyst. He works closely with leading youth activists as a mobilizer, trainer, strategist and fundraiser. He has trained dozens of spokespersons, young reporters and bloggers in and outside the Sana'a Change Square.

In February and March 2011, Mr. Al-Asaadi was closely engaged in the formation and review of the objectives of the Youth Revolution Goals along with dozens of politically independent academia, politicians, lawyers and experts.

As a member of the consultative board of the Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), known in Arabic as "*Tanawo'a*" meaning "Diversity", he provides strategic and political orientation to activists on the ground in different cities.

Mr. Al-Asaadi participated in so many protests throughout the past few years along with dozens of fellow activists including the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ms. Tawakkul Karman.

Syria

ウバイダ・ファーリス / Obaida Fares

発展と市民社会のためのアラブ協会会長・シリア国民評議会メンバー / Director, Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship in London / Member, Syrian National Council

He worked as a consultant for UNICEF and the British Council.

He is also the assistant coordinator for the Network of Democrats in the Arab World, a member of a number of executive committees of organizations in the UK, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen.

He has trained in the fields of Human Rights, Media and Training Skills, his training sessions total more than 350 days.

Participated in the writing and editing of more than 14 books in the fields of Human Rights, Media and childhood rights. He is a member of the Syrian National Council.

Tunisia

ナーズィム・ムティーマイト / Nadhem Mtimet

カルタゴ大学助教 / Assistant Professor, University of Carthage

Dr. Nadhem Mtimet received his PhD in Applied Economics from the University of Zaragoza in Spain. He is currently assistant-professor of agricultural economics at the High Agricultural School of Mograne, University of Carthage-Tunisia, and has over 7 years of academic experience in lecturing and supervising undergraduate and graduate students. Dr. Mtimet has over 10 years of scientific research in the fields of agro-food marketing, consumer behavior, and environmental economics. He participated in different research projects related to socio-economic development, marketing food-products, agricultural trade, and water use in agriculture. Dr. Mtimet has published a series of papers in international referred journals, participated in book-chapters, and several technical reports. He has also participated in various international conferences.

Tunisia

ウマル・ブーイースィー / Omar Bouissi

チュニジア民主化運動活動家 / Democratization activist

Omar Bouissi was born in the center of Tunisia in Kairouan in 1981.

He got a bachelor degree in English Language and Literature in Moknine, Monastir University in 2005.

In 2006 he pursued his postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Sousse University and he got a master degree in English literature. In 2006 he participated in an international conference on Ideology organized by the High Institute of Applied Languages in Moknine and presented an article entitled “The ideological construction of colonizer Vs colonized in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* and E.M Forster’s *A passage to India*.”

From 2006 to 2008, he taught English at the High Institute of Technological Studies in Sousse.

From 2008 to 2010, he taught English in the Ministry of Education in the Sultanate of Oman.

In July 2010, he went back to Tunisia to do researches in English literature by writing a dissertation entitled “The intersection of postmodernism and postcolonialism in J.M Coetzee’s *Foe*”

When the Tunisian revolution broke out, he was among the young activists who not only participated in but also organized the demonstrations against the dictator regime until Ben Ali was toppled in the 14th January.

Together with a group of young activists, he was conscious that the game was not over and that a new phase in the revolution had to start. After the first Kasbah sit-in which was evacuated by the police he was among the young activists who organized forums of discussions in Bourguiba street to convince the people that their revolution could be stolen if they would not continue the movements. These forums resulted in the 2nd Kasbah sit-in which represented a turning point in

Tunisian revolution regarding its results. In this sit-in he was among the organizing staff charged for the coordination with mass media.

After the success of the sit-in especially with the election of the constitutional assembly which was our major demand, I took part in different civil society activities.

Now he is a civil society independent activist and he is founding an association concerning the development of Human Rights and political consciousness.

Japan

浅利 秀樹 / ASARI Hideki

日本国際問題研究所副所長/Deputy Director General, The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Hideki Asari is Deputy Director General of The Japan Institute of International Affairs. He was Minister at the Embassy of Japan in the US before assuming his current position. After graduating from Waseda University he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1986. He earned M.A. in the University of Oxford. At MOFA he served as Counsel for Trade Negotiations in the International Legal Affairs Bureau (2004) and as Director of the Oceania Division of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2005-2007). His overseas posts include Political Counselor at the Japanese Embassy in the Republic of Korea (2003) and Economic Counselor, and later Minister at the Japanese Embassy in the US (2008-2011). He was also Cabinet Counselor in the Office of the Assistant Cabinet Secretary (2007-2009).

Japan

江崎 智絵 / EZAKI Chie

中東調査会研究員 / Research Fellow, Middle East Research Institute of Japan

Chie Ezaki is a Research Fellow at the Middle East Research Institute of Japan (MERJI) specializing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process, and the international relations in the Middle East.

From 2005-2008, she served as a researcher on the Middle East peace process and the Palestinian refugees at the Embassy of Japan in Jordan.

In addition to her work at MERJI, Ezaki teaches history of the Middle East, conflict and peace building in the Middle East, and the Islamic culture and society at some universities including International Christian University and Kanto Gakuin University as a part-time lecturer.

Ezaki is author of several articles on the Palestinian politics and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and is the co-author of *Conflict and Peace in Eurasia* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008). She holds a master's degree (International Political Economy) from the University of Tsukuba.

Japan

保坂 修二 / HOSAKA Shuji

日本エネルギー経済研究所中東研究センター研究理事 / Senior Research Fellow & Assistant Director of JIME Center, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

After receiving an M.A. (Oriental History) from Keio University in Tokyo, HOSAKA became Special Assistant of the Japanese Embassies in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Since then, he has held various posts in the fields of the Middle Eastern studies, including Researcher of the Middle East Institute of Japan, and Professor of International Center for Human Sciences, Kinki University, Osaka. He is currently Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Director of JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economic, Japan (IEEJ) and Visiting Professor of Waseda University. Among his publications are *Beggars and Islam* (1995), *Osama bin Laden's Holy Wars* (2001 and 2nd edition: 2011), *Saudi Arabia: Petro-Kingdom in Transition* (2005), and *What's Going on in Afghanistan?* (ed., 2010) (all in Japanese)

Japan

堀抜功二 / HORINUKI Koji

日本エネルギー経済研究所中東研究センター研究員 / Research Fellow, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

Education:

2001.4-2006.3

Ritsumeikan University (College of International Relations), Kyoto, Japan

B.A. in International Relations

2003.9-2004.8

UAE University, al-Ain, United Arab Emirates

Auditing student

2006.4-2008.3

Kyoto University (Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies), Kyoto, Japan M.A. in Area Studies

2008.4-2011.3

Kyoto University (Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies), Kyoto, Japan Ph.D. in Area Studies

Topics of Research:

Politics and Social System of the United Arab Emirate and Gulf Countries.

Demographic Imbalance and Expatriate Issues in the Gulf Countries.

National Identity and Gulf Cultures.

Japan

池田 明史 / IKEDA Akifumi

東洋英和女学院教授 / Professor, Toyo Eiwa University

Akifumi Ikeda is a professor of international politics and currently Vice President of Toyo-Eiwa University at Yokohama, Japan. He graduated from Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan, and studied at British universities at Stirling and Oxford, before he joined to the Institute of Developing Economies at Tokyo in 1980, as a research officer. During his tenure at the Institute, he was accepted as a Visiting Fellow (1984-86) and Visiting Senior Fellow (1995-96) at the Truman Institute of Hebrew University at Jerusalem, as well as a Senior Associate Member at St. Antony's College of Oxford. He moved to the Toyoeiwa in 1997, serving as the Head of Department (2002-04), the Dean of Faculty (2004-08), and the Vice President(2008-) successively.

He has published extensively on topics of the contemporary Middle East politics, on the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the peace process in particular. Those include a series of his edition; 'Problems of the State of Israel: Peace, Nation, and Democracy' 1994 I.D.E, 'Quest for Israeli-Palestinian Settlement: West Bank and Gaza in the Scope of Peace Process' 1990 I.D.E, 'Contemporary Politics in Israel: Issues and Developments' 1988 I.D.E, etc. etc.

Japan

今井 宏平 / IMAI Kohei

中央大学大学院博士後期過程 / Graduate School of Law, Chuo University

Kohei IMAI is a Ph.D. student in the Graduate School of Law (Major of Political Science) at Chuo University. He received his BA and MA degrees from Chuo University, and concluded his Ph.D. in the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Turkey. He was awarded a Government scholarship of Republic of Turkey in 2006, and the scholarship of Ph.D. program in the abroad from 2008 to 2011 from Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan. The title of his Ph.D. dissertation written in English is *The Possibility and Limit of Liberal Middle Power Policies: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East during the AKP Period*. He is the author of several articles on Turkish foreign policy and the theory of International Relations including "The phenomenon of cross border Islam" in Takashi Oshimura (ed.), *Cross border Politics*, Hukosha, 2010, (in Japanese), and "Turkish-U.S. Relationships in the Middle East: Function and Limitation of MiddlePower", *International Relations: The Japan Association of International Relations*, Vol.150, 2007, (in Japanese).

Japan

岩崎 えり奈 / IWASAKI Erina

共立女子大学准教授 / Associate Professor, Kyoritsu Women's University

Erina Iwasaki (eiwasaki@kyoritsu-wu.ac.jp) is an associate professor at Faculty of Letters and Arts, Kyoritsu Women's University, Tokyo. She received BA from Sophia University, MA from

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University, and concluded her Ph.D in Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University. She worked for Japanese Embassy and Japan International Cooperation Agency in Tunis. Since 2009, she has been at the present post.

The title of her Ph.D. dissertation in English is *Case Study of Rural Migrants in the Low Income Areas in the Greater Cairo* (2006) (published as *Egyptian Society in Transition: Migration, Labor, and Poverty* in 2009). She has written a number of articles, including “What is the Aila? : The comparative study of kinship structure in Egyptian villages,” *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, Vol.26, N.1, 2007; “Regional Differences in Returns to Education in Rural Tunisia”, *Proceedings of the Tunisia-Japan Symposium on Society, Science and Technology (TJASSST)*, 2011/11/13 (with Kenichi Kashiwagi).

Japan

私市 正年 / KISAICHI Masatoshi

上智大学教授 / Professor, Sophia University / Director, IAS Center at Sophia University

He is currently Professor of Maghreb Studies at the Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University and is also Program leader of Islamic Area Studies of Sophia University. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts Degree, from Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan and obtained his Ph.D. in History from Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan. His research deals with the socio-political roles of Sufi-saints in the medieval Maghreb societies and the relationship between the popular movement and Islamist groups in Algeria. At present he is studying the relationship between the popular Islamic activities (especially zawiya and sufi tariqa) and the formation of nationalism in Algeria.

Japan

川嶋 淳司 / KAWASHIMA Junji

放送大学非常勤講師 / Adjunct Lecturer, The Open University of Japan

Mr. Junji Kawashima is Adjunct Lecturer of The Open University of Japan, and former Advisor and Researcher of the Embassy of Japan at Republic of Yemen during 2008-2010. Graduated from Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University (B.A. in Political Science), and Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The Open University of Japan (M.A.). His research focuses on politics and transformation of ideologies in Yemen, its regional and international relations. Most recent work in Japanese includes; “Yemen: A Revolutionary State and Its New Era” *Thinking about Arab Popular Revolutions*, Makoto Mizutani ed., Kokushokankokai 2011; *Understanding World and Japan’s Territorial Issues At A Glance*, co-authored with Prof. Kazuo Takahashi, Nihonbungeisha 2011; “Tasks for Yemen 20 Years After Its Unification: the Southern Movement”

Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, No.509 vol. 2, MEIJ 2010. Concurrently serving as Assistant to Ambassador for Political and PR affairs, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Japan.

Japan

松本 弘 / MATSUMOTO Hiroshi

大東文化大学教授 / Professor, Daito Bunka University

Hiroshi MATSUMOTO is Professor, the Faculty of International Relations in Daito, Bunka University, Japan. He was the Special Assistant in the Embassy of Japan in the Yemen Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen from 1988 to 1991. He got the Ph.D. from Department of Middle Eastern Studies in the University of Manchester, UK, in 1994. After working in the Japan Institute of International Affairs as the Senior Research Fellow since 1997, he moved to Daito Bunka University in 2005. He is the author of *The Tribes and Regional Divisions in North Yemen* (2003, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies) and many works on Yemeni history and Democratization in Japanese.

Japan

森山 央朗 / MORIYAMA Teruaki

日本国際問題研究所研究員 / Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Teruaki Moriyama completed his doctoral study at Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, the University of Tokyo. His Ph.D. dissertation is *The Biographical Local Histories as a Genre of Hadith Literature: The Widespread of Their Compilation from the 10th to 13th Centuries and its Background*, which was accepted by the University of Tokyo in 2009. After joining JIIA as Research Fellow in 2010, he has engaged in his research activities. His current research topic includes: Influences of the 'Ulama' on the Political and Social Movements in the Modern and Contemporary Middle East, and Social and Cultural Roles of the 'Ulama' in the Mediaeval Middle East Muslim Societies. He has also contributed many columns and reviews: "Hudna: Its Jurisprudential Definitions, Historical Realities and Hamas's Choice," *The Current Situation of the Middle East Peace: Movements of the Actors and Prospective*, JIIA, 2011; "Career and Study of the 'Ulama': Religious Intellectuals in the Mediaeval Muslim Society," *Rekishi-to Chiri*, 644: *Sekaishi-no Kenkyu*, 227 (2011).

Japan

三代川 寛子 / MIYOKAWA Hiroko

上智大学人間文化研究機構地域研究推進センター研究員 / Research Fellow, NIHU Center for Area Studies

March 2006

Master's Degree in Area Studies, Graduate School of Foreign Studies, Sophia University

April 2007- March 2009

JSPS Research Fellow

April 2009- March 2011

Post-Doctoral Researcher at Sophia Research Center in Cairo

April 2011-present

Research Fellow, NIHU Center for Area Studies

Visiting Fellow, Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University

-Conducted field research from September 2007 to March 2011 in Cairo, Egypt

-Conducted interviews with bishops, priests, Coptic human rights activists,

Coptic political activists during the research

-Interested in the national integration of the Coptic Christians in modern Egypt

From viewpoints of political movement and political thought

-Interested in the Copts' social/cultural movements and their impact on their identities

-Interested in Egyptian nationalism thoughts and the transition of the Egyptian national identities through the 20th century

Japan

長沢 榮治 / NAGASAWA Eiji

東京大学教授 / Professor, The University of Tokyo

Eiji Nagasawa is Professor in the Department of West Asian Studies of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo. He has been engaged in research of area studies of the Middle East, with a focus on socio-economic history of modern Egypt. He was the director of Japan Society for Promotion of Science Research Center in Cairo from April 1998 to March 1999; the vice-director of the Institute from April 2008 to March 2009; the president of Japan Association for Middle East Studies from April 2009 to March 2011. His main works in English are *Modern Egypt through Japanese Eyes, A Study on Intellectual and Socio-economic Aspects of Egyptian Nationalism*, Cairo, Merit Publishing House, 2009, 410p.; *A Guide to Parliamentary Records in Monarchical Egypt*. Tokyo: the Toyo Bunko, 2007, (co-editor) 179p.

Japan

野上 義二 / NOGAMI Yoshiji

日本国際問題研究所理事長 / President, The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Yoshiji Nogami is President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs and Executive Advisor of the Mizuho Corporate Bank, Limited. He is former Japanese Ambassador to the U.K. and a Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. After graduating from the University of Tokyo he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1966. He was Deputy Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau and the Foreign Policy Bureau, Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. His overseas posts include Economic Counsellor at the embassy in the U.S. and Consul-General in Hong Kong. Mr. Nogami was also Ambassador to the OECD in Paris in 1997-99. He was Senior Visiting Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Japan

坂梨 祥 / SAKANASHI Sachi

日本エネルギー経済研究所中東研究センター主任研究員 / Senior Researcher, JIME Center, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

Sachi Sakanashi is a Senior Researcher at the JIME Center, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) specializing in contemporary politics in Iran. She worked as a Cultural Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Tehran from October 2000 to September 2002. She was a visiting fellow at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai from April to October 2008. She holds a master's degree in International Relations from the University of Tokyo and in Middle Eastern and Islamic Politics from the University of Durham. She has written various articles on contemporary Iran, including, "New Islamic Thinking in Iran," *Contemporary Middle East (Gendai-no-Chuto)*, 2004, "Revolutionary Ideals and Today's Iran," *Gunshuku Mondai Shiryo*, 2010.

Japan

立山 良司 / TATEYAMA Ryoji

防衛大学校教授 / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

Ryoji Tateyama is a professor, the Graduate School of Security Studies and Department of International Relations, National Defense Academy, Japan. He teaches security studies and international relations of the contemporary Middle East.

Tateyama had worked for the Japanese Embassy in Tel Aviv, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and

Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), and the Japanese Institute for Middle Eastern Economies. Since 1997 he has been at the present post.

Tateyama has written a number of books and articles, including “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Causes and Challenges,” *Asian Studies*, Vol.53, No.3, July 2007; “Failure in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Problems relating to SSR and Spoilers in the Asymmetrical Relations,” *The Journal of International Security*, Vol.37, No.2, September 2009; and “The question of Jerusalem: Conflicting Issues in the Negotiation Process and Changes on the Ground,” *The Contemporary Middle East*, No.48, January 2010.