Chapter 11  Recommendations for Japan's Middle East Policy

Study Group for the Middle East as a Global Strategy Issue
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1. Agenda and Background

As stated in the preface, the purpose of this study group is to examine the possible paths that the Middle East could take in the next 15 years leading up to 2030, with the intent of crafting policy recommendations that put Japan's strengths to best use in bringing stability to the Middle East, an issue of increasing global concern. In doing so, critical elements relevant to the present-day Middle East were analyzed: the driving factors behind political changes, global trends in energy issues, and relations with powers outside the region. This chapter will discuss the aforementioned policy recommendations.

The starting point for our discussion on this topic will be perceptions of Japan's position in the Middle East. What sort of position will Japan occupy in the Middle East's relations with the rest of the world, and how will this position change in the future? We must examine these issues in a dispassionate manner, and with a long-term perspective. Any issue pertaining to the Middle East can involve a single state, or nearby and neighboring states with special interests or concerns, or third parties from outside the region. Of course, this characterization can change with each individual issue. Western Europe and Russia are regions neighboring the Middle East, but in fact China has a substantial domestic Muslim population as well, and geographically it is directly connected to the Middle East. In this regard, China is very different from Japan.

Naturally, historical and cultural ties and geographical distance are highly significant in shaping perceptions, as is each state or region's weight in the international community (as seen in the relationship between the United States and the Middle East), which changes over time. In addition, a state or region's self-perception, as well as how it is perceived in other regions, is also important. How does the Middle East differentiate Japan from the West, and how does it view Japan? Where does the West, or Russia or China, place Japan when considering the problems of the Middle East? Japan is constantly forced to deal with these subtle perceptions with sensitivity and flexibility. Today Japan must, more than ever before, maintain a composed self-awareness and pursue smart diplomacy within the Venn diagram of relationships including the West, the former communist sphere, and the regions of Asia, along with the network of Muslim states in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The second point in our discussion is our understanding of what significance the Middle East holds for Japan as a region. We must take another look at questions such as what is important, what Japan's fundamental interests are, and why these things are important. As we compare it to other regions, we must, on an ongoing basis, rethink the Middle East's importance in terms of energy issues, its potential as a market, security implications, Japan's stance on core issues (e.g., the Palestinians) as well as its role in and relationship with the international community, and so on. Then, based on what Japan sees as important, we move on to the additional questions of whether we can
treat the Middle East as a single consolidated region, and whether our conceptions about the Middle East as a region may change in the future.

The third question is our understanding of what Japan can do in the Middle East. What are the policy measures and policy resources Japan can mobilize? In the future, what more will Japan be able to do that goes beyond today's constraints, conditions, and capabilities? Concerning this two-part question, we must carefully examine the links between the objective perceptions mentioned above. By doing so, we can ensure and develop a distinctive Japanese diplomatic policy. In addition, at the same time as we consider what Japan can do in the present and future, we must also have an objective understanding of what it is that Japan should and should not do, and where Japan’s strengths and weaknesses lie.

The last point is an ever-growing necessity to explicitly portray Japan's image to the Middle East and the world. This need has become particularly clear due to recent developments, and is intimately related to the first point: the issue of how Japan's position is perceived. It is an issue of presenting Japan's image and encouraging the outside world to understand it, while correctly understanding what the Middle East wants of Japan. In that sense, constructing an interactive framework between Japan and the Middle East is an urgent matter.

2. Policy Recommendations

(1) Recommendation I: For the sake of regional stability in the Middle East, Japan should use its position as a third party to mediate between Middle Eastern states that are parties to conflicts or rivals, and to provide aid for conflict resolution and stabilizing state institutions while coordinating with mediation efforts originating outside the region.

Iraq, whose political institutions were shown to be vulnerable by the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State in June 2014, has pressing matters to settle, such as bringing stability to its government, maintaining Iraq's current national borders, and implementing a series of reforms (delegating a certain level of authority over security matters to the governorate level, amending the de-Ba'athification policy, releasing and pardoning members of the former military, and other policies to ease Sunni dissatisfaction). The Japanese government has provided aid to Iraq, such as the Knowledge-Sharing Seminars (four seminars on the topic of national reconciliation), part of an instructional project by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that, since 2009, has invited Council of Representatives members belonging to different sects in Iraq in order to share with them knowledge concerning matters such as Japan's experiences with democratization, peace, and reconstruction since World War II; and to provide participants hints for achieving reconciliation in Iraq. It will be important to continue carrying out these efforts to overcome sectarian and ethnic hostility.

Japan is in an ideal position as a third party to offer forums for talks on Middle Eastern conflicts in which a complex and diverse array of forces are fighting against each other. Chinese diplomacy has experienced fascinating developments relating to this matter. Since the fall of 2014, for instance,
China has invited Afghani delegations from the Ghani administration and the Taliban in an attempt to encourage peace talks. It would seem that the motivating force behind this effort is China's immediate "national interests," such as counterterrorism, protection of its investments, and Beijing's setting the stage for its grand designs, as symbolized by the "Silk Road economic corridor." A new facet to these peace talks is that China has used its traditional strategic alliance with Pakistan, which has supported the Taliban in Afghanistan against the Afghan government, to involve it in the negotiations. In addition, although Russia has taken the lead in Syria, China is also trying to engage in similar conflict mediation between the Assad regime and the country's rebels, thus enhancing China's political involvement in the Middle East. Particularly noteworthy is that China is holding out a hand to parties on both sides of these conflicts, and is conducting negotiations with great patience.

In order to settle the Syrian conflict, a welcome development would be a negotiated ceasefire by all parties, planning for free elections held under international monitoring and the selection of a new administration. The prerequisites for this would be for the states giving primary support to the rebel movement (Western states, GCC member states and Turkey) and the Assad regime's supporters (Russia, Iran and Hezbollah) to encourage a mutual ceasefire, and to coordinate and mediate peace talks that also involve Kurdish nationalist forces. However, Iran's place in this is not yet defined. The international community should first consider granting Iran a proper place in negotiations as a concerned state. To do this, measures are needed to appease Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, who are concerned about Iran's growing influence. Japan, which has good relations with all these countries, may be in a suitable position to mediate and encourage substantive peace negotiations.

With regards to the Palestinian issue, one of the Middle East's biggest destabilizing factors, the two-state solution is the most feasible given current circumstances. Hence, the Japanese government should call on both sides to achieve peace. It should also encourage Israel in particular to halt settlement activity, while strongly urging the Palestinians to overcome their internal rivalries. Furthermore, it would be advisable for the Japanese government to recognize that the policy of isolating and sealing off Hamas is already a failure; and to convince the international community and the parties to the conflict to include Hamas in the peace process.

(2) Recommendation II: Bolster economic diplomacy by transferring Japanese technology and experience suited to local needs.

An important economic issue Middle Eastern states have faced in recent years is policies relating to a future-oriented energy mix, and the subsidies that impose a heavy burden on state coffers. Matters of concern relating to the growing domestic demand for energy are: (1) energy conservation policies, (2) falling unit costs for energy, and (3) an energy mix that takes into account the development of alternative energy, including nuclear. In addition, the emergence of shale gas and oil, and the effects of falling oil prices since the summer of 2014, may also hold great significance for petrostate economies.

In addition to petrostates' national strategies, oil prices are affected by the supply and demand for oil that is driven by the economic situations in consuming countries, as well as by trends among
investors who treat petroleum as a "financial product." Even petrostates' short-term policy strategies (such as the uncoordinated policies by which oil production volume is set and subsidies are granted to stabilize internal politics) run contrary to long-term national strategies for a post-oil society. In the Middle East, oil, natural gas, and electricity are offered at prices far below international standards and, despite the scarcity of water resources, water bills are wholly subsidized in some petrostates. Cheap utility prices in the region are an impediment to energy conservation incentives. There is much more room to transfer Japanese experience and technology, such as energy conservation education to make citizens recognize the importance of energy conservation; and environmental education to teach them to use limited resources effectively and live in harmony with the environment.

There are currently plans to introduce nuclear energy in Middle Eastern countries, but there are numerous safety and management issues concerning nuclear facilities and fuel, such as enriching uranium, handling spent nuclear fuel, and defending facilities from terrorists. For example, the damage could be immense if basic infrastructure—especially a nuclear power plant—were to be attacked by a terrorist group, as when natural gas facilities in Algeria that were considered heavily guarded were attacked by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in January 2013. Assigning responsibility for the risks of an accident is a hurdle when Japanese companies export nuclear power plants. A South Korean corporate alliance that won a bid to construct a nuclear power plant in the UAE offered to export construction of the plant, technology, fuel supplies, operation, and equity investment in a package deal by which they, rather than the recipient country, will take on the project implementation risks, but Japanese companies do not have a system for bearing responsibility for all risks. Constructing a framework for nuclear safety management that handles such risks as terrorism and natural disasters is not a problem solvable by only one company or country. Rather, it is an issue that necessitates further international discussion. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is indisputably the greatest threat to the region's stability.

Countries that have succeeded in cutting subsidies have rolled out policies offering a package of (1) eligibility limits for granting subsidies and (2) separate assistance measures that partially compensate for the cuts. At this time it is important for the government to adequately explain to citizens the problems associated with continued subsidies, and to make efforts to encourage their understanding. Currently, Egypt is one country working to cut subsidies, through implementing structural reforms in order to receive assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The construction of an electrical grid promised to the Egyptian government in January 2015 by Prime Minister Abe, characterized as a basic infrastructure project to curtail social unrest accompanying subsidy cuts, is commendable as an effective measure. On the other hand, a garbage collection project in Cairo for which a foreign company made a successful bid, was accompanied by local corruption, the garbage went uncollected after the bidding, and dissatisfaction grew among Cairo's residents. In order to provide assistance that improves public services while taking complex local interests into account, a corresponding amount of preparation and planning is needed, such as scrupulous assessments before, during, and afterward.
Turkey has the 18th largest GDP in the world. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkey established the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) to provide aid to the newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. In recent years, Turkey has actively engaged in aid for and diplomacy with Iraq, Palestine, and Pakistan, as well as states in Central and Eastern Africa such as Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. In 2012, TİKA and JICA exchanged a memorandum concerning technical assistance for the Middle East and Central Asia. They are now sharing information, technology, know-how, and experience with each other; and their progressing cooperation indicates the possibility of joint projects in the future. Furthermore, in 2009 the Japanese government concluded an agreement with the Iranian government on "cooperation in Afghanistan between Japan and Iran." JICA, the Iranian government, and institutions for international cooperation are leading projects to give vocational training to Afghani refugees in Iran and help them return to their home country. This is what gives meaning to offering strong stimuli to the economies, societies, and cultures on both sides in a complementary fashion through collaborative joint projects between Japan and Middle Eastern states in a variety of fields, instead of one-way technical assistance from Japan to other countries.

(3) Recommendation III: In order to solve the problem of youth unemployment, a potential cause of social unrest, provide ideas and know-how from Japan's educational system and technology to Middle Eastern countries working to address education and employment disparities.

Youth unemployment is more than simply an economic problem: it also contains the potential risk of giving rise to social and political instability. To illustrate the point, the problem has been named as one of the causes behind the Arab revolutions (popular uprisings) that began in Tunisia and Egypt. Therefore, creating jobs and reducing income inequality have become urgent matters. Although petrostates possess different traits from non-oil-producing states, these will remain issues the governments of the Middle East must tackle seriously between now and 2030. Persian Gulf states aim to transition from being oil-dependent to knowledge-based economies, and they have spoken of the importance of education to train workers with advanced skills. However, these states face an array of issues.

First is the "aspiration gap," by which the more educated a population becomes, the more easily disparities between academic background and careers arise. It requires the creation of jobs within the country, as well as changes in attitudes about what jobs young people have. In Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, people tend to prefer working as civil servants rather than as employees at private companies, while educational systems and societies make it difficult to cultivate such things as entrepreneurial spirit and teamwork. Total Quality Control (TQC) is a concept developed in Japan. TQC skills by which a company works as a single unit, such as quality control, kaizen (improvements), and teamwork, have the potential to help change the attitudes of laborers in Middle Eastern countries. While interest in QC is concentrated in departments directly related to production, TQC also covers streamlining and improvements in indirectly related areas like management and
services. In addition, TQC’s application has spread to fields outside the manufacturing sector, with hospitals and government offices being examples. Thus, Japanese companies have made efforts to collect ideas from employees working at a variety of departments, during which they form TQC circles and arrange settings for group discussions from the bottom up. Furthermore, although social education and higher learning are of course important, it would seem conducting education that fosters awareness about labor, diligence, and teamwork at the elementary and secondary education level would be effective. One example would be an initiative for pupils to learn about teamwork and a sense of responsibility by cleaning together and taking turns managing school lunches, as is practiced at Japanese elementary schools.

Japanese companies can provide Middle Eastern countries with unique Japanese technology while responding to changing needs on-site. This has already partially begun in such fields as health care, energy conservation, education, disaster management, and the environment. In addition to education targeting the secondary sector of the economy to train capable engineers and factory workers, there is also a need to expand education on energy conservation and the environment, as well as education that trains workers for a knowledge-based economy. Nile University's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Egypt-Japan University of Science and Technology, opened in 2010) and King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia (opened in 2009) have only received Japan's expanded curriculums in the sciences and, in order to cultivate opinion leaders in Middle Eastern countries who are knowledgeable about Japan, the liberal arts should also be included. In addition to Middle Eastern universities that already have Japanese language departments and Japanese research programs, Japan should bolster assistance for universities planning to conduct research on Japan and elsewhere in Asia, as well as support for such universities to encourage research and teaching by intellectuals who are Japanese or are Middle Eastern and are pro-Japan. An example of this is the Asian studies program at Qatar University.

Japan has welcomed many international students from the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the past decade, and now the time has come for follow-up research on the results. Arab students who have studied abroad in Japan, or studied Japanese in Arab countries, are rarely employed by Japanese companies. It has been pointed out that the true cause is a gap between the workers Japanese companies want and the students' skills and attitudes. To solve this problem, the incongruity between the working world and university educations must be erased. The education of Middle Eastern students who have studied Japanese language, society, and lifestyle should also include post-graduation career guidance so they can utilize this knowledge.

(4) Recommendation IV: As part of the preparations for an infrastructure to deal with the threat of international terrorism, set up a research institute for: continuously collecting and providing basic information relating to the Middle East, the Islamic world and terrorist organizations; comprehending and utilizing human networks; and overseeing training of personnel.

We can expect Japanese people and companies to get caught up in more terrorist incidents
overseas as they increase their international activity. For the sake of crisis management, the first thing that must be done is intelligence collection. To collect intelligence in the Middle East, it is advisable to set up consulates or embassy annexes in key countries and regions—such as Erbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region, or Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province—and endeavor to collect intelligence from local sources that is difficult to obtain from capital cities. Second, it is essential to construct systems to counter, root out, and prevent terrorism in Japan. In order to promptly deal with emergencies in the Middle East and terrorist incidents caused by Islamic extremists, it is urgent to train personnel capable of adequately understanding, comprehending, and analyzing the region—and of course Middle Eastern languages—as well as specialists in cyberterrorism and crisis management. For collecting and analyzing intelligence on terrorism and managing crises, it is advisable to establish a core research institution (perhaps called the Middle East Security Research Institute) to expand research and intelligence analysis on the Middle East in Japan for policy-making purposes, and to train young researchers.

In addition, this research institute could conduct training to provide knowledge about Islam and the Middle East and teach local languages (Arabic, Persian, and Turkish) to private-sector workers, civil servants, and their families who are scheduled to be stationed in the Middle East, and act as a center for providing enlightening information in Japan to make activities in the Middle East flow more smoothly. Given its track record of gathering leading researchers in Japan to conduct multi-year research projects concerning the Middle East and Islam and making policy recommendations, the Japan Institute of International Affairs could become an ideal location for establishing and commencing operations at the Middle East Security Research Institute. The research institute could conceivably become a platform for making maximum use of human resources and information while creating a network of universities and think tanks that conduct research on the Middle East and Islam and enhancing intelligence collection functions.

After the 9/11 attacks of 2001, a strong case was made for the necessity of counterterrorism measures and research on the Middle East and Islam, and a plethora of research and exchange projects were started up, but interest gradually faded thereafter, both at the government and the private-sector level. The results of the projects were not put to full use, and many were scrapped. In order to deal with the threat of terrorism, it is important for projects with basic intelligence activities and personnel training to be continuous. Furthermore, consideration should be given to actions such as restarting the discontinued Future Dialog (Dialog among Civilizations) with the Islamic World Project, which was shut down at the end of fiscal 2011; and assigning an ambassador to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC; formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference).

(5) Recommendation V: Establish a new scholarship system for refugees in order to provide continuous humanitarian assistance focused on human security, and to train personnel for post-conflict state-building and reconstruction.

It would seem that responding to refugee problems will become an international policy issue of greater and greater importance. Since 2011, educational aid for Syrian refugees who have fled to
neighboring countries has been sorely inadequate. Ignoring this issue limits the long-term development of the Middle East's human resources and causes tremendous economic loss, and could lead to social unrest and political crises. In that sense, refugee problems in remote lands are directly related to security issues on a global scale, including Japan. Backing any side in the complex web of ethnic and sectarian hostility in the Middle East can lead to unexpected trouble in the future. Hence, it is advisable for the Japanese government to follow the general rule of "non-interference in internal politics" from the standpoint of a well-intentioned third party and, from a human security perspective, to continue providing humanitarian support in the long term. This support will eventually help root out terrorism and advance democratic reforms.

In order to increase the effects of such Japanese support over the long run and on a continual basis, Japan will have to train personnel who contribute to Japanese diplomacy in the Middle East, with a future-oriented outlook on both Japan and the Middle East. In addition to cultivating Japanese specialists on the Middle East and analyzing Islamic extremism, this would include education for Middle Easterners knowledgeable about Japan, as well as personnel working on post-civil-war national peacebuilding and the creation of democratic institutions (in Syria, Libya, Iraq, etc.). While supporting countries accepting refugees, the Japanese government must build its own institutions that contribute to the national interest in the long term, such as by creating special slots for excellent refugee students from conflict zones (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Sudan) to provide them scholarships under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology's International Graduate Priority Programs.

(6) Recommendation VI: With a major power shift predicted in the Middle East between now and 2030, Japan must give due consideration to local public opinion as well as that of the governments of the region, and must also form its own principles on how to interact with non-state actors if it is to expand its role in the region.

Leading up to 2030, during which a decline in the US' influence and a rise in China's in the Middle East are considered possibilities, how should Japan define its position in the region, and should Japan shift to Western-style values diplomacy? After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States declared a Greater Middle East Initiative, and became more involved in the region. However, contrary to American expectations, the result was that anti-American sentiment increased among the people of the Middle East; terrorism targeting Americans intensified, failed states such as Iraq, Syria and Libya appeared, and regional instability was exacerbated. In this manner, unilaterally forcing Western values and democracy on the Middle East and the Muslim world instead amplified the backlash in the region, causing incalculable human and economic harm to Japan's national interests. Hence, it is advisable for Japan to reaffirm that its position in the Middle East is separate from the West's, enabling Japan to share values and thinking on an equal footing with the Middle East and the Muslim world, and to use its relationships to engage in independent diplomacy that better addresses the needs of the region.

By 2030, the United States may, in order to reduce its responsibilities and burdens in the Middle
East, ask Japan and other relevant states to shoulder greater responsibilities and burdens, such as ensuring the security of oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf via the Indian Ocean to Asia. In order to cooperate with the governments involved while avoiding friction in the region, the Japanese government will, in addition to engaging in intergovernmental communication, likely have to give thorough consideration to the effects on public opinion in the Middle East. The Japanese government may need to conduct public opinion polls in advance so as to reduce friction with local cultures, especially backlash from devout Muslims. The polls would explore how Japan can persuasively explain its role and improve its image to promote itself in the region. For example, distributing photos of the Israeli and Japanese prime ministers shaking hands to Middle Eastern states that do not have diplomatic relations with and are enemies of Israel, even if meant to promote Japan's contributions to Middle East peace, may instead create aversion among the peoples of the Middle East. It may prove beneficial to go through think tanks in Middle Eastern countries to conduct public opinion polls surveying locals on such matters as their impression of Japan and the role they expect Japan to play, to analyze the results, and to exercise soft power effectively.

Incidentally, India and China, which maintain good relations with both Arab countries and Israel, devote careful attention to strategies concerning their image in the Middle East and the international community. India purchases many weapons from Israel, but does not forget to emphasize to the world its traditional policy of taking a position in favor of harmonious coexistence between Israel and Palestine. In addition, China has moved forward with military technology exchanges with Israel but, in 2013, prior to a visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Beijing invited Mahmoud Abbas, president of the independent Palestinian government, to China, and Beijing has publicized that its general support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue is unchanged.

Furthermore, in the Arab revolutions (popular uprisings) and the Gezi Park movement in Turkey, youths who were loosely connected through social media took charge of these movements. Heading toward 2030, non-state actors could become more and more influential in international and regional politics. Non-state actors include movements loosely connected through social media, as well as organizations that win the support of local residents and evolve into political actors of substantial importance by participating in national politics and engaging in non-violent political activities and welfare, despite being designated terrorist groups by Western governments, as in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah. However, violent terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are also among the non-state actors. The Japanese government will need to establish its own diplomatic principles when dealing with these non-state actors.

(7) Recommendation VII: Utilize soft power and roll out a two-way image/publicity strategy between Japan and the Middle East.

South Korean and Turkish melodramas have become explosive hits in recent years in the Middle East due to the popularization of satellite TV. Soft power is creating new business opportunities and cultural exchanges. For example, South Korean companies use their country’s dramas to improve the image of South Korean products and boost sales, while tours from Middle Eastern countries to visit
locations in Turkey associated with dramas is a flourishing business. There are also many Middle Eastern youths who, influenced by Japanese animation that gained popularity in the Middle East beginning in the 1980s, have studied Japanese and worked on producing animation and comics. We can expect that using this kind of soft power as an asset and making more people pro-Japanese will improve Japan’s image and lead to business opportunities. In the Middle East, however, permissiveness on expressions and taboos (religion, ideology, political criticism, etc.) vary by country. Therefore, when exporting Japanese soft power, Japan will need to devise ways of avoiding friction with local cultures, such as by obtaining the help of local pro-Japanese individuals.

Undoubtedly, the West and Russia have traditionally had deep ties with the Middle East, while in recent years China has been expanding its cultural, as well as economic and political, influence in the Middle East by working to actively establish and strengthen relationships with high-profile think tanks and institutes of higher learning. In comparison, Japan's strategies to publicize its culture are clearly inferior. First, more Japan Foundation offices should be established, to supplement its sole regional office in Cairo as a way to cultivate pro-Japanese opinion leaders and improve Japan's image in the Middle East. Possible locations for setting up offices include Dubai, Tehran, and Istanbul.

Most Japanese citizens have a shared understanding in that they prefer an end to the array of hostility, conflicts and political chaos in the Middle East and the peaceful pursuit of prosperity by its peoples. Since under present circumstances Japan has weak ties and connections, and lacks the peacekeeping capabilities employing military force to restrain warring parties and bring them to the negotiating table, it has a limited ability to be directly involved in political processes concerning the Middle East's conflicts. At the same time, however, Japan's position, which is not tied to any particular forces in the region or to any specific ideological position, is also an extremely advantageous diplomatic asset for calling on the various forces to reconcile and make peace, and for the steady advancement of peoples’ livelihoods. Thus, it is advisable for the Japanese government to continue making maximum use of Japan's unique position and contributing to steady advancements in the Middle East, principally in the economic and social realm. When promoting such Japanese activity locally and in the international community, Japan must comprehend the needs of the Middle East and roll out a two-way publicity strategy. Doing so would likely make it possible to correct the Middle East's image in Japan, and improve Japan's image in the Middle East. First, by completely outsourcing monitoring (public opinion polls) of Japan’s image to local research organizations, Japan should understand these perceptions and use the results for damage control. Repairing and improving images based on this knowledge, while closely working with local media and research institutes, will boost the effect and mitigate risks.