

## Focus: Security strategies in the wake of the War in Ukraine (Summary)

### Essay: “A Turning Point of the Times” and Japan’s Security Policy

**Hiroshi Nakanishi** (Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University)

The three documents approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 – the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program – mark a major turning point in Japan’s postwar security and defense policy. This shift is intended to establish an independent defense structure in response to the transformation of the US’s forward deployment strategy, while keeping in step with the West’s strategy of prioritizing greater deterrence in the wake of the shock brought about by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, a common thread running through the three documents is the need to systematically develop and strengthen comprehensive security capabilities, encompassing not only defense and diplomatic but also economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities. While the documents outline policies on the defense and diplomatic fronts for drastically expanding defense equipment and defense budgets and pursuing a free and open Indo-Pacific region, Japan must remain aware of the many challenges that lie ahead, avoiding constraints on economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities, including fiscal and financial stability, human resources, technological infrastructure, and cyber-security systems, averting instability in the international order, and promoting global governance inclusive of climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation.

### 1 New Developments in Japan’s Security Strategy

**Ken Jimbo** (Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University)

The three strategy documents adopted by the Japanese government in December 2022 – the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program – mark a historic shift in Japan’s security policy. While the three strategy documents do not change Japan’s adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles or to its exclusively defensive defense policy, nor its path as a peaceful nation, they do represent qualitative changes in Japan’s defense policy by 1) expanding the geographical scope covered by the defense policy, 2) introducing “counterattack capability” for the SDF, and 3) amending the Japan-US alliance’s “shield and spear” relationship.

Japan’s security policy transformation derived predominantly from the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. The rapid change in the balance of power in East Asia has brought about a shift from a configuration in which both Japan and the US maintained superiority over China to one in which the superiority of the US is no longer evident and Japan sees itself as constantly inferior vis-à-vis China. This paper argues that Japan, rather than pursuing a quantitative balance of defense capabilities against China, is focusing on a “denial strategy” to deny the Chinese any prospect of operational success in major contingency scenarios and pursuing a “competitive strategy” to gain qualitative superiority by building on the denial strategy.

## 2 US Security Strategy after the War in Ukraine

**Masashi Murano** (Japan Chair Fellow, Hudson Institute)

For the first time in its history, the United States faces an ongoing strategic dilemma of an absolute shortage of defense resources despite the risk of being challenged simultaneously by the two nuclear major powers China and Russia. The concept of “integrated deterrence” proposed by the Biden administration is not a fundamental solution to this dilemma, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already proven. In order to reduce the risk of a simultaneous two-front response to China and Russia (in the Indo-Pacific and Europe), the hard choice must be made between a drastic increase in the defense budget or a temporarily increased reliance on nuclear forces to compensate for the lack of conventional forces, but the Biden administration is not moving toward either of these options. While the outcome of the US presidential election in 2024 is impossible to predict at this point, whatever administration emerges, the role of US allies will be more important than ever.

## 3 NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: The Current State of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

**Michito Tsuruoka** (Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University)

The purpose of any strategy is to clarify threat perceptions, set goals to be achieved, and define the means to achieve those goals. However, not only are means derived in accordance with the goals, but there is also an effect in the opposite direction, where the goal is lowered if the means are insufficient. In its Strategic Concept adopted in June 2022, NATO announced a fundamental strengthening of its deterrence and defense posture against Russia. One of its top priorities will be to bolster its “forward defense” capabilities to defend the countries such as Baltic states and Poland. The Strategic Concept also emphasized the need to enhance the readiness of NATO’s forces as a whole so that deployments can be quickly ramped up in the event of an emergency. However, there is no straight-line path to these goals, as much depends on the responsiveness of individual countries.

Furthermore, even if Russia is the Alliance’s main focus for the time being, China could well demand greater attention in future. While the 2022 Strategic Concept does express concerns about China, NATO is not yet in a position to formulate concrete actions to address those concerns.

## 4 China’s Domestic Governance and Security Strategy: The Diffusion of Chinese-style Police and Its Implication for the International Order

**Chisako T. Masuo** (Professor, Faculty of Social and Cultural Studies, Kyushu University)

As the revision of the Anti-Espionage Law indicates, China’s Xi Jinping administration is highly vigilant against domestic threats based on Xi’s Holistic Approach to National Security. What does the Xi administration fear? How is its security perception changing the international community? In responding to these questions, this paper first provides an overview of Xi’s Holistic Approach to National Security and explains its relevance to domestic governance. Second, it examines the administration’s current assessment of international affairs and confirms that its perception of the US is rapidly deteriorating. Third, it notes that the regime has been accelerating police cooperation with developing countries since 2022 and delves into how China reaches out to these countries, focusing on the case of the Solomon Islands. From this consideration emerges a picture of China’s efforts to promote the international diffusion of its own type of domestic governance. The paper concludes by pointing out that China’s police cooperation has the potential to change the political systems of various countries and explores the impact of this on the international order.

## 5 A Taiwan Contingency and Japan's National Security Strategy

**Lin Chenwei** (Former CEO, Institute for National Defense and Security Research)

**Yoichi Kato** (Special Fellow, Waseda Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University)

Japan's latest National Security Strategy and Defense Whitepaper identify China, North Korea, and Russia as Japan's three major security challenges. However, none of them is likely to attack or invade Japan any time soon. Considering such a current regional security environment, the most probable and serious security challenge for Japan is a Taiwan contingency.

Despite the extensive and devastating damages that Japan would suffer if Taiwan were to be annexed by China, Japan's current strategy to a Taiwan contingency is limited to avoiding entanglement in any part of the conflict and to defending its own territory.

The main reason is the strict self-imposed restrictions on the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces. But to defend its national interests Japan should pursue the prevention of annexation of Taiwan by China through non-military ways and means. The key will be "whole-of-society resilience" building approach that is gaining attention recently in the United States and Europe in the wake of the war in Ukraine. This paper offers Japan the following policy recommendations vis-à-vis Taiwan: (1) provide assurance, (2) help Taiwan build and enhance "whole-of-society resilience," and (3) propose a vision of a new security order in the Indo-Pacific region.

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