

**SYMPOSIUM**  
**“The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste**  
**~UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role~”**

March 14, 2007

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)



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## Foreword

This report provides a summary of the open symposium entitled “The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste: UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role” organized in FY2006 by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.

One of the major ongoing challenges facing the international community is that of developing and putting into practice effective approaches to reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict. In recognition of the importance of this issue for Japan, JIIA has continued to give particular attention to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste among post-conflict states around the globe.

This symposium sought to review the present circumstances in Timor-Leste and elucidate the kinds of assistance necessary to get the country back on a stable path to becoming a peaceful, democratic nation. In particular, it focused on the peacebuilding assistance provided to Timor-Leste by Japan and the United Nations with the aim of offering future guidelines for their involvement in nation building there. We believe that this symposium contributed to sparking interest in the importance of assisting post-conflict states in making a full transition from war to lasting peace.

The opinions expressed in the papers compiled herein are those of the individual authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations to which they belong; this report should also not be regarded as an endorsement of any of these opinions by JIIA itself. Nevertheless, we believe this report will prove useful in understanding the current situation in Timor-Leste and future challenges confronting peacebuilding assistance to the country.

The symposium featured a keynote address by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, former UN Under-Secretary General, as well as the participation of practitioners and experts in peacebuilding assistance in Timor-Leste and other conflict situations and of a large audience. In conducting this symposium, JIIA enjoyed the invaluable cooperation of the UN Policy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Policy Bureau and other parties, and we would like here to convey our deepest thanks to them.

March 2007

Seki Tomoda, Director-General  
The Japan Institute of International Affairs



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# Program

**Symposium “The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste  
~UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role~”**

Hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)  
Supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)  
Wednesday, March 14, 2007, Tokyo

## **Part 1: Keynote Address**

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|-------------|---|
| 13:00–13:10 | Opening Address: Yukio Satoh, President, Japan Institute of International Affairs |
| 13:10–13:40 | Keynote Address: Yasushi Akashi, Former UN Under-Secretary General                |

13:40–13:50 Break (10 minutes)

## **Part 2: “The Peacebuilding Commission and Timor-Leste as an Object of Commission Activities”**

Aims: Clarifying the role expected of the Peacebuilding Commission and stressing the importance of peacebuilding support in Japanese foreign policy. Using Timor-Leste as an example, recommendations will be offered on ways to support post-conflict states utilizing the Peacebuilding Commission.

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 13:50–16:50 | Moderator: <b>Yukihiro Nikaido</b> , Director of Research, JIIA<br>Panelists: <b>Domingos Alves</b> , Ambassador of Timor-Leste to Japan<br><b>Hideaki Asahi</b> , Former Ambassador of Japan to Timor-Leste;<br>Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA<br><b>Toshiya Hoshino</b> , Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations<br><b>Shoichi Ogawa</b> , Major General, Commanding General, 4th Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force |
|-------------|--|

16:50–17:00 Summary and Closing Remarks

## List of the Participants

<i>Keynote Speaker</i>	Mr. Yasushi Akashi	Former UN Under-Secretary General
<i>Panelists</i>	Amb. Domingos Alves	Ambassador of Timor-Leste to Japan
	Amb. Hideaki Asahi	Former Ambassador of Japan to Timor-Leste; Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA
	Prof. Toshiya Hoshino	Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
	Mr. Shoichi Ogawa	Major General, Commanding General, 4 <sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force
<i>JIIA</i>	Amb. Yukio Satoh	President, Japan Institute of International Affairs
<i>JIIA/Moderator</i>	Mr. Yukihiro Nikaido	Director of Research, JIIA

# Overview

## “The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste: UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role”

Tetsuro IJI

Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs

### 1. Background

The Peacebuilding Commission was established by the United Nations in December 2005 as a mechanism for providing advice and proposals on coherent and integrated strategies for achieving post-conflict peacebuilding, reconstruction and sustainable development, and for coordinating the activities of UN organizations as well as those of concerned countries, international financial institutions, regional organizations and NGOs. Having been selected as a member of the Commission’s 31-state Organizational Committee, Japan has clearly demonstrated an attitude of enthusiastic participation in the Commission’s activities. In recent years, Japan has advocated “peace consolidation” initiatives and the concept of “human security,” has positioned peacebuilding as a key segment of Japanese diplomacy, and has attached considerable importance to the future activities of the Peacebuilding Commission.

There have been prominent cases among the many regional conflicts that have broken out in recent years of peace or cease-fire agreements being reached, only to give way to renewed armed clashes when rebuilding of the nation does not proceed smoothly. Preventing such circumstances is the principal focus of the Peacebuilding Commission, which has taken up Burundi and Sierra Leone as its first two cases to be dealt with at country-specific meetings. Given its recent instability, Timor-Leste stands a strong chance of being yet another of the countries taken up by the Commission in the future. After armed confrontations between the national army and rebel forces had led to political instability in Timor-Leste, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established and the situation has since remained relatively calm. However, it is necessary for the international community to sustain active engagement in the country’s peacebuilding process. To date, Japan has shown a strong interest in Timor-Leste. Japan dispatched Self-Defense Force units and has continued to provide recovery and development assistance to Timor-Leste, and it is expected to exercise further initiative and leadership in the event the country is discussed in the Peacebuilding Commission.

### 2. Structure

The Japan Institute of International Affairs hosted an open symposium on “The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste: UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role” on March 14, 2007 with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. The keynote speaker and panelists for the symposium were drawn from among practitioners and experts involved or well-versed in peacebuilding assistance in Timor-Leste from Japan and the international community.

The symposium attracted a large audience, who demonstrated great interest in the present status and future direction of peacebuilding in the country.

### **3. Summary**

It was underscored in the course of presentations and discussions that, as highlighted by the serious setback suffered last year, Timor-Leste is still faced with significant challenges in establishing itself as a stable, democratic state. The general consensus at the symposium was that, despite remarkable progress made since independence in May 2002, much more needs to be done to address the many unresolved problems. Above all, emphasis was placed on the need for ensuring peace and security as a condition for reconstruction and development in the economic, social, political and cultural spheres. To this end, it is necessary to establish the rule of law, especially by strengthening the police and judiciary. Furthermore, the importance of reconciliation among the Timorese people was recognized. It was also stressed that broad participation of all citizens, especially former combatants and youths, in the process of reconstruction and nation-building would need to be ensured.

With regard to Japan's involvement in Timor-Leste, the roles played by the Self-Defense Forces were regarded highly by all the panelists, and their activities in the areas of infrastructure, water supply, and educational/cultural activities was elaborated upon. More broadly, the lessons and issues that the case of Timor-Leste presents for Japan's overall peacebuilding activities and diplomacy were discussed.

The symposium also touched upon the topic of possible future assistance to Timor-Leste from the wider international community. In particular, it was suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission could be instrumental for improving international efforts at rebuilding Timor-Leste. The aim and working of the Commission were clarified with reference to ongoing efforts in the two African cases currently being addressed. It was then suggested that, should Timor-Leste be taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission in the future, Japan might consider the possibility of taking a leadership role at the Commission in formulating an integrated peacebuilding approach toward the country.

### **4. Achievements**

By addressing the issue of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste in the form of an open symposium, it was possible to inform a broad public audience on the current situation in the country and the need for sustained international assistance to stabilization and reconstruction efforts there. In particular, the audience undoubtedly obtained a better understating of outstanding issues facing Timor-Leste in transforming into a stable, mature democracy as well as of possible roles that could be played by Japan and the international community in assisting that transition. Also, the symposium was able to raise awareness among the general public of the functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission and the importance of peacebuilding assistance to post-conflict countries, above all Timor-Leste.

# Summary

## Symposium

### “The Road to Stability in Timor-Leste ~UN Peacebuilding Support and Japan’s Role~”

#### Part 1: Keynote Address

##### Opening Address: Yukio Satoh, President, Japan Institute of International Affairs

Originally we were expecting the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste Ramos Horta or the President Xanana Gusmão, but both were unable to attend. Also the United Nations representative of Timor-Leste was unable to come. Instead, we have the great pleasure of having Ambassador Domingos Alves with us today. This may illustrate the current state of affairs in Timor-Leste. I am pleased to see a large number of people in the audience. This symposium will deal with the overall efforts in peacebuilding activities within the United Nations, taking the example of Timor-Leste and considering what Japan can do.

Although in reflection of the current state of Timor-Leste some expected guests were unable to come, it is still a very timely opportunity to hold this symposium. We hope to hold a further symposium after the presidential election in Timor-Leste is concluded. The issues of Timor-Leste will not disappear and they should always stay with us as we consider development issues facing Timor-Leste.

##### Keynote Address: Yasushi Akashi, Former UN Under-Secretary General

I am not an expert on Timor-Leste issues. In thinking about this issue I would like to talk about general assumptions and take a general perspective to the various issues that exist.

From the beginning of the 1990s the United Nations (UN) was engaged in a number of locations around the world and I think those efforts bore fruits. However, from the middle of the 1990s a number of very difficult issues appeared, including Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Angola, among others. Based on those bitter experiences, there was some soul searching on the part of the UN. The Brahimi Report was announced and in the latter 1990s the PKO activities of the UN were further energized, including in Sierra Leona, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, etc. In these places the UN has a good record.

Considering the fruits of efforts in the post Cold War period, there are three separate periods: the early 1990s, late 1990s and the 2000s. The effectiveness of PKO activities have been enhanced and complemented by peacebuilding activities. In 1992 the ambitious concept of peacebuilding was introduced, and in 1995 the “challenges to peace” were announced. The Secretary General of the time emphasized the importance of peacebuilding. The interrelation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding was highlighted from the mid-1990s.

Two years ago in September 2005 the UN celebrated its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary, with an outcome document being adopted. In this document it was mentioned that peace has to be sustained in perpetuity, therefore post-conflict peacebuilding was highlighted as an important issue. Prior to that, based on former Secretary General Annan's recommendation, a peacebuilding commission was launched. Under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the existing human rights body was elevated to the level of a Commission. In terms of the reform of the Security Council, there was no clear progress, but the issues of human rights and peacebuilding were stressed.

With regard to human rights, there were some differing views with regard to the human rights commission, and as a result the US has refrained from taking part in activities of the human rights commission.

A case study has been implemented for the future direction of the UN and Japan has decided to participate in the Peacebuilding Commission. The Peacebuilding Commission seeks to gather all the relevant actors, and mobilize funds for peacebuilding. A third aim is to have an integrated strategy for peacebuilding. In Japan, in May 2002, then-Prime Minister Koizumi made a speech in which he stated that Japan wishes to see peacebuilding and nation-building taking place in post-conflict areas, for which Japan would provide support. After that the Chief Cabinet Secretary established a body and this body issued a report, which highlighted the need to cultivate human resources who would be able to take part in peacebuilding activities. Japan has resolved to align itself with international trends in peacebuilding.

The Brahimi Report was unusual in that it was very frank in calling for review and resolution of the weaknesses in the peacekeeping operation (PKO) activities, establishing what the UN can and cannot do in PKO activities. Very often Security Council resolutions are very vague and difficult to implement in the field and the Brahimi Report also called for less ambiguity in such resolutions. Peacekeepers in the field also need up-to-date information. The Security Council and General Assembly was receptive to this report. Principles for peacebuilding were established that: there is agreement among parties; UN should be impartial in negotiations with parties; and if force is used, it should be purely for the purpose of self-defense. Brahimi stated that these are the three principles that should be adhered to.

The recommendation to maintain the three principles may sound realistic, but some questions remain. In the post-Cold War era, most conflicts are internal or ethnic in nature, and once they are resolved, unless addressed in a proper manner will reignite within the space of five years. The first priority for peacebuilding is prevention. If conflict ensues and subsequently peace is achieved, the UN should engage in PKO activities to ensure a true and stable peace. This kind of cycle does not occur in the same manner in the various conflict areas around the world.

I have been involved in Sri Lankan affairs and UN PKO activities are not included there, but Norway and other countries are making efforts to negotiate between the parties. Through such efforts peacebuilding efforts have been made, for which Japan is the largest donor.

The contents of peacebuilding differ from conflict to conflict. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is actually a very important part of peacebuilding, but the stage at which DDR can occur differs from country to country.

In the case of Timor-Leste and Kosovo, the conflicts both arose in 1999 and the efforts for peacebuilding thereafter represented the creation of new countries and the scale has been large and efforts have been complex. There are three stages to peacebuilding and the missions at these different stages will differ. In the initial stage, emergency assistance or repatriation of refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) is important. Quick and small-scale activities are often very useful in bringing the fruits of peace directly to the people. In the intermediate stage it is important to enhance the roles of the police and the judiciary. Infrastructure building is also important, accompanied by health and education. Over the long-term it is necessary to consider human-rights related issues and the development of democracy, including the development of a free media.

With respect to Timor-Leste, how should peacebuilding efforts be pursued? The whole international community is attempting to assist Timor-Leste, but a basis for true independence has not yet been established. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) was established in 1999 and by 2002 the constitution was completed, and independence achieved. In 2002 the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET) came into being, working for three years, after which the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was launched. However, last year in Dili there were riots, requiring the intervention of Australian forces. There has been an evolution in the UN involvement in Timor-Leste. In the long-term it is highly likely that Timor-Leste will be independent in economic terms, thanks to its oil and gas reserves. Right now the country is very poor, but I think there is a base in place to rescue the country.

Another point is that of truth and reconciliation, the process of which is very important for healing old wounds. Truth and reconciliation activities have been successful, but there have also been crimes committed post-independence and it is important to consider how to deal with these.

Another important issue is the difference of opinions and dissent among political leaders in Timor-Leste, partly stemming from differences in geographical area and the complex situation of language. We hope that such issues can be resolved peacefully. In Japan, we tend to consider the issue of peacebuilding from two issues: nation-building and peace consolidation, but in the case of Timor-Leste these have to take place in tandem, which makes efforts more difficult.

Concerning the question of how Japan should be involved in peacebuilding, this is not an issue we can avoid going forward. The scope for peacebuilding is quite broad. Peacebuilding diplomacy is also called for. Human resources required for peacebuilding are diverse and if we are to be involved effectively, the nurturing of human resources for peacebuilding efforts is something that needs serious consideration. In post-war Japan it has been then tendency to

adopt a passive attitude, but this will no longer be sufficient. We have to discuss what our role can be on a national level. ODA will of course continue to be important, but efforts for peacebuilding are also indispensable, and ODA will have to be used for peacebuilding-related means, including DDR, etc. In the case of Sri Lanka, a conference took place in Tokyo in 2003, the outcome of which suggested that a linkage should be created between peacebuilding and ODA, but this is a controversial issue in some sectors. The issue of linkage is one challenge that we have to consider carefully.

These series of issues require answers and answers are not easy to come by. The Peacebuilding commission of the UN can be utilized and the Japanese people have to discuss among themselves the role Japan should take on in the future. As I said before, the case of Timor-Leste is an interesting case study for peacebuilding. I believe that there is hope for the future of the economy of Timor-Leste and that we can find a good solution to outstanding issues in the country. We have the issues of peacebuilding, governance, and economic development before us and a question is how to pursue these issues in harmony. Japan could cooperate with Australia and ASEAN countries in support to Timor-Leste, under the umbrella of the UN.

In various parts of the world, peacebuilding activities are being disseminated, but there are financial limits on what the UN can do. In that sense, over the long term we feel that it is difficult to involve ourselves in the long-term in some countries. It is also important therefore to have an exit strategy and to consider the most appropriate methods of exit.

I am sorry if my speech has been too general, but I thank you for your attention.

*Break*

## **Part 2: “The Peacebuilding Commission and Timor-Leste as an Object of Commission Activities”**

*Aims: Clarifying the role expected of the Peacebuilding Commission and stressing the importance of peacebuilding support in Japanese foreign policy. Using Timor-Leste as an example, recommendations will be offered on ways to support post-conflict states utilizing the Peacebuilding Commission.*

**Yukihiro Nikaido, Director of Research, JIIA (Moderator):** When I woke up and turned on the radio this morning there was an interview with a Japanese person who had worked in Timor-Leste for six years. It was just a coincidence, but it was very timely. The March 15 issues of Time magazine also has a feature article on Timor-Leste.

**Domingos Alves, Ambassador of Timor-Leste to Japan:** I would like to extend my deep appreciation for inviting me to share my thoughts and for the continued sympathy and solidarity of our friends.



Almost five years have gone by since the transference of power from the United Nations Transitional Administration of Timor-Leste (UNTAET) to our first democratically elected government on May 20, 2002, but there still remain challenges.

When the UN started administering the country, the Timorese were living in an illusion of having an independent country. This was an illusion because since power was transferred Timor-Leste has become more dependent than ever, for example on donor countries. We are still in a transitional phase for the consolidation of the democratic State and for national development.

Before retreating from Timor-Leste in 1999, the Indonesian military destroyed most of the existing infrastructure, meaning that Timor-Leste was confronted with many challenging underdevelopment problems: lack of security, stability, and human resources; people's high expectations; lack of experience in running a government; the inherited culture of violence; and the need to consolidate the democratic institutions still in their fragile developing stages.

From the very beginning the Timorese leaders have realized the need to eradicate violence and ensure security and stability, as this is essential for sustainable development in social, cultural and economic aspects, both domestically and internationally. I would like to clarify that this is entirely my personal view and personal experience and does not reflect any official policy line.

The handover of power from UNTAET to the first democratically elected government implied transference of responsibility, transference of the achievements, and transference of a series of remaining unsolved problems. The most crucial challenge that the country has faced has been the task of ensuring and maintaining security and stability, especially since the struggle of the people of Timor-Leste during the past five hundred years was essentially defined and dictated by foreign powers.

After more than two decades of Indonesian occupation and violence, every Timorese is aware of the vulnerability of the country in the region of which it is a part, in terms of its size and geographical position, the inherited culture of violence, and the lack of institutions and a solid democratic system.

During the transitional period and in its first years of independence, Timor-Leste suffered constant incursions of militias along the border with Indonesia. The incursions tried to hinder development in order to prove that an independent Timor-Leste is economically unviable and politically unstable, and to prove to other separatist movements in Indonesia that they would have the same fate as Timor-Leste if they were to try to break away from the Republic of Indonesia.

Some decisive measures therefore had to be taken. Timor-Leste sought a policy of cooperation and good neighborliness with other countries, along with the policy of reconciliation.

The President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Mr. Xanana Gusmão, was the pioneer in promoting these policies. He met with Indonesian authorities, influential members of parliament, and even with the General Wiranto, to explore avenues of common interest on the issue of security and to establish a sound relationship with Indonesia.

President Gusmão also took initiative in promoting reconciliation meetings and dialogue between refugees and local communities along the border in an attempt to convince the refugees to return to Timor-Leste. Most returned, but some preferred to stay in West Timor as Indonesian citizens.

The establishment of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) is a remarkable achievement in terms of reconciliation, normalization and cooperation between the two countries. The main task of the CTF is to reveal the truth on issues related to the events of 1999. In addition, the two countries have settled the land border issue peacefully.

All these exceptional achievements are clear proof that the two countries are committed to peace and harmony. It is in the interests of the two countries to maintain stability and security so as to enable development in all aspects and the wellbeing of the two peoples.

Another effort has been the establishment of a special relationship with Australia, but an excessive approach must be avoided in order to prevent hostility from Indonesia and other Asian countries, and to reduce the chances of a terrorist attack on Timor-Leste. As closer ties with Indonesia could create an unpleasant environment for the relationship with Australia, we need a balanced and proportional relationship with neighboring countries.

There is no doubt that internal security is necessary for sustainable development. After prolonged conflict political instability is common, and Timor-Leste is no exception. Although there is awareness of the direct consequences of internal instability, rival factions are not always ready to think about their disputes in terms of the development of the country. At times, freedom and democracy provoke exaggerated political confrontations. Violence and organized crime can also become part of the characteristics of newly independent countries. The absence of peace and stability has reduced Timor-Leste's ability to answer adequately existing and future problems, both at the internal and external level.

Until early last year, Timor-Leste was considered as a success case in the history of UN missions around the globe. For example, the establishment of the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was able to create an atmosphere of healing by bringing the victims and the perpetrators together to start the process of acceptance and forgiveness, with its report being handed over to President Gusmão and the National Parliament in October 2005 for dissemination to the Timorese public and to the international community.

In the context of building peace and stability, programs called "Open Presidency" and "Open Government" were developed to inform the Timorese people and reduce unrealistic

expectations towards independence.

The awareness of the importance of getting rid of the culture of violence is a decisive step towards the reconstruction of Timor-Leste. A pessimistic attitude only contributes to instability and insecurity, which, in turn, will jeopardize development. In recent months in the capital Dili, organized crime took control of almost all the activities of the population. Internally displaced people and street gang fighting became a part of daily life for the Timorese people.

It is urgent to reinforce the police institutions to deal with violence in order to offer favorable conditions to the development of tourism and other economic activities. This will only succeed if it is accompanied by a program of civic education on the consequences of violence. Mobilizing all sectors of Timorese society such as youth organizations, schools, political parties, police and military, and religious institutions, is vital for the materialization of the program of reconciliation and to leave behind the culture of violence.

Timorese youth that were involved in the struggle against the illegal Indonesian occupation and a high percentage of veterans of war were, suddenly, sidelined by the establishment of an independent and democratic country, for reasons including the reintroduction of the Portuguese language, which most young people cannot speak, and the lack of work skills of the veterans. This led to a growing level of frustration, as most of the high-level rank officers that were in the Indonesian administration or police have good positions and better conditions in the new administration.

Leadership is also important in the creation of peace and stability. If those who govern are mainly concerned with their own self interests and power, then the leadership becomes unpopular and authority is lost. Leaders should be honest in their actions, humble in their attitudes, firm in defending the interests of the people, and should be exemplars of accountability and commitment.

The reinforcement of judicial power would be decisive in tackling or reducing all kinds of violence and organized crime, and in restoring the authority of the state as a whole. Despite the efforts to develop a good justice system, the presence of high numbers of international judges reveals the weakness of the Timorese side.

Another issue is that, following independence, more than 10 universities have been set up without qualified teachers, without meeting any minimum standards, and without control from the State. Proper measures must be taken to prevent undesirable social problems due to this.

We need to dissipate tensions, reduce the enormous expectations, and foster trust by establishing a system which is democratic and just. Without a genuine assurance of the functions of the democratic institutions, the level of criminality and violence will increase and Timor-Leste will become less attractive for foreign investors. The participation of every Timorese in the process of rebuilding the country should be granted.

The need to eradicate the culture of violence depends on awareness of its direct consequences on development. Democratic values and human rights are the necessary conditions to ensure peace and stability in Timor-Leste. This will enable the establishment of a sound relationship with its neighbors, which in turn will give space for economic, social, political and cultural development.

**Hideaki Asahi, Former Ambassador of Japan to Timor-Leste; Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA:** In June 2005, when I left Timor-Leste I was seriously ill and for two years after that I was told by the government to rest. I have been recovering since, but am still suffering from a secondary illness. I have therefore not been fully involved in official affairs for the past two years.

As we have so many people in the audience, I would like to be provocative to you today in my comments to you. With regard to the status of the UN, I have worked in New York, in Tokyo and in Geneva and I have been dealing with UN documents. UN documents tend to be very vague and usually fail to give a true picture.

I wanted to talk about five points, the first being why Japanese efforts for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste have been so appreciated. Second, why peacebuilding efforts in the country have ultimately been a failure. Third, what are the issues as we try to redo to the peacebuilding efforts. Fourth, what are the lessons of peacebuilding for Japan from the case of Timor-Leste. Fifth, how can our efforts in Timor-Leste contribute to the peacebuilding discussion in New York.

With regard to the first point, recently Japan conducted a campaign to become a permanent member of the Security Council, and it was pointed out that if Japan is really seeking to gain a permanent seat, it would have to make further efforts in peacebuilding. In January 2004 Japan established an embassy in Dili, and I was deployed before that to lead efforts to prepare for the opening of the embassy. At that time attention was being directed to Afghanistan or Iraq and Timor-Leste was tending to be neglected. It is a reality that attention of the international community shifts, and the attention of the Japanese people also shifts. Motivation of the people working in Timor-Leste was therefore an issue. The local people and the UN had high expectations of Japan's efforts in Timor-Leste, but this expectation was not felt in Tokyo – there was an attention gap. The efforts implemented by Japan were highly appreciated because of the large size of their presence. There were many people dispatched and this high visibility and the facilities built by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were the source of the high evaluation by the local people and the UN. Another point is that although Japan's ODA has been reduced overall, in the case of Timor-Leste it was the case that ODA was disbursed in a variety of areas and in a variety of forms. As was mentioned by Mr. Akashi, the efficacy of quick impact projects were considerable. The assistance being provided by Japan to Timor-Leste was highly visible and given a face by the SDF personnel. Facility-building was one area in which the SDF were particularly highly evaluated, as the facilities they created were helpful to local residents. Japan also sought to provide its own unique assistance in

peace-consolidation and nation-building efforts.

SDF personnel were also careful to provide training to local people so that they would be able to utilize equipment provided by Japan after the SDF personnel had returned to Japan. We wanted SDF personnel alumni to take part in education activities, and this project is still ongoing, using SDF alumni to provide training. Japanese NGOs have also been instrumental in providing assistance to local people and feel a tremendous sense of mission in Timor-Leste. A further point with respect to Timor-Leste is how to position it politically and geographically. Timor-Leste is a part of East Asia and therefore Japan should provide assistance as a country situated in the same region. This responsibility was felt in Japan and was one of the reasons that assistance was provided on such a scale. At the time of the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET), peacebuilding efforts gained momentum, led by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma. Japan was active in peacebuilding efforts at this time and these efforts were highly evaluated. Given the political delicacy of the Timor-Leste issue vis-à-vis Australia and Indonesia, Japan was well positioned to take an active role in the country. Such efforts may not be well-known in Japan, but are common knowledge internationally.

Moving onto the second point, why were peacebuilding efforts a failure? When I heard news of the riots last year, I was not surprised. The basis for nation-building was still weak and it is likely that Japan withdrew prematurely. The dividend of peace was late in coming and this created various problems. There were riots in May and June and the young people of Dili further exacerbated the problem, indicating that the dividend of peace had been late in coming. Peacebuilders said that they had been pressed by time in creating results, and local expectations had been very high.

There were three main actors in the peacebuilding process, and their mistakes led to failure in the peacebuilding process. The first is the UN, the second the related donor countries, and the third Timor-Leste itself. With respect to the UN, it is the case that there is no consensus on the definition of peacebuilding, and there is no model, nor any formulae for exit strategies.

A second point regards the related donor countries. We have to ask to whom we are extending support for peacebuilding? There is also another perspective, namely the question of an integrated approach to peacebuilding, with coordination being implemented among the UN, donor countries, and actors on the ground in Timor-Leste. These various actors must work together in harmony, otherwise no outcome can be expected.

The third actor responsible for the failure of the peacebuilding process is Timor-Leste itself. Timor-Leste has a lack of experience in peace time politics, namely rule of law, democracy, negotiation, etc. Unfortunately, in the case of Timor-Leste, the problem is how to engage in power struggles and efforts for peace when there is no precedent for engaging in peace time politics. We should not let violence be the result of power struggles and efforts seeking to create peace.

The third issue I would like to address is what efforts are required as we attempt to redo the peacebuilding process for Timor-Leste. When we talk about PKO or peacebuilding activities for a two-year period, it is a reality that it is not possible to mobilize people initially, which creates a period of lost time. So what should we deal with when redoing the peacebuilding process? I think one of the answers is to delineate clearly the roles of the police and the military. In a new country like Timor-Leste, it is not really necessary to have a military. Initially in Timor-Leste there was no move to create a national army, but there was the issue of what to do with former combatants. There were therefore deep-rooted historical challenges, and the present challenge is how to compensate for and address the problems of the past. In redressing peacebuilding activities, it is also important to consider oil and gas resources and ensure that foreign exchange resources are not squandered. It is also important to include young people in all aspects of the process.

The fourth issue is lessons for Japan and what can be done in the future. I served as the first Japanese ambassador to Timor-Leste and there were a number of issues I had to deal with. When discussing these issues with Tokyo, there was no real liaison whom I could contact. I think as Mr. Akashi said, Japan's ODA needs to be made more effective. It may be a good idea to create a Peacebuilding Commission in Japan too. Japan did get credit in Timor-Leste and I think the SDF played a fantastic role. However, in the background in the core aspect of peacebuilding, namely institution building, we do not have the appropriate human resources to help in this respect. Japanese people filled only a small number of the 300 positions in UNMISSET. Also, there is the issue of the civilian police force in Timor-Leste and if Japan could provide assistance in this regard it would be most significant.

My final point relates to Japan's view of peacebuilding and its political role. Journalists who have covered Timor-Leste for a long time say that they cannot see any political involvement in Timor-Leste. The question is how Japan's capabilities can be adequately demonstrated in terms of political engagement with Timor-Leste. Questions still abound concerning how Japan can maintain its engagement in Timor-Leste.

**Shoichi Ogawa, Major General, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force:** Our mission was one of reconstruction. In Timor-Leste there are about 500km of roads and we were part of the UN mission to engage in repair of roads. Infrastructure in the country was in disarray and many of the roads were in a particularly poor condition. We were also forced to transport all our own food, but NGO groups were also kind enough to provide us with some extra rations. Bridges were also destroyed and we were forced to travel through river beds.

In road repair we were forced to use small-size bulldozers as it was impossible to utilize the large ones on existing roads. It was decided to leave the bulldozers and donate them to the people of Timor-Leste after the withdrawal of the SDF. Vehicles were purchased and procured on the basis of local realities, usually more compact and with standard wheels, rather than caterpillar tracks, etc.

We were also engaged in the work of providing a water supply and in general assistance to the populace, including assistance to refugees and to projects implemented under the auspices of UNHCR. We also provided musical instruments for activities in cultural exchange with children. Other activities included bridge building and reforestation projects to prevent landslides. We also engaged in education to the local population concerning the use of bulldozers, cranes, etc., in order that after our withdrawal it would be possible for the equipment to continue to be used. Ultimately, we provided education to 50 people in the hope that the equipment would continue to be used in nation building.

*Break*

**Toshiya Hoshino, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations:** We have heard from Ambassadors Alvez and Asahi about the state of affairs in Timor-Leste. I would like to address the question of the way forward for Timor-Leste and the road to stability.

Ambassador Asahi talked about the UN and noted the lack of a unified consensus or model for peacebuilding. However, within the Peacebuilding Commission we are making efforts to create such a model. We recognize that all conflicts have their own unique background and that one pattern cannot be applied to all cases. Having said that it is important to have a basic model in place and an organizational committee is addressing this issue. Case studies are being implemented in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Gradually we are beginning to see the shaping of some model.

The fact that peacebuilding is important is not in question and all players are supportive of peacebuilding efforts, but this support is somewhat disparate and it is the task of the Peacebuilding Commission to integrate peacebuilding efforts. We are conducting a number of very interesting activities, but it is a reality that we are not involved in all the peacebuilding activities that are currently underway around the world. I am trying to aid the process of creating a systematic model for peacebuilding efforts. Our efforts are currently concentrated on Sierra Leone and Burundi.

I feel that if Timor-Leste were to become one of the target countries for the Commission, there could be some benefit for the country. The activities of the Commission are taking place in New York, but what we are seeking to achieve is that peacebuilding activities themselves take place on the ground, to ensure that conflict does not reignite.

The first phase of a potential model is to identify priorities for the country in question. The aim would be to find priorities that would prevent further conflict. For this purpose input from the field is essential. In the case of Burundi and Sierra Leone we held a meeting with the various actors to discuss and identify the challenges and priorities. In the case of Sierra Leone unemployment was identified as a key factor for instability. So that any given country can move up to tackle the challenges it faces, it is necessary to define these priorities.

The next phase is the necessity to create an “integrated peacebuilding strategy” (IPBS), which is formulated on the basis of various existing strategies. The third phase is to review and revise the IPBS as required and to ensure the continuance of strategy implementation, leading to the consolidation of peace. The Peacebuilding Commission in New York acts as a secretariat for the activities of the Commission. A fund for the activities of the Commission is already in existence, to which Japan has provided US\$20 million.

Today we have heard about what is taking place in Timor-Leste. To a certain extent I think that peacebuilding activities have been proceeding in Timor-Leste, including the “Chega,” and efforts by donor countries. Such efforts are key and there is also the infrastructure aspect, as highlighted by Major General Ogawa. Ambassador Asahi mentioned the initiative to reintegrate former combatants into society in which Japan has been taking an active role.

If Timor-Leste were to be taken up by Peacebuilding Commission, it is likely that priorities would be identified as the reinforcement of the security sector (police), addressing crime, and a strategy to engage youth (similar to measures in Sierra Leone), among others.

I have simplified the processes being undertaken by the Peacebuilding Commission, but I would like to talk about the role of Japan in its operation. I think that Japan should be more confident in asserting its own approach. If the Peacebuilding Commission were to take up Timor-Leste, there would have to be a country that would take the lead in activities, and Japan could be the country to play this central role. In the case of Sierra Leona the lead country is the Netherlands and in the case of Burundi it is Norway. When building an integrated peacebuilding strategy it is vital that we have input from Japan, and that Japan’s role becomes more visible.

With regard to the efforts that Japan would probably concentrate on, they would probably be on the person-to-person level, the community level, and the local level. Peacebuilding efforts would therefore respect the views of the local people.

I was encouraged by Ambassador Alvez’ comments concerning the continuing “dependence” of Timor-Leste. If that reality is recognized, then through systematic support I believe it would be possible to overcome such dependence.

**Mr. Eda:** The presentations have been informative and instructive. I believe that we should make the case of Timor-Leste a success. In the referendum in 1999 the voting rate was more than 90% and this was indicative of the unified move and enthusiasm among the people to create their own country.

**Prof. Yokota:** I have listened very carefully to the presentations and would like to explain my role from 1999 to independence. At the time of the referendum the Indonesian troops attempted to pressure people not to vote and as many 1,500 people were killed. Timor-Leste only has a population of about one million and therefore this represents a very serious crime.



It is important to address these crimes in order to proceed with peacebuilding activities, and two courts were established, one in Timor-Leste and one in Jakarta, with the purpose of bringing the perpetrators of the crime to justice. However, the court held in Jakarta was not convened in compliance with international conventions, and did not provide a forum for witnesses to speak freely. Therefore the perpetrators were not brought to justice and the general conclusion was that the trial should be repeated.

**Audience member:** I want to direct a question to Ambassador Alvez who mentioned the commission on Truth and Friendship and would like to ask how you would reconcile the roles of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) and the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF).

**Ambassador Alvez:** After looking at the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi, it seems that financially we cannot take the responsibility for the reconciliation process without support from the major countries. President Gusmão has said that justice is not a priority. Timor-Leste has a lot of problems that require an answer. The CAVR aims to reduce tension inside the country and to achieve forgiveness. We seek to reveal the true facts of what was happening inside Timor-Leste. That is the main purpose for the establishment of the commission. Initially we thought that we did not need a military, and the funds could be channeled into education or health, but in response to the constant incursions from West Timor we made the decision to create an armed force. The problem is the security and stability of the country itself. We hope that after revealing the truth the country can become stronger and enjoy greater solidarity. However, the commission does not have a mandate for prosecuting criminal activities. We seek to promote the concept of living together in solidarity.

**Ambassador Asahi:** Mr. Hoshino has enlightened us on the activities of the Peacebuilding Commission in New York. With regard to the serious crimes committed I would like to remind people that the matter of peacebuilding is a question of politics and compromises are inevitable. I think that many people are interested in peacebuilding activities in Timor-Leste is very encouraging.

### **Summary and Closing Remarks**

**Mr. Nikaido:** In spring 2000 I visited Timor-Leste and back then officials and NGOs alike were working very hard. We haven't had a chance today to hear of the views of women involved in the peacebuilding process in Timor-Leste, but I hope that such an opportunity would present itself in the future.

# Part I

## Keynote Address

Mr. Yasushi Akashi  
Former UN Under-Secretary General

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for the introduction Ambassador Satoh.

My name is Yasushi Akashi. I am not an expert in Timor-Leste issues. As Mr. Satoh has just mentioned, in thinking about this issue I would like to talk about general issues and assumptions and, as far as the expert knowledge is concerned and how to view those issues, that can be deferred. I would like to talk more about the framework.

Now we are in the post-Cold War age and the expectations on the UN are very high. Activities related to peacekeeping have increased greatly. In particular, in the early part of the 1990s the UN was engaged in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Namibia, and I believe that those efforts bore fruits. But, towards the middle of the 1990s very difficult issues cropped up one after another: Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia (which I was also involved in), and Angola, where we had some hiccups; I would not say it was a failure. Based on those bitter experiences, there was some soul searching on the part of the UN. The Brahimi Report, which I will mention later on, was announced and in the latter 1990s once again the PKO activities of the UN became further dynamized, and in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste and Kosovo the UN has been able to have a good record.

So, when we think about the fruits of the efforts after the Cold War, we have the initial period and then we have a period when there were countless problems, and then we have the recent moves. I would distinguish three separate periods in this way. Activities have been evolving and their effectiveness has been elevated with the increase in interest and commitment in peacebuilding activities. Already, in 1992, Secretary General Ghali at that time announced the challenges and introduced a very ambitious concept; not only peacekeeping but he also emphasized the importance of peacebuilding. Two and a half years later, in 1995, the “challenges to peace” were announced and in the supplement he again emphasized peacebuilding further. Based on that, in the summer of 2000 in the Brahimi report peacekeeping and peacebuilding and their interrelationship was mentioned. In other words, without peacebuilding peacekeeping could not be successful. The emphasis on peacebuilding became quite clear.

Two years ago, in September 2005, the UN celebrated its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary and there was a special assembly with the top leaders of the world and a so-called “outcome document” was adopted. In this document it was mentioned that peace has to be sustained perpetually—this is peacebuilding after a conflict. Post-conflict peacebuilding was to be understood in a more consistent manner. Before that, based on former Secretary General Annan’s recommendation, a

peacebuilding committee was to be established. That decision was made, and at the same time not only the peacebuilding committee, there was under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the human rights body which was elevated to the Human Rights Commission. The outcome document is translated into Japanese as seikabunsho, which may not exactly be appropriate, but that was decided.

In terms of the reform of the Security Council, which many Japanese had hoped for, at this 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary there was no clear progress, but two commissions on human rights and peacebuilding were decided on, and both are very important, especially with regard to human rights. The issues of peacebuilding and security and economic development were to become three pillars for the UN, so this was a meaningful decision, but there were some differing views as regards the Human Rights Council. It was to be enforced but I do not think a clear verdict is out, so the US is not participating in the Council right now. As far as the Peacebuilding Commission is concerned, one of the panelists who will follow, Mr. Hoshino, will probably give us an update on the present state of affairs. However, a new direction was indicated for the UN and activities have already been commenced, and as case studies the issues of Burundi and Sierra Leone have already been taken up. Recently I think that things are very active and Japan has decided very quickly to participate in this Peacebuilding Commission. That being the case, the Peacebuilding Commission wishes to gather all the relevant actors; the funds and resources necessary for peacebuilding are to be marshaled and mobilized; and there is to be a consistent, integrated strategy. It is under these three aims that its activities have been commenced.

On the side of the international community, recently peacebuilding efforts are gaining momentum and a clear focus has been defined. As for Japan, in May 2002, former Prime Minister Koizumi in Sydney, Australia, made a speech and said that Japan also wishes to see peace taking root and nation-building taking place, and that Japan would like to provide appropriate assistance and support. In this way he showed a very proactive attitude.

After that, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda set up a private advisory body as an organ for peace, and I acted as the chair of this body. A report for peacebuilding came out in 2002 and the role of Japan is very big and, as I will mention later on, human resources who could take part in peacebuilding activities needed to be cultivated. This was the recommendation that came out of this report on peacebuilding. That being the case, on the side of Japan too, we also decided to align ourselves with the moves of the international community and we have become very enthusiastic in peacebuilding.

I alluded to the Brahimi Report and, as a UN report, this is rather unusual in that it is very frank. If we think about the weaknesses of the peacekeeping operations (PKO) and also some halfhearted attitudes of the UN Security Council, this report called for a correction of such weaknesses and attitudes. The UN has things that they can do and cannot do and it mentioned that they should clearly distinguish between the two. Also, in PKO activities, the UN should prepare itself not with the best scenario, but rather it should assume a worst-case scenario in

making preparations.

As for UN Security Council resolutions: this is a political body and as a result of negotiations a resolution is adopted, therefore it is a political document. Oftentimes the resolutions are rather vague and ambiguous and that means that people in the field may not be able to act. Therefore, the UN Security Council should refrain from such ambiguity and, having decided on a major mission, the proper facilities and resources are needed. If those resources are not present and the mission is sent anyway, it could be a waste of effort. Peacekeepers in the field also need to have information, which needs to be prepared in advanced.

All of the above was mentioned in the Brahimi Report. The Security Council and the General Assembly were receptive to this report. For example, the PKO bureau needed to be expanded and reinforced, and that was actually realized and implemented. But, as we saw often happening in the past in the UN, as far as information and intelligence was concerned, there was a lot of resistance from the members and this has not been realized as yet. I have mentioned the significance of the Brahimi Report and, yes, there are some questions about the Brahimi Report, too.

With respect to the UN peacebuilding efforts, there have been three major principles to which there has been agreement of the parties. With the consent of the agreement the UN PKO should be in operation and, secondly, the UN should adhere to neutrality. It should have impartiality and have equidistant negotiations with the parties. Thirdly, if forces are used, the minimum necessary forces for the purpose of self defense should be used. These are the three major principles and, on these, Brahimi says that these are the three major principles that need to continue to be adhered to. While he said that, at the same time, the neutrality of the UN should not impede its value judgments. So, for good or for bad, if the UN keeps equidistance, that would be wrong; that is also mentioned by Brahimi. This recommendation sounds comfortable to our ears, but how should we apply this in reality? I believe different people may have different ideas and there is no doubt that there can be questions about the report.

At any rate, particularly in the post-Cold War era, more than 80 percent of conflicts are domestic and ethnic conflicts, as you are aware. Unless these conflicts are addressed in a proper manner, once they are resolved about half of them resume within five years. That is the reality. What should be in the UN's efforts for peacebuilding is, first of all, the prevention of conflict. No matter how hard we work to prevent conflicts, if conflicts do arise then diplomatic, peaceful arbitration or settlement should take place to get the parties to refrain from conflict. If the conflict continues even after such efforts then the UN would face a situation where forces would have to be used or economic sanctions could be a path. If there is peace after these measures then the peacekeeping activities are the ones the UN should be engaged in. The UN should not then relax once the conflict is over; peacebuilding has to be pursued as the peace should not just be temporary, but a genuine peace should be established through PKO activities. That is what Brahimi emphasizes in his report.

This kind of a cycle does not occur in the same manner in the various countries in the various conflicts. After the peacekeeping activities by the UN in the former Yugoslavia, based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, forced peace was pursued by NATO, so the order of things changed. Peacebuilding is basically a post-conflict effort, but the next stage would be the prevention of war. So, in a way, the last stage of this cycle would perhaps represent the beginning part of the next cycle; there can be overlap. In this respect there are a variety of stages in peacebuilding and there may not be a clear delineation between them.

I have been involved in Sri Lankan affairs. When I think of these, UN PKO activities are not included. For example, Norway and other countries are making efforts for arbitration in conflicts. The members of the EU, Norway, and Iceland have done Sri Lanka Monitoring Missions (SLLM) and through these efforts small-scale peacekeeping activities have been held. Japan is the largest donor country for peacebuilding. These efforts are all going on simultaneously. The contents of peacebuilding would differ from conflict to conflict. For example, the so-called Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is actually a very important part of peacebuilding, but at what stage should this take place? The situation could differ from country to country. In Cambodia, where I was involved, DDR unfortunately took place many years after the activities of the UN; the Hun Sen government implemented the DDR activities.

In the cases of Timor-Leste and Kosovo, whose conflicts both arose in 1999, the efforts for peacebuilding that came after represented the creation of new countries, so the scale has been quite large and complex. Compared with this, if you think of the peacebuilding activities in Cambodia or Iraq, you are talking about a rebuilding or recreation of an old country, so their natures would be a little different.

The missions and activities at the mid and the later stages of peacebuilding would naturally differ from the initial stages. Of course, in the initial stages, emergency humanitarian assistance or rescue of refugees would be involved. The internally displaced person (IDP) issue has expanded, as has that of refugees, and of course security is another important aspect. The implementation and execution of an election would be another aspect.

The importance of quick impact is emphasized by Brahimi in his report. Major efforts may have to be implemented, but actually quick, small-scale activities should be done, and could actually be more important if we think about bringing the fruits of peace to people. This is one of the points that merits our attention at the initial stage.

When you come to the middle stage the importance of general governance and, particularly, the role of the police and the judiciary are very important. There is also the importance of the building of infrastructure, particularly education and medicine. At the same time, if there are a lot of landmines in place, de-mining activities are also very important.

Over the long-term what we have to consider are the human rights-related issues or the

establishment of democracy, which are very important, and we also have to pay attention to the development of the media. When the country is destroyed the reconstruction, liberal society, and free economic activities are also very important aspects.

With respect to Timor-Leste, how is the peacebuilding effort being pursued? How should it be pursued? This is a matter which we will discuss after my speech. In general, in the case of Timor-Leste, to great extent a textbook-type peacebuilding has been taking place after peace-keeping. This can be said to be a model case. The whole international community has been trying to assist this country, and that is exactly what has been done, but the base for this country to be truly independent has not been established yet. In 1999 there were riots and conflicts and also the United Nations Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) was established. By 2002 the constitution was established and the presidential election took place. Independence took place and the country acceded to the UN. In 2002 the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET) came into being, following UNTAET. This organization worked for three years and a small political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), came about as a result of the efforts by UNMISSET but, as you know, in Dili and some other places there were some riots and Australian forces were deployed.

From 2006 to 2008, until February next year, the UN has sent a small mission called the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). There has been an evolution in the way in which the UN has been involved in Timor-Leste. I do not know if “evolution” is the right word, but there have been some changes. Timor-Leste is a baby country that was just born, but over the long run, as I see it, I think that the country will be fully independent economically. There should of course be development of the offshore natural gas and oil. With respect to the distribution of the natural resources there were negotiations and I believe satisfactory results were achieved. Right now the country is very poor but there is a base in place that will rescue the country from that state.

Another point we need to pay attention to is the process for truth and reconciliation. In the culture and tradition of Timor-Leste, through the process of confession and reconciliation, old wounds can be addressed and the community and country can once again be reestablished. With the wisdom of President Gusmão Timor-Leste did achieve that, but more serious crimes were committed. How should we respond? This is in fact a more serious criminal activity, and not bringing these people to justice would not be right, so this issue has also to be addressed. Efforts are being made by Ambassador Yokota, but the talks between Timor-Leste and Indonesia have not yet been completed.

Another important issue of late is that within Timor-Leste amongst the leadership there are some differences of opinion and dissent, according to media reports. This is probably stemming from the differences in some geographical areas and also in the different behaviors of the people who fought in the guerilla wars and others who did not, who actually fled to other countries. Of course there is also the issue of the very complex situation of languages. We sincerely hope that these issues will be resolved peacefully so that the entire country can strive

toward and concentrate on the reestablishment of the country.

In Japan we tend to consider this issue of peacebuilding from two aspects: peace consolidation and country building. But, in the case of Timor-Leste, peace consolidation and country building have to take place simultaneously. That makes the challenge more complex. When we consider the stance of Japan in the coming period, how should Japan be involved in or contribute to peacebuilding? I think this is not an issue we can really avoid going forward.

First, if you consider international peace and cooperation, the scope is quite broad. In the early 1990s we asked how we should be involved in the traditional PKO of the UN that would suffice. But the PKO has changed from traditional, first-generation PKO to second-generation, more multifaceted PKO, going through the fourth use type of PKO to what I call the fourth-generation type PKO, where the three major principles of PKO should be more flexibly interpreted and PKO that would involve use of force. So, there have been some changes from the first, second, third to fourth PKO, and the first, second, and third types of PKO are now occurring at the same time around the world. Something that is not part of peacebuilding activities; these kinds of diplomatic efforts need to be occurring at the same time. The human resources that are required for these activities are also diverse. People that have different skills are called on. In this respect, if we in Japan were to be involved in this constructively, then the development of human resources is something that we have to work on earnestly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office are considering these issues very closely. I believe that this is something that we all can feel happy about but, to address these issues, the compartmentalized situation should be addressed and the entire country of Japan should be involved in this.

Also, what was quite salient in the post-war period in Japan—the mentality of being away from something dangerous or risky—will not do. Our efforts will not be appreciated by the rest of the world if we assume such a mindset. There has to be a discussion among the entire country of Japan. Over the last several years there has been a reduction of ODA in Japan, and for us people who are concerned there has been a sense of crisis with respect to ODA. Rather than pursuing ODA in a peaceful environment at peaceful times, the kind of ODA that is carried out at a distance should also be continued, but humanitarian assistance is going to be increasingly important. Activities for peace consolidation and activities for country building or the use for the realization of DDR or, in the case of Sri Lanka, there is a ceasefire agreement but the genuine peace agreements are not there yet. In these countries the dividends of peace that we think of should be realized so that people can approach peace more readily.

In 2003 there was a Sri Lanka reestablishment Tokyo conference, and in the Tokyo declaration we said that the assistance process and the peace process should be linked. But this linkage, what do you think of it? On this point Japan's thinking and the EU's ideas are not necessarily aligned. How far peace should go and how much assistance should be increased: we tend to think of the issue from this perspective of positive linkage, but some countries in Europe say that this should be considered from the perspective of negative linkage. If the local people are

not making lots of efforts for peace, then the assistance should be reduced. So, there may not be a meeting of minds on these issues. This issue of linkage is one challenge that we have to consider closely.

I think I have already exceeded my time so I should wrap up. A series of issues is before us in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and looking for the answers is not at all easy. In order to resolve these issues the Peacebuilding Commission established by the UN can be utilized. We Japanese people have to work hard to cooperate with other countries to come up with a common answer. In that sense I think that this is a very meaningful activity.

We have Mr. Hoshino who is the Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations taking part in the panel discussion and I think that he will be able to give us his frank views on some of the problems that he feels exists for Japan. I believe, as I said earlier, the case of Timor-Leste is a major case for peacebuilding and a highly interesting case study at that. Timor-Leste is very different from some other countries that have collapsed and I believe that we do not need to be in desperation about its future. As I said before, there is hope for the future of the economy and I believe that we can find a good answer. At any rate, we have the peacebuilding issue before us, as well as the issues of governance and mid- to long-term independence of the society and economy of Timor-Leste. How can this be implemented in harmony? Of course, for this new country Japan should do what it can but, depending on the issue, we can also cooperate with Australia, which is also very active in Timor-Leste. We can also cooperate with ASEAN countries like Indonesia as well. We should not forget these other countries. Also we can cooperate with the former sovereign of Portugal. Under the big umbrella of the UN these activities can take place, so in that sense the regional mechanisms of the UN and bilateral activities can be combined so that we can do what we should for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste.

Also, this type of activity will be disseminating in various parts of the world. There are financial limits to what to the UN can do. There are many places where we need to deploy peace activities, like in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq, even if we just take Asia, and in the future we feel that it is difficult to involve ourselves over the long term in certain countries. In what form can we leave a good legacy and how can we withdraw leaving a good legacy? An exit strategy is also necessary. If we withdraw too rapidly it is clear that we could not contribute to peacebuilding, but it is unrealistic to just wait decades for the ideal state and continue our involvement. What would be the appropriate manner of withdrawal? What is the best exit strategy? It should be an exit that is responsible. For Japan, and for the UN too, I think that such a responsible exit strategy needs to be considered.

Keeping in mind the situation in Somalia, former Secretary of State Christopher of the US said that because Somalia and its atrocities were depicted by the media and television there was a premature intervention. Scenes of American troops being killed in a cruel manner were broadcast many times over and that was viewed by the American public, therefore the American people said that the country should not intervene in Somalia. In other words, there



was a premature withdrawal. You could call it a kind of “CNN effect.” You have a more long-term, more objective way of dealing with the world in a modern democracy. How can you have the coexistence of both sides? I think Mr. Christopher was asking himself that question, as well as raising this question to others. How can you have a constructive engagement in such conflict and how can you build peace? What can and what should Japan and the UN do? I think that Timor-Leste gives us good food for thought in that sense.

I am sorry that I have given a rather sketchy kind of speech with regard to this issue, but I thank you for your kind attention.

## Part II

### Amb. Domingos Sarmiento Alves Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste to Japan

I would like, at the outset, to extend my deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Mr. Yukio Satoh, and all the organizers of this important symposium for inviting me to share with you a few thoughts and experiences on the situation of my country since we regained our dignity as people and nation in May 20th, 2002.

Taking this opportunity, I would also like to extend my regards to all the panelists and to the moderator, Mr. Ambassador Asahi, and to express my profound gratitude for the continued sympathy and solidarity of our friends, the Japanese people, its Government and the international community as a whole. It was under this wave of sympathy and solidarity that Timor-Leste emerged as the youngest nation of the third millennium. It is always gratifying for us to know that the commitment for Timor-Leste is still ongoing and this always constitutes a motivating factor for us to move forward and meet our enormous challenges with confidence.

Almost five years have now gone by since that historical day of the transference of power from the United Nations Transitional Administration of Timor-Leste (UNTAET) to the first democratically elected Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in May 20th, 2002. Although great strides have been made in establishing democratic institutions and in laying the foundation of a State based on the Rule of Law, our path ahead is still fraught with many challenges.

When the United Nations started administering the country by establishing State Institutions and restoring peace and stability, the Timorese, especially the politicians, were living an illusion of having an independent country and hardly conceal their eagerness to run the country, to exercise their power. Illusion because once the power was transferred and Timor-Leste got its full independence, it has become more dependent than ever. It has become more dependent on the solidarity of other countries and more dependent on its own weaknesses in every aspect of a State's life. In short, we are still in a transitional phase for the consolidation of the Democratic State and for national development. Within this line, experiences around the world have demonstrated that not all of the transitional process are turbulent but neither smooth.

Timor-Leste is the poorest in Southeast Asia and one of the 10 poorest countries in the world. Before retreating from Timor-Leste in September 1999, Indonesian military destroyed most of the existing infrastructures. With practically all the infrastructures destroyed, Timor-Leste has confronted with many of the most challenging problems of underdevelopment in the process of its reconstruction. The lack of security and stability, lack of human resources, people's high expectations towards the improvements of their life after gaining the independence, the lack of experiences in running a Government and in dealing with the complexity of relationship

among nations, and the inherited culture of violence as direct consequence of a prolonged period of violence and repression and the pressing need to consolidate the democratic institutions which are still in their fragile stages have been some of the problems that have had great eco in Timor-Leste soon after the transference of power from UNTAET to the government of Timor-Leste.

Ensuring security and stability is one of the crucial challenges for the government and the leadership of Timor-Leste. From the very beginning the Timorese leaders, actually, have realized that the need to eradicate the culture of violence and to promote reconciliation is imperative to create a favorable condition for peace and harmony among the Timorese themselves and between Indonesia and Timor-Leste as well. It is a sine quo non aspect to ensure a more sustainable development in social, cultural and economic aspects that promised a solid prospect for the future of the country and its people.

This presentation was supposed to talk about the topic that was presented to me: **“Rehabilitation of Timor-Leste: *Achievements and Challenges*”** and was to cover broader aspects related to the topic but I would like to limit myself in focusing merely on the issues that jeopardize the security/peace and stability, in view of the fact that peace and stability is what really matters for economic, social, political and cultural development of the country.

Peace and stability plays a determinant role in the establishment of an atmosphere and space that offers guarantees to the materialization of a sustainable development in the above mentioned fields which in turn will reinforce the peace and harmony itself and will bring the Timorese people to the gate of prosperity.

Before developing further discussion on this matter, I would like to clarify to the audience that this presentation is entirely my personal view and personal experiences on the situation in Timor-Leste. It does not reflect any official policy line. I was encouraged simply by the idea that sharing experiences and views (more on the causes rather than on the concept of stability and security itself) with the audiences might be useful for some experts in the field to delineate adequate measures to tackle the problem of peace and stability not only in Timor but also around the world, bearing in mind that similar problems might require different solutions. Every country has its own specificities, in various aspects and levels.

### **The first steps in early stages of independence**

The end of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste in May 2002 was the start point of the first steps of the newest born country. The handover of power from the UNTAET to the first democratically elected government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste implies transference of responsibility, transference of the achievements and, above all, transference of a series of remaining unsolved problems.

One of the most crucial challenges that the country faced soon after the transfers of power from the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET) to the government of

Timor-Leste has been the task for ensuring and maintaining security and stability of the new born country. Due to the historical background and political context of the struggle of the people of Timor-Leste during most five hundred years in which its history was, essentially, defined and dictated by foreign powers, the necessity to maintain and ensure peace and stability is a paramount priority.

More than two decades of Indonesian occupation and the incredible violence before retreating from Timor-Leste in September 1999, every Timorese has full awareness of the state of vulnerability of the country in the region where it becomes part of it. The vulnerability is, essentially, dictated by the size and geographical position of the country, by inherited culture of violence and by the lack of institutions and solid democratic systems that could ensure the security and stability of the country.

### **Ensuring peace and stability through cooperation**

Allow me to underline some of the facts of our recent past that had contributed to the perception of external and internal threats and that had raised the awareness of the Timorese leaders on the importance of peace and stability for Timor-Leste and the measures taken to answer the threats.

During the transitional period and in its first years of independence, Timor-Leste suffered constant incursions of militias along the border with Indonesia. It was believed that some Indonesian military sectors whose reputation was psychologically affected due to the loss of war in Timor-Leste were hardly accepting the new reality, the independence of the territory. This fact led to an abstraction of two possible reasons of provoking instability in the border area, serving militias as the key factor of incursions into the territory. Firstly, a constant instability provoked by the incursions was, probably, expected to hinder the development of the country so as to justify the theses that an independent Timor-Leste is economically unviable and politically instable which could be a serious threat for economic development and stability in the region. Secondly, Indonesia might want to prove to the separatists' movements in Indonesia that they would have the same fate as Timor-Leste if they try to break away from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

Facing these circumstances and challenges of the security and stability, some decisive measures had been taken. Policy of cooperation and good neighborhood with countries in the region and in the world had been delineated along with the policy of reconciliation.

The President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Mr. Xanana Gusmão, was the pioneer in promoting those policies by appealing tirelessly for the need of reconciliation, harmonization and normalization with Indonesia and among the Timorese themselves. Consistent with his line of policy, President Xanana Gusmão met with Indonesian authorities such as former President Megawati, some influential member of parliament, including militia's leaders and even with the retired General Wiranto who was indicted by Serious Crimes Unit for committing crimes against humanity in Timor-Leste, to explore avenues of common

interests on the issue of security and to establish a sound relationship with Indonesia.

Besides meeting with Indonesian authorities and leaders of militia, President Xanana Gusmão also took initiative to promote a series of reconciliation meetings and dialogue between the refugees and the local communities along the border with Indonesia in an attempt to convince the refugees to return to Timor-Leste. Most of the refugees returned to Timor-Leste but some preferred to stay in West Timor as Indonesian citizens.

The establishment of Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) by Timor-Leste and Indonesia is a remarkable achievement in terms of reconciliation, normalization and cooperation between the two countries that were involved in decades of army conflict. The main task of the CTF is to reveal the truth on issues related to the 1999's event. In addition, the two countries had settled the land border issue peacefully.

All these exceptional achievements, as a direct consequence of the implementation of the policy of reconciliation, are a clear prove that the two countries are really committed themselves for peace and harmony in the region. It is in the interest of the two countries to maintain stability and security so as to enable development in all aspects and the wellbeing of the two peoples.

Another effort within the policy of cooperation and good neighborhood is establishing a special relationship with Australia. Due to the constraint of time, I will not develop this subject and other relevant successful efforts to integrate Timor-Leste in the region but just to emphasize that a more secure step for the implementation of an active foreign policy regarding peace and stability is establishing a special relationship with Australia and building a good neighborhood relationship with Indonesia.

However, an excessive approach with Australia was avoided because it could have negative implications in the relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. Avoid being labeled as a satellite country of Australia or as a country that represents the western culture has been a necessary measure to prevent any hostility from Indonesia and other Asian countries. Moreover, the risk to expose Timor-Leste as a target for terrorists' attacks would also be reduced. Just to recall that Osama Bin Laden had mentioned Timor-Leste twice by saying that Western countries and the UN had separated Timor-Leste from Indonesia.

On the other hand, a closer tie with Indonesia could create an unpleasant environment for the relationship and cooperation between Australia and Timor-Leste in various levels. Consequently, a more balanced and proportional relationship with the neighboring countries, the countries in the region and in the world as a whole should be handled properly. There are numerous successes that should be mentioned but I would rather skip them and focus more on the internal security and stability and its challenges.

## **Internal Security**

There is no space for doubt that internal security of the country is the necessary condition for sustainable development in all aspects of the State and the people's life.

One of the most common characteristics of new independent countries, after a dragged on conflict, is political instability and Timor-Leste is not an exception. Although there are awareness of direct consequences of internal instability of the country, the rival factions, in their endeavor to take-over more political space, to implement their idealism, to implement their democratic values, political and social system and other principles, the Timorese (especially the leaders) are not always ready to think about the direct consequences of their disputes in the process of economic, social and political development of the country. At times, freedom and democracy provoke exaggerated attitudes of political confrontations.

Violence and organized crimes could also become part of the characteristics of new independent countries.

It is obvious that the development of Timor-Leste in political, economic, cultural and social areas will be strongly conditioned by the pressing necessity of internal security and stability of the country. It has been a fact, especially during the last nine months, that the absence of peace and stability reduced Timor-Leste's ability to answer adequately the existing and the coming problems, both in internal and external levels.

Apart from the setback during these recent months, I would like to underline some measures that had been taken to ensure peace and stability, since May 2002. One of the notorious measures was the implementation of the policy of reconciliation, masterminded and promoted by President Xanana Gusmão. Until early last year, Timor-Leste was considered as a success case in the history of UN mission around the globe. The Timorese people were also proud of their ability to promote peace and reconciliation among themselves and with its former occupier, Indonesia.

The results of the policy of reconciliation implemented in various programs were more than concrete and the Timorese people enjoyed the benefits of this policy. For example, the establishment of the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was able to create an atmosphere of healing bitter experiences by bringing the victims and the perpetrators together to start the process of acceptance and forgiveness. The Commission had completed its mission successfully and its report of 2000 pages entitled "Chega" (literally means Enough) was handed over to President Xanana Gusmão and the National Parliament in October 2005 for its dissemination to the Timorese public and to the international community.

In the context of building peace and stability, both the Presidency Office and the Government developed programs called "Open Presidency" and "Open Government" respectively. The two programs were aimed, basically, at informing the Timorese people and reducing their unrealistic expectation towards independence.

It is important, indeed, to acknowledge all the achievements but I would rather skip them and talk about some of the challenges that I mentioned before.

### **Culture of Violence**

The culture of violence is one of the most notable obstacles for the development of Timor-Leste. The culture of violence imposed by the military regime during the occupation of 24 years has become a difficult and complex task for its eradication.

The awareness of the importance of getting rid of the culture of violence is a decisive step towards reconstruction of Timor-Leste. A pessimistic attitude in facing this pressing problem is a significant contribution to permanent existence of instability and insecurity which, in turn, will jeopardize the development of the country in various aspects.

As we have seen in recent months, the functioning of democratic institutions was debilitated and hampered the development of democracy. In Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, organized crimes took control of all the activities of the population. Internal Displaced People and street's gang fighting no longer become news for the Timorese people.

Getting rid of the culture of violence offers favorable conditions to the development of tourism and other economic activities in general, especially to attract foreign investment that is expected to reduce the high rate of unemployment. So, it is urgent to reinforce the police institutions to deal with violence.

However, investment on controlling and prevention of violence through well trained and well equipped policemen will only succeed if it is sided by a program of civic education for raising awareness about the consequences of violence and instability in the territory.

Raising awareness of Timorese people about negative effects of the violence is a paramount important and this measure could be the right step towards security and stability of the country. To mobilize and involve all sectors of Timorese society such as youth organizations, schools, political parties, police and military, religious institutions, are indispensable for the materialization of the program of reconciliation and to leave behind the culture of violence.

### **Demands for new space of participation**

Another problem that might be considered as insignificant by many is the lack of favourable condition for the involvement of all the Timorese in the process of reconstruction, especially the participation of veterans of war and of the youths.

Most of the Timorese youth that were involved actively in struggle against the Indonesian illegal occupation and a high percentage of veterans of war were, suddenly, sidelined by the new reality, the establishment of an independent and democratic country. Many reasons can be put forward to explain this fact such as: the reintroduction of Portuguese language which most

of the young generation who graduated from Indonesian Universities cannot speak and it has hindered them to participate properly in the reconstruction process or the veterans are unskilled and so forth. This led to a growing level of frustration when they find out that most of the high level rank officers that were in the Indonesian administration or in the police have good position and better condition in the new administration.

Although most of them are aware of the need to break up from our past, a past of violence, of pain and backwardness but the above mentioned situation does not help much. By the fact that they were active actors in the process of the liberation of the country, they reject to be sidelined from their future and their demand for a new space of political and cultural participation in the reconstruction of the country was not handled properly. In short, the individual and collective involvement of the Timorese people in the process of reconstruction should be nourished for it will enable them to be more responsible and it is also a way to ensure democratic values, respect for difference and tolerance and the awareness of social justice to encompass everyone.

### **Leadership**

The leadership is also another important element in the creation of a good atmosphere for peace and stability. If those who govern the country think more of themselves, in the interests of their own parties, in the effort that must be made to stay in power at all costs, then the leadership becomes unpopular and, consequently, diminish or even lost their authority. Whoever governs must possess the vision for the State, of the needs of the people and the country. This is one of the greatest challenges - the leaders should be honest in their actions, humble in their attitudes, firmness in defending the interests of the people, and being examples of accountability and commitment.

I can, of course, make a long list of challenges but before stop enlisting further challenges, allow me to add two more challenges which, in my opinion, is important to be addressed or at least to think of, that are judiciary system and the flourish of Universities in Timor-Leste soon after its independence.

### **Consolidation of Judiciary System**

Judicial Institution is one of the weakest institutions that should be reinforced. The reinforcement of judicial power is decisive to tackle or, at least, reduce all kinds of violence and organized crimes and to restore the authority of the State as a whole.

Despite the efforts to develop a good justice system, the presence of high number of international judges reveals the weakness of the Timorese side which could maintain the desire of establishing a solid and sustainable institution of the judiciary system as an everlasting need.

### **Regulating the flourish of Universities**

For political channels or as a way of exercising power or even just for economic reason, the



fact is that, soon after the independence a number of Universities (more than 10) have been set up without qualified teachers and far from meeting any minimum standard to function as University and without any control from the state, except the National University. The consequence is certain to be serious if no proper measure is taken to prevent the occurrence of undesirable social problems in the future.

### **Summing Up**

Peace and stability can be a reality in Timor-Leste if every Timorese has the capacity to recognize him/herself as the source of peace itself. Peace can only be enjoyed by society if each individual is at peace.

We need to dissipate tensions, reducing the enormous expectations and fostering trust in the future, by establishing a system which is democratic and just. This assurance could only be a reality if the functioning of democratic institutions is really assured. Without a genuine assurance of the functions of the democratic institutions, we could foresee that the level of criminality and violence will increase. As a consequence Timor-Leste becomes less attractive for foreign investors. So, participation of every Timorese in the process of rebuilding the country should be granted.

The need to eradicate the culture of violence depends on the ability of Timorese people to be aware of the direct consequences of violence and instability in various sectors of the development of the country. Maintaining an internal solid stability based on democratic values and human rights is the necessary condition to ensure effectively peace and stability in Timor-Leste that will enable the establishment of a sound relationship and cooperation with its neighbors in the region which in turn will give space for economic, social, political and cultural development.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

## Part II

Amb. Hideaki Asahi

Former Ambassador of Japan to Timor-Leste, Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA

Thank you very much for the kind introduction, my name is Asahi. The moderator has given me a request to consider the time, so because of the time constraints I would like to have your understanding at the outset and I would like to brief and go right into the content.

Why did I say at the outset I would like to have your understanding? This has to do with my privacy and there are some reasons. Maybe by talking about it I think you can understand the situation or part of the issues of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. The fact of the matter is I have some problems with respect to my mouth—speaking—so if I get tired, irrespective of my will I fail to speak as I wish. That is the kind of problem I have. What this means is that in June 2005, when I left Timor-Leste, I was gravely ill and my life was at stake. For two years after that I was told by the government to rest. It has been getting tremendously better, but I am still suffering from a secondary disorder. In particular when I am tired, I do not know if you notice but the left side of my face is still numb. The numbness gets stronger and that makes it more difficult for me to speak and I will skip some words or physically I find it difficult to speak clearly.

I thought I had to speak in English, but seeing as most of the audience and panelists are Japanese I was told it would be okay for me to speak in Japanese and that has reduced some burden.

But, as I mentioned before, I was not involved in official affairs for the past two years. I have been trying to recuperate. As an incumbent diplomat I think that my concentration is failing; I cannot concentrate as I used to be able to. So, I was told to consider the time and within the limited time I wonder if I can make my presentation in an articulate manner. I am a bit concerned but because of these reasons I hope you will forgive me.

As we have so many people in the audience, I would like to make some efforts and I have actually prepared some things. My respected Mr. Akashi says he is going to be bored today, and I would like to be provocative today in making my presentation to you.

This panel discussion is going to be pretty long so if I say anything ordinary that would bore you because of my bureaucratic sentiment. Actually, I have an assignment in April and because of that I have been away from official duties since last November. I have been relaxed and so I thought that I would give you some bold and productive remarks in my presentation. What peacebuilding means and what kind of roles can be played on the part of Japan, or what other issues are we going to face: these are the things I would like to highlight.

Earlier on Mr. Akashi said that the Brahimi Report with respect to the status of the UN—when

you say UN, personally I was in Geneva, I was in New York and I was in Tokyo and I was part of the creation of the PKO law, I had to go to the field. So, in the UN I have been dealing with UN documents and of course, as you know, it is a very vague document. If you just read it I do not think you can really easily understand the true picture. I cannot be as smart as the author of the Brahimi Report but I would like to speak in a way that you can really understand what is going in the field. I would like to share with you the episodes that I have experienced or I would like to speak in a manner that would convey the true voices of the people who are there. Of course I would like to be succinct because of the time allocation.

I wanted to talk about five points, but since Mr. Akashi gave us some very comprehensive remarks I thought I would perhaps give you a concluding remark and that would suffice, but we still have a bit more time so maybe I can be a bit more lengthy. I would like to talk about five main points which I have prepared and I would like to share those with you so you can think about them.

The first point: why has the Japanese effort for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste been appreciated so much? Secondly—I think this is something that you are very interested in—why has the peacebuilding effort, that was considered to be successful, failed? Well, according to some people it was a “setup”: this is the UN terminology. But, why was it a failure? That is the second point. The third point I am not sure how to express. Some people say it was not a failure; I say “redoing” it. So, what are the issues as we try to “redo” the peacebuilding effort? Fourthly, what are the lessons we can learn from the Japanese peacebuilding effort in Timor-Leste? What are the challenges going forward? The fifth point is about this experience of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. Regarding New York Mr. Hoshino will give us an explanation later on, but how can our efforts in peacebuilding in Timor-Leste contribute to the discussion over the Peacebuilding Commission in New York? Because of time constraints I would like to just talk about the first four points and if time allows I would like to touch upon the fifth point.

Now, the first point: why did Japan get high credit in the peacebuilding effort in Timor-Leste? I do not know if this feeling is shared domestically here in Japan, but in 2005 Japan conducted a campaign to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and many countries said, “If you become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, one of the major challenges is peacebuilding and other peace-related issues.” What can Japan do? What has Japan done? An example that has been mentioned is that Mr. Akashi led Japan’s role in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with respect to Cambodia, and Timor-Leste. When we mention these then most of the countries were persuaded, so Japan’s contribution to peacebuilding in Timor-Leste has been appreciated.

I was told to go to Timor-Leste after Golden Week in early May 2003. Actually, I was taking a one-year holiday. I was working as a volunteer in an NGO and the government noticed that. I was surprised that I was told to go to Timor-Leste. In January 2004 we established the embassy. I was told to go to prepare for the establishment of the embassy. Naturally, already there was a deployment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF). I was told to lead the efforts of our

assistance and peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. These were the two missions given to me. At that time Japanese people had forgotten about Timor-Leste and people were talking about Afghanistan or about what kind of assistance should be extended to Iraq. These were the issues drawing the attention of the Japanese media. Ms. Sadako Ogata said, "Afghanistan is also forgotten. People are only talking about Iraq." That was the situation back then. When we do peacebuilding I think we can identify one issue: people's attention shifts. People forget about things.

How was I to address this issue which was there before I went to Timor-Leste? I went there and I thought, "Uh-oh!" Within the framework of the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET) the Japanese SDF had a two-year mission. Just one year had passed and the members of the SDF who I met were all fed up. Maj. Gen. Ogawa explained that this was because the people in Tokyo were paying more attention to Iraq and when you mention Timor-Leste they say, "Why do you say this?" I have occasionally experienced this in the office. Against that background, how could I try to motivate these people? That was one of the issues that I was faced with. What surprised me was that things did not end there.

The local government, residents, and also the UN had a high expectation of Japan with respect to our role there in Timor-Leste. If you were in Tokyo that was not the kind of thing you would hear. It is not reported. That is what I call, "attention gap." When I went there what I felt keenly was this attention gap on the issue of peacebuilding. In Japan people had forgotten about Timor-Leste and the efforts we were making there, but outside of Japan this was quite highly appreciated. That was a fact. Why was Japan appreciated so much? I thought about this and there are perhaps four reasons. I would like to share these four points with you.

Firstly, the presence was so large. Japan sent a large contingent to Cambodia and the size of the force dispatched to Iraq was larger, but it was close to that. Many people were dispatched and that was highly assessed. I think this was an affect of the facilities built by troops, which was appreciated. For the SDF to go abroad of course we have lots of constraints, but I did not feel that. The strong discipline and kindness, if you will, of the SDF that were nurtured in democracy were well accepted by the local people. Before this session, yesterday, there was an unofficial brainstorming type of meeting and the SDF people said, "What we did in Japan was executed locally. So, what we do properly here in Japan can be replicated abroad." That is what they said. In fact this is something that I feel keenly when I see peacekeeping activities abroad. There are so many troops from other countries that are not really operating locally in Timor-Leste. The leaders of the UN and the local government people said that military forces, when they go abroad, create lots of problems but, in that respect, the Japanese SDF are great. That is what they said. In fact this is not really well known in Japan, but this is still a fact. That has enhanced the degree of appreciation on Japan.

The second point, related to the high presence of Japan, is that thankfully there has been a reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) of late, but there are a variety of ODA measures. That is also a strength. When you do peacebuilding activities the situation changes

so there are new needs. We started with emergency assistance, then assistance to NGOs. Or, we started with large-scale grant aid then, when things stabilized, we evolved into regular types of assistance. We have a variety of multilateral and bilateral assistance measures and that has been appreciated. What surprised me a little bit was that it is true, in the case of emergency aid, that peacetime ODA or infrastructure-type of assistance is often criticized, because something other than that is required. On the other hand, as was mentioned by Mr. Akashi, the efficacy of a quick-impact project immediately after a conflict would be great. When I was there I think I was fortunate. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and also President Gusmão said that the new ambassador was quite fortunate. I went there at the stage when emergency grant aid was about to be completed and was fortunate enough to participate in the inauguration ceremony of these projects. We were able to demonstrate what our projects were all about. The initial assistance gave the residents hope for the future and it was quite effective. It was not just money. What was good about it, because of the domestic situation in Japan, smaller businesses went and had to go and get projects abroad, so we were able to put in place a formation that allowed Japanese people to show their faces on these projects.

As often mentioned, nation-building is about governance and it takes time before the local residents will get the benefits. Of course in the future the new government will provide them with goods and services and there can be an enhanced level of living standards but, before that happens we need quick-impact projects. They are quite effective and we were able to contribute in that way.

I talked about the efficacy of the facility-building troops. Originally they were the backup to security forces and, of course in connection with that, facility-related activities had to be pursued. These facilities are quite helpful to the local residents. Compared with other peace-keeping forces I think our Japanese SDF were readily appreciated. Our troops and the Korean forces were engaged in activities next to each other. I do not know if our forces learned from Korea, but when Korea sent forces they sent medical forces and facility-building forces. Of course that was partly because they wanted to secure their security, but maybe they learned something from the SDF. So the first point is that the presence of Japan was quite large in Timor-Leste.

Secondly, on the one hand we were able to present a presence and at the same time the Japanese assistance was given precisely in order to meet the needs of the local residents. Mr. Akashi shared with us some of his impressions from when he was in Timor-Leste of the kind of assistance that was not part of the former peacebuilding activities, such as ADR and also RESPECT, I think Ambassador Alves mentioned this, and the “R” part of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) that was conducted in Afghanistan, the reintegration into society. Money-wise this was not large, but local people, particularly local politicians, wanted to have assistance of this kind and Japan was able to provide them with it. That helped a great deal in enhancing local people’s appreciation for Japan. The Japanese bureaucracy went very far at the beginning but, because of political decisions that were made, the additional assistance that I requested was not readily given. I do not know what happened

after that, but this kind of assistance was quite effective. In the field of peacebuilding Japan wanted to provide its own unique assistance. Peace consolidation and nation-building were the two key words and we were able to concretize these words with actual deeds.

The third point: Japan was quite inventive in trying to create various kinds of assistance. I would like to share with you three specific examples. The first one was also something that happened in Cambodia. When the facilities people do their activities they leave equipment, but of course the local people cannot use it, so they give training to the local residents so that they can actually use the equipment. As an extension, the second point is that in fact when I was there UNMISSET was scheduled to last for two years but because of consolidation it was extended by another year. That was called JEB locally. People appreciated JEB; it was a word that was known to all Timorese. Because of Iraq we were not able to stay for more than three years. We wanted the alumni of the SDF to participate in it and the education and technical training were done by the NGO created by the alumni of the SDF. I think this is still continuing toward the future. In order to expand the power of Japanese international assistance I think that was a good base. In 2004, in the discussion that took place in the Security Council of the UN this point was made by a Japanese representative and attracted attention.

With respect to the third point about Japanese inventiveness or effort, the Japanese NGOs have to be cited. Anywhere in the world in connection with peacebuilding in the initial stages, in the emergency humanitarian assistance, the delivery of goods is the main activity that they are involved in, but in Timor-Leste they were not satisfied with that alone so they stayed there for a long time. They were involved in the welfare and enhancement of the local residents' lives.

Mr. Moderator said earlier on that he heard an interview on the radio with the Japanese person who was there for six years. This lady is actually part of the team, I think. I do not know if I can mention this about her, but in the New Year she sent me a New Year's card via e-mail and she says she has been there for six years but cannot leave. Particularly in May and June last year there were some riots, and her children saw and were traumatized by them. She says she had to do something about it as she was very concerned. I thought she would have to stay longer and her family members in Japan say she should come back to Japan soon, but she has this sense of mission and she is still there. So, Japanese NGOs have been staying there for quite a long time, since the initial emergency humanitarian aid, to stabilize the welfare of the local community. This is yet another aspect that contributed to the great appreciation for Japan.

The fourth point: how should we position Timor-Leste geopolitically? In terms of geography, this is a country that came into being in Southeast Asia and Japan is a major power in this part of the world, so whatever Japan can do should be done to the countries in this part of the world. I think that kind of attitude or mindset was shown and Japan did exactly that in this respect. On this point I would like to give you a footnote later on. At any rate, if we call this a regional issue, an influential regional power has to extend its helping hand otherwise things

would not go in the right direction. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General Kamallesh Sharma directly told me this. When I went there Mr. Akashi, who is a good friend of Mr. Sharma, said, "You have to be careful with him. He knows a lot of things about Japan." He asked me this question: "I do not see any mention of children in Japanese classics. Why?" He is a great intellectual. He is quite insightful, he has a lot of knowledge and he stayed there for two years and intended to retire, but then there was a change of government in his home country and now he is High Commissioner of India in London, the highest post in the foreign service of India. Such a great person as he gave us great points. That was at the time of UNMISSET and maybe since before that.

Japan is a major regional power and Japan started moving and the peacebuilding efforts had a great impetus. I can give you some more proof of that. But, anyway, he said that he intended to stay there for two years and then the third year I was called by Foreign Minister Ramos. He said he and Prime Minister Horta were going to recommend Mr. Hasegawa and that was part of his expectation from Japan. In March 2004 we invited him and he actually came to Japan. There was a hearing in the security committee of the lower house in Japan; if you are interested you can read the minutes. He was then the special representative for UNMISSET for peacebuilding in East Asia. From his perspective, did Japan contribute? He said Japan did contribute and that is mentioned in the minutes.

So, Japan had a role to play and that is what people with the related countries in Asia said. Because Japan moved people realized that the Timor-Leste issue was a regional issue, but since Japan moved we went ahead and acted because of the movement of Japan. Also, Timor-Leste is a sub-region of Southeast Asia sandwiched between Indonesia and Australia. Basically, Indonesia and Australia have to play a larger role, but, because of the political delicacy of the sub-region, Japan can be a stabilizer perhaps. That is the way people look at Japan. I think this was a unique role for Japanese diplomacy and I was quite thankful. This is not well-known in Japan, but in the local community and in the rest of the world this is an episode that shows that Japan played a role.

Moving onto the second point, in May last year we saw what happened. Before then, no matter from what perspective, Timor-Leste was a major success story, but then it was a failure. When I heard that news I thought, as some witnesses had been saying all along, we had to be prepared. Basically the foundation for nation-building was still weak and that was mentioned by Japanese newspapers, but Japan withdrew prematurely. The background to that is, because of power struggles, many things happened, but I think the greatest issue was the dividend of peace was late in coming. That made various problems surface and this is another point that we have to mention.

There were riots in May and June and the young people in Dili inflamed the problem. This was one expression that the dividend of peace was late in coming. Again, immediately after I went there, the government of Timor-Leste advisor policy planners who were engaged in the peacebuilding told me that they were frustrated and wasting their time. They had to create

results sooner rather than later and were under time pressure. This should be considered by the Peacebuilding Commission, which was created by the international community in 1999. After that many leaders went to Timor-Leste and gave words of comfort to local residents. Local people's expectations went up and up. I think this is an issue that we have to consider going forward.

So, why was it a failure? I just gave you a general statement, but to look at it more closely I think there were three main actors. There was also an accomplice—I may exaggerate when I use this word. I think the three actors made mistakes in various ways that led to a failure. As I mentioned at the outset I would like to be provocative in my presentation, so I would like to say boldly: one, the UN; two, the related major countries; three, Timor-Leste. These three parties, when we consider peacebuilding activities, we have to pay attention to what they did. I think we can earn lessons from these.

With respect to the UN first: as you know, there is no definition of peacebuilding among the terminology used by the UN. I looked into it and as working terminology we use this word “peacebuilding,” but there is no consensus as to what it is. Maybe they can work on this at the Peacebuilding Commission, but there is no successful model for peacebuilding. What is a successful case? There is no model, so there is no exit strategy. I think that is one problem.

Yesterday, in the unofficial meeting, we had a big debate. They were thinking about employing an UNTAC-type system; when the election was over the role was over in East Asia in 1999. Immediately before that there was the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was the basis for Timor-Leste, but among the related parties in New York everything would be over after the political elections, but things just continued and continued. There is another reason for this: in long-term commitments perhaps we are giving the country a dependence syndrome, so we should get over this as quickly as possible. I said that that would be wrong. Of course, that would be an ideal but we thought it would be okay and we let it go and then it just fell apart. That is a problem and we have to discuss that, otherwise there can be no exit that can be found for peacebuilding. That is what we discussed yesterday. What is a successful case or model for peacebuilding?

Secondly, we have this issue concerning the major countries. We have so many people from the diplomatic community here in the audience so this is a sensitive issue. I will just tell you what the problem is: for whom are we extending this cooperation for peacebuilding? That is the issue in a nutshell. With respect to the issue concerning the major countries, there is another perspective I would like you to keep in mind. It can be said of all major countries, and what can be said of Japan can be mentioned of the US and Australia in terms of peacebuilding. That is, there has to be a comprehensive response to peacebuilding in three arenas: the people at the frontline have to get correct local information and convey that to the home country and New York. The home country and New York have to get people involved and coordinate according to the information coming from the frontline and the various parts of the



government. New York get information from Tokyo and, based on that information, they have to convey Japan's position to other countries and they have to negotiate. All these people are playing different roles, but these three actors have to play their individual roles, otherwise no good response can come. I was in one of those arenas and I felt a lot of frustration in one way or another. That has to do with the fourth point: lessons and challenges for Japan. That is another way to look at this issue.

The third actor is Timor-Leste. I should not go in depth; we have Ambassador Alves who may explain the details to us. The way I look at it is this: for peacebuilding what are the issues? This country, Timor-Leste, has a lack of experience in peacetime politics. What is peacetime politics? That is rule of law and democracy without using force. You should try to persuade and negotiate in coming to an agreement and realizing things. Unfortunately, whenever these things happen there is conflict. Yesterday we had a discussion in which some people said that power struggles are wrong. I said no, there have always been power struggles in human societies, but the issue is how to have power struggles based on rules, constructively and positively. Whether you can do it or not is an issue, but if you look at Timor-Leste, as far as this point is concerned, there is no basis established. People resort to force to resolve problems: they still have such a mentality. In this connection there are historical conflicts between east and west that are still continuing. From my perspective I have to question that. I have talked with my reliable watchers. This person went to the former Yugoslavia. He says this is a virtual thing and I agree. With respect to national unity or integrity there is still a division structure in Timor-Leste. We should not let the conflict become a reality. Violence should not be a result of it and here I think the international community can play a role. Fortunately, through elections, the conflict will be resolved. How can the international community lend its helping hand?

Maybe I can be a little bit provocative in relaying some episodes. I would like to talk about two more things. About the challenge of "redoing" the peacebuilding process: first of all there are the institutional issues, the systems, and then there is the agenda to deal with. As for the institutions—maybe this can be taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission—there is no clear model. You can look at the resolution: it is very abstract. I think the mandate is very comprehensive, which in itself is fine, but it is abstract and you do not really know what it is talking about. Also, for the mid- to long-term I do not think there is not enough commitment. That is a structural issue which cannot be helped.

There is another thing: when we talk about peacekeeping operations or peacebuilding for a two-year period, it is not operational in the first few months. Of course the troops will have assembled, but in terms of governmental bureaus and technical cooperation I would have to say that you cannot mobilize people immediately. Therefore, even if you say two-year operation, for the first half year or so it is going to start very slowly, so there is a time loss there. I guess this kind of problem cannot be helped, but it does need to be overcome and efforts need to be made in this respect.

When I talk about redoing the peacebuilding, what is it that should be dealt with? I think that is indicated in the mandate: one is that the military and the police have to have a clear division of roles. I think Mr. Akashi has experienced of this in the UN, but in a new country like Timor-Leste you do not really need a military presence initially if you can have security and order in the country. In the case of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste I do not think that originally they had thought about building the national military; rather, they were more focused on a functional police force. However, there were those fighters who had been fighting for independence who had to make a living and therefore maybe this was a kind of dividend of peace. Also, the police force itself actually was building on the former police force from the time of Indonesian rule, so there were deep-rooted historical issues in the background. I would say that the present challenge is how to correct for these difficulties. Then there is the point I mentioned earlier: how can you deliver the dividends of peace quickly?

Now there is oil and natural gas, which is beginning to be explored and I think there are around US\$3 billion of foreign reserves. These should not be wasted. We talk about the “oil curse” and “resource curse,” and we do not want to see that kind of a curse. In this context, that has to do with the younger people who are factors for instability and are a group with risks. How can you incorporate those young people? I think this is as important as the issue of military and police that I mentioned earlier. We have Prof. Yokota here today and later on we would want his comments.

What happened in Timor-Leste? We now say that these are the post-conflict days and there are serious crimes that have been committed. In parallel Timor-Leste is using the methodology of reconciliation, but what about those serious crimes? You have to resolve those serious crimes that were committed and you have to maintain the momentum of reconciliation, too. I would say that this is a very big challenge as well.

The last point: what is the lesson for Japan and what is the challenge for the future? Let me briefly comment on this final point. There are four key aspects.

I became the first ambassador to Timor-Leste and, as Mr. Akashi mentioned, it meant that I had to deal with very broad fields. There were, for example, comprehensive policies, UN and economic cooperation, then you have to deal with the unemployed youth and I even had to deal with cultural exchange. That meant having to deal with a very broad range of issues. So, when discussing these issues with Tokyo, who am I to have had dialogue with? There was not real liaison or command post that I could discuss with. Of course, in the UN there is the concept of the Peacebuilding Commission, but in the Japanese government we did not really have that kind of section, so we have to think about this from here on. The US has a department in the Department of State, I think, which is trying to deal with this kind of issue. As Mr. Akashi said, I think that Japan’s ODA needs to be made more effective. In connection with ODA, how can peacebuilding be utilized? Perhaps something like a Peacebuilding Commission might be required, even in Japan.

The second aspect, which I think Japan has realized and at least Mr. Akashi is making efforts towards: Japan did get credit in Timor-Leste and I think the SDF played a wonderful role. We owe a lot to the SDF for getting this credit, but in the background, in the institution building or core aspect of peacebuilding, we do not have a system to supply the proper human resources to assist in this respect. At the time of UNMISET 300 positions were filled by foreign consultants to create institutions. The Japanese filled only a few of those 300 positions. This is similar to what happened in Japan in the Meiji era when we also had foreign consultants. Of course there were many reasons for this, and under Mr. Akashi and Mr. Fukuda I think there were some efforts, but I think we need to develop this further. Also in connection with this there is the issue of the civilian police force.

As you know the forms of conflict are changing greatly. Of course peacekeeping SDF contribution is necessary, but along with that, in order to secure order in peacetime, the function of the police force needs to be reinforced. If we can have a system where Japan could cooperate in this respect it would be very helpful. Also, in Timor-Leste the SDF did play a very big role and I think that the SDF force itself had very great fruits, and in Samawah those fruits were reaped. In Samawah the concepts had been learned and then there was implementation and this kind of civilian support was made. How can you have a good relationship with the local community and how can you effect your original role along with the civilian support? In other words, it would be a way to protect yourself. Timor-Leste, in the context of Japan's international contribution, did play a great role. I think that many more people in Japan need to learn about this.

My last point again has to do with our view of peacebuilding, which I think is a blind spot. What is the political role of peacebuilding? I am not comparing the past and the present, but there are journalists who have followed Timor-Leste for a long time and, in the past year or so, they have viewed Japan's involvement in Timor-Leste and they say they do not see the political involvement. In the struggle in June last year I may have felt that. It is not that Japan has not done anything—it has taken many measures—but perhaps the response to the media was not very good. We are not here to debate that issue. Rather, how can Japan's capabilities be demonstrated in the form of political involvement? Japan has diplomatic political assets in Timor-Leste and I think they are being underutilized, as is being indicated by some people. In my view, there are many more things that can be done politically. For example while I was ambassador, when we think about future stability, though it did not go too well, there was the issue of the serious crimes that were committed. How can Indonesia be engaged in this process more constructively? I think Japan could have played a bigger role in this respect, for Indonesia's sake, too. That was something that I felt. Also, what happened in May last year, although this may have been a field where Japan could not directly involve itself. But, there is the non-military soft power that can be utilized to come up with political results.

I think there is more interest now in the political process of Timor-Leste now there will be elections. How can the political process be facilitated? What can Japan's role be? I think we are pursuing this right now. I think that Japan still has great political assets in Timor-Leste, so

we can use those to the fullest to be of use to the country.

I said at the outset that I wanted to talk about five main issues. I have taken up so much time already so I will stop at point number four. During the Q&A session if I have the opportunity then I will touch upon the fifth item that I wanted to speak about today. Thank you very much. Sorry to ramble on and on, I would like to close my presentation there. Thank you.

## Part II

Prof. Toshiya Hoshino  
Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Thank you for the introduction. I am with the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. Many of you may know me as a professor at Osaka University, but in August I took up this position. When I was teaching at the university I was mostly talking about international security and peace activities, or peacebuilding of the UN and doing research, but now I am in practice and I am also centrally in charge of this newly-built Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). We heard from Ambassador Alves about the situation in Timor-Leste. We also heard from Ambassador Asahi, as well as Maj. Gen. Ogawa, about the activities of Japan in Timor-Leste.

In the future, from hereon, what should we do? I think that is probably what you are interested in, therefore I would like mainly to talk about that topic: the road to stability for Timor-Leste, what the UN can do, and what the role of Japan should be.

Probably many of you have questions and comments, so I would like to try to be as brief as possible and then I would like to entertain your questions or comments and respond to them.

Ambassador Asahi talked about the UN and the fact that the definition of peacebuilding is not unified and there is no model for peacebuilding as yet, *per se*. I believe that is probably so, however, at the Peacebuilding Commission we are making efforts right now. What are those efforts? We would like to create such a model, in other words. All conflicts have their own unique background and have their own structure of power, therefore we cannot apply one pattern to all cases. I think it would be impossible to apply one model to all cases. Having said that, we can still have some model to follow.

The Peacebuilding Commission has been established and various discussions are taking place. There is an organizational committee to conduct organizational discussions. Already Burundi and Sierra Leone have been target countries so that these countries can be supported towards peacebuilding. Right now we are going through lots of trial and error to that end. Actually, for the first half year, from June last year to December, we were going on an ad hoc basis. From about January we entered the next phase. It is true that it has been rather haphazard, but gradually I think we are beginning to see the shaping of some model or other.

The fact that peacebuilding is important is not argued by people. The Japanese government, other countries in the UN, the World Bank: every player is supporting peacebuilding. However, the efforts are rather distributed so we want to have a more systematic approach. I think that is the challenge that has been given to the Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate.

I have to mention a proviso at the outset: the Peacebuilding Commission has just been

established and we are still going through trial and error. We are trying to support systematic peacebuilding on the basis of our best efforts and we are conducting very interesting activities, but there are all kinds of peacebuilding efforts that are taking place in the world right now and if you think that we are involved in all those efforts, that is not the case. We are not that broadly dispersed. The biggest challenge is that there is such high expectations toward us that we are doing this great activity. As part of the Japanese government and the Peacebuilding Commission I myself am trying to make an intellectual or actual contribution towards peacebuilding. We want to have something like a systematic model established. This Peacebuilding Commission model in the future could be utilized in various areas. Right now we are focusing on Burundi and Sierra Leone so that these two nations can somehow be stabilized. Today we are going through an interesting intellectual exercise, that is, we have the framework of this Peacebuilding Commission and we have the case of Timor-Leste, and if we apply Timor-Leste to this framework can we promise the road to stabilization?

Today was a learning experience for me. Ambassador Alves gave a very vivid explanation of the challenges for the country. Listening to what he said I felt that if Timor-Leste became one of the target countries for the Peacebuilding Commission then there could be some success or added value. That is the feeling that I got listening to the presentation. The reason for that will be explained in my talk.

As to the history of the Peacebuilding Commission and the background, I do not think we have time today, so I will skip over that. I would rather talk about what kind of model we are aiming at. I will give you the up to date talk which is indicated here.

This is the work plan for the nations. The activities of the Peacebuilding Commission are basically taking place in New York. However, what we aim for is for peacebuilding to be promoted in the actual country. That is so the conflict is not rekindled, so that peace will be consolidated, and that regular development projects can take place.

We look at this in various phases. In the first phase the target country and its biggest challenges are considered. At the very least the priorities need to be determined. We would want to prevent another conflict, so we would want to find the priorities to prevent that from happening. To do that there has to be input from the field, which will be very important. In the Peacebuilding Commission in October and December last year there were country-specific meetings about Burundi and Sierra Leone. All the relevant actors were assembled there to consider what the priorities and challenges were to consolidating peace in those countries.

With regard to Burundi it would be, for example, the issue of governance or the security sector or community development. It might sound like it is not related to peace, but actually these are where the issues lie, it seems. For Sierra Leone, young people and unemployment actually lead to a lot of instability and unless you do something about that the elections scheduled for July will not go smoothly. That might lead to the worsening of the situation in Sierra Leone. So that the country can shift gears there are certain key points that have to be identified

and tackled. That is the first phase. Then, after that there have been various activities that have been taking place separately. All of those activities need to be aligned in one direction. We call that an Integrated Peace Building Strategy (IPBS). Actually, the World Bank has a poverty reduction strategy paper and already conducts a poverty reduction strategy in the field. There are the development plans of each country or programs for humanitarian aid. So, already there are various programs that are in place, however the focus might be development, or the focus might be poverty reduction, or it might be human rights, or it might be population issues. Everything is taking place in a disparate manner.

In Sierra Leone, for example, youth unemployment might not be studied sufficiently so, in terms of priorities, if there is such an issue then this kind of IPBS could be constructed. In order to do that there are discussions by theme, we look at other countries and try and learn lessons from them. Then, in phase three, based on the strategy there will be activities implemented but on the way you need to have reviews and make some adjustments.

At any rate, the priorities have to be to a certain extent fixed and concrete and then there has to be an integrated strategy to respond to those priority issues, and then implementation. For implementation, if you look at the right where it says the country, there needs to be a mechanism where there can be consultation with the country. That will be made in parallel so that the strategy can be implemented in a sure way. New York and the country have to be linked. Therefore there will be a secretariat who will be acting as a coordinator. You could have discussions in New York, but it is very difficult to find out what is actually happening on the ground, so the PBC member country would go to Sierra Leone or Burundi; those visits are also in the plans.

Along with the establishment of the PBC there was also a special fund that was established. Japan has already contributed US\$20 million. That fund will be utilized for the sake of the target country. Along with what is actually taking place in a certain country we look at what the important issues are and we would want to deal with them, otherwise it could revert back to conflict. We want to create a strategy to prevent that from happening. That would be the big picture.

Today we heard from Ambassador Alves and Ambassador Asahi and Maj. Gen. Ogawa about what is taking place in Timor-Leste. What can I say about that? Well, already to a certain extent I think peacebuilding has been proceeding. I am not saying that everything is complete, but there is the truth and reconciliation commission activity and there is the *Chega*, which is the 2,000-page report that was mentioned. These efforts are key here. As Major Ogawa mentioned, there is the infrastructure aspect and how that is involved with peace. Without infrastructure you cannot have economic activities and that means you cannot have activities for peace. I think this is also very important.

Further, Ambassador Asahi mentioned the activity called the Reintegration, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-Combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT),

which the Japanese government also has been involved in. It includes former troops who, after they have been disarmed, will have a place to work. To a certain extent I think that kind of project is also going forward, so there are already some peacebuilding efforts taking place which need to be reinforced further, but I think this is an aspect that can be evaluated highly.

If Timor-Leste were taken up by the PBC right now, what would be the priorities? If we think about that, having listened to the presentations, there was the mention by Ambassador Alves of the culture of violence: in other words, the issues of organized crime and the capabilities and limitations of the police force. There need to countermeasures to combat crime and also the reinforcement of the security sector—the police—would be a priority. Also, youth unemployment. The youth could be politically manipulated leading to rioting. We would want to prevent that from happening so, like Sierra Leone, measures for the youth could be a priority for peacebuilding.

Also, Ambassador Alves talked about the judiciary system still being weak. In that respect we have Prof. Yozo Yokota who has also been involved with the issue of the serious crimes, so efforts are already underway, but still there are challenges remaining. What about the judiciary in terms of a governance system for the Timor-Leste government?

Ambassador Asahi introduced the woman in the NGO whose children were traumatized because of the rioting. I think, again, dealing with those issues is important, so if the PBC were to take up the case of Timor-Leste then I think those would be the focal input points. After that we would have mapping work. What do I mean? Well, right now, either through the World Bank, bilaterally with other countries, or through the UNPKO, there are activities taking place: to what extent is there coverage? There will be areas that have been missed, so then the peacebuilding fund could be used to try to deal with those gaps then, as a whole, peacebuilding could go forward. In a sense I have simplified matters quite a bit, but today we heard from Ambassador Alves and Ambassador Asahi.

If the Peacebuilding Commission were to take up Timor-Leste, what would happen? You could say that I tried to think about that. What would be the role of Japan if that were to take place? Let me just talk about that aspect.

I think Ambassador Asahi and Major General Ogawa were saying that Japan should be more confident in asserting its own approach. I believe that we should be cognizant of that. If the PBC were to take Timor-Leste up then there would have to be some country that would take the lead. Is it going to be Australia? Is it going to be Indonesia? Or, could it be Japan? When we think about that I think that Japan could play many roles. Actually, this was an opportunity for me to think about that. By the way, in the case of Sierra Leona the lead country is the Netherlands and in the case of Burundi it is Norway that is playing the central role to push the efforts forward. In other words, there has to be some country that acts as a leader to promote this integrated strategy. I think that Japan does have its own role to play.



I am in New York and I am thinking about this right now. When building this IPBS there has to be input from Japan. If this is successful then the strategy of the PBC and the strategy of Japan could be aligned. That means that the role of Japan could become more visible and it would be consistent with the activities of the UN.

If we think about what Japan would emphasize, I think it would be that the peacebuilding process is very comprehensive. Former Prime Minister Koizumi had talked about peace consolidation and nation building, which I think has to do with governance on the nation level. I think that if I analyze as a scholar, there is the human issue and the regional issue. On the human level I am talking about the human security perspective being incorporated. As far as the field is concerned, we are saying that ownership by the country is very important. As we heard from Ambassador Asahi and Ambassador Alves, it is symbolic that Japan tried to be attentive to the needs of the people of Timor-Leste by putting themselves in their shoes. I think that could lead to ownership.

Also, centering around the Minister of Foreign Affairs, there is the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity concept that is being developed. Through these efforts, peacebuilding will not just be institution building by the government, rather it would be focusing on human lives and it would also be emphasizing the views of the local people and could lead to regional security or stability. I would like to end here.

The reason I thought it would be a good idea if Timor-Leste were taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission is that a systematic approach could be possible. Another reason is that, as you will remember Ambassador Alves said at the outset, Timor-Leste became independent but there is the problem of dependence. I think that is important. They understand that there is this dependence and they are trying to get out of this dependence. That is the motivation in the background. In other words, the people of Timor-Leste, including the leaders of Timor-Leste like Ambassador Alves, so long as that is their attitude and if there is systematic support from the Peacebuilding Commission and outside, then I think that they can come up with great progress and success.

I would like to stop here but if there are questions and comments I would like to respond to them too. Thank you very much for your attention.

# UN Peacebuilding Commission and Japan's Assistance for Peacebuilding

**Toshiya Hoshino**  
*Minister-Counsellor*  
*Permanent Mission of Japan to the  
United Nations*

1

## Peacebuilding Needs

- Approx. 80% of countries with a low Human Development Index have experienced some kind of armed conflict at some point in the last 15 years
- 44% of those experience a reoccurrence of conflict within five-years after the conclusion of the initial armed conflict
- Increased risk of reoccurrence of conflict one year after elections



Peacebuilding needs

International efforts

Japan's efforts

(including UN Peacebuilding Commission)

2

## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

- 12/2004 Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel  
*A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*
- 03/2005 Report of the UN Secretary-General  
*In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*
- 09/2005 Agreement to establish PBC included in World Summit Outcome
- 12/2005 At the same time Resolutions passed by General Assembly and Security Council on PBC establishment  
A/60/180 S/RES/1645



Organizational committee (chair: Angola; 31 countries. Japan is a founding member of the grouping of countries that are the largest providers of funds. Other groupings are members of the SC, ECOSOC, General Assembly and TCC)  
Country-specific meetings take place (Sierra Leone and Burundi are considered as candidate countries)

→ 06/2006 operations begin

3

## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

- Type of organization (OP1): Intergovernmental advisory body
- Main purposes of the PBC (OP2): Engaging in post-conflict peacebuilding:
  - a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
  - b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and
  - c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to postconflict recovery.


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## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

- The PBC:
  - is an advisory body
  - concentrates on post-conflict situations
  - focuses on "gaps"
  - emphasizes integrated strategy
  - utilizes the "Peacebuilding Fund"
  - is a convening power for all relevant actors
- The PBC:
  - does not implement projects
  - does not have "conflict prevention" in its mandate
  - focuses on the SPM stage following PKO activities
  - focuses on "added value"
  - but is not another aid organization
  - is focused on "on-site" activities and the NAM is negative about World Bank/IMF participation in the Organizational Committee

5

## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)



6

## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

- **Potential of the PBC**
  - Emphasis on “package” (security+development+human rights)
  - Emphasis on integrated strategy (Civil-military Coordination)
  - “Compact” vision (Nurturing awareness of joint responsibility and commitment)
  - Desire to share experiences

↓

Affirmation of recognition of a results-oriented on-site policy (←public debate in UNSC and GA)
- **Challenges for PBC**
  - Excessive expectations: PBC activities do not include all peacebuilding support (only “forgotten cases”)
  - Is existing strategy insufficient?
  - Perpetuation of traditional UN politics (Donors vs. NAM; procedural matters; regional balance, etc.)
  - What is the “Fund” ultimately for?
  - Debate is focused in NY


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What kind of impact does the PBC have on the ground?

7

## UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

- Country-specific “work plan” model



8

# Japan's Assistance for Peacebuilding

**Peacebuilding = consolidation of peace + nation building**  
**(Promotion of peace processes, ensuring law and order and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance) (creation of political, economic and social frameworks)**



**Person-to-person level: "Human security" approach**  
 +  
**Regional level: Agreement towards formation of "arc of freedom and prosperity"**  
 +  
 Local level: Respect for ownership (including international ownership)



Economic cooperation + Human contribution + knowledge contribution

+ HR development

9

# Japan's Assistance for Peacebuilding

- **Results:**
  - Comprehensive assistance in Cambodia (political/officials/economic and social, and governance)**
  - Provision of officials, humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance in Timor L'este**
  - Support for Sri Lankan peace process and yen loans**
  - Consolidation of peace initiative in Afghanistan (Special Measures Law provides for assistance for peace process, law and order, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance)**
  - Support for a dual track process in Iraq (ODA + Self-Defense Forces assistance) (Special Measures Law)**
  - Participation in international observation mission in Mindanao (development experts)**



- **For Japan, as a peaceful country, assistance for peacebuilding activities is a policy for further expanding the number of peaceful countries**

10

## Part II

### Major General Shoichi Ogawa Commanding General, 4th Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force

Hello ladies and gentlemen, my name is Ogawa. I was the head of the 4<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade. I was there in 2005 and would like to share with you my experiences.

There is a group consisting of 500-1,000 engineers and civil engineers, who are called “facilities engineers” in Japan. But of course what are called “engineers” in the US are called *kouheitai* in Japan. When I was in Hokkaido I was very interested so I was assigned to this group. After that I have been in Okubo in Kyoto. I am head of a group of engineers: a group is two or three brigades. The reason I explain this is that 15 years ago when the Cambodian PKO started, a major brigade of engineers was dispatched and this was formulated in Okubo, Kyoto. That is the historical background. Mr. Akashi’s children are still there. We learned from him and then these people are sent to Timor-Leste. Also, the children of Mr. de Mello, who was killed in Iraq, and Mr. Akashi’s children were among us. These people went to Timor-Leste. Mr. de Mello was a special representative there and when I was there we were very close friends and I felt we should not let this fail.

Of course, the former military was mentioned, but Mr. de Mello and President Xanana Gusmão said in front of the press, “We welcome the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF).” They said that they were convinced that the Japanese SDF would be engaging in their activities with discipline. From February 2002 for six or seven months the first team was there, and then the second, third, and fourth. Altogether 2,000 people were there for two years. I would like to explain this to you. I cannot be as articulate as Ambassador Asahi so I would like to show you some pictures as I make my presentation. Our mission was reconstruction, so first of all I would like to explain to you the infrastructure. Those of you who were there know, but I would like first of all to explain the situation of the infrastructure.

First of all, about roads: In Timor-Leste there are about 500km of roads. The blue lines indicate the ones that you can really pass. We were part of the UN mission, but the roads are of course for the local residents and also UN people. This was one of the most important missions because this was for the development of the country. Ambassador Alvez mentioned that the infrastructure was in disarray, so you would see this kind of situation on roads.

This is a cliff. There are no guard rails, so you would see this kind of cross all over the place. This is a cliff that leads to the sea. I was shooting these on a jeep. You have to repair this kind of a road. What I would like to emphasize here is that beyond this mountain, south of Dili, there is Alieu and Ainaro. This is the path that leads to that place. The lady that was mentioned is in Ainaro I think. There is a souvenir shop called Sakaya. Weaving is taught and they were giving training to put that on a commercial basis. Actually our unit was located beyond the mountains, so we were transporting fuels and food. That is why we had this convoy of

trucks. If you fall, you would fall down this cliff. This woman was working very hard and we felt that the Japanese NGOs were wonderful. We had supplies from the UN, but in the initial stage when we asked for food it took us a month before we got it, so we had to transport it for ourselves. We kept eating retort food but during this time the NGO people who were here brought us some delicious food, for which we were grateful. This was a difficult place, even for SDF personnel, but there was this Japanese woman who was working very hard there. The bridges were destroyed, you could not pass over the bridges, so we had to go through rivers.

This was created by Australian forces. Because of a lack of materials, you put stones in the fence and then, because of the rain and so on, it gets destroyed. We usually go on this kind of a road slowly in Japan, but people would roar through. Armored vehicles might pass; this is a taxi in fact. Taxis also use this kind of infrastructure. So, for the UN and for local residents we worked enormously hard.

I would like to explain to you about formation and equipment. With respect to formation: this is Dili, this is Maliana, this is Suai, and this is Oecussi in the exclave. There were from 100 to 300 people. We were quite broadly distributed. From Dili to Suai we had to transport fuel and food. We also had to go near the cliffs.

Let me now show you some equipment. This is a small bulldozer. We usually use larger bulldozers but it would have been meaningless as we could not transport this kind of large bulldozer on the road, so the government permitted us to purchase this smaller kind of bulldozer. Of course if we took this there, we had to get it back home, but if the situation allowed the Japanese government to present this to the local government then we could transfer it and just leave it there. That was also something that we had in mind. That is why we purchased a small one that could be used by local people and repaired in a local garage. This is a medium-sized bulldozer. This is an ambulance. This is not a SDF ambulance. We thought that this would be of help to local people after our withdrawal. If the negotiations were not successful we would bring it back home. I learned later on that eventually we left it there and gave it to the local people.

This is a hydraulic excavator. You see it has tires; usually they have caterpillars, which would be very difficult to run. This is easier to use in the local situation. This is a crane, something that we took there. We also took dump trucks with us. These are not according to specifications of the SDF. These are smaller and easier to use and can be left to the local people.

Transportation: this is a private-sector aircraft and lastly a hovercraft. That is a craft of the Maritime Self Defense Force. There is a port in Dili, but there are no other ports aside from Dili. Without a port it would be very difficult to land these bulldozers and so on, so we used this hovercraft to carry them to the shore.

Suai village has only 2,000 residents. We were wondering, "What happened to school?" The school is off in the morning so the children came to see us. This kind of vessel can be



offloaded in Dili.

Now, with respect to our peace cooperation activities: these are the roads and bridges. Roads had to be maintained and repaired 24 hours a day. In emergency situations the SDF is deployed at any time in the day. We had to be dispatched to help to repair and maintain roads and bridges. This may be difficult to see, but near the borders, on the right-hand side there is less and less.

At that time the first Timor national army battalion was created and was in operation, so we were operating in the deeper areas. The second mission was water. The UN was maintaining and operating water stations. We took over that job. Because of a lack of water, other than civil engineering we were also in charge of water supply activities.

Next, this is the general public assistance. This is the transportation of the affected people. There was confusion in the eastern part and there were some people who escaped to West Timor. Because things settled there were many people coming back from West Timor to Timor-Leste, so we had to create accommodation: a tent village, if you will. UNHCR developed the land and the houses were built, then we transported people so that they could be accommodated in these houses. Other than this, as was mentioned by Ambassador Asahi, cultural exchanges with children and sport exchanges were needed. We actually did not think about this in the beginning, but we did it on an emergency basis.

We asked for music players and I was scolded because I was told there was no need, but we thought they were needed for children so we took some music players. These are cooks during the day, but these are actually the music players and on a volunteer basis they played the trumpet and so on. At night we held 20 or 30 concerts in our activities for cultural exchanges for children. This was again part of our assistance to the general public.

Let me explain about the construction situation. This is a village, Ermera. Coffee can be grown in the mountainous area of Ermera. The bridge was destroyed and the people who had to transport the coffee actually had to go down to the bottom of the valley before coming up to the top of the valley, so we tried to construct this bridge. We also reforested the area in Maliana and Bobonaro. In the most southern part of Suai where the roads were narrow, we enlarged the road.

There is an exclave called Oecussi. As I showed you before we had some 100-strong units and they were also engaged in construction activities. When we were there in May 2002 there was a day to commemorate the independence. President Clinton and other people were to come, so we prepared water stations and toilets for the ceremony.

The last point I want to talk to you about, as was mentioned by Ambassador Asahi, when you repair a road or when you construct a bridge, after 30 or 40 years they will get destroyed. We say nation-building starts with human-resources building so we taught people how to use the

bulldozers and excavators. If you do that then you can just leave the equipment. Of course, we had to withdraw eventually and the bulldozers, cranes, and excavators, if they are left on the ground and become rusty it would be a shame, so we wanted to develop people who could operate these. Then we could leave this equipment. We should give training for operation and the local people should be able to use the equipment. We started with just six people; the second unit gave more training, the number of people increased; the third unit, there were more people; eventually we had 50 people. If you just learn how to use the bulldozer it will become rusty, because you also need to know how to put grease or oil on it, so we also taught these aspects. Also, how to develop the land if there is a cliff, etc.—this type of know-how for civil engineering was also taught to the local people to the extent we could.

We were not well versed in English so we had two interpreters, one from Japanese to English, and one from English to Tetum, the local language, and the message was conveyed. So when we said, “*migi, migi,*” it was translated to “right, right” and when we said “stop!” we were already several meters away. Anyway, we ate together, we ate from the same bowls and we conducted a graduation ceremony. We bought yellow helmets and said, “You are a graduate so I give you this helmet.” This kind of ceremonial thing was done. Mr. Hasegawa said, “This is great! This should be continued.” He was appreciative. After that I do not know what happened to the equipment but I hope this equipment was helpful to the nation-building. All these civil engineering people dined together and acted together in cooperation for the sake of the country.

This is the last picture. We wanted to help the country, we had to prepare, we had to bring everything: hardware, software, and our warm feelings, and that resulted in our effort in Samawah, Iraq. We played music to the local children, we did civil engineering together with the local people, and we measured the fever of children in local hospitals. The Ground Self Defense Forces learned a great deal in Timor-Leste and now we are working together with the world community.

This has been a rather disorganized presentation, thank you for listening.



# International Contribution of the Ground Self-Defense Force

## 1<sup>st</sup> GSDF Engineer Dispatch Group to East Timor Overview of Activities


Shoichi Ogawa, *Major General, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup>  
Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force*  
(Head 1<sup>st</sup> GSDF Engineer Dispatch Group to East Timor)

1



## Infrastructure


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
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


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**Crossing the riverbed due to destroyed bridge: Zumalai**



7




**Ordinary vehicles and armored trucks race down a road which has a collapsed hard shoulder**

8



9



10



## Small bull dozers



### Main data

**Length: approx. 4.3m**

**Width: approx. 2.2m**

**Height: approx. 3.0m**

**Weight: approx. 5.1t**

**Width of dozer  
blade: approx. 2.2m**

11



## Medium bull dozers (13t class)



### Main data

**Length: approx. 4.9m**

**Width: approx. 3.5m**

**Height: approx. 2.7m**

**Weight: approx. 11t**

**Width of dozer  
blade: approx. 3.5m**

12





## Hydraulic shovel (wheeled)



### Main data

**Length: approx. 9.5m**

**Width: approx. 2.5m**

**Height: approx. 3.7m**

**Weight: approx. 18.5t**

**Top speed: approx. 35km/h**

**Bucket volume: approx.  
0.8m**

13



## Truck crane



### Main data

**Length: approx. 11m**

**Width: approx. 2.5m**

**Height: approx. 3.5m**

**Weight: approx. 27t**

**Top speed: approx. 49km/h**

**Largest load: 20t**

14



## Crawler dumpster (material handling vehicle)



### Main data

**Length:** approx. 4.7m

**Width:** approx. 2.2m

**Height:** approx. 2.2m

**Weight:** approx. 5t

**Top speed:** approx. 20km/h

**Largest load:** 3t

**Largest lifting load:**  
approx. 2t

15



## Transfer and shipment




Private-sector vessel

16



17



18



## Major responsibilities



### 2. Maintenance and supply of water sources



Comoro waterworks



Suai waterworks



19



## Major responsibilities



### 3. Civilian assistance

Assistance for transportation of refugees



Establishment of refugee facilities




RSC formation work

20

 **Status of work in Dili area** 


**Ermera bridge project**  
**September 1 to 13**



21

 **Status of work in Maliana area** 

**Road maintenance and repair: project name "Rausu"**  
**May 5 to August 27**



22



## Status of work in Suai area



### SPOD work

June 24 to September 3



23



## Status of work in Oecussi area



Road maintenance and  
repair between Tumin and  
Passabe May 3 to 16



24



## Work related to independence commemorations



### Construction of water supply facilities at ceremony venue (April 16 to May 14)



### Development of facilities at Comoro Airport (April 22 to May 16)



25



## Training for operation of facilities and equipment



### 1. Background

Through coordination with the communications and public works Ministry and UNMISSET (engineering division and facilities section) agreement was reached on the provision of training for operation of facilities and equipment

### 2. Period

July 29 to beginning September

### 3. Trainees

6 officials from East Timor govt.

### 4. Equipment for training

Bulldozers, hydraulic shovel



26



## Training for operation of facilities and equipment



**Speech by Special Representative of the Secretary General in East Timor Mr. Sukehiro Hasegawa**



**Practical training on work to improve the riverbed of the Camea River**

27



28





