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China's UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy: Analysis of the Factors behind the Policy Shift toward Active Engagement*

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China's rise has been a focus of interest and concern for a number of years now. Since the turn of the century, activities of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter "China") at both the state and private levels have expanded with astonishing speed, and Chinese influence has spread rapidly on a global scale. At the same time, the Chinese government's decision-making process remains far from transparent, and in many cases the intentions and the interests behind these policy decisions and their implementation remain unclear.

The typical important case is decision-making process of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Its decision-making and conduct is extremely difficult to understand from the outside, while the organization has a huge impact on the wider world. The decision to take part in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), bringing remarkable changes to China's relations with the outside world, is a strategic move requiring decisions and coordination at the highest levels, in particular with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security (police). In order to understand the true nature of China's rise, we need to keep studying such examples to explain why and how China has made such policy decisions and the ways in which it puts them into practice.

After many years of standoffishness, China sent a team of civilian personnel to Namibia in 1989 and a military engineer unit and military observers to Cambodia in 1992. Following a brief subsequent lull, China has shifted toward especially active PKO policy starting with the mission to East Timor in 2000. As Tables 1 and 2 later reveal, Chinese engagement in peacekeeping activities has increased with remarkable speed.

Most previous studies of China's PKO activities carried out prior to this current phase of active engagement tend to focus on explanations for China's noncommittal, conservative attitude to participation.¹ Studies published since the current phase began have generally attempted to explain why this change took place, as it is summarized in Table 3 further below. But while these explanations are generally persuasive in showing how UNPKO contribute to China's national interest in a broad sense (as it is further

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explained below), they do not always provide a fully satisfactory answer to the question of why Chinese policy suddenly underwent such a sudden and dramatic shift.

What was the background to China's sudden policy shift and what were the strategic intentions behind it? What factors encouraged this change and what factors mitigated against it? What is China's actual participation in PKO, what are its chief characteristics, and why did China's PKO policy so suddenly changed in the early years of the present century? This chapter aims to provide preliminary answers to these and other related questions, drawing primarily on previous research in China.

I. China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping

1. From opposition to detached observation, then to understanding and support

In the years before 1971, when the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) held China's seat at the UN, relations between China and the UN were especially poor. In the 1950s and 1960s, China opposed the UN as "the docile special detachments of the international gendarmerie of US imperialism."² This attitude dated to the time of the Korean War, when Chinese support for North Korea put China in a state of undeclared war with the United States and other members of the UN forces.

As a consequence, prior to acquiring the right of representation in the UN, China took a position of outright opposition to all ten UNPKO missions, denouncing them as "invasions" by the UN or as "tools of US neo-colonialism." When Indonesia announced its withdrawal from the UN in 1965, China supported its move and spoke out strongly against the idea of the UN Peacekeeping Forces. This response also was because, excluded from the UN itself, China was antagonistic to the organization.³

China's attitudes toward the UN began to change after 1971, when the Chinese Government took over ROC's seat at the UN following its rapprochement with the United States.⁴ But China's position on UN peacekeeping did not change immediately to that of support. The new attitude was first manifested in China's decision not to exercise its veto. During the three peacekeeping operations that took place in the 1970s, China continued to insist on respect for the principles of state sovereignty. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it abstained from voting on PKO issues and refused to support any such operations financially. In China this is referred to as the "detached observer" phase.

But this period also saw the emergence of a new tone in Chinese descriptions of UN peacekeeping. UN forces were no longer dismissed as "international gendarmerie of US imperialism." Instead, there was an acknowledgment of the fact that "peaceful qualities had appeared" under "the cooperative joint efforts of the world's progressive forces."⁵ Since it is improbable that UN peacekeeping itself had changed significantly, it is safe to assume that this new rhetoric was the result of a change in perception or at least publicly expressed opinion within China as a result of improved relations with the United States and the UN.⁶

China shifted toward support for UNPKO in the 1980s.⁷ The period from the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in December 1978 to the 12th National Congress of the CCP in September 1982 was a period of "strategic adjustment" in Chinese foreign policy, bringing greater openness to the outside world and accelerating the pace at which China joined international system and international frameworks.⁸ In 1979, China started receiving assistance from UN organizations, and Chinese representatives started to serve on UN Commission on Human Rights in 1981.⁹

China's decision to adopt a "flexible position" on UNPKO in November 1981 and issue a statement on its "conditional support" resulted from these changes underway in China itself and in its relationship with the outside world.¹⁰ In December that year, China decided to provide financial support for UN peacekeeping, and asked the UN to accept payment of its share of PKO-related expenses, which had been unpaid since 1971. China also voted in favor of a proposal to send additional troops to Cyprus. This was the first time China had supported any motion bill related to UNPKO.

In 1984 China commended the UN for its peacekeeping ability, and proposed Seven Principles on peacekeeping operations.¹¹ Continuing to adhere to the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, the Seven Principles represented a preparatory step in the direction of China's own full participation in UNPKO. It is notable that some aspects of the Seven Principles, at least in terms of wording, continued into the new millennium when China was actively engaged in peacekeeping efforts. It is therefore possible to discern considerable continuities in the statements of the Chinese government all the way from the 1980s into the twenty-first century.

In September 1988, China praised UNPKO for the first time as having "received the universal praise and support of the international community," and almost at the same time communicated to the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations its intention to contribute to UN peacekeeping, and was duly accepted as a member of the Committee.¹² China seems to have been cautiously seeking a way to become involved in UN peacekeeping activities during the 1980s.

2. Early participation in UN peacekeeping

In November 1989, for the first time the Chinese government dispatched 20 civilian officers to join the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to support Namibian independence.¹³ Often this is not mentioned in China's national defense white papers or other official publications. Probably this is because no military personnel took part. Apart from academic papers based on the sources of that time, there are few references to this first involvement by the Chinese authorities or Chinese scholars.

As a result, China often refers to its decision to send military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in April 1990 as the beginning of its involvement in peacekeeping operations. China also sent military observers to the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in April 1991 and to the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in September 1991.

In April 1992, China responded to a request from the UN Secretary-General and sent 47 military observers and a unit of 400 military engineers to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Including the precursor to this mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), China continued participating for a period of one year and nine months.

Policy shift to send PLA troops to participate in UNPKO probably represented an implementation of a previously established policy. While China was sending a division unit of engineers to Cambodia, Qian Qicshen, foreign minister and member of the State Council, said: "The UN has a duty to maintain peace, and may dispatch peacekeeping forces, but these troops must not interfere in a state's internal affairs. The UN must not become a supranational organization that starts to intervene in various places around the

world . . . China is participating in UNPKO, but will not join any such peacekeeping forces. This is China's policy,"¹⁴ making clear that China rejected the possibility of taking part in peacekeeping forces that went beyond self-defense to interfere in the internal affairs of the nation in question. It is possible to see a similar strategy continuing into the 2000s, and China's PKO policy since Qian Qichen's statement shows strong continuities. Nevertheless, there were political reasons why China's first operation was in Cambodia. As a country that had supported the Khmer Rouge and sought to contain the Vietnam-backed government of Heng Samrin, even to the extent of fighting the Sino-Vietnamese War, China was an indispensable player in the Cambodian peace process. China needed to contribute to UNPKO, which supported the general election in Cambodia that was to be an important turning point in Southeast Asia. In the international community there was a widespread feeling that peace in Cambodia would be difficult to achieve without Chinese involvement.

Chinese participation in UNPKO was also significant as a way for China to emerge from the international isolation that had resulted from the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in June 1989.¹⁵ As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China was able to exercise a veto over any particular proposal whenever necessary, and was able to exert influence over other countries by hinting that it might use its veto. And in contrary, by taking part in peacekeeping operations, it could earn respect from the countries involved. In either way, Chinese engagement in the PKO decision-making and implementation builds a give-and-take relationship with other countries. It also seems likely that China sought to rehabilitate the image of the PLA by sending its troops to Cambodia after the armed suppression of the pro-democracy movement.

3. Opposition to humanitarian intervention and preparations for active engagement

From the 1990s on, China gave priority to UNPKO as a "pillar of world peace."¹⁶ However, this did not mark a sudden shift to sending large numbers of troops to participate in UN missions. One chief reason was that the nature of UNPKO was changing. In June 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace*,¹⁷ in which he argued that in the future the UN should work actively to achieve world peace, suggesting concepts such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. Of these, the idea of "peace enforcement" in particular clashed with China's Seven Principles, which stressed the importance of noninterference in state sovereignty.

In October 1993 a multinational taskforce made up largely of US troops that had intervened in the civil war in Somalia incurred heavy casualties in Mogadishu and thus UNPKO troops were forced to withdraw. In August and September 1995, NATO forces carried out an extensive air campaign in Serbia in the former Yugoslavia with the purpose of defending the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to respond to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this way, UNPROFOR sought to enforce peace process. US and European forces thus came to play a central role in pushing the idea of humanitarian peace enforcement, and began to put the idea into practice.

There were many critical points in China's emphasis on the inviolability of state sovereignty.¹⁸ China blamed the failure of the UN mission in Somalia on the "illegality" of interfering in internal affairs based on international humanitarianism, and claimed that great power politics were the ulterior motives behind the intervention.¹⁹ At a time when his own country was involved in the United Nations Mission

for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Xu Weidi, research fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies, PLA National Defense University, criticized the mission by arguing that peacekeeping was being used as a justification for the armed invasion of sovereign states under the name of “peace enforcement.”²⁰ The main target of the criticism was clearly the United States. It was surely no coincidence that this criticism followed the US demonstration of its readiness to intervene by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups when China threatened to use force against Taiwan during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96.

Just as China had started to send troops to take part in peacekeeping operations, then, it found itself coming under pressure to comply with humanitarian intervention and democracy-inspired peace enforcement, a movement that grew stronger as the Cold War ended. Unable to go along with this new way of thinking, China limited its engagement in UNPKO to sending military observers to the traditional missions in Mozambique, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone (see Table 1).

Following the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in March 1997, China raised its New Security Concept that could serve as a model for a new type of international security relations in the post-Cold War world.²¹ This was proclaimed in the first national defense white paper, published in 1998, which was built around such ideas as Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation and opening up to each other in the economic field, promoting mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation, and solution of conflict by peaceful means.²² This approach provided a logical structure for criticizing the new style of UNPKO that prioritized humanitarianism and human rights over state sovereignty and served as the theoretical backing for China’s support of traditional peacekeeping.

Table 1. Chinese Initial Participation in UNPKO

Name	Acronym	Start date	Chinese participation	Number of personnel
United Nations Transition Assistance Group	UNTAG	April 1989	November 1989–March 1990	20 civilians personnel officers
<i>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</i>	UNTSO	June 1948	April 1990 to present	89 military observers
<i>United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission</i>	UNIKOM	April 1991	April 1991–October 2003	164 military observers
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	September 1991	September 1991 to present	314 military observers
<i>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia)</i>	UNTAC (UNAMIC)	March 1992 (October 1991)	December 1991–September 1993	97 military observers, 800 military engineer unit troops
United Nations Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ	December 1992	June 1993–December 1994	20 military observers
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	UNOMIL	September 1993	November 1993–September 1997	33 military observers
<i>United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan</i>	UNSMA	December 1993	May 1998–January 2000	2 military observers
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone)	UNAMSIL (UNOMSIL)	October 1999 (June 1998)	August 2008–December 2005	37 military observers

Sources: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Baodao Bangongshi, 2008 nian Zhongguo de guofang [China's National Defense in 2008] (Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe, 2009), 102–3; “Past Operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed January 8, 2011, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>; “Current Operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed January 8, 2011, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml>.

Note: All numbers of the dispatched personnel are as of November 30, 2011. The numbers of personnel China has been sending to the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) since February 1992 is not included. Also, while in China's national defense white paper there is no mentioning of personnel dispatch to UNTAG, some private publications refer to 20 persons being sent. Thus, for this case, period of deployment and number of personnel here is based on the author's account (“Wo daibiao zai Lianheguo: Huiyi shang biaoshi Zhongguo yuan wei jiaqiang Lianheguo weichi heping xingdong zuochu nuli [Chinese delegate at UN: Expressed China's willingness for making efforts to enhance UN peacekeeping operations at the conference],” Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], May 13, 1990).

In May 1997 China announced its agreement in principle to participating in the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).²³ China therefore did not merely criticize and oppose the new approach to UNPKO; it also maintained a positive attitude toward UNPKO, and demonstrated its readiness to engage more proactively in the future.

Study and research on the UN, UNPKO in particular, started within China in the 1980s.²⁴ The UN was first included as a topic for study in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986–90), which can be seen as a preparation for the Chinese involvement in PKO that started in 1989. The topic continued to appear in the Eighth Five-Year Plan and in subsequent plans, and, in the 1990s, UN research centers were established at universities including Beijing Language and Culture University, China Foreign Affairs University, Peking University, Renmin University of China, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, progressing dramatically in both quality and quantity. These studies too can be regarded as preparation for active engagement in PKO in the new millennium.

Table 2. Chinese Participation in UNPKO in the Active Engagement Period

Name	Acronym	Start date	Chinese participation	Number of personnel
United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (United Nations Mission in East Timor)	UNMISSET (UNAMET)	May 2002 (June 1999)	January 2000–July 2006	207 civilian police officers
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE	July 2000	October 2000–August 2008	49 military observers
United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH	December 1995	January 2001–January 2002	20 civilian police officers
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUC	December 1999	April 2004–May 2010	101 military observers, 1,962 troops
United Nations Mission in Liberia	UNMIL	October 2003	October 2003 to present	70 military observers, 3,906 troops, 83 civilian police officers
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	UNAMA	August 2006	January 2004–May 2005	3 civilian police officers

Name	Acronym	Start date	Chinese participation	Number of personnel
United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	April 2004	March 2004 to present	33 military observers
United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo	UNMIK	June 1999	April 2004 to present	73 civilian police officers
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	MINUSTAH	June 2004	May 2004 to present	916 civilian police officers
United Nations Operation in Burundi	ONUB	May 2004	June 2004–September 2006	6 military observers
United Nations Mission in Sudan	UNMIS	March 2005	April 2005 to present	88 military observers, 1,740 troops, 47 civilian police officers
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	March 1978	March 2006 to present	24 military observers, 1,187 troops
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT	August 2006	October 2006 to present	7 military observers, 30 civilian police officers
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL	January 2006	November 2007–September 2008	1 military observer
African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UNAMID	July 2007	November 2007	7 military observers, 315 troops
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUSCO	June 2010	June 2010 to present	---

Sources: The same as Table 1 above.

Note: Personnel numbers are cumulative figures as of November 30, 2008. No personnel figures are provided for MONUSCO, which was a successor mission to MONUC.

II. Policy Shift toward Proactive Engagement in UNPKO

1. Dispatch of civilian police

China began to adopt an even more proactive policy on UNPKO from the beginning of the new millennium. The first sign of this approach came with the decision to dispatch civilian police to take part in UN operations. Compared with the PLA, which has large intelligence departments in charge of collecting intelligence from the outside world, the Ministry of Public Security is much more inward-looking, with few members of staff who are conversant in foreign languages. And since civilian police come into contact with the local community in the places they are deployed, their work requires not only English but a range of advanced and complex skills and knowledge including an understanding of government administration in foreign countries. It was also widely expected that public reaction in the event of casualties would be more severe than in the case of the PLA, where some degree of casualties is accepted as an inherent risk of a combat situation.²⁵

In the beginning of 1999, the Ministry for Public Security and related authorities selected talented recruits from around the country. These new hires had to satisfy a number of criteria, including English proficiency, political screening, administrative ability, image (appearance, physical constitution and

posture, grooming), and age. The selected hires were then put on a course of intensive training.²⁶ China's squad of internationally dispatched civilian police officers is trained at the People's Armed Police Force Academy. This belongs to the Ministry of Public Security and was founded on April 24, 1981 with the ratification of the State Council. Following these preparations, China dispatched its first civilian police officers to the PKO in East Timor in January 2001.

After East Timor, it became routine for China to send civilian police to take part in peacekeeping operations. Following Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Afghanistan, China sent its largest number of civilian police officers so far to Haiti. The squad of civilian police that was sent to Haiti in 2004 had gone through more than 20 courses, including instruction on shooting, driving, international law enforcement, riot control, antiriot command, education on the background situation in Haiti, humanitarian aid, and English, in addition to six to ten hours daily military training.²⁷

The level of training for civilian police in China continued to improve. In August 2008, China established a China United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Civilian Police Training Center, where it started to provide training for civilian police from various Asian countries as well as its own civilian police. Following examinations in English, driving, shooting, physical strength, and an interview assessment, around 120 individuals per session term are selected to enter the school and begin their training.²⁸

In these ways, China seems to be meeting expected standards with regard to the civilian police it sends to UNPKO. Nevertheless, criticism has come from within the police organizations in China. These complaints claim that: (1) there is no domestic law supporting the dispatch of police overseas; (2) the lack of English-speaking law enforcement personnel causes a mismatch between the personnel required by the UN and those being dispatched; (3) the abilities of personnel are too low and are failing to meet requirements; (4) there have been a number of casualties; (5) theoretical research is inadequate; and (6) the mechanism of coordination with other ministries and departments is poor. These complaints make it clear that the sudden decision to send police personnel overseas has caused a substantial burden for the organization.²⁹


2. Expansion of the deployment scale

Another major change that took place during the first decade of the twenty-first century was that China rapidly increased its contributions to peacekeeping operations, sending large numbers of PLA troops. In August 2000, China confirmed that in the Brahimi Report³⁰ the direction of UNPKO had undergone an extensive review since Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* and become something much less assertive and less aggressive in its support of peace enforcement. China supported the Brahimi Report, showing an attitude quite different from the opposition it had shown to the Boutros-Ghali's report.³¹ Then at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, China called a meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council at which it confirmed that it would abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter.³² In this way, China had set the stage for its proactive engagement in UNPKO.

Starting in 1998, with the single exception of proposals to extend the mission in Kosovo because of the Taiwan issue, as explained below, China no longer opposed any motions on UNPKO. As a result, all motions for UNPKO since 2000 have passed the Security Council.³³ This made China's positive attitude toward peacekeeping clearer.


Regarding China’s UNPKO policy, it has been revealed that “relevant divisions within each department under the authority of the Central Military Commission organize and carry out individual concrete measures,”³⁴ but the precise decision-making process remains unclear. On policy enforcement level, in 2001 China set up a Peacekeeping Affairs Office to take overall responsibility for the management and dispatch of Chinese troops and PKO personnel. In 2002, China became a member of the UNSAS Level 1, with a UN Standard Engineering Battalion on permanent standby.³⁵

Figure 1. Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UNPKO



Source: “Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed January 10, 2011, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf>.

Figure 2. Top 20 Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget



Source: The same as Figure 1.

As of November 30, 2008, China participated in 23 UN peacekeeping missions, involving 2,157 persons at any one time, for a cumulative total of 12,433 troops and civilian police.³⁶ Of the uniformed personnel sent on UN missions to date, China has suffered 16 fatalities (including 8 in the Haiti earthquake) and several dozen other casualties. The sudden expansion in the scale of China’s involvement and the rapid increase in the number of dispatched troops are likely to have caused a substantial burden for the PLA and the Ministry of Public Security.

China’s share of the costs of UNPKO has also risen from 0.9 percent in 1998–2000 to 1.91 percent in 2001–03,³⁷ reaching 3.94 percent in 2010, making China the seventh-largest contributor (see Figure 2). The number of China’s dispatched personnel now exceeds 2,000, making it the biggest contributor of

personnel among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Only China, France, and Italy number among the top 20 countries in terms of both fiscal and personnel contributions.³⁸ Judging from the above two characteristics, China’s engagement in PKO has reached the level of expectations from international community to a major power.

Although China’s troop contributions have been limited to engineers, medical teams, and combat service support, the size of the forces dispatched means that the PLA is rapidly acquiring organizational familiarity and expertise on UN peacekeeping, and is being increasingly appreciated by the UN side. A sign of this came in August 2007, when Major General Zhao Jingmin became the first Chinese national to be appointed to the military head of a UN mission, becoming Force Commander for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).³⁹

Training military observers is the responsibility of the PLA University of International Relations in Nanjing under the Intelligence Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA, although it is unclear when this institution was founded. Students recommended by each department undergo tests in English, knowledge of UN peacekeeping, emergency response measures, and vehicle driving. Selected candidates undergo training for 90 days.⁴⁰

III. Main Factors for the Policy Shift in Favor of Active Engagement

1. Accelerating and restraining factors

Further, the author wants to analyze the factors that have spurred China to take part in UNPKO. How does sending personnel contribute to China’s national interest and the interests of the international community? Table 3 shows a digest of some of the main lines of argument put forward in China, Taiwan, and the United States regarding the benefits China obtains by participating in UNPKO, and the motivations for Chinese participation.

Table 3. Debates on the gains acquired from China’s participation in UNPKO

	International Interests	“Soft” National Interests	“Hard” National Interests
(1)	Accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter		
(2)	Responsibility as a great power	International stability contributes to China’s national security China integrated into international security mechanisms	
(3)	Stronger international security cooperation	Improvement in China’s international standing Increased exchanges with foreign militaries	Boost to quality of Chinese military personnel
(4)	Pursuit of international peace and stability	Advancement of diplomatic strategy of China playing an active role in global politics	Beneficial to China’s military exchanges, speeding modernization

	International Interests	“Soft” National Interests	“Hard” National Interests
(5)	Responsibility as a great power	China integrated into the international community Helps create an environment beneficial to Chinese development Improves adaptability of Chinese people Improves image of Chinese military Counteracts the China threat arguments Demonstrates determination and readiness to become a world peace power	Improves quality and equipment of Chinese military Secures overseas interests Containment of Taiwan
(6)	Securing and maintaining international peace	Improves image as a responsible power Improves national security benefits Strengthens security cooperation	Learning from foreign militaries accelerates modernization of Chinese forces
(7)		Improves China’s image as a responsible power PR effect for Chinese military	Learning from foreign militaries, boosts military training
(8)		Improves China’s state image China integrated into international security mechanisms	Expands support in multinational sphere, restricts US one-power politics Secures and maintains sovereignty Restricts Taiwanese independence Protects Chinese people Improves strategic ability of Chinese military Secures resources and markets in Africa
(9)		China integrated into international systems Secures image as responsible power Redefinition of national identity and study to that end	Improves economic strength Resistance to US Containment of Taiwan Training opportunities for Chinese military Protecting overseas interests
(10)		Improves China’s image Improves image of Chinese military and police	Increased influence at UN Increased influence in regional politics Containment of Taiwan Boost to abilities of Chinese military and police Opportunity to learn from foreign militaries Increase of influence commensurate with higher contributions paid

Sources: The table above summarizes the arguments contained in the following publications.

- (1) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Baodao Bangongshi, 2008 nian Zhongguo de guofang [China’s National Defense in 2008], 76.
- (2) Tang Yongsheng, “Zhongguo yu Lianheguo weihe xingdong” [China and UN peacekeeping operations], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics] (no. 9, 2002), 40–43.
- (3) Zhongguo guoji zhanlue xuehui junkong yu caijun yanjiu zhongxin ed., *Dangdai guoji weihe xingdong* [Contemporary International Peacekeeping Operations] (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Chubanshe, 2006), 391–93.
- (4) Wang Xiaonan, “Lun Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe xingdong de yiyi” [An Argument about the Significance of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations], *Bianjiang jingji yu wenhua* [Borderland Economics and Culture], no. 78 (no. 6, 2010), 52–53.
- (5) Zhao Lei, *Jiangou Heping: Zhongguo dui Lianheguo waijiao xingwei de yanjin* [Constructing Peace: The Evolution of China’s Diplomatic Behavior towards the United Nations], 207–13.

- (6) Yang Xi, Huang Liyan, “Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe zhi dongyin fenxi” [An Analysis of China’s Motivation to Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations], *Sheke zongheng* [Social Sciences Review], vol. 22, no. 12 (December 2007), 50–51.
- (7) Guo Hanbing, “Quanli yu yiwu, Zhanlüe yu waijiao, guojia liyi: Zhongguo jiji canyu Lianheguo weihe xingdong de dongyin jixi” [Right and Duty, Strategy and Diplomacy, National Interests: An Analysis of China’s Motivation to Actively Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations], *Jiangsu jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* (Shehui kexue) [Journal of Jiangsu Institute of Education (Social Sciences)], vol. 23, no. 1 (January 2007), 62–63.
- (8) Xiao Lanlan, Sun Xiaofeng, Liu Dayong, “Zhongguo canyu feizhou weihe xingdong de guoji zhanlüe liyi fenxi” [An Analysis of International Strategic Interests for China to Participate in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa], *Haerbin xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Harbin University], vol. 28, no. 10 (October 2007), 25–28.
- (9) Li Junyi, *Biange yu hezuo: Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe xingdong zhi yanjiu* [Change and Cooperation: A Study of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations] (Taipei: Xiuwei Zixun Keji, 2009), 104–23.
- (10) Drew Thompson, “Beijing’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, China Brief, vol. 5, issue 11, May 10, 2005, accessed January 15, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3860#VjMj5rcrLIU.

Coming up with a precise definition for the “national interest” is not easy. For the sake of convenience, the author will discuss the benefits in three categories: “international interest” to describe idealistic aims such as peace and stability in the international community, “soft national interest” that help improve China’s international image, and “hard national interest” for concrete benefits in the political, military, and economic spheres.

Firstly, very few commentators inside and outside of China mention idealistic “international interest.” Moreover, in many cases this discussion is very abstract.⁴¹ China’s national defense white papers are unique in speaking explicitly of this kind of international interest; the majority of other commentators focus on other national interests that prompt China to participate in UNPKO.

Second, there are a great number of references to “soft national interests.” In particular, many authors comment on the importance for China of increasing its contacts with the international community and improving its international image. The large number of works that comment on UNPKO as an activity that improves governance in the international community, hints at the broad consensus within China regarding the country’s previously low international standing, its poor image, or how it was “misunderstood” internationally.

Third, on the subject of “hard national interest,” commentators inside and outside of China refer in quite concrete terms to the benefits of participation in peacekeeping, including the contribution this makes to modernizing the PLA, to containing the United States and Taiwan, securing economic interests abroad, particularly resources and markets in Africa, and expanding Chinese influence in the UN and in the region.

As Tables 1 and 2 show, China has already sent personnel to all parts of the world, including Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. However, there are only six cases so far in which it has dispatched PLA troops: to Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Lebanon, and

Darfur. As this list shows, the main destination for PLA troops on peacekeeping missions has been Africa.

Africa is a region with a large concentration of developing countries, and this basic fact is one reason for the high demand for UN peacekeeping in the region.⁴² However, demand alone does not determine where peacekeeping personnel are sent. Even in the case of the above-mentioned UNSAS, countries retain the right to refuse a request to deploy personnel, so that it is not demand alone that influences the choice of where personnel are sent but also the policies of the country sending them. For example, a look at the list of destinations for peacekeepers from Japan, also a member of the UNSAS (Level 1), is revealing. There are only a few exceptional examples of Japanese involvement in missions in Europe or the Americas, while Africa makes up less than half, and the bulk of personnel are sent to countries in Asia.⁴³ The fact that China has been widely active in Africa is not a simple result of the high demand for peacekeeping forces in that continent, therefore, but results from a deliberate intention in that direction on the part of the supply side.

On the other side of the argument, Zhao Lei, assistant researcher at the Central Party School of the CCP and one of the leading scholars on UNPKO in China, argues that China faces two restraining factors when it takes part in UNPKO: the contradiction between humanitarianism and China's insistence on state sovereignty (as explained below), and limitations in terms of material and human resources.⁴⁴ On the second of these problems, recruiting and training the right kind of personnel is a particularly challenging problem. These two factors help explain why UN peacekeeping veered toward humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and why China expended time on training its personnel.

Some scholars have pointed to the lack of sufficient legal framework for Chinese engagement in PKO. Just as Japan needed to pass legislation to allow the Self-Defense Forces to take part in UNPKO, China too requires legal backing for sending personnel to take part in UN missions. Until now, straightforward orders have been deemed sufficient, but as the instances of military forces operating outside the country increase, growing numbers of specialists have pointed to the inadequacy of current legal provisions to cover these missions. Wang Xinjian of the Legal System Bureau of the Central Military Commission has warned that as things stand the system is likely to cause a stumbling block that will hamper the ability of the PLA to improve overseas military operations ability and could ultimately prevent it from achieving its missions effectively.⁴⁵

2. The sovereignty issue: Strict in theory, flexible in practice

China has consistently opposed the idea of enforcing peace by sending troops into another sovereign state on humanitarian grounds. Additionally, China is basically opposed to sending troops overseas for any purpose other than UN peacekeeping, and even in the case of UN peacekeeping China's position is that it will only support missions on the condition that the country in question is in a state of emergency and has requested peacekeeping personnel be sent, maintaining an extremely cautious attitude on the use of armed force for purposes other than self-defense. Even after 2000, there was no particular change in China's critical attitude toward UNPKO's neglect of state sovereignty. However, China's insistence on the principle of sovereignty should not be taken to mean that it has automatically avoided all politically sensitive UNPKO. Rather, it has acted with flexibility to choose operations in which it has felt able to participate.

China seems to have quite deftly relaxed its own interpretation of the sovereignty principle. Professor Tang Yongsheng of the PLA National Defense University writes that principle alone is not sufficient in dealing with peacekeeping missions, arguing that China needs to deal with reality as well. Tang further adds that it would be wrong to neglect our duty to peace simply because of a tendency toward interventionism in peacekeeping activities.⁴⁶ Professor Wang Yizhou of Peking University, famous as a liberal scholar of international politics, even argues that China should get more involved in UNPKO than before and should actively move ahead with what he calls creative and constructive interference.⁴⁷

An example of the changing balance between the sovereignty principle and moral or humanitarian concerns can be seen in China's participation in UNPKO in Sudan and Darfur. Although in Sudan the ongoing civil war between North and South led to serious human rights infringements, the two sides eventually agreed a peace treaty. In April 2005, on the condition that Sudan's national sovereignty was respected, China agreed to take part in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and actually ended up sending more troops than almost any other country involved.⁴⁸

It seems likely that the Chinese government sought to counteract the arguments from the UN and developed countries calling for China to impose sanctions on the Sudanese government, and was looking to avoid criticism by taking part in UNPKO. Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies explains this change in China's approach as a sign that China felt concerned about the "global interventionism" based on the values of democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism, espoused mainly by Europe and the United States. Thus, it looked to strengthen its engagement in UN peacekeeping activities as a means of "constructive development."⁴⁹

Also in Sudan, in the Darfur region an estimated 300,000 people were killed in incidents of ethnic cleansing in the years following 2003. The Chinese government continued its aid to the Sudanese government, which had been deeply involved in the massacres, even as other countries imposed sanctions and the government became increasingly isolated. China was criticized for its involvement in the exploitation of oil in Sudan and for the fact that the majority of the weapons used in the massacres were made in China, and there were even calls for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics as a result.⁵⁰ To counteract this, China appointed a Special Representative on African Affairs in May 2007 and took a decision to send 275 (later 315) engineers to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).⁵¹ In this way, China independently took a decision to participate in UNPKO, in a case where it might previously had simply shrugged off criticism from the international community.

Another example of the contrast between China's strict adherence to the principle of sovereignty and considerably greater flexibility in practice concerns Taiwan. At first, China took a fundamentalist stance on peacekeeping operations in countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In January 1997, China exercised its veto to block a proposal to send military observers to Guatemala. And in January 1999, when Macedonia signed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China voted against a proposal to extend the mission of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), leading to the withdrawal of that mission. These actions came in for severe criticism from the international community. It has been suggested that a wish to counteract this criticism was one reason why China eventually voted in favor of sending UN peacekeepers to East Timor having initially been opposed to the idea.⁵²

In 2004, China voted in favor of UNPKO in Haiti, and even participated in the mission itself, even though Haiti has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It has been suggested that by participating in UNPKO China was able to forge military ties with Haiti, improving the image of China in Haiti, and “striking a blow against independence-minded elements in Taiwan.”⁵³

In short, in the space of just a few years, then, China has shifted from a position that refused all notions of intervention or interference based on its strict adherence to the sovereignty principle, to a position in which it is now strengthening relations with countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This more flexible approach allows China to avoid international criticism and also allows China to strengthen its position in the country in question, potentially making a future switch in diplomatic allegiance to Beijing more likely. It is clearly an effective change of strategy.

Conclusion

Three observations can be drawn from the analysis in this chapter.

First, the Chinese policy shift during the first decade of the twenty-first century was a result of the consistent strategy in place since 1981. At first glance it may appear that China’s participation in UNPKO marked a sudden change in the new millennium. In fact, however, it was the culmination of ongoing preparations, dating back to China’s initial statement of support for PKO, its issuing of the Seven Principles, its UN study and research programs, training centers, and involvement in the UNSAS. It would be more accurate to note the basic continuities in China’s UNPKO policy than the changes. In the 1990s, with global politics dominated by the United States as sole superpower, the concept of humanitarian intervention was introduced to UNPKO and other military actions. This was also a period in which China faced a difficult situation with regard to Taiwan. Given the additional problem of the insufficient preparedness of the PLA and the Ministry of National Security, policy shift toward active engagement in the 1990s was simply not possible. In some aspects, therefore, policy shift that took place in the first decade of this century was one that ended up being put into effect later than originally planned.

Second, the international situation in which China found itself diplomatically was probably a factor that encouraged such policy shift. UNPKO became a tool to help China break out of the isolation that followed its suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests. China tends to suspend exchanges with countries when relations deteriorate, and frequently cuts off military exchanges in particular.⁵⁴ Considering that bilateral military exchanges between China and the Western countries were more or less broken off following the Tiananmen, the fact that China pushed ahead with its participation in UNPKO in 1989 on schedule or perhaps even ahead of the schedule, represents a significant difference from its usual practice. It is natural to conclude that this was because of the clear benefits in terms of China’s national interest from participating in UNPKO. The NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999 was hard for China to accept, with the Western allies seeming to slight the UN and taking the decision to use military force based on humanitarian justifications. It is undeniable that a desire to curb the Western-led global interventionist movement was part of the background to China’s policy shift. We should probably assume that by engaging itself in UNPKO China sought to intervene in its internal mechanisms and thus exert an influence on the direction of the international community.

Third, changing perceptions of China's national interest played in driving the policy shift. "Hard national interest" considerations including boosting the capabilities of the PLA and police, increasing China's international influence, securing natural resources and other economic benefits in Africa, and containing the United States and Taiwan are sufficient in themselves to explain China's shift to a proactive stance. At the same time, in a China where the soft power ideas of Joseph S. Nye were enjoying something of a vogue, the "soft national interest" claims that China could boost its image as a "responsible great power" by participating in peacekeeping operations were also persuasive. However, scholarly papers published in China make few mentions of international peace and stability or the moral responsibilities of China as a global power. Rather, Chinese scholars tend to explain China's engagement in UNPKO by pointing to the national interest. It is possible to take the view that China's position on UNPKO changed for reasons of practical national interest and that moralistic language was later used to explain this change.

For China, a country that had previously been at odds with the UN and opposed to the international status quo, the changes were enormous. Beginning in the 1980s, China started to pay close attention to UNPKO, formulating a strategy and then rapidly carrying out preparations and shifting its policy to one of active engagement. This was a major undertaking in which not only the lives of the personnel sent to take part were at stake but also the "face," or reputation of the state, something that China takes very seriously. China has sought to maximize its national interest without altering its fundamental principles, exercising flexibility within the confines of those principles and boldly revising the content of its policy to maximize the national interest. It seems unlikely that China will end its policy of active engagement in UNPKO anytime in the foreseeable future, and the international community will not be able to ignore China's views when it comes to carrying out peacekeeping missions. Already some scholars in China are calling for China to shift from being a "participant" in UN peacekeeping to a "leader."⁵⁵

China is a major power that faces a number of serious long-term problems including in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan with the potential to threaten state unity. It also has strong memories of the invasions and infringements on its sovereignty that it suffered in the past. These factors have helped to make China critical of any interference in a state's internal affairs, and have contributed to its insistence on the principle of sovereignty. What kind of UN peacekeeping are we likely to see if China does indeed become a leader? It is difficult to envisage any further relaxation of the requirement that the country in question must give its consent before it will participate in any UN peacekeeping. States under Chinese influence that receive Chinese aid will probably look to China for a decision on whether they should accept UN assistance in the event that they collapse into a state of civil war. We are likely to see a pattern in which such countries become increasingly dependent on China's own national interest. In this sense, China's shift to active engagement in UN peacekeeping could have the effect of bringing the regional order into closer alignment with Chinese interests.

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1. For example, M. Taylor Fravel explains "China's increasingly conservative policy toward UN peacekeeping operations could be explained in terms of Chinese pragmatism," on the grounds that "nontraditional methods of peacekeeping...is not an effective tool of conflict resolution." M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989," *Asian Survey* (vol. 36, no. 11, 1996), 1115.
 2. Zhao Lei, *Jianguo Heping: Zhongguo dui Lianheguo waijiao xingwei de yanjin* [Constructing Peace: The Evolution of China's Diplomatic Behavior toward the United Nations] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshe, 2007), 192–93.

3. Ibid., 193–96.
4. Ibid., 196–97.
5. Ibid., 197.
6. Samuel S. Kim has characterized China's change in policy toward the UN after it gained its seat on the Security Council as a "political and opportunistic approach." Wang Yizhou seeks an explanation in China's insufficient understanding of the UN. Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 216. Wang Yizhou, "Lun Zhongguo waijiao zhuanxing" [An Argument on the Transformation in Chinese Diplomacy], *Xuexi yu tansuo* [Study and Exploration], no. 178 (no. 5, 2008), 61.
7. Zhao Lei, op. cit., 197–99.
8. Men Honghua, "Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe tiaozheng yu Lianheguo waijiao (1949–2009)" [China's International Strategic Adjustment and UN Diplomacy (1949–2009)], in Zhongguo Lianheguo Xiehui, ed., *Zhongguo de Lianheguo waijiao* [China's UN diplomacy] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2009), 32–33. This is seen as a turning point toward an independent foreign policy. For a detailed study of Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy at this time, see Chisako Masuo, *Chūgoku seiji gaikō no tenkanten: Kaikaku kaihō to dokuritsu jishu no taigai seisaku* [Turning Point in Chinese Political Diplomacy: Reform and an Independent Foreign Policy] (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010).
9. Men Honghua, op cit., 34.
10. Zhao Lei, op cit., 197.
11. The Seven Principles are as follows: (1) China supports UNPKO that are in line with the principles of the UN Charter, and recognizes UNPKO as an effective means for the UN to maintain international peace and security. (2) UNPKO must be deployed at the request or with the consent of the country in question and the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the party must be strictly respected. (3) The state and the party in question should cooperate with UNPKO taking full advantage of the time and favorable conditions brought by the PKO to achieve a political solution to the problems. (4) Each PKO must have a clear mandate; no country or party should use PKO for its own private interests or to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. (5) Authorization of PKO lies with the UN Security Council. With respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, General Assembly, and the Secretary-General of the UN should fulfill their responsibilities in accordance with the Charter. (6) The cost of PKO must be shared and borne in a fair and reasonable manner. The cost should be covered, in light of different situations, by way of assessment among member states, voluntary contributions, or by the countries concerned. (7) To strengthen UNPKO, guiding principles and specific measures need to be adopted. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations can work on both aspects. "Wo daibiao zancheng jiaqiang Lianheguo weichi heping de nengli bing chanshu wo dui Lianheguo weichi heping xingdong de lichang" [Chinese Delegate Supports Enhancing UN Peacekeeping Ability and States China's Principles and Positions regarding UNPKO], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], October 17, 1984.
12. Zhao Lei, op cit., 198–99.
13. Ibid., 199.
14. "Qian Qichen jieshou Deguo 'Nanbao' jizhe caifang" [Qian Qichen gave an interview to 'Süddeutsche Zeitung' reporter], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], March 12, 1992.
15. Following Tiananmen, China maintained a low profile and used a combination of policies to regain the favor of the West and slowly return to the international community. Tatsumi Okabe, *Chūgoku no taigai senryaku* [China's Foreign Policy Strategy] (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2002), 218–19.
16. Zhao Lei, op cit., 199.
17. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. UN Doc A/47/277, S/2411, June 17, 1992, accessed January 15, 2011, <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
18. Gu Dexin, "Lianheguo ganyu xingdong yu xianzhang de chongtu" [The Contradiction between UN Intervention and the UN Charter], *Shijie zhengzhi yu jingji* [World Economics and Politics], no. 173 (no. 1, 1994).
19. Xiong Hao, "Cong Suomali weihe xingdong de shibai kan guoji rendao zhuyi ganyu de kunjing" [Examining the Predicament of International Humanitarian Intervention from the Failure of the Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia], *Jingji yu shehui fazhan* [Economic and Social Development], vol. 5, no. 6 (June 2007), 41–43.
20. Xu Weidi, "Yaobai yu panghuang zhong de tansuo: Lianheguo weihe xingdong mianlin de kunnan yu tiaozhan" [Exploration during Vacillation and Hesitation: Difficulties and Challenges UNPKO Facing with], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], no. 297 (no. 5, 2005), 10.
21. David M. Finklestein, *China's New Security Concept: Reading between the Lines* (Alexandria: The CAN Corporation, April

- 1999), 12.
22. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi ed., *Zhongguo zhengfu baipishu (1996–1999) 2* [White papers of the Chinese Government (1996–1999) 2] (Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe, 2000), 348–49.
 23. “Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe dashiji” [A Chronicle of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping], *Renmin Gong’an* [People’s Police], no. 800 (no. 2, 2010), 56.
 24. Zheng Qirong, “Lianheguo yanjiu zai Zhongguo: huigu yu sikao” [UN Studies in China: Reminiscence and Reflection], *Waijiao xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of the Foreign Affairs College] (no. 2, 2002), 18–20.
 25. This became a reality when eight officers died in the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The Chinese government showed exceptional consideration for the fates of these casualties, describing them in the media as “martyrs to the revolution.”
 26. Tang Hongsen, “Lun Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihu heping xingdong” [An Argument for China’s Participation in UNPKOs], *Taipingyang xuebao* [Pacific Journal], vol. 13, no. 3 (2005), 35–36.
 27. *Ibid.*, 36.
 28. Jiang Zhenxi, “Shilun Lianheguo weihe xingdong” [An essay on UN peacekeeping operations], *Guoji wenti yanjiu* [International Studies], no. 125 (no. 3, 2008), 45. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 206.
 29. Sun Mei, “Zhongguo jingcha canyu Lianheguo weihe xingdong mianlin de tiaozhan ji duice” [The challenges Chinese police face in participating UNPKO and its measures], *Xueshu luntan* [Academic Forum], no. 233 (no. 6, 2010), 61–64.
 30. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000, accessed January 15, 2011, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.
 31. Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Xuehui Junkong Yu Caijun Yanjiu Zhongxin ed., *Dangdai guoji weihe xingdong* [Contemporary International Peacekeeping Operations] (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Chubanshe, 2006), 383–84.
 32. Xie Yixian ed., *Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi (1949–2009)* [Contemporary Diplomatic History of China (1949–2009)] (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2009), 460–61.
 33. Mao Ruipeng, “Zhuquan yuanze yu Zhongguo zai Lianheguo weihe yan zhong de toupiao xingwei (1994–2004)” [The Principle of Sovereignty and China’s Voting Behavior on UN Peacekeeping Resolutions (1994–2004)], *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], no. 308 (no. 4, 2006), 59–60. Li Junyi, *Biange yu hezuo: Zhongguo canyu Lianheguo weihe xingdong zhi yanjiu* [Change and Cooperation: A Study of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations] (Taipei: Xiuwei Zixun Keji, 2009), 99.
 34. Zhang Wannian, *Dangdai shijie junshi yu Zhongguo guofang* [Contemporary World Military Affairs and China’s National Defense] (Beijing: Junshikexue Chubanshe, 1999), 210.
 35. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi, 2002 nian Zhongguo de guofang [China’s National Defense in 2002] (Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe, 2002), 60–61.
 36. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Baodao Bangongshi, 2008 nian Zhongguo de guofang [China’s National Defense in 2008], 102–3. As mentioned before, these figures do not include numbers of personnel dispatched to Namibia, but do include number of personnel dispatched to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that are usually not counted.
 37. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 204.
 38. As Figures 2 and 3 show, the norm is that developed countries shoulder a large part of the financial burden for UN peacekeeping while developing countries supply a large share of the troops. The general rule is that permanent members of the Security Council are exempt. In many cases, developed countries make high-end personnel contributions outside UNPKO, as with the EUFOR or the ISAF in Afghanistan.
 39. “Secretary-General Appoints Major General Zhao Jingmin of China as Force Commander for Western Sahara Mission,” Secretary-General SG/A/1089, BIO/319, accessed January 15, 2011, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sga1089.doc.htm>.
 40. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 206–7.
 41. Masayuki Masuda of the [Japanese] National Institute of Defense Studies has pointed to a rapid increase in the early years of the twenty-first century in the number of articles explaining China’s UN peacekeeping policy and dispatch of personnel using “responsibility” as a keyword in *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily] and *Jiefangjun Bao* [People’s Liberation Army Daily]. Without clear data on other reasons’ explanations that might have been given, it is not possible to say for certain what percentage of the whole these explanations made up, but it is certainly true that the “responsibility” argument has become more prominent. Masayuki Masuda, “Chūgoku no Kokuren PKO seisaku to heiin, butai haken o meguru bunmyaku hensen: Kokusai kōken, sekininron no hōga to seisaku tenkai” [The Changing Context of China’s UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy and Dispatch of Troops and Units: The Germination of an Argument in Favor of International Contribution and

- Responsibility and the Evolution of Policy], *Bōei Kenkyūjo kiyō* (vol. 13, no. 2), January 2011, 13–14.
42. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 219–23.
 43. Kokuren heiwa kyōryoku gyōmu no seiseki, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office website, accessed January 15, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_/result/achievement.html.
 44. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 204–7.
 45. Wang Xinjian, “Shewai junshi xingdong falü baozhang wenti chubu yanjiu [Preliminary Research on the Problem of Legal Guarantees for Overseas Military Activities],” *Xi’an zhengzhi xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of the Xi’an Political Institute], vol. 23, no. 1 (February 2010), 72.
 46. Tang Yongsheng, “Zhongguo yu Lianheguo weihe xingdong [China and UN Peacekeeping Operations],” *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* [World Economics and Politics], no. 265 (no. 9, 2002), 41.
 47. Wang Yizhou, “Zhongguo weihe ying ‘Chuangzao xing jieru’” [China’s peacekeeping must be ‘Creative intervention’], *Zhongguo baodao* [China Report], no. 72 (no. 2, 2010), 59.
 48. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 225–29.
 49. “Chapter 4, China: Quest for a ‘Responsible’ Power,” in the National Institute of Defense Studies ed., *East Asian Strategic Review 2007* (2007), 126–27, accessed January 15, 2011, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2007/east-asian_e2007_04.pdf.
 50. David H. Shin, “Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World,” Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 170–72. Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “China’s Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Clarifying Issues of Culpability,” *ibid.*, 266.
 51. Di Juan, “Zhongguo jiji tuidong jiejie Daerfuer wenti [China Taking Active Role in Solving Darfur Problem],” *Qiushi* [Seeking Truth], no. 452 (no. 11, 2007), 62–63.
 52. Niu Zhongjun, “Zhongguo canyu Dong Diwen weihe de yuanyin ji lichang fenxi” [An Analysis of Factors that Made China Participate in the East Timor Peacekeeping Operation and China’s Position], *Waijiao pinglun* [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 95 (April 2007), 51.
 53. Xiao Lanlan, “Qianyi weihe xingdong zai Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe zhong de liyi jiazhi: Yi Haidi weihe wei li” [The Advantage Value of Peacekeeping Operations in China’s International Strategy: An Analysis of the Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti], *Shandong xingzheng xueyuan Shandong sheng jingji guanli ganbu xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Shandong Administration Institute and Shandong Economic Management Personnel Institute], no. 80 (no. 1, 2007), 30.
 54. Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Anzen hoshō kankei no tenkai” [Development of Security Relations], in Ryōko Iechika, Yasuhiro Matsuda, Duan Ruicong, eds., *Kiro ni tatsu Nitchū kankei: Kako to no taiwa, mirai e no mosaku* [Sino-Japanese Relations at the Crossroads: Dialogue with the Past and Search for the Future] (*Kōyō Shobō*, 2007), 139. Military exchanges between China and Japan, and China and the United States are often severed unilaterally by China when bilateral relations become tense.
 55. Zhao Lei, *op cit.*, 230.