Security: Human, National, and International*

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I. Introduction: Concepts of “Security”

The English word “security” can be modified by a number of adjectives to produce a variety of different terms. In the case of Japanese, however, there is no one noun meaning “security” that is used in all contexts. Historical circumstances have led to different kanji combinations to create separate concepts corresponding to these terms. Generally, the English term “national security” is expressed in Japanese as kokka anzen hosho, “social security” is shakai hosho, “public security” is chian, and so on (Yamakage 2008).

Naturally, the semantic content of the English word “security” is quite diverse, and it is not easy to encapsulate its essential meaning simply in few words. Nevertheless, we might try to define the general sense by saying that “security” refers to a state in which a certain value or set of values that a given entity regards as important is free from threat (Kumon 1980; Tanaka 1996; Kamiya 2009). Consequently, if we turn our attention to Japanese society, the term shakai hosho (social security) refers to measures designed to create conditions in which “the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living” (Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan) are free from threat, while chian (public security) can be described as efforts undertaken to ensure that people’s lives and property are not under threat. The terms anzen hosho and kokka anzen hosho are often used as equivalents for the English term “national security.” This phrase too can have a diverse range of meanings, but traditionally speaking it has been regarded as referring to the policies and measures designed to protect the values that the state considers as important (territory, national population, and various institutions) from external attack and other threats.

One of the distinctive aspects of the Japanese situation since World War II, of course, has been the presence in the 1947 Constitution of the extremely controversial Article 9. What is the meaning of this article and its famous renunciation of war? Even if it seems self-evident that the Constitution denies legitimacy to aggressive wars of invasion, does this necessarily imply that it also excludes defensive wars? Is Japan allowed to use military force in self-defense? And with regard to the use of military force in self-defense, should there be different constitutional interpretations between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense? Is it acceptable for Japan to take part in international operations involving the use of military force under the auspices of the United Nations or similar organization? These and similar questions continue to be debated to this day.1

In thinking about national security, it is always necessary to consider what methods and means will be effective. In postwar Japan, however, this discussion has always involved an additional, and often more

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heated, legal wrangle over whether particular methods and means are in accordance with the Constitution.

The main subjects to be covered in this chapter are national security in the context of international relations, and issues relating to this for Japan as a state. How is Japan working to ensure national security within the world system of the Twenty-first Century, and what are the main issues it faces? To return to the above discussion of terms for a moment, what is under consideration here is Japan’s kokka anzen hosho, or (state) national security. As explained below, a number of concepts with various meanings and nuances have arisen in relation to national security in Japan over the years since the war. Internationally, too, diverse forms of “security” (as modified by various adjectives) have been discussed in a number of different ways. By looking at how Japan’s approach to national security has developed and changed since World War II, this chapter considers challenges for the years to come.

II. National Defense and National Security
National security as it was first conceived in Japan at the end of World War II essentially concerned the military defense of Japan as a country. Although a variety of views existed in Japan regarding the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, for those in power in Japan, “national security” basically meant protecting the nation against the threat from the Soviet Union. For a considerable time after the war, however, it was normal to use the term kokubo, or “national defense,” to describe what we would now call kokka anzen hosho, or “national security.” The United Nations had a “Security” Council, and in 1951 Japan signed a “Security” Treaty with the United States. Both of these instances of “security” were expressed in Japanese by the term anzen hosho, so this term did exist and was being used in a way similar to its present sense, but kokubo, or “national defense,” remained the most frequently used term to refer to policies and actions designed to deal with the threat of military attack from a foreign enemy.

The fundamental document on Japan’s national security was agreed on May 20, 1957, with the title Basic Policy on National Defense (Kokubo no kihon hoshin). “The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, and thereby, to safeguard the independence and peace of Japan based on democracy,” the document declared. So the purpose or definition of national security was the defense of the independence and safety of the state based on democracy. But, what means did Japan use to try to achieve this?

In occupied Japan immediately after the war, military means simply did not exist. The concept of national defense as something involving nonmilitary means therefore rose out of necessity. In a policy speech to the Diet on November 8, 1949, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida spoke as follows, using the term anzen hosho, somewhat unusually for the time: “The only way to guarantee the security of our country is, as we do in the new Constitution, to solemnly declare our country an unarmed nation, going before all countries and renouncing war and abandoning armaments in reliance on peace-loving world public opinion and make more and more clear the determination of our people to contribute to civilization, peace, and prosperity in the world.”

That Yoshida did not believe Japan’s security could be secured entirely by nonmilitary means, however, is clear from the policy measures he took subsequently. In April 1950, he sent Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda to the United States to convey his desire that US military bases should remain in Japan even after the conclusion of a peace treaty (Miyazawa 1999). Rather than seeking to ensure national security through nonmilitary means, Yoshida was aiming to maintain national security through an alliance.

Over the course of the negotiations that led to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, however, rearmament de facto proceeded, and in 1954 the Self-Defense Forces were formed. From that stage on it was no longer true that Japan was entirely dependent on the United States for the military aspects of its national
security while Japan concentrated on the nonmilitary aspects. If we analyze the process by which Japan established first the National Police Reserve, followed by the National Safety Forces and finally the Self-Defense Forces, however, it is clear that there was extremely strong pressure from the United States (Sakamoto 2000; Tanaka 1997; Shibayama 2010). Those who were involved in the negotiations between Japan and the United States were also of the view that Japan began to rebuild its military strength in order to comply with demands from the United States that it do so. But for a military response to any armed threat to Japan as a state, Japan essentially relied on the United States as its alliance partner. In the Basic Policy on National Defense, this position is defined quite plainly in the following policy: “Dealing with external aggression based on the security arrangements with the United States until the United Nations will be able to fulfill its function in stopping such aggression effectively in the future.”

Another characteristic of Japan’s postwar national security policy besides this military dependence on the United States was the priority given to economic autonomy as an objective of national security. When Yoshida attempted to rebuff American pressure to rearm in his negotiations with John Foster Dulles, President Truman’s special envoy, he did so because he was worried that the heavy burden of rearmament entailed a risk that the nation’s security would be endangered from within (Tanaka 1997, 52). The so-called Yoshida Doctrine is often taken to encapsulate Japan’s foreign policy strategy in the postwar years. Essentially, Japan’s national policy was to rely on the United States for the military aspects of security while Japan prioritized economic growth as a lightly armed commercial nation (Kosaka 2000, 513).

III. Vulnerable US Dominance and the Concept of “Comprehensive Security”

But several preconditions needed to be in place for the Yoshida Doctrine to function. First, the United States had to have an indisputable ability to maintain international order. Second, the United States was capable to overwhelm the Soviet Union militarily in the area surrounding Japan. And third, Japan had to be relatively weak and therefore seen as incapable of shouldering a bigger share of the defense burden. Doubts began to be raised about all three of these conditions from the early 1970s. The economic dominance of the United States started to fade in the 1960s as Europe and Japan achieved rapid economic growth. Questions began to be asked about the American ability to maintain international political and economic order. Numerous events suggested that cracks were beginning to appear in the international order: US difficulties in Vietnam, the end of dollar-gold convertibility in August 1971, the oil crisis of 1973, the US-Japan “textile wrangle” between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ban on soya bean imports in 1973, and so on. It hardly needs saying that in the background to all this was Japan’s rapid economic growth. By the second half of the 1960s, Japan was second only to the United States as an economic power in the capitalist bloc.

This relative decline in American strength and the rise of Japan at the same time meant two things. First, a growing awareness that with Japan’s profits expanding on a global scale the country could no longer rely solely on the United States to sustain its growth. And second, the United States became increasingly dissatisfied with the low level of Japan’s share of the national security burden. Furthermore, from the second half of the 1970s, it was clear that the Soviet Union was increasing its military strength around the globe, creating a situation in which indisputable US military superiority could no longer be taken for granted even in the region surrounding Japan.

It was against the backdrop of these developments that the idea of comprehensive security came into being. The concept was first put forward in a report published by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group established at the behest of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. The report stated the
The most fundamental change in the international situation that took place in the 1970s is the termination of clear American supremacy in both military and economic spheres. . . . Until the end of the 1960s, the United States had been the ‘policeman of the world’ and at the same time the ‘bankers of the world’ as the main pillar of the IMF and the GATT system, which covered most of the earth. This is not the case any longer.” Based on this understanding of the international situation, the report argued that it was no longer enough for Japan to depend solely on the United States as it had done until now under the Yoshida Doctrine.

The report focused on the changes that had taken place in the international system since World War II and also sought to widen the scope of the discussion on the concept of national security. First, although the report was concerned with national security, it stated that the ultimate object of national security was the people. The report defined national security as “the protection of the people’s life from various forms of external threat,” establishing a broader concept that went beyond the military invasion of territory. Second, the report argued that efforts to achieve this national security needed to be comprehensive, and that comprehensive policy had three different aspects, or dimensions—comprehensive efforts, wider fields of interest, and comprehensive means.

Regarding the first aspect, the report divided national security efforts into three levels: (1) self-reliant efforts, (2) efforts to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one, and (3) efforts to create a favorable international environment within a limited scope. The report laid out a national security policy that combined these three levels into a complementary whole and looked to implement them comprehensively. The phrase “efforts to create a favorable international environment within a limited scope” is a somewhat vague and roundabout expression. More plainly expressed, it refers to “solidarity with countries sharing the same ideals and interests”—or, in military terms, to the Japan-US relationship.

Regarding the second aspect, the report had this to say: “The expansion of the fields of interest in national security has become apparent especially since the oil crisis. Before then, the problem of security was taken up essentially as a question of coping with military threat; aside from this, only the question of security from natural disasters was debated. The oil crisis, however, demonstrated that there are other problems apart from those discussed above that could threaten the people’s life. Furthermore, from a medium- or long-range perspective, the possibility of a food shortage is being pointed out. Given these serious threats other than those in the military sphere, it is necessary [sic] to formulate a comprehensive policy encompassing all the areas.”

Regarding the third aspect, the report argued that the means used to achieve national security ends must also be comprehensive. The report noted as follows: “Just as the measures to achieve military security are not limited to those of a military nature but require comprehensive means, measures to achieve nonmilitary security are not limited to those of a nonmilitary nature but require comprehensive means. Of course, it is hardly possible to protect economic security by the direct use of military force, such as by occupying oil fields, but this possibility cannot be totally discounted, and military measures must be taken into consideration.”

The report also suggested six areas as important policy questions from the perspective of this kind of comprehensive viewpoint: (1) relations between Japan and the United States, (2) strengthening defense capability, (3) relations with China and the Soviet Union, (4) energy security, (5) food security, and (6) crisis-management systems to deal with large-scale earthquakes. The report said, “It is necessary for all the ministries and agencies of the government to bear comprehensive national security considerations in mind in implementing various policy measures,” and proposed the establishment of a Comprehensive
National Security Council to act as "a body for promoting comprehensive and integrated security policy."

However, the death of Prime Minister Ohira deprived Japan of a leader who might reorganize Japan's national security policy around the concept of comprehensive security as outlined in the report. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, successor to Ohira, established the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive Security on December 2, 1980. This organization was designed to ensure comprehensiveness and consistency from a national security perspective in fields of policy implementation such as the economy and diplomacy, and to that end to discuss areas where there was a need for greater coordination among the relevant administrative organs. But it was not a reorganization of the National Defense Council such as the report had proposed. Instead of a cabinet-level council for debating practical issues relating to different aspects of comprehensive national security with the responsibility for setting policy, the new council was a forum for discussing nonmilitary measures in economic and diplomatic policy. It met around three times a year at most, and became a purely routine meeting that rarely debated substantial issues. After its twenty-first meeting on September 26, 1990, the committee did not meet again.

In this way, the term "comprehensive security" also faded from prominence and came to be used less frequently. A large part of the reason for this was the emergence of the "Second Cold War" (1979-85) as a new aspect of the world system. Nevertheless, the work that went into the Comprehensive National Security Study Group's report was not without significance: its analysis was comprehensive in its scope, and its conceptualization repeatedly served as a foundation and framework for the debate on Japanese national security in the years that followed.

IV. The Second Cold War and National Security

The defining characteristic of Japan's national security policy in the 1980s was the strengthening of the Japan-US alliance in the context of the Second Cold War. We have seen how, under the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan's security was based on its reliance on the United States. But the alliance was not as organizationally systematized as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was. One reason was that the overwhelming military supremacy of the United States in the Far East did not require such a deep-reaching organization. It was as late as in 1978 when the framework for defense cooperation between Japan and the United States was finally laid out explicitly with the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. However, as the problem of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe developed into one of the dominant issues in international politics, superpower relations entered a period of renewed tension when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. In East Asia, too, the Soviet Union not only stationed forces on the disputed Northern Territories, but also strengthened their sea and air capabilities. This coincided with increasing trade frictions between Japan and the United States caused by Japan's rapidly growing exports of manufactured goods. In the United States, there were mounting calls for Japan to do more to shoulder its share of the defense burden.

During a visit to the United States in May 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki referred explicitly to the "alliance between the United States and Japan" in a joint communiqué, and in a speech at the National Press Club announced that Japan would work proactively to share the burden of sea-lane defense. The succeeding Nakasone government decided to increase defense spending and also made exceptions to the Three Principles on Arms Exports to allow sharing of military technology with the United States. The antisubmarine capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces were also improved dramatically in response to the increasing strength of the Soviet Navy. The ceiling placed on defense expenditures of 1 percent of GNP, imposed by Prime Minister Takeo Miki's government in 1976, was finally abolished in 1987.6
V. The End of the Cold War and International Security

The end of the Cold War brought a new aspect to Japan's national security policy: What kind of role was the country to play in international security issues that did not directly affect the safety of Japan itself? This way of thinking had not been entirely absent in the past. The comprehensive national security philosophy, after all, had included “efforts to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one” as part of its comprehensive view of Japan's national security position. Nevertheless, during the Cold War these efforts were generally thought of as being limited to economic cooperation. The crisis that broke out in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1990, however, pressed Japan to find an answer to a difficult question: How would it respond to an aggression that was illegal under international law?

The question was particularly difficult to answer because there was no legal framework in place that specified how the Self-Defense Forces could be used to respond to a problem common to the international community. In the Cold War era, it was inconceivable that the United Nations Security Council would ever vote unanimously on action, and Japan had therefore failed to prepare concrete measures or put a legal framework in place. Japan lacked an adequate answer to the question of what was legally possible in the event that the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution based on Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter 7 (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the United Nations Charter.

Theoretically, it was possible to take the view that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution merely ruled out war, military action, and the threat or use of force as “a means of settling international disputes” (in which Japan itself was involved), and that the Constitution did not forbid participation in joint actions as a part of the international community (collective security or international security), and indeed some people did take this line. However, given a 1954 House of Councillors resolution forbidding overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, and the constitutional interpretation of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau not allowing the exercise of the right to collective self-defense heavily entrenched, the dominant view within the government was that deploying the Self-Defense Forces to a situation where they might be involved in military action was impossible, despite the existence of a UN Security Council resolution. As a result, while troops from many nations were deployed as part of the United Nations coalition force that was sent into Iraq, Japan's participation was limited to contributing large amounts of financial support. After the Gulf War was over, the Kuwaiti government placed full-page messages of thanks in newspapers in the United States and other countries, listing the names of all the countries that had contributed troops to the coalition. Japan, one of the major providers of funding, was not included. For some policymakers in the Japanese government, this has become something of a traumatic memory (Tanaka and Tahara 2005, 219; Iokibe et al. 2008, 204-5).

Central to the debate on the extent of possible Japanese involvement in international security efforts was the question of participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. At the time, the civil war that had continued for over a decade in Cambodia was drawing to an end. If Japan was to be involved in some form in helping to bring about peace, certain legislative measures would be necessary. Although the Social Democratic Party and a few others remained opposed to any kind of involvement of the Self-Defense Forces, eventually the Liberal Democratic Party, Komeito, and Democratic Socialist Party voted in favor of the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (International Peace Cooperation Act), which was passed in June 1992.

Nevertheless, as a result of the constitutional interpretation of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and the influence of parties who remained reluctant to send the Self-Defense Forces overseas, the law imposed limitations that were considerably stricter than the standards for conduct of troops participating in PKO.
from other countries. First, the following five principles were drawn up as conditions for participation.

1. Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
2. Consent for the undertaking of UN Peacekeeping Operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned principles cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw the Self-Defense Force contingent.
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.

Second, although the law made provisions for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to participate in “core” peacekeeping missions, including monitoring the observance of ceasefires and demobilization; stationing in and patrol of buffer zones; and collection, storage, or disposal of abandoned weapons, a decision was taken to “freeze” permission for these “core” missions pending a later law that would lift this temporary freeze. As a result, Self-Defense Forces were limited to engaging in “logistical support” operations, providing medical, transportation, communication, and construction assistance.

Since this law was enacted, Japan has participated in thirteen UN peacekeeping operations, five international humanitarian aid operations, and nine election observation missions (as of March 2013). Of these, members of the Self-Defense Forces were deployed to missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan.

The logic behind this involvement in international security efforts was made clear by the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (chaired by Hirotaro Higuchi, then chairman of Asahi Breweries), which was set up in 1994 by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and delivered its report to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in summer of that year. Without explicitly mentioning it, this report too discussed Japan’s national security policies on three levels, just as the report by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group had done. These were multilateral security cooperation, enhancement of the Japan-US security cooperation relationship, and the maintenance and management of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability. What is particularly striking in this report is its analysis and recommendations regarding multilateral security cooperation. The report suggests that Japan should continue to participate actively in UN peacekeeping operations in the future, and that it is necessary to consider lifting the freeze on participation in core peacekeeping operations and relaxing the standards on the use of arms to this end. The report also discusses Japanese involvement in such operations that goes beyond the Self-Defense Forces, and argues in favor of taking a more proactive role:

We would like to emphasize that the civilian sector of peacekeeping operations and the construction of peace following the settlement of conflicts are important fields of international cooperation for security. In these fields Japan should be able to make particularly significant contributions. At the government level, official development assistance (ODA) policy, for example, should be positively utilized. In addition, considering that voluntary participation at the private level is particularly significant in this respect, the entire society should make serious efforts to enable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to step up their activities.10 11
The period when the Advisory Group on Defense Issues headed by Higuchi was finalizing its report coincided with a time of rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. This was Act One of the prolonged crisis brought about by North Korea's attempts to develop nuclear weapons. An immediate crisis was averted by the visit to North Korea of former US President Jimmy Carter in June 1994, and later in that year the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework was signed in Geneva, laying the foundation for maintaining relations with North Korea through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. However, the crisis made it clear that no effective legal or administrative framework was in place between Japan and the United States for dealing with crisis situations, such as the case of North Korea (Tanaka and Tahara 2005, 20).

In the United States, too, there was growing awareness of the need to reestablish the Japan-US relationship as part of a wider Asia-Pacific strategy for the years to come. To coincide with President Bill Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1996, a Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security was agreed, and it was announced that work would begin on revising the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. The new guidelines, agreed in September 1997, defined Japan-US cooperation far more specifically than the original 1978 Guidelines. They outlined in detail the nature of cooperation in the event of an emergency situation in Japan, but what distinguished the document most clearly was the provisions it made for cooperation between Japan and the United States "in situations in areas surrounding Japan," which were and are probably much more likely.

In this kind of situation, there is no armed invasion of Japan but a regional crisis develops in which there is a risk of US armed involvement. Naturally, such a situation would directly impinge on Japan's national security, but it would nevertheless not constitute an emergency situation in Japan itself. According to Article 6 of the Japan-US Security Treaty, the United States is allowed to use its bases in Japan not only for emergencies situations in Japan but also for other situations. But in Japan little progress had been made in putting together the legal and administrative framework procedures for Responding to the various contingencies likely to arise in the result of a situation of this kind in a surrounding country. This had been clear since the crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994, but the reality became starker still when it came time to revise the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. The Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Act) came into effect on May 28, 1999 as an attempt to fill this need for a clearer protocol. North Korea's launching of a Taepodong missile over Japanese territory in the summer of 1998 served to make people in Japan keenly aware of the need for a law that would make this kind of Japan-US cooperation possible.

However, two things became clear during the process of debating the law. Firstly, if the government's longstanding interpretation that denies the constitutionality of collective defense right were applied strictly, it was doubtful whether effective cooperation between Japan and the United States would be possible in a dynamically changing emergency situation in a surrounding area. While US ships and aircraft were engaged in military manoeuvres in areas neighboring Japan, the Self-Defense Forces would be able to do nothing unless Japan itself were attacked. This was a consequence of the constitutional interpretation denying the exercise of the right to collective defense. Even after the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Act was enacted, therefore, doubts remained whether cooperation would in fact be feasible under the current interpretation of the Constitution in the event of a crisis situation in a surrounding area.
Secondly, as the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Act and other pieces of legislation were put in place to bolster the legal framework for Japan-US cooperation, defense officials and experts became increasingly aware that similar questions actually existed regarding an appropriate legal framework for dealing with an emergency situation in Japan itself. It was certainly true that in the event of a crisis in a surrounding area, the restrictions imposed by the constitutional interpretation regarding the non-use of the right to collective defense might cause a problem. But a situation in a surrounding area might well be barely a hair's breadth from being an emergency in Japan itself. The essential question was, if Japan were attacked, did it have the proper legal framework in place to respond to the situation appropriately?

Naturally, what was considered at the time to be a minimum necessary amount of legislation was passed when the Defense Agency (today's Ministry of Defense) and the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954. But in a public opinion climate in which positing the idea of an “emergency” situation was enough to raise suspicions of a plot to bring back militarism, more detailed emergency laws were not drawn up. In 1978, the chairman of the Joint Staff Council Hiromi Kurisu came in for serious criticism when he stated that under the current law the Self-Defense Forces might be forced to carry out extralegal actions in the event of an emergency situation. However, the North Korean missile launch and the infiltration of Japanese waters by unidentified vessels served to make both politicians and the general public aware of the need for the ability to make a robust response to an emergency situation. The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, also had a major impact on people in Japan and helped to strengthen the view that Japan needed legislation that would guarantee national security. Also, in political circles the taboo on discussing national security had started to fade as the end of the Cold War passed ten years and more into history. Accordingly, on June 13, 2003 three laws concerning armed attacks were enacted, including the Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People's Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Armed Attack Situations Response Act). The following year, further legislature was passed, including the Act concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Civil Protection Act). These laws were approved with the support of the Democratic Party of Japan, the main opposition at the time, and it is perhaps fair to say that the passage of these laws demonstrated that the national security framework in Japan had finally advanced with the clear consent of the majority of the people.

VII. Human Security

Human security has been one of the most widely discussed security-related concepts in Japanese diplomacy in recent years. The concept itself was first espoused in the Human Development Report 1994, and has come to be used to refer to efforts to establish human safety, focusing on individuals, as opposed to national security, which aims to ensure the safety of the state (United Nations Development Programme 1994). In abstract terms, the concept aims to guarantee freedom from fear and want on a human level.

The first Japanese politician to speak about human security was Prime Minister Murayama. He made the following remarks in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1995:

A new concept of “human security,” in addition to that of national security, has emerged as a major challenge for the United Nations. This concept, which embraces respect for the human rights of every citizen on this earth and protection of each of us from poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence, is consonant with my own political principles. Since I became Prime Minister, the creation of a “human-centered society,” in which all citizens are treated equally and are able to realize their full potential, has been pivotal to my administration's policy.
However, it was Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi who brought the concept of human security to the forefront of Japanese diplomacy (Oe 2008). In a policy speech he gave in Hanoi in December 1998, Obuchi stated the following:

“Human security” is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable—the poor, women and children, and the elderly—threatening their survival and dignity. We need urgently to implement measures for the socially vulnerable who are affected by the Asian economic crisis. Japan will continue to address this area utilizing its official development assistance and multilateral frameworks such as APEC.

At the same time, even in times of economic crisis, we should not forget cooperation on medium- and long-term problems such as environmental degradation, narcotics and international organized crime which need to be addressed if we wish to protect human survival, life and dignity. Japan has decided this time to contribute 500 million yen ($4.2 million) for the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations so that international organizations concerned can provide support in a flexible and timely manner to projects that are to be implemented in this region.

Obuchi was succeeded as prime minister by Yoshiro Mori, who continued the emphasis on human security at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, where he declared that “with human security as one of the pillars of its diplomacy, Japan will spare no effort to make the Twenty-first Century a human-centered century.” In an attempt to further develop and deepen the concept of human security, Mori called for a committee on human security made up of world-renowned opinion leaders. The Commission on Human Security began its deliberations in June 2001 with Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata as co-chairs and compiled its findings in the report, Human Security Now, in May 2003 (Commission on Human Security 2003).

Where was the concept of human security put into practice in concrete terms in Japan’s diplomacy or national security policy? Prime Minister Obuchi raised the concept in Asia in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In 2001, Prime Minister Mori was on a visit to Africa when he claimed the concept was at the center of Japan’s diplomacy in that continent.

All the problems confronting Africa—poverty, conflicts, refugees, infectious diseases, water resource, environmental destruction, etc.—are problems that threaten human existence itself. Indeed, Japan’s peace diplomacy of the Twenty-first Century places human security at its core. In that sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that our success or failure in establishing human security in Africa will test the merits of Japan’s foreign policy.

It is suggestive that Obuchi put forward the applicability of human security in an East Asia still reeling from the financial crisis and that Mori stressed the same ideas on a visit to Africa: most references to human security in Japanese diplomacy tended to refer to developing countries that could be considered to be threatened by “want and fear” (Kurisu 2007, 144). The people who were to be protected by human security were generally those in developing regions. And the most prominently mentioned means
to achieve this were official development assistance and other forms of international cooperation. This was made clear in the revision of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter in August 2003.

In the revised edition, the government established human security as one of the five basic policies of Japan’s ODA policy, and stated that “in order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals.” It also listed peace building as one of four priority issues, alongside poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and addressing global issues.

But if human security focused almost exclusively on people in developing countries, what connection did the policy have with Japan’s national security? The first indication of the answer to this question came with the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities and the report it presented to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in October 2004. This advisory group, chaired by Hiroshi Araki, former chairman of Tokyo Electric Power Co., was set up at the instruction of Koizumi to organize the debate to formulate the new National Defense Program Guidelines. The report put forward two basic national security goals of (1) defense of Japan and (2) prevention of the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment, and outlined three approaches to achieve these: (1) Japan’s own efforts, (2) cooperation with an alliance partner, and (3) cooperation with the international community. Unsurprisingly, these were essentially the same approaches that had characterized Japanese policy since the comprehensive security strategy.

But what made this report distinctive was that it explicitly mentioned the prevention of the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment as one of the goals of Japan’s national security policy, alongside straightforward national defense. It also listed human security as one of the main concepts driving this approach of cooperating with the international community to achieve the second of these goals. According to the report, “In the past, there has not been sufficient awareness of the vital link between Japan’s international-cooperation activities and its security. Japan’s current international peace-building efforts and initiatives aimed at achieving ‘human security’ in various parts of the world should be viewed as having a direct bearing on Japan’s security.”

Human security is important in itself as a security concept that is not centered on the state. But the report went further, and showed an intention to position human security as part of the comprehensive security framework for achieving Japan’s national security. Human security was placed even more explicitly in a state-security context by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era. The report issued by the council in August 2010 set out three objectives for Japanese security policy—namely, security and prosperity of Japan, stability and prosperity of both the region surrounding Japan and the world, and maintaining a free and open international system. It then outlined three approaches for achieving these aims: Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with allies, and multilayered security cooperation. Again, these three approaches essentially continued the same policies in place since the beginning of the comprehensive security strategy.

In the report, human security appears as part of the concept behind the objective of maintaining a free and open international system.

To preserve a free and open international system, universal basic values such as the freedom and
dignity of individuals must be upheld. In this sense, failed states and fragile states, which lack governance, may pose a threat to the international system. In such states, fundamental values such as inviolability of life and property cannot be defended. In the interest of upholding the freedom and dignity of individuals, it is desirable to create a freer and more open international system based on the concept of “Human Security.”

Human security is mentioned again in the discussion of the approach side. First, the human security perspective is stressed as an important within Japan's own efforts.

In addition, from the standpoint of human security, social and economic conditions that encourage acts of terrorism and piracy should be addressed: strategic use of ODA to mitigate those crisis conditions must be studied and promoted. Challenges relating to human security require close coordination with public and private sectors, including support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial enterprises.

There are further references to the concept in the explanations of multilayered security cooperation: “From the standpoint of 'Human Security,' networks formed within the Asia-Pacific region to address such issues as disaster prevention and public health should be strengthened. Especially important are the construction of early warning systems for disaster and infectious disease, and support for the improvement of disaster prevention capabilities of local communities.” Compared to the Araki Report, the concept of human security is given an increasing weight and importance both as an objective and as an approach to achieve Japan's national security.

Following these developments, the revisions to the National Defense Program Guidelines approved in December 2010 made explicit mention of human security for the first time:

The first objective of Japan’s security policy is to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and to eliminate external threats that have reached it so as to minimize the ensuing damage, and thereby secure the peace and security of Japan and its people. The second objective is to prevent threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and by improving the global security environment, so as to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order and ensure Japan’s security and prosperity. The third objective is to contribute to creating global peace and stability and to secure human security.

With this, “human security” officially became an objective of Japan’s national security policy.

VIII. Conclusion
The question of what should be the focus of security policy is one that depends on the beliefs and perspectives of those responsible for policy and of the general public, but at the same time it is also affected by the wider environment that surrounds them. Japan’s post-World War II security policy has also been influenced by the ways in which the thinking of both government policymakers and many Japanese people have changed, as well as by the shifting international environment. This chapter has looked at a number of these changes, paying particular attention to the views of policymakers and others who influenced them. From this, the following two characteristics have emerged.
The first is the growth of a general consensus regarding national security and the consequent evolution of a system. Japan’s postwar security policy began from the premise that the country would rely solely on nonmilitary means, but in the course of strengthening its alliance with the United States and increasing its cooperation with the international community, the idea of building some degree of military capability with the Self-Defense Forces became established during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Particularly symbolic in this respect was the formation of a general consensus among ruling and opposition parties on the contingency legislation, which had been regarded as a taboo during the Cold War period.

Second, the idea that security policy should take a comprehensive approach has become firmly established. The three-level approach to security measures—Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with an alliance partner, and cooperation with the international community—has always been applied to the recent revisions of the National Defense Program Guidelines. A comprehensive approach is also having an effect on the objectives of national security. The most recent edition of the guidelines has gone beyond traditional definitions of national defense to encompass wider goals including protecting the safety and security of the people, improving the international security environment around Japan and in the wider world, and ensuring human security in addition to the peace and stability of the world.

Of course, there is no end to security challenges. In terms of Japan’s own efforts, there is still room for debate on questions such as the following: (1) In what way is it desirable for the country to equip its Self-Defense Forces? (2) In terms of relations with its neighboring countries, how can Japan maintain an appropriate defensive and deterrent force while formulating a policy that avoids the pitfalls of security dilemmas? (3) In terms of relations with its alliance partners, is it possible for Japan to provide appropriate support for its partners in the event of an emergency situation in a surrounding region, with the current government interpretation on the impermissibility of the exercise of the right to collective defense still in force? (4) Are the standards governing the use of arms by the Self-Defense Forces participating in PKO and similar operations appropriate to Japan’s cooperation with the international community? (5) Even more fundamentally, are the constitutional interpretations that have been made in the past regarding involvement in international peace operations appropriate?

There can be no doubt that making human security one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy and one of the aims of the country’s security policy has broadened the sphere of Japan’s diplomacy and security policy. As we have seen in this chapter, the Japanese government and its people tend to associate the term “human security” primarily with the idea of poverty and violence in developing countries. Improving these problems is part of helping to bring about peace and stability in the world as a whole, and human security is therefore connected to the national security of Japan. Consequently, it is essential for Japan to contribute to human security using various measures that were not traditionally considered to be means of achieving security policy.

Furthermore, it follows as a natural extension of this policy that human security must also be guaranteed for the people in Japan and other developed nations. It is possible to take the view that if public security and social security are adequately provided within a society, this will automatically lead to human security in the sense of freedom from fear and want (Yamakage 2008). However, Japanese people who experienced disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 are likely to be aware that an emergency situation can give rise to human security difficulties that go beyond the usual issues of public security and social security. This aspect has not been entirely absent from Japan’s security debate in the past: Ohira’s comprehensive security strategy included damage from a natural disaster such as a major earthquake as one of its subjects.
Putting policy into practice is an eternal challenge. If the assumption is that security should be tackled in a comprehensive manner, it is hardly likely that a successful policy can be implemented by vertically segmented ministries acting independently. This is why some people argue that a national security council is needed to take charge of security policy. But simply establishing a council and a secretariat for it will not automatically make a truly comprehensive policy a reality. And if human security within the international community directly affects the national security of Japan, then surely security policy and official development assistance ought to be treated as inseparably linked. In that case, how should policy be coordinated? This is a further challenge. Both in developing and developed countries, human security-related issues require not just state involvement but cooperation with international organizations and civil society groups, including NGOs. There may be no panacea. But at the very least there needs to be much more academic study of what measures are effective, as well as ongoing communication and a willingness to cooperate on the part of all the parties involved.

1 There is an almost innumerable number of reference materials on the question of Article 9, including the various textbooks on the Constitution. Hatake (2006) provides a useful summary of the issues that covers developments to date. For an account of the enactment process of the Constitution and early interpretations, see Nakamura (1996), Suzuki (1995), and Tanaka (1997); on the recent debate concerning collective self-defense, see Murase, ed. (2007).

2 All official documents relating to the government and the Diet quoted in this chapter can be found in Japanese (and some in English) in the database Sekai to Nihon [The World and Japan], http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn (Japanese) and http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/front-ENG.shtml (English). No further attribution of sources will be given, except where the English translation used is not from the above database site.

3 Taku Tamaki, Deconstructing Japan’s Image of South Korea. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 74.

4 Many commentators discussed “comprehensive security” and related ideas around this time. In 1977, Nomura Research Institute published a report advocating what it called “comprehensive security” [sogo sekyuriti] (Nomura Research Institute 1977). In his book published in 1978, Yasuhiro Nakasone made the following statement and argued the need for a comprehensive security policy: “National security is based in the first instance on the consent and will of the people, and is made up of a comprehensive combination of a nation’s diplomacy, economic cooperation, resources policy, influence on global public opinion, and other aspects. What is called national defense, centered on the Self-Defense Forces, is just one part of this comprehensive combination. In my view, it is responsible for responding to moments of urgent pressure, and is used to deter or repel invasion” (Nakasone 1978, 244-45).

5 It is sometimes argued that comprehensive security concentrates exclusively on nonmilitary means, but there is no evidence of disdain for military means in this report, as exemplified by the following statement: “There has been, for example, an argument in the security debate centering on measures against military threats that one must not ignore nonmilitary means, such as to ease or eliminate confrontations through ‘peace diplomacy’ or to remove causes of conflict through economic cooperation. Such observations are true to some extent but still show a lack of complete understanding. This is because the dynamism of international relations is governed by an all-encompassing mix of both military and nonmilitary means, and because every country, as a matter of course, gives weight to military means in coping with the question of military security. This observation remains true today just as it was true in the past. The only difference today is that military means are not brought to light as conspicuously as they were in the past. Military capability is a major factor governing the foreign policy of each country.”


7 Then LDP Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa was reported to have said: “The Cold War is over, and there are moves toward collective security centered on the United Nations. Collective security under the United Nations Charter aims to protect the world order—something quite different in character from collective self-defense, which the government deems unconstitutional. The Constitution and the UN Charter accord in their philosophy; in order to defend the Constitution’s principles of the non-use of force and renunciation of war, we have no choice but to make up for military means by collective security based on the UN. In the present instance, there is a Security Council resolution in place, so that Japan would not be
choosing to send troops on its own volition. I personally believe that it is possible for us to deploy the Self-Defense Forces to the Middle East even under the Constitution and Self-Defense Forces Act as they currently stand” (Sasaki 1992, 14).

8 According to Atsuo Kudo, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau at the time, “Since the UN forces have different objectives and missions depending on the particular case, it is impossible to make a blanket statement on whether the Self-Defense Forces should be allowed to participate in such operations. But if the objectives and missions in question involve the use of military force, I believe the participation of the Self-Defense Forces is in violation of the Constitution” (Tanaka 1997, 315-16).

9 When the International Peace Cooperation Act was enacted, the circumstances in which force could be used were limited to protecting the lives of “themselves, other SDF Personnel or Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene,” but the amendment which went into effect on December 14, 2001, extended this to make it possible to use armed force to defend “individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties” as well (Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/data/law/pdf/lfew_e.pdf).


11 Behind this kind of recommendation is the following analysis: “Regional military clashes of the kind described above would be induced by economic poverty and social discontent and by the related loss of the ability to govern. For example, regions containing many of the poorest nations and regions rich in resources but very low in stability require special attention. It seems that the solution of security problems will increasingly require not only responses by military means but also by multidimensional means, including economic and technical assistance” (Ibid., 26-27). As the main text explains, the concept of human security was first raised in the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme in 1994, the same year that the Higuchi Report appeared. In that sense, it is only natural that the concept is not mentioned by name in the Higuchi Report. Nevertheless, as this quotation from the report shows, it is possible to discern an understanding of the issues similar to that which produced the concept of human security.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

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