

Chapter 3
Lessons learned from the provision of
Japanese assistance to Afghanistan since '9/11'

Nobutaka Miyahara

Introduction

Winning popular support

After seven years since the world started to intervene in the country's nation-building, we still find Afghanistan unstable, insecure, and undeveloped. The Bonn process, which was designed to bring the Afghan people reconciliation and to establish a basis for reconstruction and development, was completed successfully. The international community repeatedly made pledges to assist Afghanistan's nation-building: US\$4.5 billion in Tokyo in 2002, US\$8.2 billion in Berlin in 2004, US\$10.5 billion in London in 2006, and US\$20.0 billion in Paris this year. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed under the authority of the UN Security Council, deployed at first in the capital and environs but later throughout the country, and increased in size. Despite such tremendous efforts by the international community, the government is weak, controlling only limited parts of the population and the country; reconstruction has made little or only partial progress; and security has deteriorated to the extent that one half of the country is controlled or at least under the strong influence of the insurgents.

What has brought about this result? This author argued three years ago^(*1) that winning popular support was the key to peace and stability in Afghanistan and warned of two threats: the slow pace of reconstruction, especially in provincial areas, and the continuous fighting with insurgents, such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists, even while dealing with fierce opposition and resistance from warlords.

This argument seems still valid at the present moment. It is because the people cannot get security from the government or the international community that they extend their support or at least approval to the control of the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan by the insurgents. In terms of who has brought the most security to the lives of people in rural areas, especially in the southern and eastern areas, the drug

lords and insurgents have better records than the government and international community. They have given money and employment to the people, especially to the youth in rural areas.

This article seeks to elaborate on the causes, policies and programs for Japanese assistance to Afghanistan and to argue how the Afghan government and the international community could win popular support by showing the lessons learned from Japanese experiences and introducing the efforts of the local people to secure their own livelihoods. These lessons come mainly from security problems faced in implementing assistance projects, respect for the ownership of development by the Afghans and the lack of capacity of the Afghan authorities. One of the most important lessons learned is that winning popular support was a key to securing our road rehabilitation and other assistance projects in rural areas. In contacts with rural communities to secure our projects, we found it essential to bring residents security to win popular support.

Japanese assistance to Afghanistan

Japan has enjoyed an entirely friendly relationship with Afghanistan since the 1930s. Japan has provided sizable development assistance during this short history, especially in the 1970s, and augmented its humanitarian assistance during the civil war in the 1990s.

However, the tragedy of September 11 totally changed the meaning and position of Japan's humanitarian and development assistance in its foreign policy. Firstly, Japanese assistance to Afghanistan has become one of the main pillars for the Japanese contribution to the global war on terror (GWOT). Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro clearly expressed this posture at the International Conference for Afghanistan Reconstruction (the Tokyo Conference), saying, "In order to eradicate terrorism, we must eliminate the conditions that allow terrorism to take root. To do so, it is essential that a peaceful and stable Afghanistan be built." (*2)

Secondly, based on the notion that peace be built on reconstruction, Japan attached great importance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, playing a significant role in creating a reconstruction process and holding the Tokyo Conference. Japan assumed that, in the framework of GWOT, it should play a leading role in the

reconstruction of Afghanistan while contributing to the creation of better conditions for combating terrorism domestically and internationally.

The conditions enabling Japan to concentrate on Afghanistan reconstruction in the context of GWOT were in place by the end of 2001. Immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan declared itself ready to work with other nations to fight terrorism and urged others to do the same. Prime Minister Koizumi sent letters and dispatched high-level special envoys to the heads of state of Islamic countries, including Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The government of Japan took the necessary measures to freeze the funds and other financial assets of individuals and entities, most prominently the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and those associated with them, in accordance with UNSCR 1267, 1333, 1373, and 1390. The Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), which allowed the government to provide logistical support for the coalition forces combating terrorism in Afghanistan and to use the Self-Defense Forces to extend humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in neighboring countries. The Japanese government made large financial contributions to the governments of Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, to enable them to give support to the international anti-terrorism effort.

At the Tokyo conference, over sixty countries of the international community pledged a total of US\$4.5 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction. Japan made a pledge of US\$500 million over two and a half years. Since then, Japan has maintained an assistance level of US\$200 million per year.

To use the pledged funds, Japan called for assistance to flow seamlessly from relief to development and set priorities for its aid based on a report by Ogata Sadako, Special Representative of the Prime Minister (SRPM) for Assistance to Afghanistan. These priorities were selected from the viewpoint of "human security".

Attaching great importance to the ideas of the seamless transition of assistance and "human security", Japan instituted several primary programs: a "Register for Peace" campaign to promote disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), later integrated into Afghanistan's New Beginning Program; the "Ogata Initiative (OI)," a program aimed at filling the gap between relief and development assistance and achieving comprehensive area development; and rehabilitation of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat trunk road. In addition to these programs, Japan took a variety of measures to help the Afghan government in financing its administration and in

capacity and institution building for education, health and medical care, mass communications, agriculture, landmine removal, and other areas.

After the assistance strategy was formulated as described above, domestic interest and attention on Afghanistan and Japanese assistance there decreased in Japan, dropping sharply after the Iraq war.

Against this backdrop, Japan's assistance strategy towards Afghanistan was pursued at the official level. Some of the original programs disappeared and some transformed into other programs. Yet, the assistance policy itself has continued in the same line as the first stage. DDR was successfully completed but the urgent need for the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) led Japan continually to assist the ANBP, which was in charge of this effort. The OI itself ceased to function as funds from Japan dried up but other new programs inherited the idea of comprehensive area development from the OI. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) promoted the comprehensive development of rural areas by conducting several projects. JICA also continued to concentrate its efforts on capacity and institution development to address medical care and health, education, transportation, and gender issues. Furthermore, it newly took up urban development, supporting the construction of infrastructure in the Kabul metropolitan area.

As the security situation in Afghanistan worsened, more assistance to improve security was required. In early 2007, Japan made the decision to start cooperating with NATO provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). As NATO took over command of the ISAF, which was deployed all over Afghanistan, it asked Japan for support in the hopes that Japan would provide military support or send a PRT. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo responded to this request by providing funds for assistance projects found by PRTs.

Lessons learned from implementation of Japanese assistance projects

Japan designed numerous projects to help eliminate the conditions that allow terrorism to take root, as mentioned in Chapter 2, understanding that one such condition was the underdevelopment of rural areas. Japan thus targeted the comprehensive development of rural areas, created the OI and began rehabilitation work on trunk roads.

Through implementation of these programs we learned several important

lessons for participation in nation-building assistance. First, a project that benefits local people is welcomed by them, as is support extended in security and other areas. Secondly, foreign assistance may harm the ownership and capacity building of local authorities. Thirdly, the involvement of local officials and people in development activities is a key to project success.

Japan learned these lessons when it faced serious challenges and difficulties in pursuing reconstruction efforts amidst poor security as well as conflicts with Afghan authorities over ownership.

Security

The deteriorating security situation has been the largest threat to reconstruction assistance. The Japanese government is extremely cautious about security for its rehabilitation projects. Japan does not have its own intelligence apparatus to judge the security situation in a country such as Afghanistan but tends to rely on intelligence reports provided by allied or friendly countries. The final judgment on the security situation for a reconstruction project is made by Tokyo, although the local Japanese embassy can express its own views. No security casualties, whether human beings or property, are acceptable during implementation of a reconstruction project.

Road rehabilitation is one of the most unfortunate victims of bad security. Responding to a request from Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Japan, with the United States and Saudi Arabia, promised to rehabilitate the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat trunk road in August 2002 and took charge of paving a 150km stretch northeast from Kandahar. In November 2002, word of a threat to the Japanese research team working on this project came from an allied country, prompting an immediate withdrawal of the team and a three-month suspension of the project. This resulted in reducing the planned 150km section to 50km and in assigning to Japan an additional 115km of road rehabilitation westward from Kandahar. Moreover, direct attacks on the road work equipment in March 2005 that resulted in no human casualties nevertheless led to a suspension of road rehabilitation work for more than two years. The latter rehabilitation had still not been completed as of the end of June 2008.

JICA is an important apparatus for Japan to expand its reconstruction activities to rural areas. As the security situation has worsened, however, JICA's

assistance activities have been limited to the large cities in the northern and central regions of the country. JICA developed its own security codes for its staff and experts working in Afghanistan that still follow the general direction on security indicated by the foreign ministry. Now (*as of the end of June 2008) JICA does not allow its more than 60 experts, including experts on agriculture in Afghanistan, to work in rural areas, and conducts trainers' training in Kabul, sending Afghan trainees to Japan even as it looks for ways to provide assistance.

In deteriorating security circumstances, the Japanese Embassy in Afghanistan could not help but develop its own security measures. The main reason for opening the Embassy was to promote and implement Japanese assistance programs and projects. First, the Embassy tried to get security by United States forces for road rehabilitation projects in areas remote from the cities. In response to an unofficial request from the Japanese Embassy right after the withdrawal of the road project research team in November 2002, the American Embassy suggested Japan send a PRT or an expert to a PRT. At that time, deployment of PRTs was under serious consideration inside the American government. The Japanese Embassy took up this suggestion and asked the headquarters to consider sending a JICA expert to the team. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned down the request, saying that JICA did not want to send experts to a military organization.

In the end, the Embassy developed security measures for the road rehabilitation project before work started in August 2003. These measures covered information gathering and analysis; protection by the local police and private security, and the patrol and emergency evacuation plans of the US forces within the coalition force; and efforts to win the support of local people for the projects. For security information gathering and analysis, the Embassy developed a network to collect security information from locals. The Embassy asked the national and local police to protect the project and its experts and workers on the one hand, and suggested that the project contractor hire armed guards from a private security company on the other. Lastly, the Embassy staff visited a shura (council) in the district through which the target trunk road ran and asked the shura elders to support and protect the road rehabilitation work by offering assistance to the district.

During the rehabilitation of the 50km road east from Kandahar, all the measures worked well but the key was support by the local people. In the American part

of the road rehabilitation, the rehabilitation work sites were often attacked and experts kidnapped while in the Japanese part no attack or kidnapping occurred.

The local people benefited greatly in employment and improvement of social and economic facilities from the road rehabilitation and small projects for the district. They extended their support to the Japanese projects to protect their interests. As the Embassy's contacts with district shuras increased, so did the information on the situation of rural areas and the way of thinking of local people.

Afghan ownership and lack of capacity of Afghan authorities

“Lack of capacity”

Following successful completion of urgent rehabilitation projects such as the UNICEF ‘Back to School Campaign’ financed by Japan, the UNDP ‘Recovery and Employment Afghanistan Program (REAP)’ financed by Japan and the JICA ‘Urgent Rehabilitation Support Program (URSP)’, Japan, in accordance with the requests made of donors by the Afghan authorities, came to conduct its assistance within the framework of the Consultative Group (CG) system. Japan worked as a focal point for the transportation CG and the DDR CG and participated in other CGs such as those for health/medical care and education.

Japan performed well as a focal point in the DDR CG and until mid-2004 in the transportation CG, but it did not seem to have made a significant contribution to other CGs as a participant. One reason for this was Japan's lack of capacity to participate in joint approaches to tackling issues. The other reason lies in the government and the international community. Not all the ministries had sufficient capacity to make the CG system workable, which resulted in the creation of ministries run by foreign experts and financially supported by the main donors, keeping those ministries' capacity to deliver governmental services undeveloped. In this circumstance, Japan listened to what the ministers and foreign experts decided before the CG meeting while it conducted its assistance program that it bilaterally arranged in consultation with a group of ministers (sometimes deputy ministers) and foreign experts.

In the meantime, JICA quietly took up the responsibility of training the staff of ministries and their branch offices in medical care and health, education, job training,

and transportation issues and helped them develop administration systems. These efforts have gradually been producing concrete results (*3).

“Ownership and capacity building”

The concept of the OI is to bring about comprehensive area-based development based on the results of humanitarian and urgent rehabilitation assistance. Japan assumed that, for improvement of “human security” in rural communities, development of the entire area around targeted communities would be essential. To implement this concept, it was necessary for Japan to consult local authorities and share its vision for the development of the targeted areas. Japan chose three areas as targets for the OI: Kandahar; Nangarhar; and the northern five provinces.

When the Japanese Embassy informed Ashuraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, of the second funding of the OI of around US\$42 million in October 2002, however, he refused permission for direct contact with local authorities, that is, provincial governments. According to him, the government had created the national development programs (NDP), including those for rural development, and the donors should talk with the relevant ministries about assistance. In addition, he harshly criticized Japan for opening a pipeline other than the government to provide funds to local people.

By the end of 2002, the Japanese Embassy had asked the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), which was thought to have much to do with the OI, to jointly hold an OI coordination meeting. The purposes of the meeting were firstly to involve MRRD in the OI and secondly to coordinate between NDPs and the OI. Since the OI was implemented by international agencies such as the UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF, another purpose was to get the officers at those agencies to understand the concept of the OI and to urge them to coordinate their work with each other and with the central and local governments.

The joint coordination meeting by the MRRD, the Japanese embassy and UN agencies produced a program for the third funding of the OI. As information came in through contacts with UN officers and local governments, however, it was discovered that efforts to coordinate and share visions on development at the local level were lacking, with a few exceptions(*4). The joint coordination meeting then held a workshop on the OI, inviting local government officials and UN officers to work out their own

projects.

The workshop created a comprehensive program for the fourth funding. It attached great importance to the centrality of the NDPs and thought out a way for the OI to complement the NDPs in comprehensive area development. If Japan had funded this planned program in a timely fashion, the OI would have proven very successful in demonstrating administration capacity on development. Unfortunately, it failed to do so. The humanitarian part of the program was funded but the preparatory part of the program for development missed out on funding due to Japan's failure to create a budgetary item for this purpose(*5).

Winning popular support

The conclusion of the lessons mentioned above is that, for comprehensive rural development, you need local people's support/initiative and empowered local authorities. Japan (or we at the field level) discovered this reality by gradually relying on local people for security of its assistance projects and people. Furthermore, we were given insights into the realities and wishes of local communities and their people.

Confidence building between Japanese and local people

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Japanese Embassy in Afghanistan developed three security measures for the road rehabilitation project in 2003 and it was found that, of the three measures, the key was winning the support of local people for the projects. To win such support, we first needed the confidence of the local people in us, and to gain such confidence, we needed to take definite actions.

At the first meeting with the shura of the district in which the trunk road to be rehabilitated ran, some of the elders said that many foreigners had promised help but that none of them had kept their promises. The embassy staff patiently listened to their grievances and offered them rehabilitation projects through the Grass Root Grant Aid scheme. The contractor for the road rehabilitation also went to the shura every week and nurtured a close friendship with its members.

From June 2003 to the end of that year, the projects we promised to the shura elders took shape month by month. In July, the embassy official in charge of the Grant

Aid for Grass-root Project (GAGP) appeared at the shura meeting and began discussing concrete projects such as digging a well and constructing a culvert. In August, the trunk road rehabilitation project started with the hiring of 500 local employees. In December, the first GAGP, a well was constructed while the first phase of the road rehabilitation project was completed.

In the following year, we were welcomed everywhere in Kandahar province. With the good reputation among the citizens enjoyed by JICA's URSP projects and the Japan-funded UNDP REAP projects implemented in the city of Kandahar, the Japanese assistance outside the city was highly appreciated. More requests by local people for assistance came to the embassy. The embassy tried to respond to them as much as possible by making use of GAGP and by persuading the Japanese Foreign Ministry to approve projects for rehabilitating secondary roads in the province. In July 2004, when the people of the province learned of Ambassador Komano's imminent departure, the elders sent him a letter thanking Japan for all its assistance.

Information on community circumstances and realities

As our good relationships with local communities and tribes grew, considerable information on community circumstances poured into our communication network. Three features were observed from this information: a rapid increase in anti-American feelings and distrust of the government, the need for livelihood alternatives to poppy cultivation, and a generation gap between the young and old.

“Anti-American feelings and distrust of the government”

In late March 2004, one of the local Afghans approached this author, then deputy chief of mission at the Embassy, and requested that Japan support communities in Zabul Province. This Afghan came from the influential tribal leader's family and was respected by the whole tribe. He said, “I talked with the elders of the tribe. They said that they were hit on the right cheek by the Taliban and on the left cheek by the Americans. Their villages were destroyed. They asked Japan to help them rebuild their communities. I guarantee your safety and request that you come with me. I will escort you.” This author, in consultation with the head of the mission, declined to visit Zabul and suggested he cooperate with the PRT stationed there and the government. He declined to cooperate with the PRT but later he arranged meetings with the government.

It was Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani who met the representatives of Zabul communities. According to him, however, the meetings did not produce any concrete agreement. Minister Ghani asked them to cooperate with the PRT but they refused. He said, “I met Ashraf two times. At the beginning he said I came from Kuchi. Since his attitude was so arrogant, I told him that, if you are a Kuchi, you should wear nomadic clothes, live and work in a tent.”

A high-ranking official in the government was concerned about the treatment of the local people by the coalition soldiers in August 2004. He said, “Recently, the coalition troops came to a village house in Helmand at 5:00 in the morning, and woke up and took all the family members out of the house. The family members were divided into two groups, men and women, and separately investigated. No man could observe the women’s group. Even the Russians did not do this type of investigation. President Karzai raised this issue with the supreme commander of the coalition forces but fell silent after the commander declined by saying that American soldiers bleed for Afghanistan”. This high-ranking official also said, “This is tremendously serious. I ought to speak loudly about it if I consider the impact on Afghanistan in five years’ time.”

In July 2004, this author went to the Panjway district of Kandahar Province to inform the shura of the Japanese decision to pave the 22km road connecting Kandahar City and its district center. The meeting room was full of elders who welcomed the Japanese delegation. Less than 10 minutes after the meeting started, however, coalition troops came by in military jeeps and entered the meeting room without permission and without taking off their shoes (all the attendants, including the Japanese delegates, had taken off their shoes and sandals before entering the meeting room). The commander of the troops said, “We are patrolling near here by permission of Provincial Governor Pashutoon. Our only purpose is to help reconstruct this country.” The elders gathering there were dumbfounded and the atmosphere of the meeting was marred. This author at the time thought the commander was a good guy but believed that the elders saw him and his troops as alien and unwelcome.

“Poppy cultivation”

In April 2004, a Japanese delegation going from Kandahar City to Gereshuk in Helmand Province took the trunk road connecting the two cities (*6). Most striking to

them were the blooming poppy fields they saw from the car windows on both sides of the road. The delegation visited several district shuras, announced the planned road rehabilitation and asked for support for the project while offering assistance in community development as usual as in any district shura. At meetings, none of the delegation mentioned the poppy cultivation; however, the elders of the shuras said, in effect, “We know poppy cultivation is bad. But we have no choice. We have to grow poppies because we have no ability to grow alternative crops and sell them at the market. We really need help from you to undertake other kinds of agriculture.”

After this visit, the interpreter said, “You are now safe. Since you did not suggest anything to accuse them of poppy cultivation but offered assistance to community development, the elders told the young people at the service in the mosque not to attack the Japanese and their projects.” The late Mulla Nagibullah, who was made wealthy by the revenue from his fruit fields and oil business, sympathized with poor farmers, saying that they knew poppy cultivation was bad but could not survive without it.

“Generation gap”

The Afghan notable from Zabul, mentioned earlier in this section, once complained that young people had forgotten to respect their elders and did not follow the instructions of the community elders. He said, “In a community, a lot of young people lived in poverty without proper jobs. The elders are losing the power to instruct young people. Young people tend to be attracted by the parties employing them, whoever they are.” The elders of the three districts of Kandahar whom the Japanese delegation met in April 2004 came up with ideas during the meeting on influencing young people. In the case of the Daman district where the 50km trunk road rehabilitation took place, the Japanese road construction company gave job opportunities through the elders to young people in the community. Thus the elders took back the old order of the community, including respect for elders.

After withdrawal of Japanese assistance from the south

“Ideas for situation change from the Afghans”

In the southern provinces no Japanese assistance projects are ongoing, except

the 115km trunk road rehabilitation project and the nursing school project run by an Afghan NGO and financed by JICA, due to the deterioration of the security situation. No Japanese personnel officially live in the south. Thus, the communication network once developed for collecting community information has disappeared.

However, the struggle of elders for community survival continues. In December 2006, this author visited Kabul and met the Afghan notable mentioned above. He made two points. One was “Don’t use a device again that failed once.’ He meant that, as former commanders had shown their inability to rule as governors and security chiefs, they should not be posted to the same positions.

The other was an idea for community survival and development. According to him, this idea was not his but the conclusion of discussions by community elders in the south. The contents of the idea are as follows:

- a) A proposal by the government to entrust a community with internal governance, security and reconstruction/development;
- b) A third party, who knows the community, is necessary to help the community form its organization and is expected to conduct research on living conditions in the community and to inform the government of the results;
- c) The government, responding to the research report, should provide necessary materials and fund for the community; and
- d) Two to three years later, the government could provide able personnel for development of the community.

In the same trip by this author, Prof. Naderi, Special Advisor to the President, stressed the importance of planning a strategy for the people. A proposal from the community viewpoint emerged when the government realized the need for a strategy for the people. Without community survival and support for the government and the international community, it has become obvious that the situation cannot be reversed for improvement. It seems that the time may have come for the international community to support this.

“Security Plan”

In May 2008, the Afghan notable communicated a security plan by local Afghans to this author. This security plan was developed by local people (*7) in the southwest (*8) and sought to destroy the camps of the insurgents and drug mafias and

drug factories, to arrest all the members of the drug mafias involved in business and production, and to identify local Taliban commanders and communications with the outside of Afghanistan in southwest Afghanistan. This plan has already identified camps and factories near the borders. It includes hiring local intelligence services, consulting with local elders and mullahs and cooperating with all the forces (ISAF, Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Afghan intelligence forces). The notable added that this plan was secretly supported by all the communities.

This is a local initiative coming from the need to secure livelihoods, and is compatible with the direction of international assistance recently agreed upon in a G8 official level meeting. Local people want to restore security by destroying the facilities of drug mafias and insurgents. A combination of these arguments means that the international community and the government of Afghanistan now have an opportunity to gain the support of local people.

Observation

In August 2003, then Governor of Kandahar Province Eng. Pashutun (*9) said, “Fifty percent of the reason for bad security in the south is neglect of rural areas by the government, and the other 50 percent is Pakistan’s willingness to let the Taliban regroup and infiltrate into Afghanistan. If the government succeeds in reconstruction in the rural areas, half of the reason for bad security will disappear and the influence of the Taliban will be reduced to 10 to 20 percent.”

Although the security situation has dramatically worsened over the past five years, the words of Eng. Pashutun are still valid. The government together with the international community has failed in reconstruction in the rural areas, that is, in reconstruction of rural communities.

Japan started its assistance to Afghanistan in the context of contributing to the GWOT, and formulated a number of projects for assistance to reconstruction propping up peace and stability. In order to realize the purposes of these projects, Japan participated in a coordination mechanism respecting Afghan ownership and tried to ensure security for the project works. In implementation, however, Japan, at least at the field level, found that without community support, the projects would not succeed. Furthermore, as Japan attached importance to community development, a trade item

for community support of the projects, it came to realize the reality of communities. This reality comprises poverty, psychological and physical damage due to the coalition's military actions, anti-government feelings, and the collapse of the old order and security.

The points communicated by the Afghan notable suggest that the international community and the government of Afghanistan still have an opportunity to work together with local people for a common purpose that the local community wants and that is compatible with the direction of international assistance. This in turn offers the hope of winning popular support, absolutely necessary for winning the fight against terrorism.

[Notes]

*1: Gaiko Forum Spring 2005, "Winning Popular Support: The Key to Peace and Stability in Afghanistan" (Miyahara Nobutaka)

*2: Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Tokyo conference, January 21, 2002

*3: For example, in medical care, a school and education system for midwives in Kandahar as well as the tuberculosis center and its education system

*4: The OI in Balkh province produced a unit supporting the provincial government and achieved partial success.

*5: In July 2005, Japan created another program in cooperation with the UNDP for comprehensive rural development.

*6: The delegation consisted of the Embassy staff and personnel from the consultant and contractor companies for the trunk road rehabilitation.

*7: According to the information, 'the tribe leaders and powerful people from the Afghan-Pakistan and Afghan-Iranian border areas' and '12 people staying near the enemy's camps and movement routes' were involved in drafting this security plan.

*8: The provinces of Kanadahar, Helmand, Zabul, Urzgan, Nemroz and Farah

*9: Presently he serves in the post of Minister of Urban Development and Housing.