日本国際問題研究所The Japan Institute of International Affairs

「新しい核の秩序構想タスクフォース・フェーズ2」

Premises
As the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide, the risk of nuclear proliferation would also rise under the existing modality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The spread of sensitive technology related to the nuclear fuel cycle would be the most critical issue that we have to address in reducing the risk of proliferation. Without appropriate measures to control the proliferation risk arising from the expansion of nuclear energy and technology worldwide, the world would become a more dangerous place.

However, it is not easy to find a solution. Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prescribes the 'inalienable right' of peaceful use of nuclear energy. This is normally interpreted as allowing state parties to the NPT to conduct research and development of, or have access to, sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology per se as well as to benefits from such technology, under the condition of full compliance with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT. If it were possible to constrain the spread of sensitive technology through an approach of denying access to such technologies by restricting the transfer of technology, this would allow us to contain the risk of proliferation. However, there are several concerns. First, indigenous development of fuel cycle technology cannot be prevented as information on such technology would be relatively easily accessible. Second, clandestine acquisition of technology would occur, of dual use items in particular. Such concerns remind us of the difficulty in containing proliferation risks at the entry point of the proliferation cycle. Third, intensifying restrictions on technology transfer through such a 'technology access denial' approach might cause a serious political polarization and create more nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots,' which could undermine the reliability and credibility of the existing non-proliferation regime.

Therefore, it is important to establish a set of criteria for international transfer of nuclear fuel cycle technology and possession of a nuclear fuel cycle program, in combination with strengthened safeguard mechanisms for detection, verification, and enforcement against non-compliance. The criteria-based approach would allow states that meet predetermined criteria to possess a nuclear fuel cycle. While the criteria-based approach has a restrictive nature, it does not categorically deny access to fuel cycle technology. It should be universally applicable, not only to non-nuclear weapons states but also to nuclear weapons states, to supply-side states as well as demand-side ones. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has already been moving toward a criteria-based approach for transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities/equipment and technology. What is important is decoupling, as much as possible, the promotion of peaceful use from the risks of nuclear terrorism, diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes and clandestine activities as well as nuclear accidents, without relaxing the conditions for nuclear trade.

The point, for the purpose of non-proliferation, is how to effectively contain latent intentions with strategic motives by preventing covert/overt acquisition of technology using objective and universal rules and criteria. At the same time, in order to avoid being exploited in authorizing the acquisition of technology for ill-purposed activities, strict and severe measures must be taken against violations of and non-compliance with international rules and obligations. Without these measures, the effectiveness of such a criteria-based approach would not be guaranteed. The criteria-based approach is also important in maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime by providing assurance of rule-based governance, not of governance by politically discriminatory decisions.

Incentives such as assurance of fuel supply through multilateral fuel cycle arrangements are important measures to encouraging new nuclear energy states to give up pursuing their own national fuel cycles from an economic viewpoint. Participation in multilateral arrangements may also result in demonstrating the faithful commitment of participating states to global non-proliferation norms. Non-participation, despite economic rationality, may also be a good reason to suspect hidden intentions behind such a decision. However, multilateral arrangements alone may not be sufficient as non-proliferation measures since participation in a multilateral arrangement cannot become a legally-binding obligation. If it is not possible to have legally-binding multilateralization of all fuel cycle activities, the incentive approach, such as multilateral arrangements, may work complementarily with other approaches.

It should also be noted that the incentive approach mentioned above deals only with economic incentives, which are not sufficient. Equally important is dismantling potential proliferators' political and strategic motives. Although this question is beyond the scope of this policy recommendation, this recommendation takes into consideration the need to address a fundamental challenge for nuclear non-proliferation: the improvement of the regional security environment so that potential proliferators would not be tempted to pursue nuclear ambitions to cope with their regional security concerns.

Lastly, in order to decouple expanded use of nuclear energy from the risks of nuclear proliferation, nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism, we have to ensure the 3Ss, namely nuclear non-proliferation/safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security, in emerging nuclear states. Advanced nuclear states such as Japan have a role and responsibility to support their efforts on 3S-related infrastructure development and capacity building. In this respect, the proposals to establish support centers for nuclear security made by several states, including Japan, during the nuclear security summit should be promoted in terms of sharing the expertise of advanced nuclear states with emerging nuclear states.

The technological approach should also have value. Although the technological approach alone is not able to prevent nuclear proliferation, we can reduce the risk of proliferation through utilization of the technological approach in combination with other approaches. For example, combining the adoption of proliferation-resistant technologies and extrinsic measures for proliferation resistance such as safeguards will increase overall proliferation resistance. Efforts to obtain international consensus on the guidelines for proliferation resistance as well as R&D efforts for proliferation-resistant nuclear technology should be promoted. Also, innovation and improvement in safeguards technologies, such as technology for measurement and detection, help promote the non-proliferation capabilities of the international community.

In considering the pros and cons of various approaches, it is important to stress that finding and developing the 'best mix' of multiple approaches with a combination of 'restrictions' and 'incentives' is an urgent task for the world.